LIBRARY 
UNIVERSITY   OF  CALIFORNIA. 

Received.,.. 


Accessions  Aro.  ^-^^/        Shelf  No. 


THE  PHILOSOPHY 


OF 


HERBERT  SPENCER. 


mt  (fikamination  of  %  Jtrst  ^rindplcs  of  Ijis  JSgsiem. 


BY  B.  P.  BOWNE,  A.  B. 


NEW  YORK: 
PHILLIPS    &     HUNT. 

CINCINNATI  : 
WALDEN     &     STOWE. 

1881. 


Bl* 


Entered  according  to  Act  of  Congress,  in  the  year  1874,  by 

NELSON  &    PHILLIPS, 

^^^  / 
in  the  Office  of  the  Librarian  of  Congress  at  Washington. 


TO 

PROF.    BENJAMIN    N.    MARTIN- 
ONE  OF  THOSE  RARE  SOULS 

WHO   KNOW   HOW   TO   COMBINE  FAITH   AND   FREEDOM; 
WHO,    UNDETERRED   BY   PROSCRIPTION,    SEEK  TO   PROVE   ALL   THINGS, 

WHILE,    UNFASCINATED   BY  NOVELTY, 
THEY     LOYALLY     HOLD     FAST     ALL     THAT     IS     GOOD 

|  hbitafe  tjjis  $ook. 

B.  P.  BOWNE, 


PREFACE. 


r  I  ^HE  following  discussion  is  based  upon 
several  essays  which  lately  appeared  in 
the  "  New  Englander."  They  have  been  ex- 
tended somewhat,  and,  for  the  sake  of  greater 
unity  than  essays  which  were  at  first  inde- 
pendent of  each  other  could  have,  their  form 
has  also  been  altered.  I  have  quoted  copi- 
ously from  Mr.  Spencer  for  two  reasons  : 
First,  no  candid  writer,  whose  purpose  is  as 
controversial  as  mine,  will  trust  himself  to 
represent  his  opponent's  doctrine  without 
the  check,  both  of  exact  quotation  and  exact 
reference ;  and,  secondly,  because  so  contra- 
dictory and  absurd  are  some  of  Mr.  Spencer's 
positions,  that  my  unsupported  statements 
about  them  would  not  be  believed. 

Mr.  Spencer  claims  to  seek  for  truth.     I 


6  Preface. 

make  the  same  claim ;  and,  believing  most 
heartily  that  Mr.  Spencer  has  not  found  the 
truth,  I  have  ventured  to  say  so.  Still  the 
appeal  is  not  to  sentiment,  much  less  to  au- 
thority, but  to  the  judicial  reason.  Let  reason 
judge  between  us. 

HALLE,  November^  1873. 


CONTENTS. 


C 

I.  WHAT  is  EVOLUTION  ? 9 

II.  LAWS  OF  THE  UNKNOWABLE 24 

III.  LAWS  OF  THE  KNOWABLE 79 

IV.  PRINCIPLES  OF  PSYCHOLOGY 146 

V.  THE  THEISTIC  ARGUMENT 218 

VI.  SUMMARY  AND  CONCLUSION 270 


REVIEW  OF  HERBERT  SPENCER. 


UNIVERSITY 


CHAPTER  I. 

WHAT     IS     EVOLUTIO 

NO  one  longer  holds  with  the  ancient  skeptic, 
that  all  things  remain  as  they  were  since  the 
beginning.  All  alike  admit  that  the  universe,  as 
we  know  it,  has  had  a  beginning  in  time,  and  the 
problem  which  all  alike  propose  is,  to  account  for  its 
origin  and  history.  There  was  a  time  in  the  eternal 
duration  when  the  present  order  did  not  exist,  and  a 
time  when  it  began  to  be.  How  ?  This  is  the  question 
which  both  science  and  religion  attempt  to  answer. 

Until  within  a  few  years  Theism  has  been  accus- 
tomed to  conceive  of  creation  as  an  instantaneous 
work.  "The  Creator  spake,  and  it  was  done;  he 
commanded,  and  it  stood  fast."  In  a  moment,  as 
the  lightning  flashes  out  of  the  dark  night,  so  the 
worlds  were  "won  from  the  void  and  formless  in- 
finite," and  each  one  started  on  its  way,  perfect  after 
its  kind.  By  the  word  of  the  Lord  were  the  heavens 
made.  At  his  command  the  light  kindled,  and  the 
oceans  filled,  and  the  whole  earth  swarmed  with 
life.  But  it  is  claimed  that  the  long  times  of 


io  Review  of  Herbert  Spencer, 

natural  history  and  geology,  and  the  gradual  intro- 
duction of  higher  forms,  have  thrown  doubt  upon 
this  conception.  It  is  said  that  the  law  which  holds 
for  all  present  development  is  true  for  creation  also : 
First  the  blade,  then  the  ear,  after  that  the  full  corn 
in  the  ear.  Creation  was  not  a  single  but  a  succes- 
sive work  ;  and,  instead  of  being  finished  once  for  all, 
its  vast  and  mysterious  operations  are  still  going  on. 
Even  yet  the  creative  plan  is  not  completed ;  and,  so 
far  from  being  at  a  distance,  we  are  in  the  very 
midst  of  creation's  week. 

It  is  hardly  necessary  to  point  out  that  evolution 
in  this  general  form  is  perfectly  compatible  with 
Theism.  All  that  Theism  cares  to  know  is,  that 
Mind  is  the  primal  cause  and  the  eternal  ruler  of  the 
universe.  Whether  it  hastens  on  to  its  purpose,  or 
whether  it  lingers  upon  its  way,  is  a  matter  of  com- 
parative indifference.  When  was  it  that  the  Spirit 
of  God  brooded  over  nature  to  bring  forth  the  living 
from  the  lifeless  ?  Set  up  the  date  six  thousand 
years  ago,  or  carry  it  back  to  that  nebulous  time 
when  the  earth  was  without  form  and  void,  and  dark- 
ness hung  over  the  face  of  the  deep  ;  one  cannot  see 
that  it  makes  any  difference.  When  was  it  that  the 
seeds  of  life  and  mind  were  sown  ?  Was  it  after  our 
earth  had  taken  on  its  final  form  ?  or  were  they  scat- 
tered upon  that  desert  mist  from  which  the  world 
has  sprung  ?  How  long  was  nature  in  fulfilling  the 
Divine  command — a  week  or  an  age  ?  Has  it  ac- 


Review  of  Herbert  Spencer.  1 1 

complished  the  work,  or  is  it  yet  toiling  at  the  task  ? 
Were  the  lower  forms  of  life  created  with  the  power 
of  evolving  the  higher  or  not  ?  Is  organic  existence 
complex  in  essence,  or  is  its  variety  but  a  harmonious 
variation  upon  a  single  string  ?  It  is  no  degradation 
to  the  individual  to  be  born  ;  why  should  it  be  any 
more  degrading  to  species  to  be  born  ?  If  it  is  not 
degrading  to  teach  that  the  individual  reaches  dis- 
tinctive manhood  only  through  the  darkness  and 
weakness  of  the  birth-process  and  of  unfolding  in- 
fancy, I  know  not  why  it  should  be  thought  degrading 
to  teach  that  species,  too,  struggle  up  through  lower 
forms  to  their  distinctive  characteristics.  I  cannot 
feel  that  Theism,  or  even  Christianity,  is  at  all  con- 
cerned with  the  answer  to  any  of  these  questions. 
One  view  makes  creation  single,  the  other  makes  it 
successive.  One  concentrates  the  creative  act  upon 
a  point  of  time,  the  other  spreads  it  over  unknown 
years.  One  makes  nature  instantaneously  obedient  ;| 
the  other  keeps  it  toiling  for  ages  at  the  Divine  com-' 
mand.  Either  view  might  be  worthily  held,  and 
each  has  many  elements  of  peculiar  sublimity  and 
grandeur.  Religion  cares  only  to  insist  that  in  the 
beginning  a  Divine  sower  went  forth  to  sow. 

But  there  is  another  form  of  the  evolution  theory. 
The  thorough-going  evolutionist,  availing  himself  of 
the  doctrine  of  the  unity  of  the  forces,  paces  with 
firm  step  through  the  animal  and  vegetable  kingdoms, 
and  finally  brings  all  things  home  to  the  parentage 


12  A  Review  of  Herbert  Spencer. 

of  matter  and  force.  He  drives  back  beyond  all 
life,  beyond  all  form,  beyond  even  the  present 
material  elements,  back  to  the  raw  and  faint 
beginnings  of  matter  and  force  themselves.  At  that 
distant  point  there  are  no  such  myths  as  life  and 
mind  ;  these  are  unimaginable  ages  down  the  future. 
There  is  nothing  there  but  little  lumps  of  good,  hard 
matter.  These  are  the  fountain-head  of  existence, 
.  and  only  need  to  be  left  alone  long  enough  to  trans-  / 
form  chaos  into  creation.  Mind  is  not  the  begin-  I 
ning  and  primal  cause  of  things,  but  is  the  final 
outcome  of  nature — the  highest  point  to  which  the 
whirling  atoms  climb.  This  is  what  purports  to  be 
the  scientific  book  of  Genesis.  This  is  evolution  as 
it  is  held  by  the  New  School  of  Philosophy,  of  which 
Mr.  Spencer  is  one  of  the  chief  apostles. 

Now  let  us  note  the  true  nature  of  the  problem 
which  the  New  Philosophy  attempts  to  solve.  It 
often  happens  that  a  few  vague  and  general  anal- 
ogies are  allowed  to  blind  the  reason  to  the  infinite 
complexity  of  the  problem,  and  it  may  even  be 
questioned  whether  many  of  the  evolutionists  them- 
selves properly  appreciate  the  task  they  have  to 
perform.  Their  proposition,  in  plain  words,  is  this : 
All  things  have  come,  by  a  rigid  mechanical  se- 
quence, from  the  condensation  of  that  primeval  mist. 
Not  merely  the  forms  and  disposition  of  matter,  but 
life,  and  mind,  and  their  various  manifestations,  have 
all  been  evolved  by  necessary  physical  causation. 


Review  of  Herbert  Spencer.  13 

At  first  sight  it  would  appear  that  thought  and 
emotion  have  nothing  in  common  with  the  buzzing 
of  atoms ;  but,  in  truth,  these  little  lumps  need  only 
to  be  properly  combined  to  become  self-conscious, 
and  think,  and  feel,  and  hope,  and  aspire ;  and,  if 
they  have  come  forward  under  the  proper  conditions, 
they  may  even  pray  and  worship.  Whatever  of 
nobility,  of  heroism,  and  of  high  manhood  there 
may  have  been  in  the  past,  it  was  only  a  material 
combination,  and  had  an  exact  physical  equivalent. 
So  completely  is  mind  the  result  of  organization, 
that  it  is  even  held  that  if  a  brain  could  be  made 
exactly  like  that  of  Socrates,  the  owner  would  have 
the  memory,  the  thought,  the  consciousness  of 
Socrates.  Two  brains  which  are  physically  equiv- 
alent are  also  mentally  equivalent.  Construct,  to- 
day, the  brain  of  Plato  as  it  was  in  his  old  age,  and 
that  brain  would  remember  its  early  association  with 
Socrates,  the  scenes  at  his  trial  and  in  the  prison, 
the  composition  of  the  dialogues,  and  all  that  the 
real  Plato  actually  experienced.  Manufacture  Crom- 
well's brain,  and  it  could  give  you  an  exact  account, 
from  its  own  consciousness,  of  the  battle  at  Naseby 
and  the  triumph  at  Marston  Moor.  It  could  tell  of 
the  Long  Parliament,  the  condemnation  of  the  King, 
and  the  Lord-Protectorship.  Any  man's  thought, 
memory,  consciousness,  could  be  completely  recov- 
ered by  reconstructing  his  brain.  If  there  had 
been  a  spectator  who  could  detect  the  position  of 


14  Review  of  Herbert  Spencer. 

'  the  forces  in  that  nebulous  mass,  he  could  have  rea- 
soned mechanically  and  mathematically,  to  orbital 
rings  and  solid  globes,  to  man  and  his  works,  to 
Homer  and  the  Iliad,  to  Newton  and  the  Principia, 
to  Milton  and  the  Paradise  Lost,  to  Shakspeare 
and  Hamlet.  By  simple  deductive  reasoning,  that 
spectator  could  have  foreseen  all  our  art,  our  science, 
our  civilization,  and  could  have  prophesied  all  that 
is  yet  to  come.  He  could  have  foretold  all  the  folly 
and  suffering  and  sin  of  men,  and  could  have  writ- 
ten human  history,  while  yet  the  race  was  unborn. 
There  is  not  a  mote  that  trembles  in  the  sunbeam, 
nor  a  leaf  that  is  driven  in  the  wind,  whose  exist- 
ence and  exact  position  he  could  not  have  foretold. 
The  problem  would,  indeed,  have  been  a  complex 
one,  and  would  have  outrun  the  resources  of  our 
mathematics,  but  still  it  would  have  been  a  purely 
mechanical  question.  There  is  not  a  thought  that 
ever  toiled,  or  that  ever  shall  toil,  in  a  human  brain, 
there  is  not  an  ache  that  ever  wrung  a  human  heart, 
that  was  not  potentially  there.  The  physical  com- 
binations that  represent  truth  and  honor,  piety  and 
affection,  were  all  latent  there.  Our  longings  for 
knowledge  were  there;  and  when  we  inquire  after 
the  origin  of  things  our  thoughts  but  return  to 
their  early  home.  Mr.  Spencer,  and  his  philosophy, 
and  the  criticisms  upon  it,  were  there.  The 
dancing  atoms  whirled  and  whirled,  until  they  be- 
came self-conscious,  and  thought,  and  reflected,  and 


Review  of  Herbert  Spencer.  1 5 

wrote  their  autobiography  in  the  philosophy  of  Mr. 
Spencer.  I  am  not  misrepresenting  the  theory.  '\ 
Prof.  Tyndall  says  of  it :  "  Strip  it  naked,  and  you 
stand  face  to  face  with  the  notion  that  not  only  the 
more  ignoble  forms  of  animalcular  or  animal  life,  not 
alone  the  nobler  forms  of  the  horse  and  lion,  not 
alone  the  exquisite  and  wonderful  mechanism  of  the 
human  body,  but  that  the  human  mind  itself — emo- 
tion, intellect,  will,  and  all  their  phenomena — were 
once  latent  in  a  fiery  cloud."  *  In  this  evolution  there 
has  been  no  guiding  Mind,  but  only  the  working  of 
physical  force.  Mr.  Spencer  demands  no  purpose, 
but  only  a  power.  One  aim  of  his  philosophy  is  to 
show  that  an  intelligent  Creator  is  needless.  He  is 
impatient  of  the  doctrine  that  creation  is  the  work 
of  wisdom,  and  calls  it  the  "  carpenter  theory."  If 
we  consider  the  fact  and  function  of  reproduction, 
which  run  through  all  organic  nature,  it  would 
seem  that  here  is  overwhelming  proof  of  a  purpose 
to  preserve  the  species ;  but  we  are  not  allowed  to 
think  so,  on  pain  of  being  charged  with  "  f etichism." 
If  we  think  of  the  eye  or  ear  as  it  forms  in  the 
womb,  it  would  seem  that  the  power  at  work  must 
understand  the  laws  of  acoustics  and  optics,  to  form 
these  organs  in  such  exact  and  complex  accordance 
with  them.  It  would  seem,  too,  that  the  formation 
of  these  organs  before  they  are  needed  indicates  a 
knowledge  of  future  wants,  and  a  purpose  of  supply- 

*  "  Fragments  of  Science,"  p.  159. 


1 6  Review  of  Herbert  Spencer. 

ing  them  ;  but  this  belief  also  lies  under  the  ban  of 
fetichism.  We  can  hardly  help  believing  that  the 
several  organs  were  intended  to  perform  those  func- 
tions which  they  actually  do  perform ;  but  this 
thought  is  only  a  species  of  the  primitive  fetichism. 
The  eyes  are  used  to  see  with,  but  they  were  not 
intended  for  seeing.  The  ears  hear,  but  they  were 
not  designed  for  hearing.  We  see  and  hear  because 
we  have  eyes  and  ears  ;  but  we  are  forbidden  to  say 
that  eyes  and  ears  exist  in  order  that  we  may  see. 
The  organs  of  reproduction  serve  to  preserve  the 
species,  but  they  were  not  made  for  any  such  end. 
They  were  evolved  and  used  for  this  purpose. 
Every  thing,  no  matter  how  complex  and  purpose- 
like  in  its  adaptations,  represents  the  working  of  a 
power ;  nothing  whatever  exhibits  the  fulfillment  of 
a  purpose.  "The  transformation  of  an  indefinite, 
incoherent  homogeneity  into  a  definite,  coherent 
heterogeneity,  which  goes  on  every-where  until  it 
brings  about  a  reverse  transformation,  is  consequent 
upon  certain  simple  laws  of  force."*  Such  is  the 
theory.  To  many  it  will  seem  to  break  down  from 
pure  excess  of  absurdity.  At  present  I  make  no 
decision  ;  but  I  do  insist  that  every  one  who  is  fond 
of  talking  magniloquently  about  evolution  should 
know  precisely  what  he  has  to  prove. 

Yet,  strange  as  it  may  seem,  Mr.  Spencer  denies 
that  his   system   is   atheistic.     The   ground  of  the 

*  "  First  Principles,"  p.  495. 


Review  of  Herbeft  Speiicer.  17 

denial  is  his  doctrine  of  an  unknowable.  But, 
upon  inquiry,  it  turns  out  that  this  unknowable  is 
merely  the  substance  which  underlies  phenomena. 
It  has  neither  sense,  intelligence,  nor  will.  To 
?  attribute  these  to  it  is  a  species  of  fetichism.  Yet 
Mr.  Spencer  dreams  that  he  saves  his  system  from 
atheism  by  calling  this  thing  God.  We  will  not 
quarrel  about  names.  That  which  we  know  as  mat- 
ter is  set  up  as  the  cause  of  all  things.  This  matter, 
working  according  to  mechanical  laws,  without  intel- 
ligence or  purpose,  has  produced  the  order  of  the 
world  about  us.  All  spontaneous  action  is  distinctly 
repudiated.  This  is  the  doctrine ;  and  this  is  essen- 
tial atheism. 

Mr.  Spencer  further  denies  that  his  system  is 
materialistic.  The  New  Philosophy  plumes  itself 
upon  rising  above  the  contest  between  the  spiritual- 
ist and  materialist,  and  pronounces  the  question  to 
be  a  war  of  words.  The  claim  is  the  emptiest  pre- 
tense. "That  no  idea  or  feeling  arises  save  as  a  result 
of  some  physical  force  expended  in  producing  it,  is 
fast  becoming  a  commonplace  of  science  ;  and  .vho- 
ever  duly  weighs  the  evidence  will  see  that  nothing 
but  an  overwhelming  bias  in  favor  of  a  preconceived 
theory  can  explain  its  non-acceptance."  *  That 
mental  force  is  but  transformed  physical  force,  is  the 
primary  assumption.  The  mind  itself  is  a  "  series 
of  states  of  consciousness  ;"  and  a  state  of  conscious- 

*  "  First  Principles,"  p.  280. 
2 


1 8  Review  of  Herbert  Spencer. 

ness  is  a  transformed  nerve-current.  Now  note  the 
result.  Without  a  nervous  system  there  can  be 
no  nerve-currents  ;  without  nerve-currents  there 
can  be  no  states  of  consciousness ;  and  without 
states  of  consciousness  there  can  be  no  mind.  The 
mind  comes  into  existence  with  the  organism,  and 
both  perish  together.  During  its  existence,  it  is  ab- 
solutely determined  by  external  conditions  ;  for  Mr. 
Spencer  denies  volitional  freedom  in  the  most  explicit 
terms,  and  on  the  admitted  ground  that  if  freedom 
be  a  fact  it  is  fatal  to  his  system.  Now,  it  is  rather 
instructive,  after  such  teaching,  to  be  told  that  "  the 
explanations  here  given  are  no  more  materialistic 
than  they  are  spiritualistic."  It  is  evident,  however, 
from  the  .frequency  and  earnestness  with  which 
Mr.  Spencer  makes  this  claim,  that  he  really  thinks 
his  petty  word-distinctions  save  his  system  from 
materialism.  Yet,  if  the  system  which  makes  the 
soul  a  product  of  organization  that  must,  of  course, 
perish  with  the  organism  is  not  materialistic,  it 
would  be  hard  to  say  what  materialism  is.  Indeed, 
this  is  the  doctrine  which  most  of  the  leaders  of  the 
New  Philosophy  now  openly  avow,  whether  from 
keener  logical  perception  or  from  greater  causes  I 
cannot  decide. 

One  more  general  criticism  must  be  offered  before 
proceeding  to  a  specific  examination  of  this  philos- 
ophy. Every  system  of  evolution  which  is  not 
guided  by  intelligence  is  merely  a  new  edition 


Review  of  Herbert  Spencer.  19 

of  the  time-honored  theory  of  chance.  In  every 
mechanical  system,  all  the  results  depend  upon  the 
first  impulse,  and  between  that  primal  motion  and 
its  effects  there  is  room  for  nothing  but  necessity./ 
However  wide-spreading  its  effects  may  be,  they  / 
were  all  necessarily  contained  in  that  first  motion. 
Now,  since  to-day  is  determined  by  yesterday,  it\ 
follows  that  all  days  were  determined  by  the  first 
day ;  and  before  this  philosophy  can  assume  to  b< 
an  explanation  at  all,  it  must  account  for  that  first 
day.  The  implicit  assumption  of  its  disciples  is, 
that  by  the  time  we  have  reached  the  nebula,  we 
have  come  to  a  simple  and  unorganized  form  of  mat-j 
ter  which  needs  no  explanation.  But  here  it  must 
be  borne  in  mind  that  complexity  and  organization 
do  not  cease  where  we  fail  to  trace  them.  Upon 
this  point  Prof.  Tyndall  speaks  as  follows : 

"  It  cannot  be  too  distinctly  borne  in  mind  that 
between  the  microscopic  limit  and  the  molecular 
limit  there  is  room  for  infinite  permutations  and 
combinations.  It  is  in  this  region  that  the  poles  of 
the  atoms  are  arranged,  that  tendency  is  given  to 
their  powers,  so  that  when  these  poles  and  powers 
have  free  action  and  proper  stimulus  in  a  suitable 
environment,  they  determine  first  the  germ  and  after- 
ward the  complete  organism.  The  first  marshaling 
of  the  atoms,  upon  which  all  subsequent  action  de- 
pends, baffles  a  keener  power  than  that  of  the  micro- 
scope. Through  pure  excess  of  complexity,  and  long 


2O  Review  of  Herbert  Spencer. 

before  observation  can  have  any  voice  in  the  matter 
the  most  highly-trained  intellect,  the  most  refined 
and  disciplined  imagination,  retires  in  bewilderment 
from  the  contemplation  of  the  problem.  We  are 
struck  dumb  by  an  astonishment  which  no  micro- 
scope can  relieve,  doubting  not  only  the  power  of  our 
instrument,  but  even  whether  we  ourselves  possess 
the  intellectual  elements  which  will  enable  us  to  grap- 
ple with  the  ultimate  structural  energies  of  nature."  * 
Prof.  Tyndall  here  calls  attention  to  a  fact  which 
biologists  and  physiologists  constantly  overlook — the 
almost  infinite  complexity  of  what  the  microscope  sees 
as  simple.  Nothing  is  more  common  than  to  hear 
physiologists,  Mr.  Spencer  among  the  rest,  speak  of 
germs  as  perfectly  homogeneous,  because  the  micro- 
scope detects  no  trace  of  organization ;  and,  indeed, 
atheistic  reasoning  derives  much  of  its  plausibility 
from  this  false  assumption.  If  the  complex  animal 
can  be  derived  from  the  homogeneous  germ,  it  is 
not  incredible  that  the  complexity  of  creation  should 
be  derived  from  the  homogeneous  nebula.  But 
Prof.  Tyndall  has  taught  us  that  homogeneity  is 
only  in  seeming ;  that  under  the  most  homogeneous 
surface  there  are  structural  energies  of  such  com- 
plexity, that  we  must  question  whether  we  have  the 
mental  elements  which  will  enable  us  to  grapple 
with  them.  It  was  in  that  realm,  inaccessible  to 
every  thing  but  mind,  that  the  wonders  of  creation 

*  "  Fragments  of  Science,"  p.  153. 


I71RSITY 

Review  of  Herbert 


were  wrought  out.  The  atheist's  attempt  to  esca 
into  simplicity  is  fruitless.  His  very  assumptions 
forbid  it.  Because  of  the  necessity  which  connects 
cause  and  effect  in  every  mechanical  scheme,  we 
must  conclude  that  all  which  exists  now,  existed 
in  its  causes  at  any  given  time  in  the  past.  The 
nebulous  period  really  manifested  no  less  intelli- 
gence and  purpose  than  the  present  does  ;  the  only 
difference  is,  that  what  is  explicit  now  was  implicit 
then.  Going  back  to  that  nebulous  time,  we  find 
tendencies  and  laws  and  powers  so  balanced  that 
time  alone  is  needed  to  give  birth  to  the  present 
order.  No  matter  how  far  back  we  go  ;  if  we  assume 
that  that  nebula  was  the  ruins  of  an  earlier  system, 
which  had  in  turn  been  born  from  an  antecedent 
nebula,  still,  at  the  earliest  time,  we  find  the  exact 
and  complex  adjustment  of  tendencies  and  powers 
which  must  in  time  give  birth  to  to-day.  Looking 
around  upon  that  earliest  nebula,  we  find  that  the 
present  was  there  ;  and  again  we  ask,  What  deter- 
mined that  first  day  ?  what  procured  that  primal 
balance  of  poles  and  powers,  which  made  it  impos- 
sible that  any  thing  but  the  existing  order  should  be 
born  ?  Here  lies  the  mystery  of  creation  ;  nothing 
is  explained  until  this  question  is  answered.  It 
must  be  either  the  work  of  wisdom  or  of  chance  ; 
and  if  the  work  of  chance,  then  all  that  has  sprung 
from  it  is  the  work  of  chance  also.  Mr.  Spencer 
denies  that  intelligence  has  any  thing  to  do  with 


22  Review  of  Herbert  Spencer. 

evolution ;  it  follows,  then,  that  chance  is  the  archi- 
tect of  the  universe.  The  vaporings  about  law  and 
order  do  indeed  serve  to  give  an  aspect  of  freshness 
to  the  threadbare  arguments ;  but  they  in  no  wise 
alter  the  underlying  philosophy.  When  we  get  to 
the  naked  form  of  Mr.  Spencer's  teaching,  it  is  that 
a  cloud  of  atoms  only  need  to  be  shaken  together 
long  enough  to  hit  upon  the  present  order  and  har- 
mony of  the  universe.  The  New  Philosophy  is  not 
so  new  after  all ;  for,  except  in  terminology,  this  is 
precisely  the  doctrine  which  Democritus  and  Lucre- 
tius taught  two  thousand  years  ago.  The  only  thing 
which  gives  the  new  heresy  greater  plausibility  than 
the  old,  is  the  greater  extension  of  the  universe  in 
time.  Who  knows  what  might  happen  in  eternity  ? 
To  be  sure,  we  do  not  find  the  atoms  playing  any 
such  tricks  now ;  but  who  knows  what  might  not 
have  happened  back  yonder  in  the  dark  ?  Time 
works  wonders ;  and  so  the  evolutionist  becomes 
confused  and  giddy  from  the  long  cycles  with  which 
he  deals,  and  talks  of  "  untold  ages,"  as  if  time  could 
certainly  correlate  with  intelligence.  Because  the 
work  of  intelligence  is  not  stolen  outright,  but  by 
piecemeal,  the  theft  is  allowed  to  escape  notice.  It 
is  the  error  of  the  old  mythology  over  again.  The 
evolutionist  gets  the  world  upon  the  turtle's  back ; 
and  then  either  he  forgets  to  supply  any  footing  for 
the  turtle,  or  else  his  faith  becomes  robust  enough  to 
venture  to  stand  alone. 


Review  of  Herbert  Spencer.  23 

We  are  now  able  to  determine  the  true  nature  of 
the   Spencerian   doctrine   of    evolution.     Whatever 
Mr.  Spencer's  personal  views  may  be,  the  doctrine  of 
his  books  is  fatalism,  materialism,  atheism.     These 
words  are  not  used  as  terms  of  opprobrium  at  all,  but 
as  exactly  descriptive  of  the  system.     There  is  no 
personal  God  ;  there  is  no  immortal  soul.     There  is 
nothing  but  necessity  without,  and  necessity  within. 
To  be  sure,  this  philosophy  is  fond  of  speaking  of 
progress,  and  talks,  almost  like  a  prophet,  of  the  new 
heaven  and  the  new  earth.     But,  nevertheless,  the 
progress  ends  in  annihilation  ;  and  all  the  wealth  of 
manhood  and  affection  which  has  made  history  rich 
and  reverend,  has  dropped  into  darkness  and  per- 
ished.    It  is  most   instructive   to  hear  materialism 
boasting  of  the  high  destiny  which  awaits  the  race. 

But  it  is  not  for  the  critic  to  get  frightened  at 
results,  but  to  ask  for  the  credentials  of  the  doctrine. 
It  does  not  follow  that  the  theory  is  false  because  it 
is  materialistic  and  atheistic.  We  should  indeed  feel 
saddened  and  degraded  if  it  were  established,  but 
that  is  no  argument  against  it.  If  the  reasoning  is 
just,  and  the  assumptions  are  well-founded,  the  doc- 
trine must  stand,  with  all  its  dreadful  consequences. 
These  are  the  questions  which  we  have  now  to 
consider. 


24  Review  of  Herbert  Spencer. 


CHAPTER  II. 

LAWS    OF   THE   UNKNOWABLE. 

A/TR.  SPENCER  introduced  his  philosophy 
-L*-*-  about  ten  years  ago  by  the  publication 
of  his  "First  Principles."  The  volume  is  divided 
into  two  parts :  the  "  Laws  of  the  Unknowable," 
and  the  "  Laws  of  the  Knowable."  Part  I  aims 
to  determine  the  true  sphere  of  all  rational  inves- 
tigation, and,  by  so  doing,  to  save  the  speculative 
mind  from  wasting  its  strength  upon  barren  and 
essentially  insoluble  problems.  The  conclusion  - 
reached  is  that  we  can  know  nothing  but  phe- 
nomena, and  their  relations  of  coexistence  and  suc- 
cession. Reality  lies  beyond  the  reach  of  our 
faculties,  and  is  essentially  unknowable. 

When  this  work  first  appeared  it  was  received 
with  considerable  applause,  even  by  religious  think- 
ers. Mr.  Spencer  admitted  the  reality  of  religion,  v 
and  insisted  upon  the  existence  of  God.  To  be 
sure,  God,  as  the  essential  reality  of  the  universe, 
must  be  unknowable ;  but  still,  as  such  reality,  Mr. 
Spencer  insisted  upon  the  Divine  existence  as  the 
most  fundamental  datum  of  science,  as  well  as  of 
religion.  In  this  respect  the  work  was  an  agree- 


Review  of  Herbert  Spencer.  2$ 

able  change  upon  the  open  war,  and  scarcely  un-v 
disguised  atheism,  of  such  men  as  Comte.  It  had, 
too,  an  aspect  of  humility.  It  set  a  limit  to  many 
extravagant  speculations  by  declaring  the  limited 
nature  of  our  faculties.  These  things  moved  many 
theologians  to  look  upon  the  work  as  a  flag  of  truce  ^ 
sent  out  from  a  hitherto  hostile  camp ;  and  they 
failed  to  see  that  the  concessions  to  religion  — • 
amounted  to  absolutely  nothing,  while  the  de- 
mands from  it  were  such  as  to  render  true  piety 
impossible.  Mr.  Spencer's  "reconciliation"  was  ef- 
fected by  the  destruction  of  one  of  the  parties,  and 
his  peace  was  that  of  death.  A  God  who  must 
always  remain  x  for  thought  and  conscience  has  no 
more  religious  value  than  a  centaur  or  a  sea-serpent. 
Not  that  Mr.  Spencer  intended  this  result  when 
he  introduced  this  Trojan  horse ;  but  such  is,  never- 
theless, the  outcome  of  the  doctrine.  In  its  relig- 
ious aspects  this  theory  of  nescience  is  as  per- 
nicious as  any  in  all  speculation  ;  more  so,  even,  than 
the  hardy,  old-fashioned  atheism,  because  it  is-j 
more  decorous  in  appearance,  and  more  specious 
in  argument,  while  the  two  are  identical  in  the  final -J 
result.  The  first  is  a  precipice,  bold  and  naked, 
over  which  one  may  plunge  if  he  chooses,  but  not 
unconsciously ;  the  second  is  the  same  precipice 
covered  over  with  snow,  not  strong  enough  to  save 
one  from  the  abysses,  but  powerful  by  its  seeming 
safety  to  lure  one  to  destruction. 


26  Review  of  Herbert  Spencer. 

In  passing  to  an  examination  t>f  Mr.  Spencer's 
reasoning  I  must  bespeak  the  readers'  patience. 
The  discussion  will  lead  us  into  many  metaphys- 
ical recesses  ;  and  the  country  through  which  we 
take  our  way  is  surely  as  dry  as  Sahara,  if,  indeed, 
it  be  not  full  as  barren. 

This  know-nothing  doctrine  is  as  old  as  philoso- 
phy, but  the  philosophy  of  the  doctrine  has  changed 
with  time.  Formerly  the  difficulty  was  external, 
now  it  is  internal.  "We  cannot  know  any  thing," 
the  old  skeptics  used  to  say,  "because  as  much, 
and  as  good,  evidence  can  be  brought  against  any 
proposition  or  belief  as  for  it ;  and  hence  the  mind 
must  remain  in  eternal  balance  between  two  opin- 
ions." But  the  fault  was  in  the  evidence,  not  in 
the  mind.  If  there  were  any  reality  to  know,  the 
mind  was  clearly  competent  to  apprehend  it ;  but 
is  there  any  reality  to  know  ?  This  was  the  ques- 
tion with  them ;  and  they  held  that  in  every  case 
the  contradictions  of  the  testimony  so  embarrassed 
the  jury  as  to  render  necessary  the  Scotch  verdict 
— not  proven. 

Now,  all  this  has  changed.  The  difficulty  is  no  y 
longer  external,  but  internal.  The  criticism  of  fact 
has  been  exchanged  for  the  criticism  of  faculty. 
The  nescientist  no  longer  inquires  whether  reality 
exists,  but  contents  himself  with  the  humbler  ques- 
tion, whether  we  have  any  faculties  for  knowing 
it,  supposing  it  to  exist?  As  the  result  of  his 


Review  of  Herbert  Spencer.  27 

•Viventory,  mental  limits  have  been  discovered,  and 
all  knowledge  of  the  real  is  said  to  be  beyond 
them.  The  grounds  of  nescience  are  much  morev* 
fundamental  than  the  old  know-nothings  dreamed. 
By  the  constitution  of  the  mind  itself  we  are  for- 
ever prohibited  from  reaching  reality.  Phenomena 
are  all  we  know ;  and  these,  when  analyzed  to  the 
bottom,  can  never  give  us  things  as  they  are,  or 
"things  in  themselves."  Between  appearances,  or 
things  as  we  know  them,  and  the  hidden  reality 
behind  them,  an  impassable  gulf  is  fixed. 

This  form  of  nescience  began  with  Kant.  He 
taught  that  there  are  forms  of  thought  and  sensi- 
bility in  the  mind  which  determine  the  form  of 
our  knowledge,  something  as  a  mold  gives  shape 
to  a  casting.  The  matter  of  any  thing,  as  an  iron 
ball,  is  one  thing  ;  the  form  is  quite  another.  So  the 
content,  or  matter  of  our  knowledge,  is  given  by  the 
thing ;  but  the  form,  which  is  entirely  different,  is 
given  by  the  mind  itself.  And  as  the  same  matter 
can  be  molded  into  a  thousand  different  forms,  can 
be  round,  square,  triangular,  etc.  :  so  the  same  exter- 
nal reality  can  take  on  different  shapes,  according  as 
it  is  cast  in  different  mental  molds.  Hence  all  our 
knowledge  is  a  composite,  of  which  the  two  factors 
are,  the  external  thing,  and  the  internal  form.  What 
the  thing  is  apart  from  this  form,  or  what  it  is  "  in 
itself,"  is,  and  must  be — to  use  the  established  phrase 
— "  unknown  and  unknowable."  Moreover,  as  it  is 


28  Review  of  Herbert  Spencer. 

conceivable  that  other  orders  of  intelligence  should 
differ  from  the  human,  we  can  never  be  sure  that  our 
knowledge  has  universal  validity.  We  think  things 
in  the  relation  of  cause  and  effect,  of  substance  and 
attribute,  etc.  ;  but  these  relations  are  only  forms  of 
our  thought,  and  correspond  to  no  reality  in  the 
thing.  We  cannot  help  assenting  to  the  so-called 
intuitions,  not  because  they  represent  the  universal 
truths  of  the  universe,  but  because  they  constitute 
the  skeleton  of  the  mind  itself.  They  uphold  the 
mind  and  give  law  to  its  tendencies  ;  but  so  far  from 
revealing  reality  to  us,  they  rather  lead  us  away  from 
it.  Their  very  necessity  stamps  them  as  mental 
forms,  and  their  utterances  become  untrustworthy 
irf  proportion  as  they  are  sure.  Hence  our  knowl- 
edge is  of  phenomena  only,  and  is  true  only  for  us  \ 
at  least,  we  can  never  be  sure  that  it  is  true  for  other 
orders  of  being.  The  windows  of  the  human  mind 
are  of  stained  glass,  and  the  inhabitant  within  is 
forever  cut  off  from  the  white  light  of  reality  beyond. 
These  are  the  essential  features  of  the  Kantian 
theory;  and  the  doctrine  of  relativity,  upon  which 
Mr.  Spencer  relies  for  the  support  of  his  view,  is  but 
a  degraded  form  of  the  same.  This  later  form  of  the 
doctrine,  as  it  appears  in  the  works  of  Hamilton, 
Mansel,  and  Spencer,  has  far  less  logical  and  meta- 
physical value  than  the  earlier  form  as  taught  by  Kant. 
In  Kant's  works,  one  commonly  finds  both  good 
sense,  and  good  logic.  The  arguments  are  not  mere- 


Review  of  Herbert  Spencer.  29 

!y  logical,  but  real.  We  may  not  admit  their  validity, 
but  at  the  same  time  we  feel  that  they  have  a  genuine 
momentum,  and  are  not  a  logical  play  on  words.  In-  {  ~ 
deed,  if  Kant  could  have  saved  his  system  from  Ideal-  ^ 
ism,  it  would  have  been  well-nigh  impregnable.  But 
in  passing  to  the  relativity  philosophy,  one  is  sensible 
of  a  marked  change  in  this  respect.  There  seems  to 
be  a  kind  of  intellectual  shuffling  going  on  ;  a  play- 
ing fast  and  loose  with  words,  as  the  "absolute," 
"  infinite,"  "  conditioned,"  "  unconditioned,"  etc. 
There  is  an  air  of  jugglery  and  thimble-rigging 
over  the  whole.  This  makes  one  regard  many  ol 
the  conclusions  as  he  does  the  celebrated  one,  that 
each  cat  has  three  tails,  or  that  the  minute-hand  of 
a  watch  can  never  overtake  the  hour-hand  ;  to  dis- 
prove them  may  be  difficult,  but  to  believe  them  is 
impossible.  We  certainly  see  the  ghost  according  to 
programme ;  but  we  cannot  rid  ourselves  of  the  con- 
viction that  concave  mirrors  and  magic  lanterns  are 
at  the  bottom  of  the  show.  Kant  shows  us  real  ex-w 
istences  fighting,  the  relativist  shows  us  shadows. 
These  indulge  in  the  most  dazzling  fence,  and  cleave 
each  other  through  and  through  ;  but  no  blood  is 
drawn,  and  nobody  is  hurt. 

Armed  with  a  knowledge  of  our  mental  limits,  Mr. 
Spencer,  following   in   the  wake  of   Hamilton   and 
Mansel,  proceeds  to  charge  all  our  familiar  concep-  f 
tions  with  involving  contradictions  and  intellectual 
hari-kari.     A  further  analysis  of  our  faculties  reveals 


3O  Review  of  Herbert  Spencer. 

to  his  searching  gaze  a  pack  of  intellectual  impostors 
who,  by  some  hocus-pocus,  have  contrived  to  shuffle 
themselves  into  such  universal  acceptance,  that  most 
men  regard  them  as  necessary  truths.  But  these 
villains  are  usurpers  nevertheless  ;  and  having  the 
bad  taste  to  contradict  our  philosopher,  they  very 
naturally  excite  his  wrath.  He  at  once  brands  them,/ 
as  "  pseud-ideas,"  keeps  them  just  long  enough  to  give 
evidence  against  themselves — which  is  assumed  to  be 
the  only  true  evidence  they  can  give — and  then  turns 
them  out  of  doors.  We  notice  that  they  are  contin- 
ually smuggled  in  to  help  the  prosecution,  but  are  for-  ^ 
bidden  to  say  a  word  for  the  defense.  This  is  the  last 
feather.  After  being  convicted  of  harboring  "  pseud- 
ideas,"  the  mind  feels  the  propriety  of  being  humble 
For  the  present  our  only  hope  is  that,  as  these  neces- 
sary truths,  alias  pseud-ideas,  are  such  liars,  they 
may  have  lied  when  they  spoke  against  themselves. 
The  authority  for  this  summary  ejection  seems  to  be 
that  these  truths  cannot  be  pictured  by  the  imagi- 
nation, and  hence  are  "unthinkable,"  and  "incon- 
ceivable." The  test  of  the  knowable  is  its  ability  to 
come  before  the  representative  faculty.  Whatever 
can  do  this  may  be  admitted  to  the  rank  of  real- 
ity ;  whatever  cannot  thus  appear  is  banished  into 
the  outer  darkness  of  illusions  and  "  pseud-ideas." 
Horsed  upon  this  test  of  knowledge,  Mr.  Spencer 
gallops  gayly  out  of  the  a  priori  country,  but,  like 
the  famous  John  Gilpin,  is  carried  farther  than  he 


Review  of  Herbert  Spencer.  3 1 

cares  to  go,  before  he  dismounts.     Can  anything  be' 
more  mocking  to  an  exact  thinker,  than  this  claim 
that  nothing  shall  be  admitted  to  the  rank  of  knowl-  ^ 
edge,  which  cannot  come  before  the  representative 
faculty  ?     What  is  the  image  of  force  ?  or  of  cause  ? 
of  law  ?  or  of  existence  ?     Yet  these,  and  a  multitude 
of  other  ideas,  all  absolutely  without  the  imagination, 
do  constantly  enter  into  the  exactest  reasonings,  each 
keeping  its  own  place  without  any  danger,  nay,  with- 
out  any  possibility,  of  being  confounded   with  any 
other.     Now  are  we  to  claim  that  all  knowledge  into 
which  these  "  unthinkable  ideas  "  enter  is  only  illu- 
sion ?      If  we  do,  then  science,  as  well  as  religion,  * 
must  vanish  into  the  dreams  of  night.      This  test  of 
Mr.  Spencer's  reduces  all  knowledge  to  the  scale  of  J 
sensation,  and  makes  science  itself  impossible.     For 
observation  and  experiment  constitute  a  very  small 
portion  of  scientific  knowledge.     The  greater  part  is 
only  inference  from  observed  facts,  and  depends  upon 
the    validity   of  our   belief  in    causation.     Science 
deals  with  forces,  and  causes,  and  laws,  and  space, 
and  time  ;  these  words  are  forever  upon  its  lips.    But 
what  does  the  imagination  know  about  forces,  and  • 
causes,  and  laws  ?      All  these  ideas  are  utterly  with- 
out the  imagination,  and   are  strictly  inconceivable, 
in  the  sense  that  no  mental  image  can  be  formed  of 
them.     It  follows,  then,  that  science,  which  is  built  ^ 
entirely  upon  these  ideas,  is  blank  illusion,  and  must 
be  content  to  vanish,  along  with  religion,  into  the 


32  Review  of  Herbert  Spencer. 

abysses  of  the  unknowable.  If  involving  unthink-  v 
able  ideas  warrants  the  banishment  of  religion,  it 
also  warrants  the  repudiation  of  science.  If  Mr. 
Spencer  insists  upon  this  test  we  need  go  no  further. 
Sensation  is  the  measure  of  knowledge,  and  his  phi-  \f 
losophy  falls  to  the  ground.  Mr.  Spencer  has  mowed 
down  the  "  pseud-ideas  "  without  mercy  ;  but  in  his 
enthusiasm  has,  unfortunately,  mowed  off  his  own 
legs.  After  we  have  gone  further  into  Mr.  Spencer's 
work,  we  shall  not  be  surprised  at  any  thing  in  the 
way  of  contradiction ;  but  at  present  it  seems  strange 
that  he  should  have  adopted  such  a  test  without  per- 
ceiving that  it  tells  as  powerfully  against  science  as  v 
against  religion.  Besides,  too,  it  is  plainly  false  ;  the 
conceivable,  in  his  sense  of  the  word,  does  not  com- 
prise all  the  knowable ;  indeed,  the  most  certain 
knowledge  we  have  is  what  Hamilton  has  most  hap- 
pily termed  the  "  unpicturable  notions  of  the  intelli- 
gence." Mr.  Spencer  says  large  numbers  are  incon- 
ceivable ;  but  that  does  not  shake  our  faith  in  our 
calculations.  Great  magnitudes  fail  of  an  adequate 
conception,  but  our  knowledge  is  none  the  less  sure. 
The  infinity  of  space  baffles  and  breaks  down  the  im- 
agination, but  is  an  assured  fact  of  the  understanding. 
Self-existence,  Mr.  Spencer  says,  is  an  inconceiv- 
ability of  the  first  magnitude,  and  all  ideas  into  which 
it  enters  must  be  sentenced  to  perpetual  imprison- 
ment in  the  unknowable ;  yet  we  have  no  surer 
piece  of  knowledge  than  that  there  is  self-existence 


Review  of  Herbert  Spencci .  1 3 

somewhere.  Whenever  the  intellect  is  steadied  and 
focussed  for  exact  statement,  it  affirms,  with  the 
utmost  certainty,  that  all  we  see  finds  its  support  and 
reality  in  an  existence  within  it,  or  beyond  it,  which  is 
self-centered  and  abiding.  The  truths  of  the  under- 
standing are  not  the  truths  of  the  imagination  ;  and; 
it  is  the  neglect  of  this  fact  which  lies  at  the  bottom; 
of  Kant's  antinomies,  Hamilton's  contradictions,  and! 
the  general  assortment  of  inconceivabilities  which  Mr. 
Spencer  tries  to  saddle  upon  our  reason. 

A  good  illustration  of  the  value  of  this  test,  is 
given  in  his  criticism  of  the  atheistic,  pantheistic, 
and  theistic  theories  of  the  origin  of  the  universe. 

Mr.  Spencer  believes  that  there  is  a  tone  of  truth 
even  in  the  falsest  creed,  and  that  every  creed,  if  ana- 
lyzed, would  be  found  to  agree  in  something,  even 
with  its  seeming  contradiction.  "  To  doubt  this 
would  be  to  discredit  too  profoundly  the  average 
human  intelligence."  Hence,  if  we  should  lay  aside 
from  the  various  creeds  all  that  is  peculiar  to  each,  and 
find  that  in  which  they  all  agree,  this  common  article 
of  faith  would  possess  the  very  highest  claim  to  our  ac- 
ceptance. Accordingly  he  summons  the  atheist,  pan- 
theist, and  theist,  in  turn,  to  appear  for  examination. 

Between  atheist  and  theist,  it  would  seem  a  hope- 
less task  to  look  for  common  ground  ;  something 
like  harmonizing  yes  and  no  in  some  higher  unity. 
But  great  is  logic,  and  Mr.  Spencer  proves  equal  to 
the  task.  The  result  of  the  examination  is  the  proof 


34  Review  of  Herbert  Spencer. 

that  "  not  only  is  no  current  hypothesis  tenable,  but  ». 
also  that  no  tenable  hypothesis  can  be  framed."  The 
"  soul  of  truth,"  existing  in  these  diverse  statements, 
turns  out  to  be  that  none  of  the  parties  know  any 
thing  about  the  matter.  This  is  what  they  have 
always  been  trying  to  say,  but  were  never  able  to 
enunciate  it  until  Mr.  Spencer  helped  them.  An  om- 
nipresent mystery  behind  the  universe,  unexplained 
and  unexplainable,  is  the  ultimate  religious  truth  in 
which  all  conflicting  creeds  agree. 

What  now  is  the  reason  for  involving  atheist,  pan- 
theist, and  theist,  in  a  common  condemnation  ?  It 
is  that  they  all  postulate  the  inconceivable  idea  of 
self-existence.  Each  view  assumes  either  the  crea- 
tion or  the  Creator  to  be  self-existent ;  and  hence  all 
are  equally  untenable.  "  Differing  so  widely  as  they 
seem  to  do,  the  atheistic,  pantheistic,  and  theistic 
hypotheses  contain  the  same  ultimate  element.  It  is 
impossible  to  avoid  making  the  assumption  of  self- 
existence  somewhere  :  and  whether  that  assumption 
be  made  nakedly,  or  under  complicated  disguises,  it 
is  equally  vicious,  equally  unthinkable." — P.  36. 

I  suspect  that  neither  atheist,  pantheist,  nor  theist 
would  be  seriously  dismayed  by  this  argument.  For 
whether  it  be  unthinkable  or  not,  it  is  one  of  the 
strongest  affirmations  of  the  reason  that  there  is 
self-existence  somewhere ;  the  question  between  the 
theist  and  his  opponents  being,  where  that  existence 
is  to  be  found.  It  is  in  the  material  universe,  say 


Review  of  Herbert  Spencer.  35 

the  atheist  and  pantheist.  That  cannot  be,  says  the 
theist.  The  visible  universe  bears  every  mark  of 
dependence ;  there  must  be  some  being  apart  from 
this,  uncaused  and  independent.  "  Stop,"  says  Mr. 
Spencer,  "  if  we  admit  that  there  can  be  something 
uncaused  there  is  no  reason  to  assume  a  cause  for 
any  thing." — P.  37.  "Those  who  cannot  conceive  a 
self-existent  universe,  and  who  therefore  assume  a 
creator  of  the  universe,  take  for  granted  that  they 
can  conceive  a  self-existent  Creator.  The  mystery 
which  they  recognize  in  this  great  fact  surrounding 
them  on  every  side,  they  transfer  to  an  alleged 
source  of  this  great  fact,  and  then  suppose  they 
have  solved  the  mystery." — P.  35.  "Lastly,  even 
supposing  that  the  genesis  of  the  universe  could 
really  be  represented  in  thought  as  the  result  of  an 
external  agency,  the  mystery  would  be  as  great  as 
ever ;  for  there  would  arise  the  question,  How  came 
there  to  be  an  external  agency?" — P.  35.  These 
statements  would  have  some  force  if  the  law  of  cau- 
sation committed  us  to  the  absurdity  of  an  infinite 
series.  If  every  thing  must  have  a  cause,  then 
causes  themselves  must  have  causes,  and  so  on  in 
endless  regression.  In  that  case  it  would  be  as  well 
to  break  the  chain  in  one  place  as  in  another ;  and 
it  would  be  strictly  true  that  "if  there  can  be  any 
thing  uncaused,  there  is  no  reason  to  assume  a  cause 
for  any  thing."  But  the  law  of  causation  commits  V 
us  to  no  such  absurdity  as  an  infinite  series  of  causes. 


36  Review  of  Herbert  Spencer. 

It  is  not  existence,  as  such,  that  demands  a  cause, 
but  a  changing  existence.  Could  the  universe  be 
brought  to  a  standstill  so  that  all  change  should 
cease,  the  demand  for  a  cause  would  never  arise.  It 
is  entrance  and  exit  only  that  give  rise  to  this  de- 
mand. Whatever  manifests  them  must  have  its 
cause,  whatever  does  not  manifest  them  can  dispense 
with  a  cause.  Mr.  Spencer's  claim  that  "  Did  there 
exist  nothing  but  an  immeasurable  void,  explanation 
would  be  needed  as  much  as  now,"  is  a  mistake.  It 
is  change  that  suggests  causation,  the  changeless  is 
independent  and  eternal.  The  dependent  suggests 
the  independent,  and  when  the  mind  has  reached 
that,  it  rests.  Mr.  Spencer  himself  believes  this.  He 
cannot  rest  in  the  phenomena  of  the  visible  universe, 
but  insists  upon  a  fundamental  reality  behind  them 
as  their  abiding  cause.  And  that,  too,  after  telling 
us  that,  "  If  we  admit  there  can  be  any  thing  un- 
caused, there  is  no  reason  to  assume  a  cause  for 
any  thing."  Surely  this  fundamental  reality  is  an 
intruder  if  the  dictum  be  true.  One  or  the  other 
must  leave  forthwith.  If  the  dictum  goes,  Mr., 
Spencer's  argument  against  a  self-existent  Creator 
falls  to  the  ground  ;  if  the  fundamental  reality  is  dis- 
carded, the  bottom  falls  out  of  his  philosophy.  And 
now,  since  the  visible  universe  is  but  a  vast  aggre- 
gation of  events,  of  entrances  into  and  exits  from 
existence,  let  the  reader  judge  whether  Mr.  Spencer 
is  justified  in  dismissing  the  atheistic,  pantheistic, 


Review  of  Herbert  Spencer.  37 

and  theistic  hypotheses  as  equally  untenable  ;  or 
whether  the  theist  is  right  in  passing  behind  the 
seen  and  temporal  to  the  unseen  and  eternal.  Sure- 
ly the  suicidal  proclivities  of  Mr.  Spencer's  test  of- — 
knowledge  should  be  restrained.  We  have  before 
found  it  mowing  off  its  own  legs,  and  here  it  insists 
upon  biting  off  its  own  nose.  For  Mr.  Spencer  ap- 
parently believes  that  his  "  fundamental  reality  "  is  * 
self-existent ;  which  assumption,  by  his  own  reason- 
ing, makes  the  "fundamental  reality"  an  " untenable 
hypothesis,"  involving  "  symbolic  conclusions  of  the 
illegitimate  order."  We  surely  are  in  a  sad  pre- 
dicament here.  We  cannot  call  the  "  fundamental 
reality"  uncaused,  for  Mr.  Spencer  says  that,  "If  we 
! admit  that  any  thing  can  be  uncaused,  there  is  no/ 
i reason  to  assume  a  cause  for  any  thing."  But  we- 
cannot  call  it  caused,  for  then  it  would  not  be  the 
fundamental  reality  any  longer.  For  the  same  rea- 
son we  cannot  call  it  dependent ;  but  we  cannot  call 
it  independent,  for  that  involves  the  idea  of  self- 
existence,  which  would  make  it  an  "  untenable  hy- 
pothesis." The  beauty  of  the  reasoning  will  perhaps 
be  better  appreciated  if  we  see  the  arguments  side 
by  side. 

Whatever  involves  the  idea  Whatever  involves  the  idea 

of  self-existence,  is  an  untenable  of  self-existence,  is  an  untenable 

hypothesis.  hypothesis. 

God  involves  the  idea  of  self-  The  fundamental  reality  in- 

existence.  volves  the  idea  of  self-existence. 

God  is  an  untenable  hypoth-  The  fundamental  reality  is  not 

esis.  an  untenable  hypothesis. 


j 8  Review  of  Herbeit  Spencer. 

The  logic  is  not  the  best,  to  be  sure,  but  the  gen- 
eralship is  of  the  very  highest  order.  The  only 
explanation  I  can  think  of  is,  that  Mr.  Spencer  has 
one  kind  of  logic  for  religious  ideas,  and  another 
kind  for  his  own — a  view  which  the  internal  evi- 
dence seems  to  support. 

As  the  result  of  his  criticism  of  scientific  and  relig- 
ious ideas,  Mr.  Spencer  concludes  that  a  "fundamental 
reality"  underlies  the  universe,  and  that  this  is  "un- 
known and  unknowable."  Religion  ends  in  mystery, 
science  ends  in  mystery ;  and  our  highest  knowledge 
is  to  recognize  that  this  mystery  is  utterly  inscrutable. 

To  prove  that  this  mystery  lies  utterly  without 
the  limits  of  knowledge,  Mr.  Spencer  appeals  to  the 
doctrine  of  the  relativity  of  knowledge,  and  offers 
the  following  argument  : 

"  If,  when  walking  through  the  fields  some  day  in 
September,  you  hear  a  rustle  some  yards  in  advance, 
and  on  observing  the  ditch  side  where  it  occurs,  see 
the  herbage  agitated,  you  will  probably  turn  toward 
the  spot  to  learn  by  what  this  sound  and  motion  are 
produced.  As  you  approach  there  flutters  into  the 
ditch  a  partridge,  on  seeing  which  your  curiosity  is 
satisfied — you  have  what  you  call  an  explanation  of 
the  appearances.  The  explanation,  mark,  amounts 
to  this  :  that  whereas  throughout  you  have  had 
countless  experiences  of  disturbances  among  small 
stationary  bodies,  accompanying  the  movements  of 


Review  of  Herbert  Spencer.  39 

other  bodies  among  them,  and  have  generalized  the 
relation  between  such  disturbances  and  such  move- 
ments, you  consider  this  particular  disturbance  ex- 
plained on  rinding  it  to  present  an  instance  of  the 
like  relation.  Suppose  you  catch  the  partridge,  and, 
wishing  to  ascertain  why  it  did  not  escape,  examine 
it,  and  find  at  one  spot  a  slight  trace  of  blood  upon 
its  feathers.  You  now  imderstand,  as  you  say,  what 
has  disabled  the  partridge.  It  has  been  wounded  by 
a  sportsman — adds  another  case  to  the  many  cases 
already  seen  by  you,  of  birds  being  killed  or  injured 
by  the  shot  discharged  at  them  from  fowling-pieces. 
And  in  assimilating  this  case  to  other  such  cases 
consists  your  understanding  of  it.  But  now,  on  con- 
sideration, a  difficulty  suggests  itself.  Only  a  single 
shot  has  struck  the  partridge,  and  that  not  in  a  vital 
place  ;  the  wings  are  uninjured,  as  are  also  those 
muscles  which  move  them,  and  the  creature  proves 
by  its  struggles  that  it  still  has  abundant  strength. 
Why,  then,  you  inquire  of  yourself,  does  it  not  fly  ? 
Occasion  favoring,  you  put  the  question  to  an  anat- 
omist, who  furnishes  you  with  a  solution.  He  points 
out  that  this  solitary  shot  has  passed  close  to  the 
place  at  which  the  nerve  supplying  the  wing-muscles 
of  one  side  diverges  from  the  spine  ;  and  that  a 
slight  injury  to  the  nerve,  extending  even  to  the 
rupture  of  a  few  fibers,  may,  by  preventing  a  perfect 
co-ordination  in  the  action  of  the  two  wings,  destroy 
the  power  of  flight.  You  are  no  longer  puzzled.  But 


4-O  Review  of  Herbert  Spencer. 

what  has  happened  ? — what  has  changed  your  state 
from  one  of  perplexity  to  one  of  comprehension  ? 
Simply  the  disclosure  of  a  class  of  previously  known 
cases  along  with  which  you  can  include  this  case. 
The  connection  between  lesions  of  the  nervous  sys- 
tem and  paralysis  of  limbs  has  been  already  many 
times  brought  under  your  notice  ;  and  here  you  find 
a  relation  of  cause  and  effect  that  is  essentially  sim- 
ilar.''— P.  69.  Mr.  Spencer  claims,  justly  enough,  that 
all  scientific  explanations  are  of  this  order ;  they  are 
but  classifications  of  particular  facts  under  one  more 
general.  Thus  we  explain  the  sinking  of  a  stone, 
the  floating  of  a  cork,  the  fall  of  heavy  bodies,  the 
rise  of  a  balloon,  the  flow  of  the  rivers,  the  swell 
of  the  tides,  and  the  motion  of  the  planets,  all,  by 
referring  them  to  the  general  fact  of  gravitation. 
This  is  the  nature  of  all  scientific  explanations.  But 
clearly  such  a  process  must  come  to  an  ultimate  facty 
at  last  which  cannot  be  included  in  any  other,  and 
so  remain  unexplained  and  unexplainable.  "  For 
if  the  successively  deeper  interpretations  of  nature, 
which  constitute  advancing  knowledge,  are  mere 
inclusions  of  special  truths  in  general  truths,  and 
of  general  truths  in  truths  still  more  general ;  it  ob- 
viously follows  that  the  most  general  truth,  not  ad- 
mitting of  inclusion  in  any  other,  does  not  admit  of 
interpretation.  Manifestly,  as  the  most  general  cog- 
nition at  which  we  arrive  cannot  be  reduced  to  a 
more  general  one,  it  cannot  be  understood.  Of  ne- 


Revieiv  of  Herbert  Spencer.  41 

cessity,  therefore,  explanation  must  inevitably  bring 
us  down  to  the  inexplicable.     The  deepest  truth  we  ux 
can  get  at  must  be  unaccountable.     Comprehension 
must  become  something  other  than  comprehension 
before    the    ultimate    fact    can    be    comprehended." 

-P.  73- 

Mr.  Spencer's  argument  proves  an  unexplainable,  V 
not  an  unknowable  ;  for,  though  we  cannot  give,  the 
rationale  of  that  final   fact,  by  the  supposition,  we   ^ 
know  it  as  a  fact.     To  return  to  our  illustration,  the 
essential  nature  of  gravitation  is  a  profound  mystery  ; 
but  gravitation  as  a  fact,  the  law  of  its  variation,  the 
truth  that  it  includes  all  the  particular  facts  mentioned, 
all  these  things   science  regards  as  established  be- 
yond question.     Clearly,  the  incomprehensible  may  ^ 
be  Tcnnwnasji  fact,  and  its  ]aws  and  relations 
aTsocons_titute  a  part  of  our  most  assuredknowledge. 
Mr.  Spencer's  conclusion  is  the  extremely  common- 
place one,  that  argument  and  all  explanation  post- 
ulate something  as  their  foundation  or  support.     I 
admit  most  cheerfully  that  explanation  must  assume 
the  unexplainable,  or  independent ;  but  I  deny  that 
this  unexplainable  is  the  unknowable.     Our  own  ex- 
istence is  wrapped  in  the  profoundest  mystery,  but 
that  does  not  destroy  the  fact  that  we  have  a  large 
knowledge   of  human   nature.      No   more   can    Mr.  V 
Spencer    argue    from    the    mystery   of   the    Divine  I 
existence,  to  our  necessary  ignorance  of  the  Divine  ' 
nature. 


42  Review  of  Herbert  Spencer. 

Mr.  Spencer,  however,  has  great  faith  in  this  argu- 
ment, and  advances  it  again  in  the  following  form  : 

"Every  complete  act  of  consciousness,  besides 
distinction  and  relation,  also  implies  likeness.  Be- 
fore it  can  become  an  idea,  or  constitute  a  piece  of 
knowledge,  a  mental  state  must  not  only  be  known 
as  not  only  separate  in  kind  from  certain  foregoing 
states  to  which  it  is  known  as  related  by  succession, 
but  it  must  be  known  as  of  the  same  kind  with  cer- 
tain other  foregoing  states.  ...  In  brief,  a  true  cog-v> 
nition  is  possible  only  through  an  accompanying 
recognition.  Should  it  be  objected  that,  if  so,  there 
cannot  be  a  first  cognition,  and  hence  no  cognition, 
the  reply  is,  that  cognition  proper  arises  gradually — 
that  during  the  first  stage  of  incipient  intelligence, 
before  the  feelings  produced  by  intercourse  with  the 
world  have  been  put  in  order,  there  are  no  cognitions, 
strictly  so  called  ;  and  that,  as  every  infant  shows  us, 
these  slowly  emerge  out  of  the  confusion  of  unfolding 
consciousness  as  fast  as  these  experiences  are  ar- 
ranged into  groups — as  fast  as  the  most  frequently 
repeated  sensations,  and  their  relations  to  each  other, 
become  familiar  enough  to  admit  of  their  recognition, 
as  such  or  such,  whenever  they  recur.  Should  it  be 
further  objected,  that  if  cognition  presupposes  recog- 
nition there  can  be  no  cognition  even  by  an  adult,  of 
an  object  never  before  seen,  there  is  still  the  sufficient 
answer,  that  in  so  far  as  it  is  not  assimilated  to  pre- 
viously-seen objects  it  is  not  known,  and  it  is  known 


Review  of  Herbert  Spencer.  43 

in  so  far  as  it  is  assimilated  to  them.  Of  this  para- 
dox the  interpretation  is,  that  an  object  is  classifiable 
in  various  ways,  with  various  degrees  of  complete- 
ness. An  animal  hitherto  unknown  (mark  the  word), 
though  not  referable  to  any  established  species  or 
genus,  is  yet  recognized  as  belonging  to  one  of  the 
larger  divisions — mammals,  birds,  reptiles,  or  fishes  ; 
or  should  it  be  so  anomalous  that  its  alliance  with 
any  of  these  is  not  determinate,  it  may  yet  be  classed 
as  vertebrate  or  invertebrate  ;  or  if  it  be  one  of  those 
organisms  of  which  it  is  doubtful  whether  the  ani- 
mal or  vegetal  characteristics  predominate,  it  is  still 
known  as  a  living  body;  even  should  it  be  ques- 
tioned whether  it  is  organic,  it  remains  beyond  ques- 
tion that  it  is  a  material  object,  and  is  cognized  by 
being  recognized  as  such.  Whence  it  is  manifest 
that  a  thing  is  perfectly  known  only  when  it  is  in  all 
respects  like  certain  things  previously  observed  ;  that 
in  proportion  to  the  number  of  respects  in  which  it 
is  unlike  them,  is  the  extent  to  which  it  is  unknown 
and  that  hence,  when  it  has  absolutely  no  attribute  in 
common  with  any  thing  else,  it  must  be  absolutely 
beyond  the  bounds  of  knowledge." — P.  79. 

To  the  objection  that  if  a  true  cognition  implies 
recognition,  there  can  be  no  first  cognition,  and  hence 
no  cognition,  Mr.  Spencer's  reply  that  cognition 
proper  arises  gradually,  is  entirely  inadequate.  If 
all  cognition  presupposes  recognition,  then  a  firstv 
cognition  is  a  manifest  impossibility.  Recognition, 


44  Review  of  Herbert  Spencer. 

being  cognition  over  again,  must  of  necessity  follow 
upon  cognition  ;  but  cognition  must  also  follow  rec- 
ognition ;  that  is,  each  must  follow  the  other,  and 
hence  both  are  impossible.  But  Mr.  Spencer  escapes 
from  this  dilemma  by  teaching  that  cognition  proper 
arises  gradually  in  childhood  ;  and  thus  we  get  the 
raw  material  for  future  cognitions.  But  if  cognition 
proper  arises  gradually  in  childhood,  why  may  it  not 
arise  gradually  in  manhood  as  well  ?  Mr.  Spencer's 
answer  to  the  objection  is  a  good  specimen  of  a 
favorite  method  with  the  associational  psychologists. 
Whenever  one  of  their  fundamental  assumptions  is 
contradicted  by  the  experience  of  manhood,  it  is  easy 
to  say  that  in  infancy — a  period  of  which  any  thing 
can  be  affirmed,  since  nothing  is  remembered — it 
was  strictly  true.  This  is  certainly  making  the  most 
of  the  early  years.  The  "  small  child  "  is  put  into  the 
associational  mill,  and  after  a  little  brisk  grinding  is 
brought  out  with  a  complete  set  of  mental  furniture. 
When  the  critic  reaches  the  spot  he  is  blandly  told 
that  the  work  is  done,  and  the  machinery  put  away. 
He  is  further  warned  that  any  search  on  his  part  will 
be  useless  ;  as  the  traces  of  manufacture  have  been 
entirely  obliterated. 

The  argument  of  the  quotation  just  made  is  the 
fallacy  we  have  already  examined — the  confounding 
the   unexplainable,    or   unclassifiable,   with   the    un-  ^ 
knowable.     Plainly,  we  can  only  give  the  rationale 
of  classifiable  facts,  for  explanation  is  only  classifica- 


Review  of  Herbert  Spencer.  45 

tion  ;  but  the  facts  must  be  known  as  facts  before 
they  can  be  classified.  A  thing  in  which  we  detect 
no  likeness  to  other  things  is  not  an  unknowable,*^ 
but  an  unclassified  thing.  When  we  are  enabled  to 
classify  a  body  of  heterogeneous  facts,  we  get  a 
knowledge  of  their  relations  to  each  other,  but  no 
new  knowledge  of  them  as  facts.  To  say  that  such 
facts  can  only  be  cognized  by  being  recognized  as 
matter,  is  to  deny  them  to  our  perceptive  faculties, 
and  delude  ourselves  into  thinking  that  this  is  a  fail- 
ure of  the  knowing  power. 

As  a  philosophical  doctrine  this  relativity  theory 
is  not  well-defined.  It  is,  in  fact,  a  combination  of 
several  doctrines,  some  of  which  are  not  only  true, 
but  truisms  ;  while  the  rest  look  marvelously  like 
something  "  pseud."  We  have  already  had  some  con- 
fused illustrations  of  it,  let  us  examine  it  further. 

Sometimes  it  means  that  we  can  only  know  things 
as  related  to  ourselves,  that  is,  that  we  have  only 
such  knowledge  as  our  faculties  can  give  us.  In  one 
sense  this  is  axiomatic.  All  knowledge  implies  a 
thing  to  be  known,  and  a  faculty  for  knowing  it. 
Clearly,  then,  we  can  know  only  those  things,  or 
properties  of  things,  which  are  related  or  adjustea  to 
our  faculties.  An  eye  could  not  see  sound  ;  an  ear 
could  not  hear  vision.  It  is  said  that  there  are 
sounds  of  so  high  a  pitch  as  to  be  above  the  limits 
of  our  hearing,  and  others  again  of  so  low  a  pitch  as 


46  Review  of  Herbert  Spencer. 

to  be  below  them.  Our  knowledge  of  sound  then  is 
relative — we  hear  only  those  notes  which  are  properly 
related  to  the  ear.  It  is  very  conceivable  that  there 
should  be  organisms  which  could  perceive  sounds 
that  range  far  above  the  limits  of  our  hearing,  and 
perhaps  none  of  those  which  we  hear.  Now,  in  eacli 
case,  the  knowledge  of  sound  is  relative  ;  but  are  we 
to  say  in  such  a  case  that  neither  party  knows  any 
thing  about  sound  ?  Two  men  stand  on  the  shore 
and  look  seaward.  One  has  stronger  eyesight  than 
the  other,  and  hence  the  range  of  vision  is  relative  ; 
but  the  fact  of  vision  is  none  the  less  real.  Certainly 
it  would  not  be  claimed,  because  one  sees  farther 
than  the  other,  that  both  see  nothing.  Plainly, 
nescience  finds  no  support  from  this  interpretation 
of  the  doctrine  of  relativity.  Let  there  be  other  be- 
ings than  men,  and  let  their  faculties  far  outrun  ours, 
or  be  altogether  different  from  ours,  the  fact  casts  no 
discredit  on  what  knowledge  our  faculties  do  give  us. 

Again,  the  doctrine  sometimes  reads :  We  cannot 
know  pure  being — that  is,  being  without  attributes — 
but  only  the  attributes  of  being. 

This,  I  conceive,  is  not  an  exact  statement  of  our 
knowledge.  It  is  not  true  that  we  know  attributes 
alone,  but  rather,  we  know  being  as  possessing  attri- 
butes. Thus,  we  do  not  know  redness,  hardness, 
squareness,  but  a  red,  hard,  square  thing.  All  our 
knowledge  begins  with  a  knowledge  of  things  ;  and 
it  is  not  until  considerable  progress  has  been  made 


Review  of  Herbert  Spencer.  47 

in  abstract  thinking  that  a  knowledge  of  attributes 
becomes  possible.  But  let  the  doctrine  stand  as 
stated,  still  nescience  derives  no  support  from  it. 
We  cannot  know  pure  being  for  the  sufficient  reason, 
that  there  is  no  such  thing  to  know.  All  this  talk 
about  pure  being  arises  from  a  pernicious  habit  into 
which  thinkers  fall,  of  thinking  that  whatever  can  be 
separated  in  thought,  can  also  be  separated  in  fact. 
A  beam  has  an  upper  and  lower  side,  either  of  which 
can  be  thought  of  separately,  but  no  beam  can  exist 
without  both  sides.  Being  without  attributes,  is  as 
impossible  as  a  stick  without  two  ends  ;  and  to  argue 
about  pure  being  is  as  absurd  as  to  talk  of  pure 
"  upper-sideness,"  or  absolute  "  one-endness."  But 
supposing  such  a  fiction  to  exist,  we  cheerfully  ad- 
mit that  we  can  know  nothing  about  it ;  nor  need 
one  be  much  distressed  at  the  loss.  Matter  or  spirit, 
the  finite  or  the  infinite,  apart  from  their  properties 
or  powers,  excite  very  little  curiosity  in  our  mind. 
Imagine  a  metaphysical  engineer  who,  knowing  how 
his  engine  is  made,  how  it  works,  what  it  can  do,  etc., 
should  say  that  this  is  no  knowledge  at  all,  and  insist 
upon  knowing  the  "absolute"  engine,  or  engine  "in 
itself."  But  if  any  one  still  believes  that  pure  being 
is  not  pure  nonsense,  and  is  grieved  at  his  inability 
to  know  it,  be  it  far  from  me  to  disturb,  or  speak 
lightly  of,  so  profound  a  sorrow.  For  myself,  how- 
ever, if  the  relativist  will  allow  me  to  know,  not  being 
in  itself,  but  the  powers,  the  properties  of  being,  I 


48  Review  of  Herbert  Spencer. 

am  content.  The  attributes  of  being  are  its  mani- 
festations ;  and  this  proposition  that  we  cannot  know 
pure  being  amounts  to  the  harmless  truism,  that  un- 
manifested  being  must  remain  unknown. 

These  forms  of  the  relativity  doctrine  give  no  sup- 
port to  nescience,  and  are  but  laborious  attempts  to 
establish  the  truisms,  that  all  knowledge  must  be  re- 
lated to  our  faculties,  and  that  whatever  is  not  thus 
related  cannot  come  into  knowledge  ;  both  of  which 
might  have  been  admitted  beforehand  ;  but  to  establish 
his  theory,  Mr.  Spencer  must  deny  that  our  faculties  u 
give  us  the  real  properties  of  being,  or  the  objective 
reality  of  things.  This  is  what  he  means  ;  and  this 
is  the  tacit  assumption  of  his  entire  argument. 

Mr.  Spencer  is  not  an  idealist.  He  insists  as 
strongly  upon  the  existence  of  a  fundamental  reality 
as  upon  our  ignorance  of  its  nature.  "  It  is  rigor- 
ously impossible  to  conceive  that  our  knowledge  is  a 
knowledge  of  appearances  only,  without  at  the  same 
time  conceiving  a  reality  of  which  they  are  appear^ 
ances  ;  for  appearance  without  reality  is  unthink- 
able."— P.  88.  Now,  it  seems  to  me  that  this  know-V 
nothing  position  is  the  most  untenable  possible  ;  that 
Mr.  Spencer  has  been  so  flushed  with  his  victory  over 
the  "  pseud-ideas  "  as  to  push  the  rout  too  far,  and  in 
,i  attempting  to  drive  them  into  the  abysses,  has  himself 

tumbled  in  after  them.     The  claim  that  all  we  know  is  j 
Tx^^unreal,  and  that  all  we  do  not  know  is  real,  looks  very  I 


Review  of  Herbert  Spencer.  49 

much  like  an  "  untenable  hypothesis."  We  have  already 
seen  what  cruel  contradiction  the  fundamental  reality 
suffers  from  Mr.  Spencer's  own  logic :  I  wish  now  to 
show  that  Mr.  Spencer  must  either  go  farther,  or  not 
so  far ;  that  he  must  either  adopt  absolute  idealism, 
or  admit  the  objective  validity  of  our  knowledge  of 
things.  To  deny  a  thing  to  thought,  and  save  it  to 
existence,  is  impossible  ;  for  to  risk  a  logical  para- 
dox— nothing  which  is  said  to  exist  can  be  declared 
unknowable  until  something  is  known  about  it.  To 
be  unknowable  it  must  fulfill  certain  conditions,  and 
have  certain  marks  to  distinguish  it  from  the  know- 
able  ;  and  unless  one  assumes  a  knowledge  of  its 
nature,  he  cannot  declare  it  unknowable.  In  his 
present  position  this  modern  Samson  parallels  the 
ancient  by  pulling  the  temple  on  his  own  head. 

In  the  statement  that  our  faculties  do  not  give  us 
the  objective  reality  of  things,  we  recognize  at  once 
the  mental  forms  of  Kant.  Let  us  see  the  logical 
result  of  such  teaching. 

Matter  is  said  to  have  form  ;  has  it  really  form  ? 
It  has  for  us,  says  the  know-nothing,  but  it  has  no 
form  in  itself.  Some  higher  intelligence  might  see 
it  as  formless.  Then  the  form  which  I  attribute  to 
it  is  a  phantom  of  my  own  creation. 

Matter  is  said  to  resist ;  has  it  really  any  such 
power  ?  Again,  the  answer  is,  that  matter  "  in  itself" 
has  no  such  power.  We  must  conclude,  then,  that 

the  resistance  of  matter  is  a  fiction  of  the  mind  that 

4 


5O  Review  of  Herbert  Spencer. 

affirms  it ;  as  ghosts  exist  only  in  the  eye  that  sees 
them. 

The  line  of  argument  is  evident.  We  have  but  to 
call  up  in  turn  the  various  attributes  of  matter,  and 
win  from  the  know-nothing  the  confession  that  all  we 
think  we  find  in  matter  is  but  the  shadow  of  the 
mind  itself.  But  how,  then,  do  we  know  that  there  is 
any  "fundamental  reality,"  or  "thing  in  itself ?"  If 
all  that  we  do  know  is  imaginary,  there  seems  to  be 
no  good  reason  for  supposing  that  all  we  do  not  know 
is  real.  If  mental  limits,  or  mental  forms,  can  create 
so  much,  it  is  very  credible  that  they  can  create  the 
thing  outright. 

But  it  is  urged,  in  reply,  the  same  thing  produces 
diverse  effects  upon  different  organisms ;  and  as  the 
reality  cannot  be  like  all  the  reports  given  of  it,  it  is 
most  reasonable  to  suppose  it  like  none  of  them. 
White  light  falling  on  different  objects  has  no  tend- 
ency to  make  them  all  of  the  same  color,  but  rather 
makes  the  particular  color  of  each  more  vivid :  the 
blue  becomes  bluer,  the  green  becomes  greener,  etc. 
If  we  suppose  persons  to  have  eyes  that  see  only 
blue  or  green,  their  judgment  would  undoubtedly  be, 
every  thing  is  blue  or  green.  Now  here  we  have  an 
illustration  of  the  unknown  reality  (white  light)  pro- 
ducing effects  altogether  diverse  from  itself  and  from 
each  other,  (blue  light,  green  light.) 

There  are  a  few  stock  objections  of  this  kind  which 
are  of  as  much  value  to  the  know-nothing  as  the 


SITY, 

Review  of  Herbert  Spencer.  5  1  ;  y 


"  small  child  "  is  to  the  associational  psychologist, 
as  the  charges  of  "  fetichism,"  "  anthropomorphism," 
and  "  bibliolatry,"  are  to  the  theological  iconoclast. 
But  they  amount  to  nothing.  Supposing  such  a 
queer  lot  of  eyes  to  exist,  where  is  the  contradiction  ? 
If  light  is  said  to  be  blue,  green,  etc.,  it  is  only  the 
truth  :  light  is  blue  and  green.  The  error  would  be 
in  affirming  it  to  be  only  blue  or  green.  If  this  error 
be  avoided,  there  is  no  contradiction,  and  no  ground 
for  nescience.  It  is  only  saying  that  one  eye  is 
adapted  to  the  blue  ray,  and  the  other  to  the  green. 

The  same  reasoning  applies  to  the  other  objections 
which  the  know-nothing  is  in  the  habit  of  urging 
against  the  truth  of  the  senses.  His  hypothetical 
senses,  which  are  to  give  such  different  reports  of 
things,  would  in  no  wise  impair  the  credibility  of  the 
faculties  which  we  actually  have.  As  a  result  of 
these  considerations,  I  hold  that  he  must  either 
advance  or  retreat.  If  mental  forms  can  create  so 
much,  they  can  create  all.  If  the  known  has  no  root 
in  reality,  the  unknown  has  surely  no  better  claim. 
Between  absolute  idealism  and  the  admission  that 
our  knowledge  of  things  is  real,  there  is  no  middle 
ground.  No  mental  form,  and  no  relativity  of  thought, 
can  bridge  the  bottomless  pit  between. 

But  do  you  mean  to  say  that  you  have  an  "  abso- 
lute" knowledge  of  things  ?  that  you  know  the  thing 
"in  itself?"  What  an  "absolute"  knowledge,  etc., 
may  be,  I  am  not  entirely  certain.  I  only  mean  to 


52  Review  of  Herbert  Spencer. 

say  that  what  we  seem  to  find  in  a  thing  is  really 
there  ;  that  we  know  the  thing  as  it  is.  There  may 
be  other  beings  whose  faculties  may  present  the 
same  thing  to  them  under  an  altogether  different 
aspect ;  but  in  every  case  the  particular  aspect  which 
the  faculties  do  present  represents  the  thing  as  it  is. 
We  see  a  thing  as  square ;  there  may  be  beings 
whose  faculties  do  not  enable  them  to  apprehend 
form,  but  all  beings  who  can  appreciate  form  see 
that  thing  as  square.  The  squareness  belongs  to 
the  thing.  We  measure  the  speed  of  the  light,  and 
the  distances,  and  magnitudes  of  the  stars  ;  possibly 
some  orders  of  intelligence  might  be  incapable  of  ap- 
preciating these  ideas,  but,  for  all  who  can,  they  re- 
main the  same.  This  is  what  is  meant  by  saying 
that  we  know  the  thing  as  it  is.  I  suspect,  too,  that 
this  "absolute,"  "thing  in  itself/'  "fundamental 
reality,"  etc.,  in  the  way  in  which  the  terms  are 
used,  is  really  the  very  pseudest  of  pseud-ideas. 
Here  is  a  table  which  has  legs,  leaves,  top,  cover,  etc. 
This  is  beyond  question,  this  is  the  thing,  and  this 
is  the  whole  of  it.  If  there  be  any  ghostly,  abso- 
lute-fundamental-reality-thing-in-itself  table  lurking 
around  the  real  one,  I  am  happy  to  admit  that  I 
know  nothing  about  it.  What  do  you  mean  by  the 
thing  "  in  itself,"  apart  from  the  thing  as  it  appears  ? 
How  do  you  know  that  there  is  any  thing  "  in  itself," 
as  distinguished  from  the  phenomenal  thing  ?  This 
"in  itself"  is  simply  a  word-ghost  which  has  been 


Review  of  Herbert  Spencer.  53 

allowed  to  make  a  great  deal  of  disturbance,  but 
which  vanishes  when  interrogated.  Our  claim,  then, 
is,  that  what  we  see  in  things  is  really  in  them,  and 
that  a  denial  of  this  truth  leads  inevitably  to  what 
Mr.  Spencer  calls  the  "  insanities  of  idealism."  His 
claim  that  it  is  impossible  to  get  rid  of  the  conscious- 
ness of  "  an  actuality  lying  behind  appearances,"  and 
that  "  from  this  impossibility  results  our  indestructi- 
ble belief  in  that  actuality,  (p.  97,)  will  in  no  wise 
save  him  from  the  abysses.  We  have  an  irrepressi- 
ble belief  that  we  see  things  as  they  are ;  and  if  we 
could  get  rid  of  one  belief,  we  could  easily  get  rid  of 
the  other.  'The  law  of  thought  which  warrants  the 
existence  of  a  thing,  warrants  also  the  assertion  of 
something  about  it.  The  fundamental  reality  must 
either  come  into  knowledge,  or  go  out  of  existence. 

But  in  insisting  upon  the  validity  of  our  knowledge 
of  matter,  it  is  not  meant  that  we  know  all  about  it. 
As  we  have  seen,  all  knowledge  implies  both  a  thing 
to  know,  and  a  faculty  for  knowing  it.  For  sight  or 
sound,  there  must  be  both  the  external  vibration  and 
the  adapted  organ.  It  is  very  credible  that  new 
senses,  or  even  an  intensifying  of  our  present  facul- 
ties, should  reveal  to  us  properties  now  unknown. 
An  eminent  physicist  has  remarked,  that  the  air  still 
retains  every  sound  intrusted  to  it  since  the  begin- 
ning, and  that  could  our  hearing  be  made  more  acute 
we  might  recover  again  every  sound  and  word  that 
has  ever  floated  out  on  the  airy  tides.  All  about  us 


54  Review  of  Herbert  Spencer. 

there  may  be  forms  of  being  and  of  beauty,  and 
melodies  of  unknown  harmony,  all  unseen  and  un- 
heard, because  they  do  not  come  within  the  range  of 
our  present  powers.  Matter  may  have  a  million  as- 
pects of  which  we  can  form  no  idea  ;  of  these  we  say 
nothing.  But  whatever  sides  it  may  or  may  not 
have,  it  certainly  has  those  which  we  see.  To  be 
sure,  we  know  only  phenomena  or  appearances — two 
words  which  are  saturated  with  illusion — but  then 
things  appear  as  they  are,  and  not  as  they  are  not. 
Indeed,  why  should  it  not  be  so  ?  Why  not  perceive 
the  very  thing,  instead  of  some  phantom  which  has 
no  likeness  to  it  whatever  ? 

The  same  general  observation  is  to  be  made  con- 
cerning the  laws  of  pure  thought,  to  which  this  same 
form  of  relativity  has  been  applied.  We  always 
think  things  in  certain  relations,  as  one  or  many,  as 
substance  or  attribute,  as  cause  or  effect,  as  necessary 
or  contingent.  These  are  the  categories,  the  neces- 
sary affirmations  of  the  human  mind.  They  consti- 
tute the  foundation  of  our  knowledge,  and  the  law  of 
all  our  thinking.  But  the  know-nothing  says  that 
these,  while  true  for  us,  may  not  be  true  for  other 
orders  of  being.  I  admit  that  they  may  be  unknown, 
and  hence  inapplicable  to  other  intelligences,  who 
may  think  things  an  altogether  different  relations ; 
but  our  categories  cannot  be  false  for  them  unless 
they  know  them.  A  thing  of  which  one  has  no 
knowledge  is  neither  false  nor  true  for  him,  but 


Review  of  Herbert  Spencer.  55 

simply  unknown.  Philosophy  would  have  been  saved 
a  great  deal  of  confusion  on  this  point  had  it  been 
kept  in  mind  that  false  and  true  apply  only  to  the 
known.  The  intuitional  philosopher,  assured  of  the 
essential  truth  of  the  categories,  affirms  with  great 
earnestness  that  they  are  true  for  all  possible  intelli- 
gence. But  it  is  by  no  means  impossible  that  other 
order  of  intelligence  should  think  things  in  entirely  dif- 
ferent relations  ;  and  the  nescientist,  perceiving  this, 
denies  the  claim  of  the  intuitionist.  Now,  the  proper 
claim  is  not  that  our  categories  are  the  categories 
of  all  thought,  but  that  they  are  essentially  true.  If 
these  hypothetical  beings — in  whose  existence  I  have 
not  much  faith — can  understand  the  meaning  of  our 
categories,  it  is  impossible  that  they  should  perceive 
them  to  be  false.  There  may  be  beings  without  the 
idea  of  number,  and  to  them  the  equation  3x2  =  6 
would  present  no  idea  whatever,  and  hence  would  be 
neither  false  nor  true,  but  unintelligible.  But  for  all 
who  have  the  idea  of  number,  3  2 -=6  every-where 
and  always.  Mr.  Mill  gravely  suggests  that  24-2  =  4 
for  us,  but  it  is  very  possible  that  in  some  other 
world  2  +  2  =  5.  It  is  possible  that,  in  such  other 
world,  the  equation  should  be  meaningless  ;  but  if  the 
inhabitants  have  a  knowledge  of  numbers,  we  in- 
sist that  it  requires  much  less  faith  to  believe  that 
24-2  =  4  than  to  believe  Mr.  Mill's  equation.  "  What 
presumption  ! "  says  the  know-nothing ;  "  do  you 
mean  to  say  that  the  laws  of  our  thought  are  true  for 


56  Review  of  Herbert  Spencer. 

all  intelligence  ? "  In  the  sense  explained,  I  mean  pre- 
cisely that ;  and  which,  I  ask  in  return,  is  the  greater 
presumption,  to  teach  that  3x2  =  6  every-where  and 
always,  or  to  stultify  one's  self  by  teaching  that  in 
some  corner  or  cranny  of  the  universe,  and  for  some 
transcendent  intelligence,  3  x  2  =  77  ?  There  may  be 
beings  whose  thought-processes  compare  with  ours 
as  the  speed  of  lightning  with  the  pace  of  the  snail ; 
but  the  conclusions  we  reach  in  our  slow  advance  are 
as  true  as  theirs,  though  grasped  with  the  swiftness 
of  light.  We  refrain  from  imposing  our  categories 
upon  other  beings,  but  insist  that  they  are,  neverthe- 
less, true.  To  deny  this  is  to  commit  intellectual 
suicide,  to  identify  light  and  darkness,  cosmos  and 
chaos,  being  and  blank. 

Thus  far  Mr.  Spencer  has  established  nothing  which  ^ 
could  not  have  been  admitted  beforehand.  He  has 
laboriously  proved  two  truisms :  first,  that  all  our  — 
knowledge  must  be  related  to  our  faculties  ;  and  sec- 
ond, that  being,  without  attribute  or  power  or  mani- 
festation of  any  kind,  is  unknowable ;  both  of  which 
may  be  admitted  without  at  all  impairing  the  fact 
that  what  knowledge  our  faculties  do  give  us  is  ob- 
jectively real.  If,  however,  he  chooses  to  deny  this, 
then,  as  we  have  seen,  his  only  landing-place  is  abso- 
lute idealism,  which  Mr.  Spencer  says  is  insanity. 
As  between  religion  and  science,  his  argument  thus 
far  tells  with  equal  force  against  both.  Religion  in- 
volves unthinkable  ideas,  which  fact  Mr.  Spencer  v' 


Review  of  Herbert  Spencer.  57 

looks  upon  as  sufficient  warrant  for  banishing  it  to 
the  outer  darkness  of  the  unknowable.  But  science 
also  involves  equally  unthinkable  ideas,  and  must, 
therefore,  go  along  with  religion.  God,  as  self-exist^ 
ent,  is  an  untenable  hypothesis.  The  fundamental' 
reality  must  also  be  conceived  as  self -existent,  andi 
hence  must  be  set  down  as  an  untenable  hypothesis./ 

But  Mr.  Spencer  has  other  arguments  against  the 
validity  of  religious  knowledge ;  and  though  he  has 
utterly  failed  to  establish  nescience  in  science,  he  ' 
may  possibly  make  it  out  in  religion.  The  peculiar 
nature  of  the  problem  offers  abundant  opportunity  for 
lofty  tumbling,  and  Mr.  Spencer  avails  himself  of  the 
chance  to  exhibit  some  of  the  most  astonishing  acro- 
batic feats  that  philosophy  can  boast  of.  The 
question  is,  Is  God  an  object  of  knowledge  ?  the 
fundamental  proposition  upon  which  the  argument 
is  based  is,  That  God  must  be  conceived  as  first 
cause,  infinite,  and  absolute ;  and  the  claim  is,  that 
these  three  conceptions  land  us  in  bogs  of  contra- 
diction in  which  the  speculative  intellect  can  only 
flounder  and  smother  and  perish.  Mr.  Spencer 
quotes  from  Mr.  Mansel  as  follows : 

"  But  these  three  conceptions,  the  cause,  the  abso- 
lute, and  the  infinite,  all  equally  indispensable,  do 
they  not  imply  contradictions  to  each  other,  when 
viewed  in  conjunction  as  attributes  of  the  same  be- 
ing? A  cause  cannot,  as  such,  be  absolute;  the 


58  Review  of  Herbert  Spencer. 

absolute  cannot,  as  such,  be  a  cause.  The  cause,  as 
such,  exists  only  in  relation  to  its  effect :  the  cause 
is  a  cause  of  the  effect ;  the  effect  is  an  effect  of  the 
cause.  On  the  other  hand,  the  conception  of  the 
absolute  implies  a  possible  existence  out  of  all  rela- 
tion. We  attempt  to  escape  from  this  apparent  con- 
tradiction by  introducing  the  idea  of  succession  in 
time.  The  absolute  exists  first  by  itself,  and  after- 
ward becomes  a  cause.  But  here  we  are  checked  by 
the  third  conception,  that  of  the  infinite.  How  can  the 
infinite  become  that  which  it  was  not  from  the  first  ? 
If  causation  is  a  possible  mode  of  existence,  that  which 
exists  without  causing  is  not  infinite  ;  that  which  be- 
comes a  cause  has  passed  beyond  its  former  limits." 

Before  continuing  the  quotation  let  us  ask  one  or 
two  questions.  If  "the  conception  of  the  absolute 
implies  a  possible  existence  out  of  all  relation,"  not  a 
necessary,  but  a  possible  existence  apart  from  rela- 
tion, in  what  is  its  absoluteness  impaired  if  it  should  \/ 
become  a  cause  ?  Would  the  possibility  of  its  sep- 
arate existence  be  any  the  less  ?  Would  its  inde- 
pendence, which  is  its  true  absoluteness,  be  at  all 
impaired  ?  Certainly  not ;  and  the  whole  of  this  con- 
fusion falls  to  the  ground.  But  Mr.  Spencer  con- 
tinues his  quotation  : 

"  Supposing  the  absolute  to  become  a  cause,  it  will 
follow  that  it  operates  by  means  of  free-will  and  con- 
sciousness. For  a  necessary  cause  cannot  be  con- 
ceived as  absolute  and  infinite.  If  necessitated  by 


Review  of  Herbert  Spencer.  59 

something  beyond  itself,  it  is  thereby  limited  by 
a  superior  power ;  and  if  necessitated  by  itself, 
it  has  in  its  own  nature  a  necessary  relation  to 
its  effect.  The  act  of  causation  must  therefore  be 
voluntary,  and  volition  is  only  possible  in  a  conscious 
being.  But  consciousness,  again,  is  only  conceivable 
as  a  relation.  There  must  be  a  conscious  subject, 
and  an  object  of  which  he  is  conscious.  The  subject 
is  a  subject  to  the  object ;  the  object  is  an  object  to 
the  subject ;  and  neither  can  exist  by  itself  as  the 
absolute.  This  difficulty,  again,  may  be  for  the  mo- 
ment evaded  by  distinguishing  between  the  absolute 
as  related  to  another,  and  the  absolute  as  related  to 
itself.  The  absolute,  it  may  be  said,  may  possibly  be 
conscious,  provided  it  is  only  conscious  of  itself.  But 
this  alternative  is,  in  ultimate  analysis,  no  less  self- 
destructive  than  the  other.  For  the  object  of  con- 
sciousness, whether  a  mode  of  the  subject's  existence 
or  not,  is  either  created  in  and  by  the  act  of  con- 
sciousness, or  has  an  existence  independent  of  it.  In 
the  former  case  the  object  depends  upon  the  sub- 
ject, and  the  subject  alone  is  the  true  absolute.  In 
the  latter  case  the  subject  depends  upon  the  object, 
and  the  object  alone  is  the  true  absolute.  Or  if  we 
attempt  a  third  hypothesis,  and  maintain  that  each 
exists  independently  of  the  other,  we  have  no  abso- 
lute at  all,  but  only  a  pair  of  relatives  ;  for  co-exist- 
ence, whether  in  consciousness  or  not,  is  itself  a 
relation." — P.  39. 


60  Review  of  Herbert  Spencer. 

I  have  often  wondered  whether  Mr.  Mansel  when 
he  wrote  this,  or  Mr.  Spencer  when  he  quoted  it,  was 
really  serious  or  not.  For,  with  the  exception  of  Mr. 
Mill's  famous  conclusion  that  matter  is  an  affection 
of  mind,  and  mind  a  product  of  matter,  this  is  the 
finest  specimen  of  amphibious  logic  I  have  ever  met 
with.  Mr.  Spencer  begins  by  assuming  that  there  is\ 
an  absolute,  and  ends  by  telling  us  that  there  is  no 
absolute  :  "for  co-existence,  whether  in  consciousness  j 
or  not,  is  itself  a  relation."  From  this,  the  conclu- 
sion is  irresistible  that  there  is  now  no  absolute  in 
the  universe,  and  never  will  be  until  God  has  cast  all 
created  being  back  into  nothingness.  For  we  exist ; 
God  co-exists,  and  hence  is  not  absolute  at  present, 
but  relative.  But  if  this  thing  which  can  only  exist 
alone  be  the  true  absolute,  Mr.  Spencer  is  very  right 
in  saying  that  we  cannot  know  it.  For  it  is  plain 
that  the  absolute  cannot  be  this  absolute,  until  we 
have  become  non-existent ;  and  then  there  would  be 
very  grave  obstacles  to  our  pursuit  of  knowledge. 

But  the  absolute  with  which  Mr.  Spencer  began 
the  paragraph  is  one  that  can  co-exist  with  the  rela- 
tive, at  least  we  must  suppose  so  ;  for  it  is  incredible 
that  he  meant  to  waste  all  this  argument  on  a  non- 
existence.  The  conception  of  this  absolute,  he  says, 
"implies  a  possible  existence  out  of  all  relation." 
Mark,  not  a  necessary,  not  even  an  actual  existence 
apart  from  relation,  but  a  possible  one ;  that  is,  an 
existence  dependent  on  nothing  else.  This  absolute 


Review  of  Herbert  Spencer.  6r 

we  cannot  know  because  of  the  hostility  of  the  idea 
of  a  first  cause. 

Now  why  do  we  affirm  absolute  being  at  all  ?  Only 
as  the  support  of  contingent  or  related  being.  What 
kind  of  an  absolute  do  we  affirm  ?  Not  one  out  of 
all  relation,  but  out  of  necessary  or  dependent  rela- 
tion. Mr.  Spencer  recognizes  this  in  his  definition, 
and  forgets  it  in  his  application.  In  the  definition  it 
is  what  holds  no  necessary  relation.  "  Its  conception 
implies  a  possible  existence  apart  from  all  relation." 
In  the  reasoning  it  becomes  that  which  must  exist 
apart  from  all  relation,  as  in  the  example  quoted  : 
"  co-existence,  whether  in  consciousness  or  not,  is  it- 
self a  relation."  Now  the  absence  of  restriction,  not 
the  absence  of  relation,  is  the  characteristic  of  the  only 
absolute  that  can  be  rationally  affirmed.  The  only  ab- 
solute being  that  we  know  is  found  in  causal  connec- 
tion with  the  universe,  and  is  affirmed  for  the  sole 
and  single  purpose  of  supplying  a  landing-place  for 
our  thought.  We  rise  to  that  being  by  the  law  of 
causation ;  but,  forsooth,  we  cannot  leave  it  by  the 
same  law.  This  absolute  of  Mr.  Spencer's  is  the 
veriest  in  grate :  it  owes  its  existence  to  the  law  of 
causation — for  we  should  never  affirm  an  absolute,  ex- 
cept as  the  support  of  related  being — and  now,  like 
some  naughty  children,  it  refuses  to  acknowledge  its 
parentage.  At  the  bare  mention  of  cause,  it  begms 
to  bristle  up,  puts  on  airs,  and  declares  that,  being 
absolute,  it  knows  nothing  about  causes.  The  fact 


62  Review  of  Herbert  Spencer. 

is  that  this  absolute,  which  Hamilton,  Mansel,  and 
Spencer  have  conjured  up,  is  a  myth  of  their  own%^ 
imaginations,  and  has  no  other  existence.  Philoso- 
phy has  allowed  itself  to  be  browbeaten,  and  knowl- 
edge has  disowned  itself,  at  the  bidding  of  a  non- 
existence.  All  the  arguments  of  these  doughty 
philosophers  about  the  incompatibility  of  the  con- 
ceptions of  the  absolute  and  the  first  cause  are 
reduced  to  idle  words,  by  the  fact  that  the  only  abso- 
lute in  which  there  is  the  slightest  reason  for  believ- 
ing, is  known  as  the  first  cause.  Of  course,  such  an 
absolute  God  will  be  in  relation  to  his  universe,  and  * 
hence  will  be  knowable,  for  the  relative  is  conceded 
to  knowledge. 

Hamilton  and  Mansel  taught  that  our  conception  v 
of  the  absolute  is  purely  negative.  Mr.  Spencer 
seeing  that  this  view  must  lead  to  a  negation  of  the 
absolute,  since  a  negative  conception  can  represent 
nothing  positive,  sets  himself  to  oppose  it.  In  so 
doing  he  comes  very  near  the  true  doctrine  of  the 
absolute,  but  in  saving  the  doctrine  he  makes  sad 
work  with  his  philosophy.  He  says  : 

"  Our  conception  of  the  relative  itself  disappears 
if  our  conception  of  the  absolute  is  a  pure  negation. 
...  It  is  admitted,  or  rather  contended,  that  the 
consciousness  of  a  relation  implies  a  consciousness 
of  both  the  related  members.  If  we  are  required  to 
conceive  the  relation  between  the  relative  and  the 
non-relative,  without  being  conscious  of  both,  we  are 


Review  of  Herbert  Spencer.  63 

in  fact  required  to  compare  that  of  which  we  are  con- 
scious with  that  of  which  we  are  not  conscious — the 
act  itself  being  an  act  of  consciousness,  and  only 
possible  through  a  consciousness  of  both  its  objects. 
What  then  becomes  of  the  assertion  that  '  the  abso- 
lute is  conceived  merely  by  a  negation  of  conceiv- 
ability,'  or  as  '  the  mere  absence  of  the  conditions 
under  which  thought  is  possible?'  If  the  absolute 
is  present  in  thought  only  as  a  mere  negation,  then 
the  relation  between  it  and  the  relative  becomes  un- 
thinkable, because  one  of  the  terms  of  the  relation  is 
absent  from  consciouness.  And  if  this  relation  is 
unthinkable,  then  is  the  relative  itself  unthinkable 
for  want  of  its  antithesis,  whence  results  the  disap- 
pearance of  all  thought  whatever." — P.  91. 

Mark,  we  are  forever  told  that  we  can  never  be  L., 
conscious  of  the  absolute.  "  It  is  thus  manifest  that 
a  consciousness  of  the  absolute  is  equally  self-con- 
tradictory with  that  of  the  infinite."  "  It  is  thus 
manifest  that,  even  if  we  could  be  conscious  of  the 
absolute,  we  could  not  possibly  know  that  it  is  the 
absolute ;  and  as  we  can  be  conscious  of  an  object, 
as  such,  only  by  knowing  it  to  be  what  it  is,  this  is 
equivalent  to  an  admission  that  we  cannot  be  con- 
scious of  the  absolute  at  all."  "  As  an  object  of  con- 
sciousness, every  thing  is  necessarily  relative/' — 
P.  78.  In  the  argument  just  quoted,  however,  its 
necessary  existence  in  consciousness  is  insisted 
upon.  We  must  have  a  consciousness  of  the  abso- 


64  Review  of  Herbert  Spencer. 

lute,  or  all  thought  is  impossible.  We  are  told,  too, 
that  the  absolute  cannot  enter  into  a  relation. 
here  we  learn  that,  unless  it  is  known  in  relation  and 
antithesis  to  the  relative,  there  is  no  thinking  possi- 
ble. I  yield  the  point ;  the  reasoning  is  too  cogent 
for  resistance.  I  believe  with  Mr.  Spencer  that  our 
thinking  goes  in  pairs,  as  finite  and  infinite,  relative 
and  absolute  ;  and  that  these  appear  and  disappear 
together.  But  this  makes  the  absolute  a  relative, 
cancels  the  alleged  nescience,  and  brings  it  once 
more  within  the  domain  of  thought  and  knowledge. 

All  this  is  the  sheerest  jugglery ;  it  is  not  argu-v 
ment,  but  logical  thimble-rigging.  God  is  related  to 
the  universe,  and  in  such  relation  we  are  not  even 
forbidden  to  know  him.  Of  what  use,  then,  to  tell  us 
that,  apart  from  all  relation  to  his  creation,  we  could 
not  know  him  ?  If  there  were  no  other  being  than 
God,  we,  being  non-existent,  could  not  know  him.  If 
God  were  all  alone  in  a  mighty  void,  without  any 
manifestation  of  power,  wisdom,  or  character,  no 
more  a  being  than  a  blank,  indifferently  existent  and 
non-existent — for  to  deny  the  absolute  the  power  of 
becoming  non-existent  would  be  a  limitation — then 
I  grant  that  we  could  never  know  him,  and  would 
not  care  to  know  him.  But  what  does  this  amount 
to  ?  It  is  a  labored  attempt  to  prove  that  in  eternal 
darkness  there  would  be  no  light,  and  no  sound  in 
everlasting  silence.  This  most  petty,  pitiful,  and 
barren  conclusion  is  all  that  is  reached  ;  while  the 


Review  of  Herbert  Spencer.  65 

unhappy  looker-on,  entangled  in  verbal  confusions, 
and  dazzled  with  a  show  of  logic  and  science,  is  left 
to  infer  that  we  know  nothing  of  God,  or  his  will  con- 
cerning us.  The  God  who  has  revealed  himselfin  the 
universe,  the  author  of  its  glorious  beauty,  the  preserv- 
er of  its  eternal  order,  the  infinite  purity  and  holiness, 
this  God  we  are  permitted  to  know,  and  with  this 
we  can  be  content.  The  living  God  of  the  Bible  is 
is  left  us  ;  the  sleeping  Brahma  of  the  know-nothing 
we  cheerfully  resign  to  the  worshiper  of  the  absolute. 

But,  finally,  God  is  infinite,  and  hence  we  cannot  ^ 
know  him.  Mr.  Spencer  has  some  argument  on  this 
head  which  must  be  noticed.  As  in  the  case  of  the 
absolute  we  remarked  a  perpetual  shuffling  from  one 
definition  to  another,  so  here  there  is  a  constant 
shifting  from  the  metaphysical  infinite,  which  is  the 
all,  to  an  infinite  which  can  co-exist  with  the  finite. 
In  a  passage  already  quoted,  Mr.  Spencer  says,  "  If 
causation  is  a  possible  mode  of  existence,  then  that 
which  exists  without  causing  is  not  infinite."  There 
is  no  end  to  the  absurdities  that  could  be  evolved  by 
employing  the  principle  of  this  argument.  Thus  there 
are  degrees  of  activity,  and  as  long  as  the  highest 
degree  is  not  maintained,  the  possibilities  of  action 
are  not  filled  up,  and  the  infinite  is  not  the  infinite. 
The  infinite,  then,  must  always  be  infinitely  active, 
upon  pain  of  losing  its  infinity.  Thus,  not  only 
would  the  infinite  have  its  hands  full  to  keep 


66  Review  of  Herbert  Spencer. 

up  with  its  work,  but  we  are  met  with  another 
difficulty :  that  which  is  compelled  is  in  subjection, 
and  hence  cannot  be  infinite.  In  spite  of  its  infinite 
efforts  it  would  be  forced  to  take  a  back  seat,  and 
allow  the  compelling  principle  to  assume  the  throne. 
But,  not  to  repeat  the  same  process  with  the  second 
infinite,  we  are  met  by  still  other  difficulties  ;  this 
same  argument  can  be  used  to  show  that  any  being 
which  does  not  include  in  itself  all  other  beings,  and 
all  evil,  however  vile,  is  not  infinite.  Envy  and 
malice,  and  all  the  depths  of  iniquity,  are  possible 
modes  of  existence.  Are  we  to  conclude,  then,  that 
a  God  who  is  not  envious  and  malicious  is  not  infi- 
nite ?  At  all  events,  it  would  be  a  blessing  not  to 
know  such  an.  infinite.  Again,  if  the  infinite  includes 
all  being,  it  includes  us  also  ;  in  which  case,  since  we 
belong  to  the  infinite,  there  seems  to  be  no  reason 
why  we  should  not  know  the  infinite.  Or,  possibly, 
the  infinite  is  the  only  reality,  and  we  are  shows  and 
shadows  ;  in  which  case  the  question  disappears  into 
zero  along  with  us.  There  is  no  end,  I  say  again,  to. 
the  absurdities  that  may  be  evolved  by  employing 
the  principle  of  Mr.  Spencer's  argument. 

When  we  inquired  after  the  origin  of  our  idea 
of  the  absolute,  we  found  that  Hamilton  and 
his  followers  had  been  busying  themselves  with  a 
myth  of  their  own  fancy,  in  whose  actual  existence 
there  is  not  even  the  shadow  of  a  reason  for  believ- 
ing. To  put  all  their  arguments  to  rout,  it  was  only 


Review  of  Herbert  Spencer.  67 

necessary  to  inquire  what  kind  of  an  absolute  the 
mind  really  does  affirm.  So  in  the  case  of  the  in- 
finite, the  argument  is  altogether  about  a  nonentity. 
The  metaphysical  infinite  to  which  Mr.  Spencer's 
reasoning  only  applies  is  but  a  fancy  of  the  meta-*-/-- 
physicians.  All  knowledge  assumes  the  reality  of 
self.  If  we  are  not  sure  of  our  own  existence  we  are 
sure  of  nothing.  We  are  sure,  too,  that  we  are  our- 
selves, and  not  some  other.  Now  any  doctrine  which 
traverses  these  certainties  breaks  down  the  possi- 
bility of  any  knowledge.  If  we  can  be  deceived  in 
these  things,  we  can  be  sure  of  nothing  whatever. 
Now  the  metaphysical  infinite  about  which  Mr. 
Spencer  is  reasoning,  does  just  this  thing.  Either 
we  lose  our  personality  in  the  infinite,  or  we  lose  it 
in  zero ;  we  are  merged  into  the  infinite,  or  we 
vanish  into  the  void ;  and  either  alternative  makes 
all  knowledge  impossible.  The  very  affirmation  of 
such  an  infinite  is  suicidal.  The  moment  that  it  is 
made  all  our  beliefs  become  untrustworthy,  and  all 
argument  must  cease.  And  yet  we  have  great  phi-  \ 
losophers,  like  Hamilton,  constructing  this  elaborate 
contradiction,  and  then  parading  the  thing  about  as 
beyond  the  scope  of  knowledge.  And  philosophy 
turns  pale,  and  religion  takes  its  flight,  at  the  bid- 
ding of  this  wretched  metaphysical  abortion.  The 
only  infinite  being  in  whom  there  is  any  warrant 
whatever  for  believing,  is  one  whose  notice  nothing 
can  escape,  and  whose  power  nothing  can  defy  ; 


68  Review  of  Herbert  Spencer. 

whose  years  are  eternal,  and  whose  wisdom  compre- 
hends all  being.  This  is  the  omy  infinity  that  can 
be  rationally  attributed  to  God.  I  grant,  nay,  insist,  v 
that  God  is  not  metaphysically  infinite.  If,  however, 
any  one  feels  aggrieved  at  this  claim,  he  is  at  liberty 
to  go  into  mourning  over  his  miserable  abstraction 
as  soon  as  he  pleases.  Common  minds  cannot  un- 
derstand, much  less  sympathize  with,  so  profound 
a  grief.  Now,  against  the  knowledge  of  such  an  infi- 
nite as  I  have  mentioned,  there  is  not  a  word  of  valid 
argument  in  all  that  has  been  written  on  this  subject. 
The  God  who  upholds  all  things  by  the  word  of  his 
power,  and  rules  in  heaven  and  in  earth,  is  conceded 
to  our  knowledge.  All  that  is  made  out  is  that  if 
God  were  every  thing  and  we  nothing,  our  pursuit  of 
knowledge  would  be  very  much  embarrassed. 

However,  not  to  rest  too  much  on  my  own  repre- 
sentation, I   shall  allow  Mr.  Spencer  to   argue  his 
own  case.     Against  a  knowledge  of  the  infinite,  he  v/ 
urges  the  following  difficulties  : 

"The  very  conception  of  consciousness,  in  what- 
ever mode  it  may  be  manifested,  necessarily  implies 
distinction  between  one  object  and  another.  To  be 
conscious,  we  must  be  conscious  of  something ;  and 
that  something  can  only  be  known  as  what  it  is, 
by  being  distinguished  from  that  which  it  is  not. 
But  distinction  is  necessarily  limitation ;  for  if  one 
object  is  to  be  distinguished  from  another,  it  must 
possess  some  form  of  existence  which  the  other  has 


Review  of  Herbert  Spencer.  69 

not,  or  it  must  not  possess  some  form  which  the 
other  has.  But  it  is  obvious  that  the  infinite 
cannot  be  distinguished  from  the  finite  by  the 
absence  of  any  quality  which  the  finite  possesses, 
for  such  absence  would  be  a  limitation.  Nor 
yet  can  it  be  distinguished  by  the  presence  of  an 
attribute  which  the  finite  has  not  {  for,  as  no  finite 
part  can  be  a  constituent  of  an  infinite  wholeMhis 
differential  characteristic  must  itself  be  infinite*;  and 
must  at  the  same  time  have  nothing  in  common 
with  the  finite.  We  are  thus  thrown  back  upon  our 
former  impossibility  ;  for  this  second  infinite  will  be 
distinguished  from  the  finite  by  the  absence  of  qual- 
ities which  the  latter  possesses.  A  consciousness 
of  the  infinite,  as  such,  thus  necessarily  involves  a 
self-contradiction ;  for  it  implies  the  recognition, 
by  limitation  and  difference,  of  that  which  can  only 
be  given  as  unlimited  and  indifferent." — P.  76. 

This  argument  relates  only  to  that  metaphysical 
infinite,  which  we  have  already  seen  to  be  a  myth,  and 
which  therefore  needs  no  further  notice.  One  of  the 
great  fallacies  of  this  philosophy,  however,  appears  here 
— that  to  know  things  by  distinction  and  difference  is 
a  mental  weakness.  Now,  I  do  not  like  to  be  presump- 
tuous ;  but,  with  all  deference  to  the  great  philoso- 
phers who  have  held  this  view,  I  must  think  that  the 
reason  why  we  know  things  by  difference  is  that  they 
are  different.  If  they  differed  not  in  attribute,  nor 
in  space,  nor  in  time,  they  would  be  the  same.  This 


70  Revieiv  of  Herbert  Spencer. 

power  of  knowing  things  apart  is  a  weakness,  is  it  ? 
Are  we  to  suppose,  then,  that  there  is  some  absolute 
or  transcendent  intellect  which  sees  all  things  alike, 
detecting  no  difference  between  yes  and  no,  good 
and  evil,  being  and  blank  ?  Such  a  thing  would 
be,  not  absolute  intelligence,  but  absolute  insanity. 
Because  we  are  not  thus  highly  gifted,  it  is  held  that 
we  cannot  know  the  infinite  ! 

But,  for  the  sake  of  progress  in  the  argument,  let 
us  grant  that  we  cannot  reach  the  infinite ;  still,  before* 
the  impossibility  of  communion  is  affirmed,  another 
question  must  be  considered  :  Can  the  infinite  reach 
us  ?  This  is  a  question  which  Mr.  Spencer  entirely 
ignores.  Intent  only  on  casting  opprobrium  upon  v 
the  human  faculties,  he  forgets  that,  at  the  same 
time,  he  is  charging  inabilities  upon  the  infinite  too. 
The  moment  we  read  the  question  in  this  order,  all 
Mr.  Spencer's  arguments  turn  traitor,  and  fire  into 
his  own  ranks.  Inasmuch  as  the  infinite  includes 
all  possibilities,  it  of  course  includes  the  possibility 
of  self-revelation.  Mr.  Spencer  is  often  praised  for 
his  "  severe  logic,"  and  I  have  even  seen  him  styled  a 
"  modern  Aristotle  "  by  some  enthusiastic  admirer  ; 
but  I  confess  that  passages  like  the  following  stag- 
ger me :  "  But  it  is  obvious  that  the  infinite  cannot 
be  distinguished,  as  such,  from  the  finite  by  the 
absence  of  any  quality  which  the  finite  possesses, 
for  such  absence  would  be  a  limitation." — P.  77. 
On  reading  this  I  took  heart ;  the  infinite  is  all  that 


Review  of  Herbert  Spencer.  71 

the  finite  is,  and  more.  It  is  their  living,  conscious 
intelligence.  It  is,  too,  a  free  mind  like  our  own. 
In  it  abide  all  thoughts  of  beauty,  and  all  love  of 
good.  One  phase  of  the  infinite  lies  over  against 
our  finite  nature,  and  runs  parallel  with  it ;  and 
through  that  phase  the  finite  and  the  infinite  can 
commune.  All  these  beliefs  I  based  upon  Mr. 
Spencer's  declaration.  But  my  satisfaction  was 
short-lived.  On  page  1 1 1,  the  claim  that  "  the  uni- 
verse is  the  manifestation  and  abode  of  a  free  mind 
like  our  own,"  is  given  as  an  illustration  of  the 
"  impiety  of  the  pious."  Is  it  possible  ?  Why,  have 
we  not  just  learned  that  the  infinite  must  have 
all  that  the  finite  has  ?  Is  this  the  "  severe  logic  " 
of  the  "  modern  Aristotle  ? "  I  wonder  what  the 
ancient  Aristotle  would  have  said  to  this !  The 
infinite  must  be  every  thing ;  yet,  to  say  that  it  is 
living,  conscious  intelligence  is  the  vilest  fetichism. 
It  must  possess  all  power  and  transcend  all  law,  yet 
has  not  the  power  of  revelation.  Able  to  sow  space 
with  suns  and  systems,  to  scatter  beauty  broadcast 
like  the  light,  to  maintain  the  whole  in  everlasting 
rhythm ;  but  utterly  unable  to  reach  the  human 
soul !  Mr.  Spencer  has  much  to  say  about  contra- 
dictions ;  let  the  reader  judge  whose  is  the  contra- 
diction here.  By  his  own  reasoning  he  is  involvedx 
in  the  most  perfect  dilemma  possible :  if  God  be 
infinite  he  can  reach  us  ;  if  not  infinite  we  can  reach  ; 
him.  In  either  case  communion  is  possible. 


72  Revieiv  of  Herbert  Spencer. 

But  here,  as  in  the  case  of  matter,  while  insisting 
upon  a  real  knowledge  of  God,  I  am  very  far  from 
claiming  a  complete  one.  Religion  does  not  pretend 
to  give  a  rationale  of  the  Divine  existence  any  more 
than  of  our  own.  The  mystery  of  existence  is 
equally  insoluble  in  both  cases  ;  and  some  facts, 
not  some  explanations,  are  all  that  can  possibly 
be  given.  "Who  can  search  out  the  Almighty  to 
perfection  ? "  has  been  the  language  of  the  best  re- 
ligious thinkers  from  the  time  of  Job  until  now.  As 
little,  if  not  less,  patience  is  due  to  those  geog- 
raphers of  the  Divine  nature  who  know  every  thing, 
as  to  the  know-nothing  who  leaves  us  in  total 
ignorance.  All  that  is  claimed  is  that  we  have  a 
real,  though  finite,  knowledge  of  the  Deity — not  an 
infinite  thought,  but  a  finite  thought  about  the  infi- 
nite, which,  like  the  infinite  series  of  the  mathe- 
matician, is  true  as  far  as  it  goes,  though  car- 
ried to  only  a  limited  number  of  terms.  All  our 
science  and  all  our  theology  are  but  the  slightest 
surface-play  on  the  bosom  of  fathomless  mystery ; 
but  this  is  a  very  different  thing  from  saying  that 
what  we  do  know  is  untrustworthy.  Measureless 
mystery  wraps  us  round,  and  gulfs  of  nescience  yawn 
on  every  side,  but  what  we  do  know  is  sure.  The 
little  island  of  knowledge,  though  washed  on  every 
side  by  the  boundless  ocean  of  the  unknown,  is  still 
anchored  in  reality,  and  is  not  a  cloud-bank  which 
may  at  any  moment  disappear  into  the  void.  This 


Review  of  Herbert  Spencer.  73 

is  our  claim,  and  its  denial  can  only  result  in  "  the 
insanities  of  idealism." 


But  it  is  time  to  bring  this  discussion  to  a  close. 
We  have  met  with  laborious  proofs  of  truisms,  and 
have  wandered  through  mazes  of  paralogisms  which 
have  disappeared  upon  accurate  definition.  Nothing 
has  been  made  out  that  could  not  have  been  admitted 
beforehand.  The  argument  has  been  made  up  of 
"  words,  words,  words " — of  words  either  without 
meaning,  or  with  a  totally  false  one.  The  terms  ab- 
solute and  infinite,  upon  which  so  much  reliance  is 
placed,  are  found  upon  examination  to  totally  repu- 
diate the  meaning  put  upon  them.  I  shall  give  one 
more  quotation  from  Mr.  Spencer's  discussion  of  the 
unknowable,  and  it  is  a  fit  companion  to  the  con- 
fusions already  noticed.  There  is  an  old  satire  often 
urged  against  religion  ;  so  old,  indeed,  that  what  little 
point  it  ever  had  has  been  lost  for  ages.  It  runs  back 
to  the  time  of  Xenophanes,  and  has  been  repeated  in 
various  ways  ever  since.  Xenophanes  used  oxen  and 
lions  for  comparison.  Mr.  Theodore  Parker  improved 
on  this,  and  introduced  the  novelty  of  a  buffalo.  He 
supposes  that  a  buffalo,  arguing  as  the  natural  theo- 
logians do,  would  conclude  that  God  has  horns  and 
hoofs.  I  have  even  known  a  mole  to  be  used  to 
illustrate  this  powerful  irony.  Of  course  the  inge- 
nious  and  witty  conclusion  was  that  a  mole  could 
only  argue  to  a  God  with  fur  and  paws.  Mr.  Spencer 


74  Review  of  Herbert  Spencer. 

believes  that  "  volumes  might  be  written  on  the  im- 
piety of  the  pious/'  and  he  accordingly  proceeds  to 
lash  said  impiety  by  dressing  up  the  old  satire  in 
this  form  : 

"  The  attitude  thus  assumed  can  be  fitly  repre- 
sented only  by  developing  a  simile  long  current  in 
theological  controversies — the  simile  of  the  watch. 
If  for  a  moment  we  made  the  grotesque  supposition 
that  the  tickings  and  other  movements  of  a  watch 
constituted  a  kind  of  consciousness,  and  that  a 
watch  possessed  of  such  consciousness  insisted  upon 
regarding  the  watchmaker's  actions  as  determined, 
like  its  own,  by  springs  and  escapements,  we  should 
only  complete  a  parallel  of  which  religious  teachers 
think  much.  And  were  we  to  suppose  that  a  watch, 
not  only  formulated  the  cause  of  its  existence  in 
these  mechanical  terms,  but  held  that  watches  were 
bound  out  of  reverence  so  to  formulate  this  cause, 
and  even  vituperated  as  atheistic  watches  any  that 
did  not  so  venture  to  formulate  it,  we  should  merely 
illustrate  the  presumption  of  theologians  by  carrying 
their  own  arguments  a  step  further." — P.  no. 

This  is  extremely  severe,  no  doubt ;  and  if  theo- 
logians taught  that  God  has  legs  and  arms,  parts  and 
passions,  the  satire  might  have  some  point ;  but 
since  they  expressly  forbid  such  an  assumption,  it 
is  difficult  to  tell  where  the  force  of  the  "grotesque 
supposition  "  lies.  For  if  that  philosophical  buffalo, 
that  ingenious  mole,  and  that  "grotesque"  watch, 


Review  of  Herbert  Spencer.  75 

should  argue,  not  to  horns  and  hoofs,  fur  and  paws, 
"  springs  and  escapements,"  but  to  intelligence  in 
their  maker,  they  would  not  be  very  far  astray.  If 
this  thinking,  conscious  watch  should  infer  that  it 
had  a  thinking,  conscious  maker,  it  would  be  on  the 
right  track.  Only  remember  that  religion  does  not 
attribute  organs  and  form  to  God,  and  the  logical 
value  of  the  "  grotesque  supposition  "  is  all  gone  ; 
though,  to  be  sure,  the  wit  remains  to  please  us. 
And  now  that  Mr.  Spencer  has  kindly  developed  the  *- 
simile,  I  know  not  that  his  own  attitude  can  be 
more  fitly  represented  than  by  its  further  develop- 
ment. Suppose  that  this  grotesque  watch  should  turn 
know-nothing,  and  insist  that  a  belief  in  a  thinking, 
conscious  watchmaker  is  fetichism,  and  should  begin 
to  "  vituperate "  all  watches  who  were  stupid  and 
superstitious  enough  to  believe  in  a  watchmaker, 
instead  of  adopting  the  higher  and  truer  view  that 
watches  evolve  themselves  from  the  unknowable  by 
changing  "from  an  indefinite,  incoherent  homoge- 
neity to  a  definite,  coherent  heterogeneity,  through 
continuous  differentiations  and  integrations ; "  why 
clearly  the  watch  would  make  a  fool  of  itself,  espe- 
cially if  it  "  vituperated  "  at  any  great  length.  And 
all  this  but  illustrates  Mr.  Spencer's  presumption  by-/ 
carrying  his  own  argument  a  step  further.  I  mean 
no  disrespect  to  Aristotle,  either  the  ancient  or  the 
modern ;  but  I  must  think  that,  until  this  metaphor- 
ical watch  turned  know-nothing,  and  began  to  vitu- 


76  Review  of  Herbert  Spencer. 

perate  its  simpler  neighbors,  it  ticked  off  better  logic 
than  Mr.  Spencer  has  done. 

My  excuse  for  this  long  and  dry  discussion  is  the 
religious  importance  of  the  question.  The  only  im- 
portant bearing  of  the  nescience  doctrine  is  a  religious 
one.  Science  would  go  on  in  just  the  same  way 
as  at  present,  collecting  and  coordinating  its  facts, 
though  the  facts  were  proved  to  be  phantoms.  Com- 
mon life  would  experience  no  change.  The  most 
thorough-going  know-nothing  would  be  as  eager  to 
get  bread  as  the  realist ;  he  would  be  as  careful  to 
keep  out  of  a  relative  fire  or  a  relative  river,  as  out 
of  an  absolute  one.  In  all  these  cases  the  practical 
necessity  would  override  the  speculative  error. 

But  it  is  not  so  in  morals  and  religion.  There  we 
are  not  forced  to  act ;  there  we  are  constantly  seek- 
ing some  excuse  for  inaction.  Even  the  suspicion 
that  our  religious  ideas  are  delusions  leads  to  a 
speedy  relaxation  of  moral  effort ;  as  they  know  too 
well  who  have  at  any  time  made  nescience  their  the- 
ology. To  declare  our  knowledge  imperfect  and 
inadequate,  is  admissible ;  but  to  declare  it  utterly 
false,  is  fatal  to  religion.  It  is  useless  to  leave  us  our 
religious  ideas  as  regulative  truths — that  is,  things 
good  for  us  to  believe,  but  without  foundation  in  fact. 
A  regulative  truth  will  regulate  until  one  discovers 
the  fraud ;  but  he  must  have  very  little  knowledge 
of  human  nature  who  imagines  that  it  will  have  any 
authority  after  the  trick  has  been  found  out.  These 


Review  of  Herbert  Spencer.  77 

gleams  of  good  that  sometimes  visit  us,  these  occa- 
sional intimations  of  a  solemn  beauty  and  a  perfect 
purity,  these  undying  suspicions  of  conscience  which 
we  have  fancied  are  tokens  of  a  will  and  holiness 
more  august  than  our  own — all  these  things,  which 
we  thought  point  upward  to  God,  are  found  to  point • 
nowhere,  and  are  but  magnificent  will-o'-the-wisps. 
Why  pursue  them  ?  It  might  be  safe  to  follow  them, 
but  it  might  also  be  dangerous.  Who  can  tell  into 
what  bogs  they  may  lead  and  leave  one  ?  The  only 
rational  thing  to  do  is  to  ignore  them.  Proved  to  be 
phantoms,  they  shall  delude  us  no  longer.  No,  out 
of  this  blank  abyss  of  total  darkness,  neutral  alike 
to  good  and  evil,  no  inspiration  of  the  soul  can  come. 
Religion  cannot  live  on  nescience,  and  reverence  is 
impossible  toward  a  blank.  Though,  to  be  sure,  we 
now  see  through  a  glass  darkly,  yet  the  image  there- 
discerned  must  not  be  wholly  distorted.  As  we 
think  of  the  infinite  past  and  the  infinite  to  come,  it 
becomes  plain  that  there  is  much  in  the  Infinite  One 
which  we  can  never  hope  to  understand,  but  upon 
which  we  can  only  gaze  ;  yet  must  not  all  be  wrapped 
in  shadow  ;  something  must  pierce  through  to  the  ... 
sunlight  and  the  clear  blue.  In  contemplating  Him 
we  shall  ever  be  as  men  watching  in  the  darkness 
of  early  dawn,  with  a  deep  sense  of  awe  and  mystery 
pressing  upon  us  ;  still  there  must  be  some  glow  upon 
the  hill-tops  and  a  flush  in  the  upper  air.  There 
must,  indeed,  be  a  solemn  silence  that  reverence 


78  Review  of  Herbert  Spencer. 

may  bow  low  and  worship ;  but  there  must  also  be 
a  voice  which  we  can  trust,  bidding  us  be  not  afraid. 
The  absence  of  either  of  these  elements  would  lead, 
I  believe,  to  the  decay  of  all  true  religion.  In  the 
God  who  commands  our  reverence  and  our  loving 
worship,  there  must  be  mystery,  and  there  must  be 
manifestation. 


Review  of  Herbert  Spencer.  79 


CHAPTER  III. 

LAWS    OF   THE    KNOWABLE. 

THE  "  Laws  of  the  Knowable"  constitute  Part  II 
of  Mr.  Spencer's  First  Principles.  Part  I  has 
already  been  examined,  and  its  principles  have  been 
found  to  be  self-destructive.  We  have  now  to  in- 
quire whether  Part  II  is  any  more  worthy  of  the  high 
reputation  it  has  acquired. 

Part  II  has  a  very  ambitious  aim.  It  is,  in  brief, 
an  attempt  to  rewrite  the  book  of  Genesis  on  the 
a  priori  plan,  and  from  a  scientific  stand-point.  Hav- 
ing in  Part  I  safely  landed  all  absolute  knowledge, 
including  the  knowledge  of  God,  in  the  realm  of  the 
unknowable,  Mr.  Spencer  next  proceeds  to  show,  by 
reasoning  on  our  ideas  of  matter  and  force,  and  by 
generalizations  from  known  scientific  laws,  how  the 
universe,  including  both  life  and  mind,  has  necessa- 
rily  evolved  itself  from  the  primitive  star-dust,  and 
that,  too,  without  any  guiding  intelligence.  Assum- 
ing the  existence  of  a  diffused  nebulous  matter,  and 
admitting  the  validity  of  our  ideas  of  matter  and 
force,  the  cosmos  must  have  become  what  it  is.  Mr. 
Spencer  not  only  attempts  to  support  this  proposi- 
tion, but  also  to  exhibit  the  method  by  which  the 
primal  cloud-bank,  without  any  directing  mind,  has 


80  Review  of  Herbert  Spencer. 

spun  and  woven  itself  into  a  universe  which  seems  a 
miracle  of  design.  The  scheme  is  certainly  a  bold 
one,  and  demands  unbounded  confidence  in  logical 
architecture.  When  Mr.  Darwin  presents  his  limited 
doctrine  of  the  origin  of  species,  we  feel  that  there  is 
an  enormous  disproportion  between  the  vast  conclu- 
sion and  the  scanty  evidence ;  but  when  the  problem 
is  to  give  an  a  priori  recipe  for  the  universe,  this 
feeling  is  greatly  increased.  Nothing  but  a  very 
secure  set  of  first  principles  can  justify  such  a  pro- 
cedure. If  these  have  the  slightest  parallax  with  the 
truth,  the  conclusions  based  upon  them  will  be  utterly 
untrustworthy  at  the  distances  to  which  he  extends 
them.  But  let  us  judge  nothing  beforehand. 

Mr.  Spencer  evidently  feels  relieved  at  escaping 
from  the  darkness  of  the  unknowable  into  the  day- 
light of  the  knowable.  His  subterranean  gropings 
fettered  his  free  movement,  and  it  is  with  a  sigh  of 
relief  that  he  emerges  again  into  the  upper  air.  The 
"  pseud-ideas "  are  all  safely  locked  up  below,  and  a 
permanent  injunction  has  been  placed  upon  religion. 
No  more  trouble  is  to  be  expected  from  that  quarter, 
and  science  has  the  field  to  itself  at  last.  But  no 
sooner  does  Mr.  Spencer  begin  his  scientific  discus- 
sion, than  it  clearly  appears  that  he  has  not  left  all 
the  "pseud-ideas"  in  the  dungeons  below,  but  has 
smuggled  a  few  of  them  over  the  borders  of  the 
knowable  for  his  own  private  use.  Or,  possibly,  he 
believes  with  Emerson,  that  "  a  foolish  consistency  is 


Review  of  Herbert  Spencer.  8 1 

the  bugbear  of  weak  minds."  At  all  events,  in  writ- 
ing Part  II  he  is  at  no  pains  to  remember  the  philo- 
sophical principles  established  in  Part  I.  In  Part  I 
we  learn  that  a  self-existent  creator  is  an  untenable 
explanation  of  the  universe,  because  self-existence  is 
rigorously  inconceivable.  And  why  inconceivable  ? 
Because  "self-existence  necessarily  means  existence 
without  a  beginning  ;  and  to  form  a  conception  of 
self-existence  is  to  form  a  conception  of  existence 
without  a  beginning.  Now,  by  no  mental  effort 
can  we  do  this.  To  conceive  existence  through 
infinite  past  time  implies  the  conception  of  infinite 
past  time,  which  is  an  impossibility." — P.  31.  The 
impossibility  here  affirmed  is  one  insisted  upon  by 
Hamilton,  and,  before  him,  by  Hobbes  ;  but  I  must 
confess  that,  upon  a  most  diligent  examination  of  our 
conceptions,  I  am  unable  to  detect  the  alleged  diffi- 
culty. The  force  of  the  argument  lies  altogether  in 
the  false  assumption  that  nothing  is  entitled  to  the/ 
rank  of  knowledge,  which  will  not  come  before  the> 
representative  faculty^  But,  not  to  insist  upon  this, 
see  how  Mr.  Spencer  answers  himself.  Infinite  time 
is  an  impossible  conception,  and  any  idea  or  doc- 
trine which  implies  it,  must  be  regarded  as  something 
"  pseud."  Yet  as  soon  as  God  and  religion  are  com- 
mitted to  prison  on  the  strength  of  this  warrant,  he 
tells  us  with  undoubting  assurance  that  matter  is  un- 
originated.  But  if  so,  then  matter  must  have  existed 
through  infinite  past  time.  The  conception,  then,  of 


82  Review  of  Herbert  Spencer. 

unoriginated  matter  implies  tne  conception  of  infinite 
past  time.  "Now,  by  no  mental  effort  can  we  do 
this.  To  conceive  existence  through  infinite  past  time 
implies  the  conception  of  infinite  past  time,  which  is 
impossible." — P.  31.  I  yield  to  the  cogency  of  the 
reasoning,  and  admit  the  eternity  of  matter  to  be  an 
untenable  hypothesis,  a  "pseud-idea."  Mr.  Spencer 
is  equally  sure  that  matter  and  force  are  indestruct- 
ible, both  "persist."  These  are  first  principles,  and 
much  space  is  devoted  to  their  exposition.  But  if 
matter  and  force  are  indestructible,  they  must  exist 
through  infinite  future  time ;  and  the  conception  of 
their  indestructibility  really  involves  the  conception 
of  infinite  future  time.  "  Now  by  no  mental  effort  can 
we  do  this,"  etc.  So  then  Mr.  Spencer's  leading  doc- 
trines concerning  matter  and  force  are  condemned  by 
his  own  metaphysics  as  untenable  hypotheses,  involv- 
ing "  symbolic  conclusions  of  the  illegitimate  order." 
As  a  kind  of  bar  to  this  criticism,  he  says :  "What- 
ever may  be  true  of  matter  absolutely,  we  have  learned 
that  relatively  to  our  own  consciousness,  matter  never 
comes  into  existence  nor  ceases  to  exist."— P.  239. 
This,  however,  in  no  wise  assists  him,  for  in  his  plea 
against  idealism  he  assures  us  that,  though  we  do 
not  know  the  absolute  reality,  the  relative  reality 
which  we  do  know  stands  in  fixed  connection  with 
it.  "Thus,  then,  we  may  resume  with  entire  confi- 
dence the  realistic  conceptions  which  philosophy  at 
first  sight  seems  to  dissipate.  Though  reality  under 


Review  of  Herbert  Spencer,  83 

the  forms  of  our  consciousness  is  but  a  conditioned 
effect  of  the  absolute  reality,  yet  this  conditioned 
effect,  standing  in  indissoluble  relation  with  its  un- 
conditioned cause,  and  equally  persistent  with  it  so 
long  as  the  conditions  persist,  is,  to  the  cons9ious- 
ness  supplying  those  conditions,  equally  real.  The 
persistent  impressions  being  the  persistent  results 
of  a  persistent  cause  are,  for  practical  purposes,  the 
same  as  the  cause  itself,  and  may  be  habitually  dealt 
with  as  its  equivalent." — P.  229.  As,  then,  the  con- 
nection is  indissoluble,  while  the  relative  reality  per- 
sists the  absolute  reality  must  persist  also  ;  and  as 
the  relative  reality,  matter,  never  begins  nor  ceases 
to  exist,  it  follows  that  the  absolute  reality  never  be- 
gins nor  ceases  to  exist.  Now  a  Divine  existence  is 
incredible,  because  it  involves  the  conception  of  in- 
finite time ;  this  is  the  very  reason  alleged  for  con- 
demning the  belief  in  a  self-existent  creator  as  an 
untenable  hypothesis.  Yet  here  are  doctrines  which, 
though  involving  the  same  impossible  idea,  are  dealt 
with  as  first  truths.  It  is  impossible  to  overestimate 
the  convenience  of  a  double-faced  logic  like  this.  I 
submit  that  Mr.  Spencer  must  either  recall  his  sen- 
tence of  banishment  against  the  Deity,  or  else  con- 
sign his  own  most  fundamental  doctrines  to  the  limbo 
of  "  pseud-ideas." 

Mr.  Spencer  is  not  only  a  scientist,  he  is  also  a 
metaphysician.  As  a  consequence,  he  is  fond  of 
representing  laws  which  have  been  discovered  only 


84  Review  of  Herbert  Spencer. 

by  long  and  patient  induction,  as  discoverable  by  a 
priori  cogitation.  Thus  the  indestructibility  of  mat- 
ter, the  continuity  of  motion,  and  the  persistence  of 
force,  are  declared  to  be  a  priori  truths  of  the  highest 
certainty.  It  is  a  fashion  with  him  to  close  a  chapter 
by  pointing  out  that  the  contained  doctrine  is  really 
an  a  priori  truth  ;  or,  at  least,  a  necessary  corollary  of 
some  a  priori  principle.  This  is,  indeed,  a  necessity 
of  his  system.  No  possible  amount  of  experiment 
and  induction  would  avail  to  prove  these  doctrines 
for  all  time  and  space  ;  and  unless  they  can  get  some 
a  priori  support,  they  must  present  a  sorry  figure  in 
so  great  a  field.  Indeed,  these  doctrines,  as  Mr. 
Spencer  points  out,  are  incapable  of  inductive  proof. 
Matter  can  be  proved  indestructible  only  by  assum- 
ing the  persistence  of  force,  and  force  can  be  proved 
persistent  only  by  assuming  matter  to  be  indestruc- 
tible. The  argument  is  circular,  and  hence,  worthless  ; 
one  or  the  other  of  these  doctrines  must  be  based  upon 
a  priori  considerations.  Throughout  this  philosophy, 
fact  is  necessarily  subordinate  to  theory.  Out  of  a 
universe  of  phenomena  only  a  few  can  be  placed  in  the 
witness-box,  and  who  knows  but  that  only  the  most 
pliable  have  been  subpoenaed  ?  The  panel  is  very 
large,  and  possibly  the  jury  may  be  packed.  Unless 
the  metaphysical  principles  are  very  secure,  such  a 
suspicion  will  necessarily  attach  to  a  verdict  based 
upon  such  scanty  evidence.  The  facts  adduced  serve 
to  give  a  scientific  appearance  to  the  work,  but  their 


Review  of  Herbert  Spencer.  85 

argumentative  value  is  extremely  small.  It  is  to  the 
underlying  metaphysics  that  the  doctrines  must  look 
for  support.  Yet  I  cannot  but  think  Mr.  Spencer 
singularly  unsuccessful  in  his  attempt  to  unite  fact 
and  philosophy.  He  does  not  seem,  indeed,  to  have 
any  just  appreciation  of  the  fact  that  contradictions 
cannot  comfortably  co-exist.  In  one  place  he  tells 
us  that  a  necessity  of  thought  is  no  sign  of  a  neces- 
sity of  fact ;  and  then  he  offers  a  necessity  of  thought 
as  the  best  possible  proof  of  an  external  fact.  Ex- 
amine the  following  statements : 

"  Our  inability  to  conceive  matter  becoming  non- 
existent is  immediately  consequent  upon  the  nature 
of  thought  itself.  Thought  consists  in  the  establish- 
ment of  relations.  There  can  be  no  relation,  and, 
therefore,  no  thought  framed,  when  one  of  the  terms 
is  absent  from  consciousness.  Hence  it  is  impossible 
to  think  of  something  becoming  nothing,  for  the  same 
reason  that  it  is  impossible  to  think  of  nothing  be- 
coming something — the  reason,  namely,  that  nothing  ^* 
cannot  become  an  object  of  consciousness.  The  an-  ^ 
nihilation  of  matter  is  unthinkable  for  the  very  same 
reason  that  its  creation  is  unthinkable ;  and  its  inde- 
structibility thus  becomes  an  a  priori  cognition  of 
the  highest  order." — P.  241.  To  the  objection,  that 
most  men  do  believe  that  matter  is  destructible,  he 
replies  that  most  men  do  not  really  think,  but  only 
think  that  they  think.  "And  if  this  obliges  us  to 
reject  a  large  part  of  human  thinking  as  not  thinking 


86  Review  of  Herbert  Spencer. 

at  all,  but  merely  pseudo-thinking,  there  is  no  help  for 
it." — P.  243.  An  explanation  bordering  on  the  heroic. 

This  reasoning,  which  is  repeated  in  proof  of  the 
persistence  of  force,  amounts  to  this  :  what  we  cannot 
conceive  is  impossible.  We  cannot  conceive  either 
creation  or  annihilation,  hence  they  are  impossible. 

Let  us  ask  Mr.  Spencer  to  answer  himself  again. 
Turning  to  the  chapter  on  "  Ultimate  Scientific 
Ideas  " — a  miscellaneous  collection  of  metaphysical 
puzzles — we  learn  that  inconceivability  is  no  test  at 
all  of  truth.  That  matter  is  infinitely  divisible,  we 
are  told,  is  an  impossible  conception.  That  it  is 
not  infinitely  divisible,  is  declared  equally  irrational. 
Now,  as  it  must  be  one  or  the  other,  it  follows  that  the 
inconceivable  is  not  the  impossible. 

Again,  the  supposition  that  matter  is  absolutely 
solid  is  shown  to  be  inconceivable.  The  converse 
is  equally  inconceivable.  But  as  one  of  the  supposi- 
tions must  be  true,  it  again  appears  that  inconceiv- 
ability is  no  test  of  truth. 

Reasoning  upon  consciousness  he  says :  "  Hence, 
while  we  are  unable  either  to  believe  or  to  conceive 
that  the  duration  of  consciousness  is  infinite,  we  are 
equally  unable  either  to  believe  or  to  conceive  that 
the  duration  of  consciousness  is  finite  ;  we  are  equally 
unable  either  to  know  it  as  finite,  or  to  conceive  it  as 
infinite." — P.  63.  Here  is  another  proof  that  incon- 
ceivability is  no  test  of  the  possible  ;  for  one  of  these 
suppositions  must  be  true. 


Review  of  Herbert  Spencer.  87 

Yet  more,  not  only  is  the  inconceivable  shown  to 
be  the  possible,  it  is  even  the  observable  and  the  de- 
monstrable. The  transfer  of  motion,  and  the  pas- 
sage from  motion  to  rest  or  from  rest  to  motion,  are 
mentioned  as  inconceivabilities  of  the  first  magnitude  ; 
but  they  are  nevertheless  facts  of  hourly  observation. 
The  sphericity  of  the  earth  is  another  supreme  incon- 
ceivability, and  also  an  undoubted  fact.  That  cen- 
tral forces  should  vary  as  the  inverse  square  of  the 
distance,  is  declared  to  be  an  inconceivability  which 
passes  all  understanding;  it  is  also  a  fact  of  un- 
doubted demonstration.  Dozens  of  illustrations 
might  be  culled  from  this  chapter,  all  showing  the 
worthlessness  of  inconceivability  as  a  test  of  truth. 
Now  who  would  expect  to  find  the  author  of  this 
chapter  basing  his  belief  in  any  thing  upon  the  in- 
conceivability of  the  opposite  ?  Yet  no  sooner  does 
Mr.  Spencer  get  clear  of  the  unknowable,  than  he  ' 
finds  it  the  best  of  proofs.  The  creation  and  de- 
struction of  matter  and  force  are  impossible  because 
inconceivable.  And  this  he  offers  as  argument,  after 
giving  us  page  upon  page  of  proof  that  inconceiv- 
ability is  no  test  at  all  of  reality.  Evidently  Mr. 
Spencer,  in  his  hurried  flight  from  the  unknowable, 
left  either  his  memory  or  his  logic  behind  him — or 
both. 

As  a  rendering  of  the  mental  test,  I  cannot  but 
think  the  inconceivability,  which  Mr.  Spencer  charges 
upon  the  belief  in  the  creation  and  destruction  of  mat- 


88  Review  of  Herbert  Spencer. 

ter,  to  be  one  of  the  many  psychologic  forgeries  which 
he  has  substituted  for  the  true  reading.  Inconceiv- 
ability is  an  ambiguous  term.  Some  statements 
violate  the  law  of  our  reason,  others  transcend  our 
reason.  To  the  first  class  belong  all  contradictions, 
such  as  that  a  thing  can  be  and  not  be  at  the  same 
time.  Here,  too,  belong  denials  of  the  law  of  causa- 
tion. To  the  second  class  belong  inquiries  about  the 
inner  nature  of  things,  such  as  the  questions  :  How 
does  matter  attract  ?  what  constitutes  existence  ?  The 
first  class  only  are  strictly  inconceivable.  Violating, 
as  they  do,  the  fundamental  intuitions  of  the  mind, 
as  long  as  we  have  any  faith  at  all  in  reason,  we  must 
believe  these  inconceivables  to  be  impossibles.  The 
second  class  is  merely  incomprehensible.  How  mat- 
ter is  constituted,  how  motion  is  transmitted,  how 
force  is  exercised  :  these  are  not  inconceivable,  but 
incomprehensible.  We  have  not  the  data,  if  we  have 
the  faculties,  for  such  inquiries  as  these.  A  denial 
based  upon  an  inconceivable  of  the  first  class  is 
founded  upon  mental  power ;  one  based  upon  an  in- 
conceivability of  the  second  class  is  founded  upon 
mental  weakness.  Because  of  what  the  mind  is,  we 
declare  all  that  denies  our  mental  intuitions  to  be  in- 
conceivable. Because  of  what  it  is  not,  we  declare 
all  that  transcends  our  intuitions  to  be  inconceivable  ; 
but  the  first  inconceivable  represents  an  impossible, 
the  second  represents  an  incomprehensible. 

Now  if  we  examine  the  alleged  inconceivability  of 


Review  of  Herbert  Spencer.  89 

the  creation  and  destruction  of  matter,  we  shall  see 
that  it  is  really  an  incomprehensibility  and  nothing 
more.  It  does  not  violate,  it  transcends  the  laws  of 
our  thought.  For  who  has  such  knowledge  of  the  in- 
most nature  of  matter,  that  he  can  positively  deny  that 
things  seen  were  made  from  things  not  appearing. 
Who  can  prove  that  matter  is  not  the  result  of  a  spirit- 
ual activity  in  space,  which  will  disappear  when  the 
activity  ceases  ?  Who  has  so  possessed  himself  of 
the  central  secret  of  material  existence  as  to  be  sure 
that  the  world  abides  forever  ?  We  call  the  hills 
everlasting,  and  speak  of  the  eternal  stars ;  yet  who 
can  bring  any  proof  whatever  that  Shakspeare  was 
not  right  when  he  wrote : 

"  The  cloud-capped  towers,  the  gorgeous  palaces, 
The  solemn  temples,  the  great  globe  itself, 
Yea,  all  which  it  inherit,  shall  dissolve, 
And,  like  this  insubstantial  pageant  faded, 
Leave  not  a  wreck  behind  ?  " 

On  the  subject  of  causation,  the  mind  has  a  very 
positive  deliverance,  but  it  has  none  whatever  on  this 
question  ;  it  is  simply  transcendental  to  our  faculties. 
All  we  can  say  is,  we  cannot  comprehend  how  crea- 
tion or  destruction  is  possible,  but  that  they  may  be 
possible  no  one  can  deny.  Vet  Mr.  Spencer  uses 
this  mental  impotence  as  a  sufficient  test  of  objective 
reality.  We  cannot  explain  how  a  thing  can  be  ; 
hence,  it  cannot  be.  Part  I  loads  our  faculties  with 
opprobrium  ;  Part  II  constitutes  them  the  measure, 
not  merely  of  knowledge,  but  of  existence.  Part  I 


QO  Review  of  Herbert  Spencer. 

declares  inconceivability  worthless  as  a  test  of  real- 
ity;  Part  II  makes  it  the  best  of  proofs. 

But,  leaving  these  contradictions  to  destroy  each 
other,  let  us  pass  to  the  central  point  of  this  system, 
and  indeed  the  central  point  of  all,  that  styles  itself 
the  *  New  Philosophy  " — the  correlation  of  forces. 

This  doctrine  necessarily  holds  the  first  place  in 
every  scheme  of  evolution  ;  for  if  it  cannot  be  main- 
tained, there  must  be  irreducible  breaks  in  the  rea- 
soning. If  the  physical  forces  refuse  to  correlate 
with  the  vital,  there  would  be  no  possibility  of  passing 
from  the  tossing  whirlpool  of  flame,  or  the  waste 
theater  of  rock  and  mud,  which  once  constituted  our 
earth,  to  organic  existence.  There  would  be  an  ab- 
solute necessity  for  some  external  power  to  introduce 
the  new  creation,  or  the  inorganic  would  remain  in- 
organic forever.  In  the  same  way,  if  the  physical 
forces  do  not  correlate  with  the  mental,  the  evolu- 
tionist could  not  pass,  by  a  continuous  chain  of  cause 
and  effect,  from  the  ancient  nebula  to  mind  and  its 
manifestations.  But  if,  on  the  other  hand,  there 
should  be  such  correlation,  there  would  be  a  possi- 
bility of  finding  the  present  order  potentially  existent 
in  the  primeval  mist.  The  possibility  might  be  very 
slight  indeed,  but  it  would  be  sufficient  to  base  an 
argument  upon.  When  the  earth  cooled  down  to  a 
temperature  compatible  with  the  existence  of  organ- 
ization, the  physical  forces,  in  their  restless  and  eternal 


Review  of  Herbert  Spencer.  91 

hide-and-seek,  might  chance  upon  organic  combina- 
tions, and  thus  life,  and  finally  mind,  would  be  started 
upon  their  way ;  and  when  a  beginning  was  once  made, 
natural  selection  and  time  could  be  offered  in  expla- 
nation of  all  improvement.  It  is,  then,  of  first  impor- 
tance to  a  philosophy  which  aims  to  educe  life,  mind, 
poetry,  science,  Milton,  Plato,  Newton,  Raphael,  every 
body  and  every  thing,  from  a  condensing  mist,  to  make 
out  this  correlation.  Let  us  see  how  the  work  is  done. 
In  Mr.  Spencer's  proof  of  the  correlation  of  the 
physical  forces,  the  same  ridiculous  confusion  of 
force  and  motion  is  apparent,  which  is  so  patent  in 
all  our  works  on  this  subject.  Heat  is  a  mode  of 
motion  and  a  mode  of  force,  at  the  same  time. 
Motion  produces  magnetism,  magnetism  is  motion, 
magnetism  is  force,  motion  is  force.  The  same  is 
said  of  light  and  electricity  :  both  are  motions  and 
both  are  forces.  Yet  the  universal  definition  of  force 
describes  it  as  the  hidden  cause  of  motion  or  change. 
When  pressed  for  a  definition,  there  is  no  scientist 
who  would  view  them  in  any  other  relation.  To  use 
cause  and  effect  as  interchangeable  and  identical, 
involves  a  most  remarkable  confusion  of  ideas.  Yet 
Mr.  Spencer  is  not  alone  in  this  error.  I  do  not 
know  a  single  scientist  who  has  maintained  the 
proper  distinction  between  force  and  motion.  It 
would  be  easy  to  fill  pages  with  quotations  from  the 
writings  of  the  most  prominent  scientists,  all  illus- 
trating the  same  confusion.  In  truth,  the  majority 


92  Review  of  Herbert  Spencer. 

of  scientific  men  do  not  understand  the  doctrine  of 
correlation.  Heat,  light,  electricity,  etc.,  are  not 
forces,  but  modes  of  motion,  any  one  of  which  can 
produce  all  the  rest.  This  passage  of  one  mode  of 
motion  into  another  mode,  is  its  correlation  ;  but  this 
correlation  is  a  correlation  of  motions,  and  not  of 
forces.  Whether  the  hidden  force  or  forces  which 
manifest  themselves  in  these  several  modes  be  one  or 
more,  is  a  question  which  no  experiment  can  decide. 
To  prove  a  true  correlation  of  forces,  it  must  be  shown 
that  the  powers  which  maintain  the  chemical  mole- 
cule and  those  which  bind  the  members  of  the  solar 
system  together,  are  identical.  The  identity  of  cohe- 
sion, chemical  affinity,  and  the  force  of  gravitation, 
must  be  established — a  thing  which  no  one  has  done. 

For  the  sake  of  progress,  however,  let  us  admit 
the  unity  of  the  physical  forces.  Do  these  correlate 
with  the  vital  forces  ?  What  is  the  proof  that  vitality 
is  a  function  of  material  forces  ?  Mr.  Spencer  argues 
as  follows : 

"  Plant  life  is  all  dependent,  directly  or  indirectly, 
upon  the  heat  and  light  of  the  sun — directly  depend- 
ent in  the  immense  majority  of  plants,  and  indirectly 
dependent  in  plants  which,  as  the  fungi,  flourish  in  the 
dark ;  since  these,  growing  as  they  do  at  the  expense 
of  decaying  organic  matter,  mediately  draw  their  forces 
from  the  same  original  source.  Each  plant  owes  the 
carbon  and  hydrogen,  of  which  it  mainly  consists,  to 
the  carbonic  acid  and  water  in  the  surrounding  air 


ulflT'ERSITY 

Review  of  Herbert  Spencer. 

and  earth.  The  carbonic  acid  and  water  must,  how- 
ever, be  decomposed  before  their  carbon  and  hydrogen 
can  be  assimilated.  To  overcome  the  powerful  affin- 
ities which  hold  their  elements  together  requires  the 
expenditure  of  force,  and  this  force  is  supplied  by 
the  sun.  In  what  manner  the  decomposition  is  ef- 
fected we  do  not  know.  But  we  know  that  when, 
under  fit  conditions,  plants  are  exposed  to  the  sun's 
rays,  they  give  off  oxygen  and  accumulate  carbon  and 
hydrogen.  In  darkness  this  process  ceases.  It 
ceases,  too,  when  the  quantities  of  light  and  heat  re- 
ceived are  greatly  reduced,  as  in  winter.  Conversely 
it  is  active  when  the  light  and  heat  are  great,  as  in 
summer.  And  the  like  relation  is  seen  in  the  fact 
that,  while  plant-life  is  luxuriant  in  the  tropics,  it  di- 
minishes in  temperate  regions,  and  disappears  as  we 
approach  the  poles.  Thus  the  irresistible  inference 
is  that  the  forces  by  which  plants  abstract  the  ma- 
terial of  their  tissues  from  surrounding  inorganic 
compounds — the  forces  by  which  they  grow  and 
carry  on  their  functions — are  forces  that  previously 
existed  as  solar  radiations. 

"  That  animal  life  is  immediately  or  mediately  de- 
pendent on  vegetal  life  is  a  familiar  truth  ;  and  that, 
in  the  main,  the  processes  of  animal  life  are  opposite 
to  those  of  vegetal  life,  is  a  truth  long  current  among 
men  of  science.  Chemically  considered,  vegetal  life 
is  chiefly  a  process  of  deoxidation,  and  animal  life 
chiefly  a  process  of  oxidation — chiefly,  we  must  say, 


94  Review  of  Herbert  Spencer. 

because  in  so  far  as  plants  are  expenders  of  force  for 
the  purposes  of  organization  they  are  oxidizers  ;  and 
animals,  in  some  of  their  minor  processes,  are  prob- 
able deoxidizers.  But,  with  this  qualification,  the 
general  truth  is  that  while  the  plant,  decomposing  car- 
bonic acid  and  water  and  liberating  hydrogen,  builds 
up  the  detained  carbon  and  hydrogen  (along  with  a 
little  nitrogen  and  small  quantities  of  other  elements 
elsewhere  obtained)  into  branches,  leaves,  and  seeds, 
the  animal  consuming  these  branches,  leaves,  and 
seeds,  and  absorbing  oxygen,  recomposes  carbonic 
acid  and  water,  together  with  certain  nitrogenous 
compounds  in  minor  amounts.  And  while  the  decom- 
position effected  by  the  plant  is  at  the  expense  of 
certain  forces  emanating  from  the  sun,  which  are 
employed  in  overcoming  the  affinities  of  carbon  and 
hydrogen  for  the  oxygen  united  with  them,  the  re- 
composition  effected  by  the  animal  is  at  the  profit  of 
these  forces  which  are  liberated  during  the  combina- 
tion of  such  elements.  Thus  the  movements,  inter- 
nal and  external,  of  the  animal  are  re-appearances  in 
new  forms  of  a  power  absorbed  by  the  plant  under 
the  shape  of  light  and  heat.  Just  as,  in  the  manner 
above  explained,  the  solar  forces  expended  in  raising 
vapor  from  the  sea's  surface  are  given  out  again  in 
the  fall  of  rain  and  rivers  to  the  same  level,  and  in  the 
accompanying  transfer  of  solid  matters,  so  the  solar 
forces,  that  in  the  plant  raise  certain  chemical  ele- 
ments to  a  condition  of  unstable  equilibrium,  are 


Review  of  Herbert  Spencer.  95 

given  out  again  in  the  actions  of  the  animal  during 
the  fall  of  these  elements  to  a  condition  of  stable 
equilibrium." — Pp.  271-273. 

To  this  general  proof  he  adds  the  following  illus- 
tration :  "  The  transformation  of  the  unorganized 
contents  of  an  egg  into  the  organized  chick  is  alto- 
gether a  question  of  heat.  Withhold  heat,  and  the 
process  does  not  commence  ;  supply  heat,  and  it 
goes  on  while  the  temperature  is  maintained,  but 
ceases  when  the  egg  is  allowed  to  cool.  The  devel- 
opmental changes  can  be  completed  only  by  keeping 
the  temperature  with  tolerable  constancy  at  a  defi- 
nite height  for  a  definite  time  ;  that  is,  only  by  sup- 
plying a  definite  amount  of  heat." — P.  273. 

The    gist    of    Mr.    Spencer's    argument    is   this.X 
Without  sunshine  there  can  be  no  plant  or  animal  \ 
life,  hence  sunshine  and  life  are  one.     Without  heat  j 
the  chicken  cannot  Be  hatched,  therefore  heat  and/ 
vitality  are  identical.     Now  surely  it  requires  a  great 
deal  of  faith  to  accept  this  argument  as  conclusive. 
At  the  most,  it  only  proves  the  possibility  of  their 
identity,  but   it   by  no  means  establishes  the  fact. 
All  that  is  really  made  out  is  that  heat  and  light  \ 
are  necessary  conditions  of  vital  action ;  but  surely  ' 
the  conditions  of  the  action,  and  the  power  acting, 
need  not  be  the  same.     Bricks  and  mortar  .are  con- 
ditions of  the  builder's  activity,  but  they  are  not  the 
builder.     The  engine  is  a  condition  of  steam's  activ- 
ity, but  the  engine  is  rarely  the  steam.     Now  if  the 


96  Review  of  Herbert  Spencer. 

believer  in  vitality  should  choose  to  say  that  there  is 
a  constructive  or  directive  force  in  the  body,  which, 
while  separate  from  the  physical  forces,  does  use 
those  forces  as  its  agents  in  construction  and  func- 
tion, what  is  there  in  Mr.  Spencer's  argument  to 
disprove  it  ?  There  is  not  one  word  which  makes 
against  such  a  hypothesis  ;  yet  he  moves  on  ap- 
parently without  a  suspicion  that  any  more  proof  is 
desirable,  and  tells  us  on  the  strength  of  this  fallacy 
that  "  whoever  duly  weighs  the  evidence  will  see 
that  nothing  short  of  an  overwhelming  bias  in  favor 
of  a  preconceived  theory  can  explain  its  non-ac- 
ceptance." But  if  this  is  all  the  proof  that  Mr. 
Spencer  has  to  offer,  it  requires  no  very  critical  eye 
to  see  where  the  "  overwhelming  bias  "  is.  Whoever 
has  proved  the  correlation  of  the  physical  and  vital 
forces,  Mr.  Spencer  has  not ;  indeed,  one  who  can 
^/thus  confound  the  conditions  of  activity  with  the 
j  power  acting,  has  not  even  understood  the  meaning 
of  the  problem,  to  say  nothing  of  solving  it. 

But  has  any  one  proved  this  correlation  ?  Is 
there,  in  any  of  the  treatises  on  this  subject,  any 
thing  which  establishes  the  identity  of  the  physical 
and  vital  forces  ?  There  is  no  end  of  assertion  and 
imagination  ;  but  there  is  nothing  which  approaches 
a  proof.  Mr.  Huxley  tells  us  that  protoplasm  is  the 
basis  of  life,  and  then  says  that  life  is  the  only 
known  source  of  protoplasm ;  that  is,  the  "  basis " 
requires  a  living  base.  But  since  there  is  no  life 


Review  of  Herbert  Spencer.  97 

without  protoplasm,  and  no  protoplasm  without  life, 
the  question  of  priority  becomes  the  parallel  of  the 
famous  inquiry  whether  the  hen  produces  the  egg, 
or  the  egg  the  hen.  If  the  question  be  left  in  this 
condition,  it  might  be  claimed  with  equal  justice  that 
life  is  the  basis  of  protoplasm.  It  becomes  neces- 
sary, then,  to  break  the  circle  somewhere ;  and, 
accordingly,  he  tells  us  that,  if  we  could  have  been 
present  when  the  earth  manifested  extraordinary 
conditions,  we  might  have  seen  protoplasm  produced 
from  the  inorganic.  This,  and  the  further  declara- 
tion that  there  is  no  telling  what  chemistry  may 
do  yet,  is  all-  that  Mr.  Huxley  has  to  offer.  One 
"  might-have-been  "  and  one  "  may-be,"  are  the  sup- 
port of  the  great  conclusion.  Indeed,  not  even  this 
much  can  be  allowed  him  ;  for,  though  the  doctrine 
is  that  protoplasm  lives  by  virtue  of  its  chemical 
combination,  he  unluckily  admits  that  protoplasm 
may  die,  and  often  is  found  dead.  Now,  dead-life  is 
decidedly  good ;  but,  if  we  are  not  prepared  to 
believe  in  it,  we  must  conclude  that  protoplasm  is 
not  life,  but  something  into  which  life  enters,  and 
from  which  it  may  depart.  Mr.  Huxley's  lecture  in 
which  he  propounded  this  logical  atrocity,  taken 
along  with  the  fright  it  gave  some  nervous  people, 
constitutes  a  most  brilliant  example  of  the  possibil- 
ities of  "  much  ado  about  nothing."  Pages  of  similar 
assertions  might  be  gathered  from  the  leading  works 
on  this  subject,  together  with  not  a  few  contemptu- 


gS  Review  of  Herbert  Spencer. 

ous  expressions  about  the  believers  in  vitality.  The 
odium  theologicum  is  a  favorite  charge  against  the 
theologians  ;  but  it  really  seems  as  if  there  is  an 
odium  scientificum  which  is  not  one  whit  more  hon- 
orable. Dr.  Beale,  one  of  the  first  microscopists  of 
the  day,  in  an  essay  on  the  "  Mystery  of  Life,"  com- 
plains as  follows :  "  It  is  indeed  significant,  if,  as 
seems  to  be  the  case  at  this  time  in  England,  an 
investigator  cannot  be  allowed  to  remark  that  the 
facts,  which  he  has  demonstrated,  and  phenomena, 
which  he  has  observed,  render  it  impossible  for  him 
to  assent  at  present  to  the  dogma  that  life  is  a  mode 
of  ordinary  force,  without  being  held  up  by  some 
who  entertain  opinions  at  variance  with  his  own,  as  a 
person  who  desires  to  stop  or  retard  investigation,  who 
disbelieves  in  the  correlation  of  the  physical  forces, 
and  in  the  established  truths  of  physical  science." 

Disregarding  now  all  fancies  and  prophecies,  what 
is  really  proved  in  the  premises  ?  What  are  the 
facts  in  the  case  ? 

A  living  organism  manifests  properties  so  differ- 
ent from  those  of  inorganic  matter,  that,  unless  some 
plausible  explanation  can  be  found  in  the  properties 
of  the  latter,  we  must  assume  some  peculiar  power, 
some  distinct  cause,  to  explain  the  variation.  In  the 
first  place,  organic  compounds  are  all  in  a  state  of 
unstable  equilibrium,  which  chemistry  and  mechanics 
are  constantly  seeking  to  overset.  So  long  as  life 
lasts,  this  equilibrium  is  maintained  ;  as  soon  as  \\ 


Review  of  Herbert  Spencer.  99 

ceases,  the  body  is  quickly  reduced  to  more  stable  in- 
organic compounds.  This  looks  as  though  life  were 
not  a  function  of  chemical  affinity  and  mechanical 
power,  as  the  correlationists  assert,  but  rather  a 
force  which  is  in  direct  opposition  to  them.  Again, 
inorganic  compounds  have  no  identity  apart  from 
the  atoms  that  compose  them  ;  living  beings  main- 
•tain  their  identity  in  the  constant  change  of  their 
composition.  The  body  of  to-day  is  not  the  body  of 
last  year,  or  even  of  yesterday,  but  it  is  the  same  living 
being.  This  looks  as  though  there  were  a  principle 
or  power  which  abides  in  the  organism,  and  renews 
its  constant  waste  by  an  equally  constant  repair. 
Dead  matter,  too,  grows  only  by  accretion,  and  what 
is  added  to  it  gains  no  new  properties  ;  living  matter 
grows  by  selective  assimilation.  One  kind  of  matter 
goes  to  the  muscles,  another  to  bones,  another  to 
brain  and  nerves  ;  and  what  is  thus  assimilated  takes 
on  new  powers  of  which  there  was  not  the  slightest 
hint  before.  This  selective  assimilation  looks  as 
though  there  were  a  selective  power  within. 

In  the  different  forms  of  life,  too,  we  have  different 
plans  of  development.  The  carbon,  oxygen,  hydro- 
gen, and  nitrogen  which  a  fish  assimilates,  are  built 
up  into  fish,  and  not  into  horse.  This  differentiation 
of  identical  elements  into  different  forms  of  life,  also 
looks  as  though  there  were  something  more  than 
chemistry  concerned  in  the  matter. 

Another   peculiarity    is    that    a  living  being,   if 


ioo  Review  of  Herbert  Spencer. 

killed,  cannot  be  made  to  live  again ;  dissolution 
is  destruction.  You  may  have  the  identical  ele- 
ments, and  can  mix  them  as  you  will  ;  you  can 
heat  them,  or  use  magnetism  or  electricity,  as  long 
as  you  please ;  the  thing  is  dead  and  will  not  live. 
In  this  respect  it  differs  from  the  crystal,  that  stand- 
ing illustration  of  the  unbelievers,  which  may  be 
dissolved  and  reproduced  at  pleasure.  But,  not  to 
mention  other  points  of  difference,  the  phenomena 
of  carbon,  hydrogen,  oxygen,  and  nitrogen,  where 
they  appear  in  the  organic  world,  differ  entirely  from 
their  phenomena  in  the  inorganic.  Combine  and 
treat  them  as  we  will,  they  give  no  hint  of  their 
organic  powers.  What  is  it,  then,  which  bestows 
upon  these  elements  their  high  prerogatives  ?  What 
is  it  which  raises  them  to  this  upper  plane  ?  Do 
they  do  it  themselves  ?  or  is  there  a  mystic  and  sub- 
tle chemist  in  those  little  cells,  who  is  the  author  of 
these  inimitable  wonders  ? 

The  standing  answer  of  the  correlationists  is,  that 
the  peculiar  chemical  combination  explains  the  facts. 
We  may  not  be  able  to  detect  the  molecular  interac- 
tions ;  but  if  we  could,  we  should  undoubtedly  find  a 
complete  explanation  of  vitality  in  the  properties  of 
the  chemical  elements.  These  elements  in  certain 
combinations  manifest  chemical  properties  ;  in  oth- 
ers they  manifest  vital  properties.  This  is  the  sum 
of  their  utterances  on  this  subject. 

In  the  first  place,  if   this  theory  were  true   the 


Review  of  Herbert  Spencer.  101 

difficulty  would  not  be  explained.  Life  comes  only 
from  life.  There  is  no  proof  at  all  of  any  vital  passage 
from  the  inorganic  to  the  organic.  To  the  conclusion 
derived  from  Tyndall's  experiments  upon  floating  dust 
and  germs,  the  theory  of  spontaneous  generation  has 
not  made  any  effective  reply.  So  far  as  our  present 
chemistry  is  concerned,  the  organic  and  inorganic  are 
separated  by  an  impassable  gulf.  Mightily  as  it  has 
conjured,  it  knows  no  incantation  which  will  evoke 
the  living  from  the  lifeless.  Prophecy  is  not  wanting, 
but  fulfillment  has  thus  far  been  of  the  Millerite  order. 
If,  then,  the  chemical  combination  explained  the  phe- 
nomena, the  chemical  combination  would  next  have 
to  be  explained.  Is  the  combination  the  source  of 
life  ?  it  is  no  less  certain  that  life  is  the  only  known 
cause  of  the  combination.  The  backdoor  by  which 
Mr.  Huxley  escaped  from  a  similar  dilemma  about 
protoplasm  is  still  open,  however ;  and  the  correla- 
tionist  may  escape  the  difficulty,  by  suggesting  that 
under  very  extraordinary  conditions,  and  in  some 
time  so  far  out  of  sight  as  to  be  beyond  criticism, 
that  which  our  highest  wisdom  cannot  now  accom- 
plish, that  which  it  would  be  folly  to  think  happens 
now,  happened  then  of  its  own  accord. 

So  much  for  the  explanation,  even  if  it  were  true, 
that  the  chemical  combination  explains  the  facts.  But 
is  it  true  ?  We  are  met  by  difficulties  here  again. 
If  it  be  true,  these  identical  combinations  ought  to 
result  in  the  same  forms  of  life.  It  is  well  known, 


IO2  Review  of  Herbert  Spencer. 

however,  that  the  germ-cells  of  many  of  the  higher 
and  lower  animals,  and  even  of  plants,  are  chemically 
identical.  Yet  each  of  those  germs  is  potential  of  a 
specific  type  of  life,  and  of  no  other.  Now,  if  chemi- 
cal affinity  is  the  only  force  at  work  here,  how  does 
it  happen  that  these  germs  of  similar  composition 
develope  into  such  diverse  forms  ? 

It  is  said  that  difference  of  conditions  determines 
the  difference  of  result,  but  the  answer  to  this  plea  is 
obvious.  On  this  supposition  the  source  of  impreg- 
nation is  a  matter  of  indifference.  A  mouse  might 
become  a  man,  and  conversely  ;  in  short,  all  males 
might  interchange  without  affecting  the  result.  Con- 
dition will,  indeed,  determine  whether  a  given  germ 
shall  realize  its  type  of  development,  but  the  type  is 
impressed  upon  the  germ  itself.  If  the  conditions  of 
development  are  not  met  there  is  no  result ;  but  where 
they  are  met,  then  the  thing  develops  after  its  kind. 
That  the  microscope  detects  no  trace  of  organization, 
is  no  argument  against  the  fact — the  microscope  is  not 
all-seeing.  Professor  Tyndall  has  pointed  out  that  the 
most  profound  and  complex  changes  take  place  almost 
infinitely  below  the  microscope  limit.  We  know,  too, 
that  a  human  germ  may  carry  with  it  an  evil  tend- 
ency which,  in  thirty  or  forty  years,  shall  send  a  man 
to  the  insane  asylum.  Now  in  the  same  way,  only 
much  more  intimately,  does  the  germ  bear  with  it  an 
organizing,  constructive  power  which,  when  the  fit 
conditions  are  supplied,  will  determine  the  future 


Review  of  Herbert  Spencer.  103 

product.  The  doctrine  of  the  chemical  affinity  of 
germs  is  just  the  reason  why  we  cannot  look  upon 
life  as  a  function  of  affinity,  because  it  leaves  the  dif- 
ference of  the  product  entirely  unaccounted  for.  At 
this  point  the  correlationist,  instead  of  admitting  that 
his  doctrine  is  without  support,  generally  suggests 
that  though  known  chemical  properties  do  not  ex- 
plain the  facts,  there  may  be  unknown  properties 
which  do — a  mode  of  argument  which  would  disprove 
every  scientific  doctrine. 

But  what,  then,  is  the  function  of  the  physical  forces 
in  the  body  ?  We  take  food,  which  certainly  does 
nourish  the  system  and  does  produce  power ;  is  not 
this  a  correlation  ?  Grant  that  the  correlation  is  a 
logical  impossibility,  is  it  not,  like  many  other  logical 
impossibilities,  an  established  fact  ?  To  this  the  an- 
swer is,  that  the  physical  forces  are  the  working 
forces  of  the  system — they  are  expended  in  labor  and 
in  the  performance  of  function — but  the  preceding 
considerations  render  it  impossible  to  look  upon  them 
as  the  organizing,  constructive,  or  directive  force  of 
the  system.  This  organizing  force  emp'oys  the  phys- 
ical forces  as  its  servants,  and  cannot  dispense  with 
them  ;  but  there  is  no  proof  of  correlation. 

The  only  argument  of  any  weight  that  can  be  urged 
against  this  has  been  offered  by  Mr.  Maudsley,and  that 
does  not  attack  the  justice  of  the  reasoning,  but  rather 
seeks  to  evade  it  by  a  skillful  flank  movement.  He 
says  :  "  Admitting  that  vital  transforming  matter  is 


IO4  Review  of  Herbert  Spencer. 

at  first  derived  from  vital  structure,  it  is  evident  that 
the  external  force  and  matter  transformed  does,  in 
turn,  become  transforming  force — that  is,  vital.  And 
if  that  takes  place  after  the  vital  process  has  once  com- 
menced, is  it,  it  may  be  asked,  extravagant  to  suppose 
that  a  similar  transformation  might  at  some  period 
have  commenced  the  process,  arid  may  ever  be  doing 
so  ?  The  fact  that  in  growth  and  development  life  is 
continually  increasing  from  a  transformation  of  phys- 
ical and  chemical  forces  is,  after  all,  in  favor  of  the 
presumption  that  it  may  at  first  have  so  originated. 
And  the  advocate  of  this  view  may  turn  upon  his  op- 
ponent and  demand  of  him  how  he,  with  a  due  regard 
to  the  axiom  that  force  is  not  self-generatory,  and  to 
the  fact  that  living  matter  does  increase  from  the 
size  of  a  little  cell  to  the  magnitude  of  a  human  body, 
accounts  for  the  continual  production  of  transforming 
power?  A  definite  quantity  only  could  have  been 
derived  from  the  mother  structure,  and  that  must 
have  been  exhausted  at  an  early  period  of  growth. 
The  obvious  refuge  of  the  vitalist  is  to  the  facts  that 
it  is  impossible  now  to  evolve  life  artificially  out  of 
any  combination  of  physical  and  chemical  forces,  and 
that  such  a  transformation  is  never  witnessed  save 
under  the  conditions  of  vitality."  * 

This  is  the  best  thing  the  correlationists  have  said 
yet,  and  it  is  the  best  that  can  be  said.  The  only 
thing  more  satisfactory  will  be  the  production  of  life 

*  Body  and  Mind,  p.  169. 


Rei'ieiv  of  Herbert  Spencer.  105 

from  the  inorganic — a  thing  which  Mr.  Maudsley 
prophesies  with  somewhat  of  confidence.  Dr.  Car- 
penter's famous  reductio  ad  absurdum  against  the 
vitalists  is  similar  to  this  argument,  but,  having  the 
logical  merit  of  self-contradiction,  it  need  not  be  con- 
sidered. Now,  the  sum  of  Mr.  Maudsley's  argument 
is  this — vital  force  is  increasing.  But  either  it  must 
be  self-generating  or  it  must  be  transformed  physical 
force.  The  former  supposition  is  absurd,  hence  the 
latter  is  true.  This  is  his  argument ;  his  soothsay- 
ings  are  beside  the  question. 

It  is  not  quite  certain,  however,  that  the  first  suppo- 
sition is  as  absurd  as  the  exigencies  of  the  argument 
demand.  Scientific  men  teach  that  an  atom  of  matter 
can  propagate  its  attractive  influence  along  an  in- 
finite number  of  radii  and  to  an  infinite  distance,  and 
do  it  forever — this  is  the  doctrine  of  gravitation. 
Moreover  the  atoms  of  a  molecule  hold  each  other  in 
a  grasp  which  giants  could  not  wrench  asunder,  and 
exert  this  tremendous  pull  forever — this  is  the  doc- 
trine of  chemical  affinity.  Now  one  might  turn  upon 
the  advocate  of  these  doctrines  and  "demand  how 
he,  with  due  regard  to  the  axiom  that  force  is  not 
self-generating,"  can  hold  such  views  ?  But  if  these 
views  are  not  incredible,  why  may  not  the  original 
spark  of  vitality  have  indefinitely  extended  itself? 
But  granting  the  supposition  to  be  as  absurd  as  Mr. 
Maudsley  thinks  it,  his  alternatives  do  not  exhaust 
the  possibilities  of  the  case.  Vitality  might  be  self- 


io6  Review  of  Herbert  Spencer. 

generating,  it  might  be  transformed  physical  force, 
or  it  might  have  a  source  unrecognized  at  present. 
Let  us  grant  the  absurdity  of  the  first  supposition, 
the  previous  considerations  show  the  difficulty  of  ad- 
mitting the  second ;  there  is,  then,  no  alternative 
but  to  ascribe  it  to  an  unknown  source.  Indeed,  why 
not  ?  There  may  well  be  "  more  things  in  heaven 
and  earth  than  are  dreamed  of  in  our  philosophy." 

So  much  for  the  correlation  of  the  physical  and 
vital  forces.  Our  interest  in  the  doctrine  is  chiefly 
logical ;  true  or  false,  religion  would  be  able  to  live 
and  philosophy  to  catch  its  breath.  But  whatever 
the  future  may  establish,  at  present  this  boasted  cor- 
relation has  not  a  shadow  of  support,  but  is  in  irrecon- 
cilable opposition  to  known  facts.  It  is  based,  in 
many  cases,  upon  that  desire  for  unity  and  simplicity 
in  science  which  is  at  once  so  attractive  and  so  mis- 
leading ;  in  many  more,  it  is  based  upon  a  desire  to 
be  irreligious ;  and  in  all,  upon  monstrously  bad  logic. 

f  But  let  us  get  back  to  Mr.  Spencer.  His  argu- 
ment for  the  identity  of  physical  and  vital  force,  we 
saw  to  be  triumphantly  worthless  ;  now,  let  us  see 
whether  he  succeeds  any  better  in  proving  the  iden- 
^ly  of  the  physical  and  mental  forces.  It  is  not  at 
all  probable,  after  the  specimens  we  have  already  had 

of  Mr.  Spencer's  reasoning,  that  we  shall  meet  with 
t  K^5^^       A 
\U  vf^  any  va^ua^^e  results  J  still  let  us  possess  our  souls  in 

patience.     The  proofs  adduced  are  as  follows  : 

' 


Review  of  Herbert  Spencer.  107 

"All  impressions  from  moment  to  moment  made 
on  our  organs  of  sense  stand  in  direct  correlation 
with  physical  forces  existing  externally.  The  modes 
of  consciousness  called  pressure,  motion,  sound,  light, 
heat,  are  effects  produced  in  us  by  agencies  which,  as 
otherwise  expended,  crush  or  fracture  pieces  of  mat- 
ter, generate  vibrations  in  surrounding  objects,  cause 
chemical  combinations,  and  reduce  substances  from  a 
solid  to  a  liquid  form.  Hence,  if  we  regard  the 
changes  of  relative  position,  of  aggregation,  or  of 
chemical  state  thus  arising,  as  being  transformed 
manifestations  of  the  agencies  from  which  they  arise, 
so  must  we  regard  the  sensations  which  such  agencies 
produce  in  us  as  new  forms  of  the  forces  producing 
them."  .  .  . 

"  Besides  the  correlation  and  equivalence  between 
external  physical  forces  and  the  mental  forces  gener- 
ated by  them  in  us  under  the  form  of  sensations, 
there  is  a  correlation  and  equivalence  between  sensa- 
tions and  those  physical  forces  which,  in  the  shape 
of  bodily  actions,  result  from  them.  The  feelings  we 
distinguish  as  light,  heat,  sound,  odor,  taste,  pressure, 
etc.,  do  not  die  away  without  immediate  results,  but 
are  invariably  followed  by  other  manifestations  of 
force.  In  addition  to  the  excitements  of  secreting 
organs  that  are  in  some  cases  traceable,  there  arises 
a  contraction  of  the  involuntary  muscles  or  of  the 
voluntary  muscles,  or  of  both.  Sensations  increase 
the  action  of  the  heart — slightly  when  they  are  slight, 


i  o8  Review  of  Herbert  Spencer. 

markedly  when  they  are  marked — and  recent  physio- 
logical inquiries  imply  not  only  that  contraction  of 
the  heart  is  excited  by  every  sensation,  but  also  that 
the  muscular  fibers  throughout  the  whole  vascular 
system  are  at  the  same  time  more  or  less  con- 
tracted." .  .  . 

"  If  we  take  emotions  instead  of  sensations,  we 
find  the  correlation  and  equivalence  equally  manifest. 
Not  only  are  the  modes  of  consciousness  directly 
produced  in  us  by  physical  forces  re-transformable 
into  physical  forces  under  the  form  of  muscular  mo- 
tions, and  the  changes  they  initiate,  but  the  like  is 
true  of  those  modes  of  consciousness  which  are  not 
directly  produced  in  us  by  the  physical  forces.  Emo- 
tions of  moderate  intensity,  like  sensations  of  moder- 
ate intensity,  generate  little  beyond  excitement  of 
the  heart  and  vascular  system,  joined  sometimes  with 
increased  action  of  glandular  organs.  But,  as  the 
emotions  rise  in  strength,  the  muscles  of  the  face, 
body,  and  limbs  begin  to  move.  Of  examples  may 
be  mentioned  the  frowns,  dilated  nostrils,  and  stamp- 
ings of  anger  ;  the  contracted  brows  and  wrung  hands 
of  grief ;  the  smiles  and  leaps  of  joy,  and  the  frantic 
struggles  of  terror  and  despair.  Passing  over  certain 
apparent,  but  only  apparent,  exceptions,  we  see  that 
whatever  be  the  kind  of  emotion,  there  is  a  manifest 
relation  between  its  amount  and  the  amount  of  mus- 
cular action  induced." — Pp.  275-277. 

This,  with  the  further  considerations  that  physical 


Review  of  Herbert  Spencer.  1 09 

stimuli,  as  whisky  or  opium,  increase  mental  action, 
while  unconsciousness  follows  inaction  of  the  brain, 
is  the  substance  of  the  proof  that  the  physical  and 
mental  forces  are  one.  Disengaged  from  swelling 
statement  it  reads  thus :  Physical  forces,  such  as 
light  or  heat,  excite  sensations  ;  therefore  sensations 
are  transformed  light  and  heat. 

Sensations,  being  pleasant  or  painful,  are  followed 
by  motion  either  toward  or  from  the  object  of  sensa- 
tion. Hence  mechanical  motion  and  its  equivalents 
are  the  correlates  of  sensation. 

Again,  mental  action  is  attended  by  certain  physi- 
cal conditions  ;  hence  they  are  one. 

Indeed,  the  whole  argument  may  be  summed  up 
in  this :  Physical  states  excite  mental  states ;  hence  1 
each  is  a  form  of  the  other. 

Now,  looking  at  this  merely  with  a  logician's  eye  it 
must  be  confessed  that  it  falls  far  short  of  proof.  It 
establishes  relation,  not  identity.  One  thing  may 
well  be  the  occasion  of  another  without  being  that 
other.  No  one  can  deny  that  light  and  heat  may 
be  the  physical  antecedents  of  sensation  without 
being  transformed  sensations.  Surely  to  prove  a  re- 
lation is  not  to  prove  a  correlation.  To  the  claim  of 
quantitative  relation  between  mental  action  and  brain 
waste  there  is  this  reply  :  The  soul  communicates 
with  the  physical  world  through  a  material  organism, 
and  its  interests  are  bound  up  with  it.  Mental  action 
is  accompanied  by  nervous  action,  and  this  being 


i  I  o  Review  of  Herbert  Spencer. 

so,  we  should  expect  such  quantitative  relation  even 
if  there  were  no  real  interchange  of  power.  Besides, 
there  are  many  things  which  seem  to  indicate  that 
even  this  relation  is  not  as  constant  as  the  theory 
demands  ;  that  the  soul  can  by  its  own  energy  main- 
tain and  restore  physical  vigor.  It  often  happened 
during  our  late  war  that  a  stirring  national  air  or 
some  familiar  home-tune  inspired  a  body  of  dispirited 
and  worn-out  men  with  new  life  and  vigor.  Every 
student  has  known  what  it  is  to  feel  the  jar  and  dis- 
cord of  a  nerve  cease,  and  weakness  pass  into  power, 
as,  in  some  moment  of  desponding  gloom,  a  great 
thought  has  kindled  within  ;  under  its  inspiration 
he  has  achieved  the  impossible,  and  without  any  corre- 
sponding depression.  Whence  the  new  power  ?  Ordi- 
narily the  connection  between  mental  action  and 
nervous  waste  is  maintained,  but  it  does  not  seem  to 
be  always  so.  Yet  if  it  were,  the  correlation  is  not 
made  out.  The  experiments  made  by  Professor  Bark- 
er and  others,  which  are  said  to  establish  the  iden- 
tity of  heat  and  mental  force,  really  prove  only  a 
correlation  between  heat  and  the  nervous  action 
which  attends  thinking.  Nervous  action  and  heat 
correlate,  but  the  real  point  is  to  prove  that  nervous 
action  and  mental  force  correlate.  This  has  never 
been  done.  The  whole  argument  consists  in  ringing 
the  changes  upon  the  fact,  known  and  undoubted 
from  the  beginning,  that  mental  and  physical  states 
affect  each  other — which  is  far  enough  from  proving 


Review  of  Herbert  Spencer.  1 1 1 

an  identity.  Yet,  not  only  is  this  all  that  Mr.  Spencer 
has  to  offer,  it  is  all  that  any  one  has  to  offer ;  and 
the  conclusion  based  upon  this  scanty  evidence  is 
dressed  up  in  a  pseudo-science,  and  trumpeted  abroad 
as  having  all  the  certitude  of  scientific  demonstration. 
To  ask  for  more  proof  is  sure  proof  of  "  an  over- 
whelming bias  in  favor  of  a  preconceived  theory." 

Bad  as  the  argument  is  logically,  psychologically  it 
is  a  great  deal  worse.  But  as  I  wish  to  reserve  this 
discussion  for  the  .next  chapter,  I  will  merely  indicate 
the  psychological  shortcomings  of  the  theory  and  -r/'; 

pass  on.  In  the  first  place,  the  doctrine  does  not 
explain  why  even  sensation  is  impossible  without  an 
inner  activity  of  the  soul.  In  the  next  place,  it  gives 
no  account  of  the  great  majority  of  our  mental  states 
which  have  no  physical  antecedent.  It  also  denies 
the  possibility  of  self-determination,  which  is  one  of 
the  most  assured  facts  of  consciousness  ;  and  finally,  , 
it  contradicts  the  emphatic  distinction  which  the  soul 
makes,  between  itself  and  the  organism  which  it 
inhabits. 

But  psychology  has  yet  another  word  to  offer  to  the 
"  New  Philosophy."  It  demands  the  authority  for  the 
belief  in  force  at  all.  It  summons  the  evolutionist  to 
tell  where  he  discovered  this  force  with  which  he  con- 
jures so  mightily.  And  just  here  every  system  of 
mechanical  atheism  is  speechless.  For  it  is  admitted 
now  by  all  that  force  is  not  a  phenomenon,  but  a  mental 
datum.  Hume  did  philosophy  a  good  service  in  show- 


i  1 2  Review  of  Herbert  Spencer. 

ing  that  nature  presents  nothing  but  sequence,  and 
this  is  rigidly  true.  The  keenest  eye,  looking  upon  the 
armies  of  phenomena  which  maneuver  in  the  physical 
world,  could  detect  nothing  but  succession.  Regi- 
ment after  regiment  might  march  by  us  in  time-order, 
but  they  could  give  us  no  hint  of  power.  This  idea  is 
home-born,  and  born  only  of  our  conscious  effort.  It 
is  only  as  agents  that  we  believe  in  action  ;  it  is  only 
as  there  is  causation  within,  that  we  get  any  hint  of 
causation  without.  Not  gravitation,  nor  electricity, 
nor  magnetism,  nor  chemical  affinity,  but  will,  is  the 
typical  idea  of  force.  Self-determination,  volition,  is 
the  essence  of  the  only  causation  we  know ;  will  is 
the  sum-total  of  the  dynamic  idea ;  it  either  stands 
for  that  or  nothing.  Now  science  professes  itself 
unable  to  interpret  nature  without  this  metaphysical 
idea  of  power.  Some  of  the  more  rigorous  Baco- 
nians, as  Comte  and  Mill,  have  attempted  to  exclude 
the  conception  from  science  as  without  warrant ;  but 
the  ridiculous  contradictions  into  which  they  fell,  only 
served  to  make  more  clear  its  absolute  necessity. 

Science  refers  all  change  to  one  universal  force  ; 
what  is  that  force  ?  It  is  either  the  activity  of 
a  person,  the  determination  of  a  will,  or  nothing.  If 
external  causation  is  to  be  affirmed  on  the  warrant 
of  internal  causation,  the  external  must  be  after  the 
pattern  of  the  internal ;  the  existence  of  one  thing  is 
no  reason  for  affirming  the  existence  of  another  to- 
tally unlike  it.  The  mental  law  which  warrants  the 


Review  of  Herbert  Spencer.  113 

belief  in  external  power,  warrants  the  interpretation 
of  that  power  into  the  divine  activity.  If  science 
like  not  this  alternative,  then  it  has  no  warrant  for 
belief  in  force  at  all.  It  must  content  itself  with  a 
lifeless  registration  of  co-existences  and  sequences 
which  have  no  dynamic  connection.  Every  form  of 
science  which  assumes  the  reality  of  causation  must 
disappear  ;  and  Positivism,  a  thousand-fold  more  rigid 
than  M.  Comte  ever  dreamed  of,  will  be  all  that  is 
left  us.  The  uncultured  mind  in  all  ages  has  persisted 
in  referring  external  phenomena  to  external  wills. 
Was  there  a  storm,  Neptune  was  angry,  or  Eolus  had 
let  slip  the  winds.  Was  there  a  pestilence,  some 
malignant  demon  had  discovered  the  fountain  of  life; 
and  charged  it  with  deadly  poison.  Every  order  of 
fact  had  its  god,  to  whose  agency  it  was  referred. 
The  winds  were  ministers,  and  the  brooks  had  their 
errand.  In  that  early  time  men  saw  a  divine  smile 
in  the  sunshine  and  the  harvest,  and  detected  tokens 
of  wrath  in  the  flying  storm.  The  quiet  lake,  which 
reflected  from  its  surface  the  encircling  woods  and 
hills,  was  the  abode  of  a  divine  peace  ;  and  each  dark 
and  fearful  cave  was  the  dwelling-place  of  a  fury.  In 
short,  nature  was  alive,  and  men  gazed  upon  it  and 
saw  there  their  own  image.  Absurd  as  were  many 
of  the  beliefs  begot  of  this  tendency,  it  was  far  truer 
to  psychology  than  is  the  prevailing  scientific  con- 
ception of  an  impersonal  force.  Nature  is  the  abode 
and  manifestation  of  a  free  mind  like  our  own.  We 


114  Review  of  Herbert  Spencer. 

prune  and  criticise  that  ancient  belief,  and  return  to 
find  it,  not  false,  but  needing  only  a  transfigured  in- 
terpretation. As  for  the  scientific  conception  of  an 
impersonal  force,  it  has  no  warrant  within,  nor  the 
rshadow  of  support  without.  Will-power,  or  none,  is 
the  alternative  offered  by  inexorable  logic.  Besides, 
the  doctrine  of  an  impersonal  force  in  matter  seems 
really  opposed  to  the  law  of  inertia.  The  law  assumes 
absolute  deadness  in  matter  ;  the  doctrine  attributes 
to  it  all  kinds  of  activity.  One  doctrine  is  that  mat- 
ter cannot  change  its  state ;  the  other  is  that  matter 
can  change  its  state.  It  is  for  the  scientists  to  de- 
termine which  they  will  give  up.  If  they  retain  in- 
ertia, they  must  give  up  the  force ;  and  if  they  retain 
the  force,  they  bring  matter  within  the  realm  of  the 
self-determining. 

M.  Comte  in  a  very  remarkable  passage  admits 
the  justice  of  this  reasoning.  He  says  : 

"  If  we  insist  upon  penetrating  the  insoluble  mys- 
tery of  the  essential  cause  of  phenomena,  there  is  no 
hypothesis  more  satisfactory  than  that  they  proceed 
from  wills,  dwelling  in  them  or  outside  of  them  ;  an 
hypothesis  which  assimilates  them  to  the  effects  pro- 
duced by  the  desires  which  exist  within  ourselves. 
Were  it  not  for  the  pride  induced  by  metaphysical 
and  scientific  studies,  it  would  be  inconceivable  that 
any  atheist,  ancient  or  modern,  should  have  believed 
that  his  vague  hypotheses  on  such  a  subject  were 
preferable  to  this  direct  mode  of  explanation.  And 


Review  of  Herbert  Spencer.  1 1 5 

it  was  the  only  mode  which  really  satisfied  the 
reason  until  men  began  to  see  the  utter  inanity  and 
inutility  of  all  absolute  research.  The  order  of  na- 
ture is  doubtless  very  imperfect  in  every  respect; 
but  its  production  is  far  more  compatible  with  the 
hypothesis  of  an  intelligent  will,  than  with  that  of  a 
blind  mechanism.  Persistent  atheists,  then,  would 
seem  to  be  the  most  illogical  of  theologians  ;  for  they 
occupy  themselves  with  the  same  questions,  yet  reject 
the  only  appropriate  method  of  handling  them."  * 

That  is,  it  is  nonsense  to  ask  for  the  cause  of  the 
present  order ;  but  if  you  are  not  yet  ripe  enough  to 
see  the  folly  of  such  inquiries,  then  the  only  rational 
answer  is  that  the  order  of  nature  is  the  work  of  a 
superintending  Mind.  M.  Comte  was  not,  in  strict- 
ness, an  atheist ;  he  was  more,  he  was  a  positivist. 

Mr.  Spencer,  too,  admits  the  cogency  of  the  rea- 
soning which  reduces  external  force  to  a  personal 
activity,  but  escapes  the  conclusion  by  the  following 
logical  sleight-of-hand : 

"On  lifting  a  chair,  the  force  exerted  we  regard 
as  equal  to  that  antagonistic  force  called  the  weight 
of  the  chair ;  and  we  cannot  think  of  these  as  equal 
without  thinking  of  them  as  like  in  kind,  since 
equality  is  conceivable  only  between  things  that  are 
connatural.  The  axiom  that  action  and  reaction  are 
equal,  and  in  opposite  directions,  commonly  exem- 
plified by  this  very  instance  of  muscular  force  versus 

*  L'Ensemble  du  Positivisme,  p.  46. 


n6  Review  of  Herbert  Spencer. 

weight,  cannot  be  mentally  realized  on  any  other 
condition.  Yet,  contrariwise,  it  is  incredible  that 
the  force  as  existing  in  the  chair  really  resembles 
the  force  as  present  to  our  minds.  It  scarcely  needs 
to  point  out  that  the  weight  of  the  chair  produces  in 
us  various  feelings  according  as  we  support  it  by  a 
single  finger,  or  the  whole  hand,  or  the  leg ;  and 
hence  to  argue,  that  as  it  cannot  be  like  all  these 
sensations,  there  is  no  reason  to  believe  it  like  any. 
It  suffices  to  remark  that  since  the  force  as  known 
to  us  is  an  affection  of  consciousness,  we  cannot  con- 
ceive the  force  existing  in  the  chair  under  the  same 
form  without  endowing  the  chair  with  consciousness. 
So  that  it  is  absurd  to  think  of  force  as  like  our 
sensation  of  it,  and  yet  necessary  so  to  think  of  it, 
if  we  realize  it  in  consciousness  at  all." — P.  58. 

Mr.  Spencer  here  admits  that  if  we  think  of  ex- 
ternal force  at  all  it  must  be  viewed  as  a  personal 
power  like  our  own  ;  but  as  this  would  land  us  in 
absurdities,  we  must  not  conceive  it  under  such  a 
form.  However,  the  force  of  his  argument  against 
the  conception  lies  entirely  in  the  assumption  that 
force  is  identical  with  muscular  tension  arid  sensa- 
tion. There  is  no  absurdity  in  supposing  that  the 
great,  coordinating  force  of  matter,  whereby  not  only 
this  chair  and  the  earth,  but  all  things,  are  bound 
together,  is  a  manifestation  of  a  Divine  will ;  and  in 
such  case,  whenever  our  wills  measure  themselves 
against  it,  there  would  really  be  a  common  measure. 


Review  of  Herbert  Spencer.  1 1 7 

There  is  no  need  to  endow  the  chair  with  conscious- 
ness or  the  power  of  sensation,  but  only  to  conceive 
this  universal  coordinating  power  as  rooted  in  a  per- 
sonality in  some  respects  like  our  own.  As  for  the  ten- 
sion that  we  feel,  it  is  not  force,  but  the  effect  of  force. 
Sensation  is  not  power,  but  result.  Our  knowledge 
of  power  is  based  upon  our  self-determination,  and  not 
upon  our  muscular  feelings  ;  all  of  which  might  be 
removed  without  in  any  way  affecting  our  knowledge 
of  force.  There  is,  to  be  sure,  an  absurdity  in  the 
paragraph,  but  it  is  the  absurdity  of  identifying  cause 
and  effect,  and  belongs  entirely  to  Mr.  Spencer. 

In  a  recent  essay  upon  Mr.  Martineau,  Mr.  Spen- 
cer makes  some  further  criticisms  upon  this  doctrine, 
that  mind  is  first  and  rules  forever.  He  orders  up 
the  following  re-enforcements  : 

"  If,  then,  I  have  to  conceive  evolution  as  caused 
by  an  '  originating  Mind/  I  must  conceive  this  mind 
as  having  attributes  akin  to  those  of  the  only  mind 
I  know,  and  without  which  I  cannot  conceive  mind 
at  all.  I  will  not  dwell  on  the  many  incongruities 
hence  resulting  by  asking  how  the  'originating  Mind' 
is  to  be  thought  of  as  having  states  produced  by 
things  objective  to  it ;  as  discriminating  among  these 
states  and  classing  them  as  like  and  unlike,  and  as 
preferring  one  objective  result  to  another.  I  will 
simply  ask,  What  happens  if  we  ascribe  to  the  '  orig- 
inating Mind'  the  character  absolutely  essential  to 
the  conception  of  mind,  that  it  consists  of  a  series 


1 1 8  Review  of  Herbert  Spencer. 

of  states  of  consciousness  ?  Put  a  series  of  states 
of  consciousness  as  cause  and  the  evolving  universe 
as  effect,  and  then  endeavor  to  see  the  last  as  flow- 
ing from  the  first.  It  is  possible  to  imagine  in  some 
dim  kind  of  way  a  series  of  states  of  consciousness 
serving  as  antecedent  to  any  one  of  the  movements 
I  see  going  on,  for  my  own  states  of  consciousness 
are  often  indirectly  the  antecedents  to  such  move- 
ments. But  how  if  I  attempt  to  think  of  such  a 
series  as  antecedent  to  all  actions  throughout  the 
universe,  to  the  motions  of  the  multitudinous  stars 
through  space,  to  the  revolutions  of  all  their  planets 
around  them,  to  the  gyration  of  all  these  planets  on 
their  axes,  to  the  infinitely  multiplied  physical  proc- 
esses going  on  in  each  of  these  suns  and  planets  ? 
I  cannot  even  think  of  a  series  of  states  of  conscious- 
ness as  causing  the  relatively-small  group  of  actions 
going  on  over  the  earth's  surface  ;  I  cannot  even 
think  of  it  as  antecedent  to  all  the  winds  and  dis- 
solving clouds  they  bear,  to  the  currents  of  all  the 
rivers  and  the  grinding  action  of  all  the  glaciers  ;  still 
less  can  I  think  of  it  as  antecedent  to  the  infinity  of 
processes  simultaneously  going  on  in  all  the  plants 
that  cover  the  globe,  from  tropical  palms  down  to 
polar  lichens,  and  in  all  the  animals  that  roam  among 
them,  and  the  insects  that  buzz  about  them.  Even 
to  a  single  small  set  of  these  multitudinous  terrestrial 
changes,  I  cannot  conceive  as  antecedent  a  series  of 
states  of  consciousness — cannot,  for  instance,  think 


Review  of  Herbert  Spencer.  1 1 9 

of  it  as  causing  the  hundred  thousand  breakers  that 
are  at  this  instant  curling  over  the  shores  of  En- 
gland. How,  then,  is  it  possible  for  me  to  conceive 
an  'originating  Mind,'  which  I  must  represent  to 
myself  as  a  series  of  states  of  consciousness,  being 
antecedent  to  the  infinity  of  changes  simultaneously 
going  on  in  worlds  too  numerous  to  count,  dispersed 
throughout  a  space  which  baffles  imagination  ? "  * 

If  the  doctrine  of  an  "originating  Mind"  prove  to  be 
one  half  as  absurd  as  the  doctrine  of  this  paragraph, 
it  ought  to  be  given  up  at  once.  Note  first  the  defini- 
tion of  mind  as  a  "  series  of  states  of  consciousness." 
I  verily  believe  with  Mr.  Spencer,  that  such  a  mind 
could  not  originate  either  the  universe  or  any  thing 
else ;  but  the  definition  looks  to  me  very  much  like 
a  "  symbolic  idea  of  the  illegitimate  order."  A  state, 
must  be  the  state  of  something.  Consciousness  im- 
plies a  being  who'  is  conscious  ;  motion  implies  | 
something  moved  ;  and  so  a  state  implies  a  being 
which  is  in  that  state.  Mind  is  neither  a  state  nor, 
a  series  of  states,  but  a  being  which  experiences 
these  states.  I  do  not  hesitate  a  moment  to  class 
Mr.  Spencer's  definition  with  the  "  pseud-ideas."  I 
grant  that  in  many  things  the  Divine  Mind  must  be 
altogether  different  from  ours.  We  gain  our  knowl- 
edge from  without ;  with  Him  all  is  self-contained. 
Our  art  is  but  the  faintest  copy  of  what  is  original 
with  Him.  From  our  own  experience  we  can  gain  no 

*  "  Popular  Science  Monthly,"  July,  1872. 


i  20  Review  of  Herbert  Spencer. 

clew  to  very  many  phases  of  the  Creative  Mind. 
His  ways  are  not  as  our  ways,  nor  his  thoughts  as 
our  thoughts.  We  can  predicate  nothing  of  the  Divine 
Reason  save  the  purest  intellection.  But  the  funda- 
mental conception  of  mind  is  that  of  a  self-deter- 
mining intelligence ;  and  whenever  we  meet  with  a 
free  intelligence,  we  call  it  a  mind.  It  may  differ  in 
many  ways  from  us,  but  in  the  underlying  freedom 
and  knowledge  we  find  a  common  measure. 

Now  can  such  a  mind,  free  and  intelligent,  be  the 
cause  of  all  things  ?  Mr.  Spencer  thinks  not ;  for 
though  it  is  abundantly  credible  that  linear  forces  in 
their  blind  play  should  have  produced  the  great  har- 
mony of  the  universe,  a  mind,  he  thinks,  would  be- 
come confused  and  giddy.  I  defy  any  one  to  get  out 
of  Mr.  Spencer's  argument,  apart  from  the  nonsense 
about  the  "  series  of  states,"  any  thing  more  than  the 
suggestion  that  an  infinite  mind  would  have  more  on 
hand  than  it  could  attend  to.  He  speaks  of  the  infinity 
of  processes  going  on  upon  our  earth,  multiplies  it 
by  the  number  of  the  stars,  and  asks  if  it  is  credible 
that  one  mind  should  originate  and  control  all  this. 

Nay,  let  us  obey  Mr.  Spencer,  and  think  upon  the 
multitudinous  changes  which  are  forever  going  on. 
Let  us  begin  with  the  small  series  of  changes  which 
take  place  on  a  day  in  June,  when 

"  Every  clod  feels  a  stir  of  might, 

An  instinct  within  it,  that  reaches  and  towers, 

And  groping  blindly  above  it,  for  light, 
"  Climbs  to  a  soul  in  grass  and  flowers," 


Review  of  Herbert  Spencer.  1 2 1 

and  remember  that  all  these  changes  are  along  lines  of 
order  and  of  beauty.  Think  of  the  universal  war- 
ring of  tremendous  forces  which  is  forever  going  on, 
and  remember  that  out  of  this  strife  is  born,  not 
chaos,  void  and  formless,  but  a  creation  of  law  and 
harmony.  Bear  in  mind,  too,  that  this  creation  is 
filled  with  the  most  marvelous  mechanisms,  with  the 
most  exquisite  contrivances,  and  with  forms  of  the 
rarest  beauty.  Remember,  also,  that  the  existence 
of  these  forms  for  even  a  minute  depends  upon  the 
nicest  balance  of  destructive  forces.  Abysses  of 
chaos  yawn  on  every  side,  and  yet  creation  holds  on 
its  way.  Nature's  keys  need  but  to  be  jarred  to  turn 
the  tune  into  unutterable  discord,  and  yet  the  har- 
mony is  preserved.  Bring  hither  your  glasses,  and 
see  that  from  atomic  recess  to  the  farthest  depth 
there  is  naught  but  "  toil  cooperant  to  an  end."  All 
these  systems  move  to  music  ;  all  these  atoms  march 
in  tune.  Listen  until  you  catch  the  strain,  and  then 
say  whether  it  is  credible  that  a  blind  force  should 
originate  and  maintain  all  this.  Mr.  Spencer  thinks 
it  is.  There  is  no  difficulty  in  supposing  a  mechan- 
ical force  to  have  done  it  all ;  but  the  hypothesis  of 
a  Creative  Mind,  which  animates  nature  and  realizes 
His  thought  in  all  its  phenomena,  is  too  incredible  to 
be  entertained  for  a  moment ;  because,  forsooth,  such 
a  mind  would  have  too  much  to  attend  to.  Surely 
science  must  be  asleep,  and  philosophy  at  its  lowest 
ebb,  when  such  sheer  nonsense  as  this  is  allowed  to 


t22  Review  of  Herbert  Spencer. 

usurp,  unchallenged,  a  prominent  place  in  either.  Do 
you  speak  of  the  stars  ?  "•  Lift  up  your  eyes  on  high, 
and  behold  who  hath  created  these  things,  that  bring- 
eth  out  their  host  by  number :  he  calleth  them  all  by 
names ;  by  the  greatness  of  his  might,  for  that  he  is 
strong  in  power,  not  one  faileth."  Does  the  infinity 
of  orderly  change  astonish  you  ?  "  Hast  thou  not 
known  ?  hast  thou  not  heard,  that  the  everlasting 
God,  the  Lord,  the  Creator  of  the  ends  of  the  earth, 
fainteth  not,  neither  is  weary  ?  there  is  no  searching 
of  his  understanding."-  The  absurd  definition  of 
mind  is  miserable  enough  as  an  argument ;  but  the 
assertion  that  a  mind  would  be  unequal  to  the  situa- 
tion, is  positively  ludicrous. 

One  active  force  in  nature,  the  scientists  say ;  and 
psychology  gives  them  the  choice  of  making  that 
force  nothing,  or  else  the  activity  of  an  ever-living 
Will.  Yet  possibly  some  may  feel  that  this  doctrine 
is  at  variance  with  known  scientific  facts.  How  can 
we  reconcile  this  doctrine  with  the  fixedness  of  na- 
ture's laws  ?  The  answer  is,  "  With  Him  is  no  vari- 
ableness, neither  shadow  of  turning."  Why  may  not 
Will  adopt  for  purposes  of  its  own  a  fixed  mode  of 
working  ?  Why  may  not  the  steady  law  be  made 
the  expression  of  the  constant  thought  ? 

But  is  not  gravitation  an  impersonal  force  ? 
Surely,  since  all  the  splendid  achievements  of  as- 
tronomy are  based  upon  this  conception,  we  must 
suppose  it  to  represent  a  fact. 


Review  of  Herbert  Spencer.  123 

Yes,  we  may  suppose  it  to  represent  a  fact,  while 
it  i5  not  the  fact  itself.  In  mechanics,  when  we 
have  a  single  force  we  can  always  decompose  it 
into  two  or  more  forces  which  shall  produce  the 
same  effect ;  or  if  we  have  a  number  of  forces, 
we  can  compound  them,  and  obtain  an  equivalent 
single  force.  In  every  such  case  of  resolution  and 
composition,  the  reasoning  for  one  member  of  the 
equation  holds  also  for  the  other ;  yet  we  are  not 
dealing  with  the  fact  itself  but  with  its  equivalents — 
the  resultant  is  the  equivalent  of  the  components, 
and  conversely.  By  this  device  the  problem  is  made 
amenable  to  our  calculus,  and  the  known  equivalence 
justifies  our  confidence  in  the  conclusion. 

Now  scientific  theories  I  believe  to  be  of  this  na- 
ture ;  they  are  equivalents  of  the  fact,  and  not  the  fact 
itself.  Being  equivalents,  they  serve  the  purposes  of 
science  as  well  as  the  fact  itself  would — enabling  us  to 
previse  phenomena,  and  giving  unity  to  our  knowl- 
edge, which  are  the  chief  functions  of  science.  Thus 
the  atomic  theory  works  upon  matter  as  composed  of 
indivisible  atoms.  Different  elements  have  atoms 
of  different  sizes,  and  perhaps  of  different  forms  ;  but 
the  size  and  form  for  each  element  are  constant.  Our 
chemical  philosophy  is  based  almost  entirely  upon 
this  conception.  By  means  of  it  we  are  able  to  co- 
ordinate many  chemical  facts,  and  to  form  some  dim 
idea  of  the  method  of  chemical  combination.  But 
while  the  theory  has  a  scientific  value,  it  is  extremely 


124  Review  of  Herbert  Spencer. 

doubtful  whether  it  represents  any  fact  of  the  inte- 
rior constitution  of  matter ;  it  is  an  equivalent,  not  a 
fact.  So,  too,  the  vibratory  theory  of  light,  and  the 
classifications  of  natural  history,  serve  to  explain 
many  facts,  to  give  unity  to  our  knowledge,  and  to 
forecast  the  future.  So  far  they  are  equivalents,  and 
we  may  safely  rely  upon  the  conclusions  based  upon 
them,  but  there  is  no  proof  that  they  are  any  thing 
more.  Indeed,  the  fact  that  they  all  fail  to  explain 
all  the  phenomena,  indicates  that  they  are  like  those 
mathematical  calculations  which  are  based  upon  ap- 
proximative methods — true  enough  for  practical  pur- 
poses, but  sure  to  diverge  from  the  truth  if  carried 
too  far.  They  all  have  a  parallax  with  reality,  imper- 
ceptible indeed  for  terrestrial  measures,  but  at  the 
distance  of  the  fixed  stars  the  sub-tending  line  is  the 
diameter  of  the  earth's  orbit. 

This,  then,  is  what  I  mean  in  saying  that  the 
scientific  conception  of  gravitation  represents  a 
fact,  while  it  is  not  the  fact  itself.  Indeed,  this 
is  the  way  in  which  Newton  stated  the  theory ; 
not  that  there  is  a  power  in  the  sun  by  which 
the  planets  move,  but  that  they  move  as  they  would 
if  there  were  such  a  power.  That  the  force  of  grav- 
ity really  resides  in  the  atoms,  Newton  declared  to 
be  a  conception  which  no  philosopher  could  enter- 
tain, because  it  implies  that  inert  matter  can  act 
where  it  is  not ;  and  that,  too,  across  an  absolute 
void,  and  without  any  media  whatever.  Mr.  Mill  felt 


Review  of  Herbert  Spencer.  125 

called  upon  to  rebuke  Newton  for  this  statement, 
insisting  that  no  one  now  finds  any  difficulty  what- 
ever in  believing  that  matter  can  act  across  a  void, 
and  without  media  ;  and  he  further  advised  that  every 
philosopher  who  feels  inclined  to  say  what  can  be, 
and  what  cannot,  should  hang  this  statement  of  New- 
ton's in  his  study  as  a  warning  against  similar  rash- 
ness. But  since  Mr.  Mill  had  already  filled  the  first 
half  of  his  "  System  of  Logic  "  with  proofs  that  there 
is  no  active  power  in  matter,  and  that  even  mattei 
itself  is  only  an  assumption,  which  is  far  from  being 
sure,  it  would  seem  that  Mr.  Mill  himself  might 
with  very  great  propriety  have  hung  this  statement 
of  Newton's  in  his  study,  together  with  some  of  his 
own,  and  might  with  advantage  have  pondered  them 
well  before  he  uttered  his  rebuke.  The  truth  is,  that 
to  the  empirical  intellect,  whatever  is  customary  is 
clear  ;  as  to  the  empirical  conscience,  whatever  is 
customary  is  right.  Science  has  the  laws  of  the 
planets'  movements,  and  that  is  all  that  it  needs  to 
know.  As  to  the  force  by  which  they  move,  science 
can  say  nothing ;  that  is  a  question  for  philosophy, 
and  philosophy  repudiates  the  conception  of  an  im- 
personal force,  as  involving  irrationalities  ;  and  de- 
clares this  great  coordinating  force  of  nature  to  be 
the  activity  of  Him  in  whom  we  live,  and  move,  and 
ha  e  our  being. 

I  look  upon  this  idea  of  force  as  the  only  mediator 
between  science  and  religion.     It  has  long  been  seen 


126  Review  of  Herbert  Spencer. 

by  all  thinking  men  that  it  is  impossible  to  make  any 
satisfactory  partition  of  territory  between  these 
rivals.  Wherever  there  are  events,  whether  in  mind 
or  in  matter,  science  will  look  for  a  law.  Wherever 
there  are  events,  whether  in  mind  or  matter,  religion 
will  look  for  God.  If  science  and  religion  are  mu- 
tually exclusive,  there  must  be  constant  encroach- 
ments, with  resulting  feuds,  until  one  or  the  other  is 
destroyed.  It  may  be  possible  for  some  men  to  keep 
their  religion  in  one  hemisphere  of  their  brain  and 
their  science  in  the  other ;  but  to  most  men  such  a 
feat  is  impossible.  Few  minds  are  foggy  enough  to 
have  hostile  ideas  encamping  in  the  same  head  with- 
out detecting  each  other's  presence.  Nor  is  it  desir- 
able that  it  should  be  otherwise,  for  such  a  composite 
figure  is  more  suggestive  of  hypocrisy  than  any  thing 
else.  If  one  lobe  believes  only  in  immutable  law, 
the  other  can  have  little  faith  in  prayer. 

But  it  seems  to  me  that  this  idea  of  force,  which  is 
as  much  the  necessity  of  science  as  it  is  of  religion, 
makes  an  honorable  reconciliation  possible,  because  it 
enforces  on  the  one  hand  the  need  of  an  originating 
and  controlling  mind,  and  on  the  other  leaves  the  meth- 
od of  its  working  undetermined.  Science  discovers 
laws,  but  is  forced  to  provide  an  ever-active  admin- 
istrator ;  this  satisfies  religion.  Religion  proves  an 
ever-living  Will,  but  is  compelled  to  grant  its  steady 
method ;  this  satisfies  science.  Thus  each  can  look 
without  aversion  upon  the  claims  and  efforts  of  the 


Review  of  Herbert  Spencer.  127 

other.  To  the  claim  of  religion  that  mind  is  not 
last  but  first,  and  rules  forever,  science  says,  Amen. 
To  the  claim  of  science,  that  this  mind  has  its  steady 
method,  religion  answers, 

"  God  is  law,  say  the  Avise,  O  soul,  and  let  us  rejoice. 
For  if  he  thunder  by  law,  the  thunder  is  still  his  voice." 

Chastened  and  purified  by  needed  criticism,  relig- 
ion takes  up  again  the  strain  of  ancient  piety,  and 
sings,  with  a  deeper  and  more  assured  knowledge, 
that  He  holdeth  the  deep  in  the  hollow  of  his  hand, 
and  causeth  the  day-spring  to  know  his  place.  To 
religion  the  cause,  to  science  the  method  ;  to  relig- 
ion the  power,  to  science  the  path  :  this,  I  believe, 
is  the  only  possible  basis  for  an  abiding  peace. 

But  as  it  is  desirable  to  continue  this  argument  a 
little  further,  that  we  may  more  clearly  see  the  true 
character  of  Mr.  Spencer's  system,  let  us  grant 
what  he  assumes,  the  existence  of  a  universal  im- 
personal force,  and  inquire  how  he  accounts  for  the 
intelligence  which  the  universe  seems  to  manifest. 
We  shall  find  it  to  be  only  the  old  atheistic  system 
of  chance  in  a  new,  and  not  much  improved,  edition. 
One  force  of  infinite  differentiations,  but  without  in- 
telligent play,  is  that  able  to  turn  chaos  into  crea- 
tion ?  is  that  able  to  hit  upon  and  maintain  organic 
forms  which  are  marvels  of  adaptive  skill  ?  is  that 
able  to  construct  the  eye  with  its  double  lenses  to 
refract  the  light,  with  its  chamber  darkened  that  no 


128  Review  of  Herbert  Spencer. 

wandering  reflections  may  disturb  the  image,  with 
its  optic  nerve  at  the  optical  focus  for  the  reception 
of  the  picture,  and  with  its  telegraphic  line  of  com- 
munication with  the  brain  ?  If  life  is  a  resultant  of 
force,  it  is  not  the  result  of  a  single  form  but  of  many. 
Mechanical,  chemical,  elective,  thermal  forces  enter 
into  the  compound  ;  and  only  by  the  nicest  adjust- 
ment is  life  maintained.  Is  this  underlying  linear 
force  capable  of  originating  and  maintaining  the 
happy  balance  ?  The  old  theory  that  out  of  a  jumble 
of  atoms  organic  forms  arise,  is  scouted  by  every 
one  ;  is  it  any  more  credible  that  they  should  arise 
out  of  a  jumble  of  forces  ?  Mr.  Spencer  sees  no  di- 
flculty  in  such  a  view,  and  bases  his  faith  upon  the 
"  Instability  of  the  Homogeneous,"  the  "  Multiplica- 
tion of  Effects,"  and  "Differentiation  and  Integra- 

/  tion  ;"  three  chapters  in  which  he  explains  the  process 

1  of  evolution. 

Take  any  mass  of  homogeneous  matter  ;  its  parts 
stand  differently  related  to  both  internal  and  external 
forces.  The  exterior  will  receive  light  and  heat, 

/while  the  interior  will  receive  no  light  and  little 
heat.  The  same  is  true  of  the  action  of  any  of  the 
forces  ;  they  must  affect  different  parts  unequally. 
But  this  unequal  action  will  result  in  unequal 
changes,  by  which  the  original  homogeneity  will  be  de- 
stroyed. Heterogeneity,  being  once  established,  will 
cause  a  still  more  varied  reaction  of  the  several  parts, 
and  the  necessary  result  will  be  a  still  more  complex 


Review  of  Herbert  Spencer.  129 

heterogeneity.  The  increasing  differentiation  of  the 
parts  will  cause  the  incident  forces  to  split  into  a 
variety  of  forms — light,  heat,  electricity — all  of  which 
will  increase  the  heterogeneity  and  "  nrultirjly^egects.'' 
Here,  then,  we  have  a  force  constantly  at  work  to 
produce  diversity.  Under  its  operation  the  homo- 
geneous nebula  spun  itself  into  orbital  rings,  and 
condensed  into  solid  globes.  Its  working  has  pro- 
duced all  the  heterogeneity  of  the  earth's  crust, 
and  the  complexity  of  its  physical  aspects.  Now 
we  cannot,  to  be  sure,  trace  all  its  operations,  but 
here  is  a  force  which,  in  some  of  its  turnings 
and  twistings,  must  produce  living  forms.  This 
is  the  sum  of  the  chapters  on  the  "  Instability 
of  the  Homogeneous "  and  the  "  Multiplication  of 
Effects."  It  will  hardly  be  credited  without  a  quo- 
tation. 

"  Take  a  mass  of  unorganized  but  organizable  mat- 
ter— either  the  body  of  one  of  the  lowest  living  forms 
or  the  germs  of  one  of  the  higher.  Consider  its  cir- 
cumstances— either  it  is  immersed  in  water  or  air,  or 
within  a  parent  organism.  Wherever  placed,  how- 
ever, its  outer  and  inner  parts  stand  differently  re- 
lated to  surrounding  agencies — nutriment,  oxygen, 
and  the  various  stimuli.  But  this  is  not  all.  Whether 
it  lies  quiescent  at  the  bottom  of  the  water  or  on  the 
leaf  of  the  plant,  whether  it  moves  through  the  water, 
preserving  some  definite  attitudes,  or  whether  it  is  in 

the  inside  of  an  adult,  it  equally  results  that  certain 

9 


1 30  Review  of  Herbert  Spencer. 

parts  of  its  surface  are  more  exposed  to  light,  heat, 
or  oxygen,  and  in  others  to  the  material  tissues  and 
their  contents.  Hence  must  follow  the  destruction 
of  its  original  equilibrium." — P.  370.  The  over- 
turned equilibrium  is  assumed  to  take  the  direction 
of  the  parent  form. 

But  as  this  assumption  in  the  case  of  the  higher 
organisms  would  task  the  credulity  even  of  an  evolu- 
tionist, Mr.  Spencer  proceeds  to  mask  it  as  follows : 

"  Of  course  in  the  germs  of  the  higher  organisms, 
the  metamorphoses  immediately  due  to  the  instability 
of  the  homogeneous  are  soon  masked  by  those  due 
to  the  assumption  of  the  hereditary  type.  Such 
early  changes,  however,  as  are  common  to  all  classes 
of  organisms,  and  so  cannot  be  ascribed  to  heredity, 
entirely  conform  to  the  hypothesis.  .  .  . 

"  But  as  already  hinted,  this  principle,  understood 
in  the  simple  form  here  presented,  supplies  no  key 
to  the  detailed  phenomena  of  organic  development. 
It  fails  entirely  to  explain  generic  and  specific  pecul- 
iarities ;  and  indeed  leaves  us  equally  in  the  dark  re- 
specting those  more  important  distinctions  by  which 
families  and  orders  are  marked  out.  Why  two  ova, 
similarly  exposed  in  the  same  pool,  should  become 
the  one  a  fish  and  the  other  a  reptile,  it  cannot  tell 
us.  That  from  two  different  eggs  placed  under  the 
same  hen  should  respectively  come  forth  a  duckling 
and  a  chicken,  is  a  fact  not  to  be  accounted  for  on 
the  hypothesis  above  developed.  We  have  here  no 


Rei'iew  of  Herbert  Spencer.  1 3 1 

alternative  but  to  fall  back  upon  the  unexplained 
principle  of  hereditary  transmission.  The  capacity 
possessed  by  an  unorganized  germ  of  unfolding  into 
a  complex  adult,  which  repeats  ancestral  traits  in  the 
minutest  details,  and  that  even  when  it  has  been 
placed  in  conditions  unlike  those  of  its  ancestors,  is 
a  capacity  we  cannot  at  present  understand.  .  .  . 
Should  it,  however,  turn  out,  as  we  shall  hereafter 
find  reason  for  suspecting,  that  these  complex  differ- 
entiations which  adults  exhibit  are  themselves  the 
slowly-accumulated  and  transmitted  results  of  a  proc- 
ess like  that  seen  in  the  first  changes  of  the  germ, 
it  will  follow  that  even  those  embryonic  changes  due 
to  hereditary  influence  are  remote  consequences  of 
the  alleged  law.  Should  it  be  shown  that  the  slight 
modifications  wrought  during  life  on  each  adult,  and 
bequeathed  to  offspring  along  with  all  preceding 
modifications,  are  themselves  unlikenesses  of  parts 
that  are  produced  by  unlikenesses  of  conditions. 
Then  it  will  follow  that  the  modifications  displayed 
in  the  course  of  embryonic  development  are  partly 
direct  consequences  of  the  instability  of  the  homo- 
geneous, and  partly  indirect  consequences  of  it." — 

Pp.  373.  374- 

This  is  admirable  strategy,  but  it  does  not  alter 
the  argument.  It  extends  the  time  a  little,  but  after 
all  every  thing  comes  back,  directly  or  indirectly,  to 
the  instability  of  the  homogeneous.  The  homoge- 
neous germ  must  lapse  into  heterogeneity.  Action 


132  Review  of  Herbert  Spencer. 

and  reaction  will  be  further  complicated  by  this 
change — "  effects  "  will  be  "  multiplied,"  and  the  re- 
sult will  be  more  heterogeneity.  The  direction  of 
these  changes  is,  to  be  sure,  mainly  a  matter  of  guess- 
work— for,  as  Mr.  Spencer  well  says,  "  the  actions 
going  on  throughout  an  organism  are  so  involved 
and  subtle  that  we  cannot  expect  to  identify  the  par- 
ticular forces  by  which  particular  integrations  are 
effected."  The  finished  result  will  be,  let  us  suppose, 
a  baby.  Out  of  the  infinite  heterogeneities  possible, 
this  unintelligent  force  will  hit  each  time  upon  that 
particular  heterogeneity,  a  baby.  When  born,  it  will 
bring  with  it  eyes  fitted  for  the  light,  ears  adapted  to 
sound,  lungs  adapted  to  the  air,  bones  to  support  the 
structure,  muscles  to  move  it,  a  nervous  system  to 
coordinate  and  control  its  motions  ;  yet  this  marvel- 
ous adaptation  of  the  parts  to  each  other,  and  of  the 
whole  to  its  surroundings,  and  this  astonishing  pre- 
vision of  future  needs,  are  the  results  of  the  "  Insta- 
bility of  the  Homogeneous  "  and  the  "  Multiplication 
of  Effects."  Two  pregnant  principles  surely.  But 
grant  that  the  homogeneous  is  unstable,  why  should 
it  not  fall  into  a  chaotic  heterogeneity  ?  Why  should 
not  the  heterogeneous  changes  cancel  themselves, 
that  is,  why  should  not  the  result  of  one  heterogenity 
be  to  cancel  a  previously  existing  one  ?  Why  should 
there  be  any  progress  at  all  ?  Most  of  all,  why 
should  there  be  any  orderly  and  intelligent  series  of 
changes  such  as  are  here  exhibited  ?  Chaotic  heter- 


Review  of  Herbert  Spencer.  133 

ogeneities  are  infinite  ;  how  does  it  happen  that  this 
overturned  homogeneity  escapes  all  those,  and  lights 
upon  a  heterogeneity  which  is  impact  of  intelligence, 
foresight,  and  purpose  ?  There  is  no  answer  to  these 
questions  in  any  thing  which  Mr.  Spencer  has  said. 
The  "  Instability  of  the  Homogeneous  "  might  pos- 
sibly account  for  chaos  ;  it  is  totally  insufficient  to 
explain  creation. 

Mr.  Spencer  attempts  to  supplement  this  reason- 
ing by  the  chapter  on  "  Differentiation  and  Integra- 
tion." The  doctrine  is  that  like  tends  to  get  with 
like  under  the  operation  of  a  uniform  force.  It  is 
illustrated  by  the  fact  that  a  smart  breeze  in  October 
carries  away  the  dying  leaves  and  allows  the  green 
ones  to  remain.  This  is  called  "  segregation."  The 
sorting  action  of  rivers  is  another  example  ;  first  the 
larger  stones  are  deposited,  next  the  smaller,  and 
finally  the  mud  and  sand  settle  far  out  at  sea.  Some 
phenomena  of  crystallization  are  also  appealed  to  ; 
and  in  society  we  find  that  birds  of  a  feather  flock 
together.  All  these  are  instances  of  "  segregation." 
Mr.  Spencer  has  a  way  of  using  the  vaguest  and 
rriost  far-fetched  analogies  as  identities,  which  often 
makes  it  impossible  to  get  at  any  defined  meaning. 
But  I  suppose  he  intends  by  these  illustrations  to 
teach  that  there  is  some  kind  of  sorting  action  in  the 
body,  whereby  similar  kinds  of  organic  matter  get 
together.  Bone  matter  unites,  nervous  matter  segre- 
gates, etc.  This  is  the  reason  why  each  organ  ob- 


134  Review  of  Herbert  Spencer. 

tains  its  own  peculiar  nourishment.  Omitting  to 
inquire  as  to  the  fact,  it  suffices  to  say  that  even  if 
true  the  argument  is  not  improved.  Simple  aggre- 
gation would  satisfy  the  law  of  segregation ;  but 
something  more  than  aggregation  is  necessary  for 
organic  systems.  Nervous  matter  must  not  only  be 
segregated,  but  segregated  in  a  very  peculiar  manner. 
The  marvelous  network  of  nerves  which  incloses  and 
interlaces  the  body  is  a  remarkable  order  of  segrega- 
tion, and  one  which  is  hardly  illustrated  by  the  blow- 
ing away  of  dead  leaves  or  the  washing  of  sand  out 
of  gravel.  The  same  remark  is  true  for  all  the  com- 
ponents of  the  body.  Bones,  muscles,  veins,  sinews, 
must  be  segregated  after  an  exact  pattern  to  serve 
the  needs  of  the  structure.  It  is  not  segregation 
alone,  but  the  segregation  in  such  peculiar  forms,  in 
forms  so  happily  adapted  to  the  wants  of  the  organ- 
ism, and  which  display  such  marks  of  intelligence  ; 
this  it  is  which  is  the  real  wonder ;  and  this  is  en- 
tirely unaccounted  for  by  any  thing  in  the  "  Instability 
of  the  Homogeneous,"  the  "Multiplication  of  Effects," 
or  the  process  of  "  Differentiation  and  Integration." 
I  avow  it ;  this  is  nothing  but  the  Lucretian  system 
of  chance  dressed  up  in  a  pseudo-scientific  jargon. 
The  atoms,  Lucretius  says,  must  in  infinite  time  try 
all  forms ;  and  some  of  these  forms  will  live.  The 
homogeneous,  says  the  later  Lucretius,  must  fall  into 
the  heterogeneous  ;  and  some  of  these  heterogeneities 
will  live.  Will  some  one  point  out  the  difference  be- 


Review  of  Herbert  Spencer.  135 

tvveen  them  ?  An  imposing  and  confusing  termin- 
ology, which  is  made  to  take  the  place  of  argument, 
is  the  only  advantage  which  the  modern  has  over  the 
ancient. 

The  purely  hap-hazard  character  of  Mr.  Spencer's 
system  appears  more  clearly  in  the  volumes  on  Bi- 
ology and  Psychology,  where  these  principles  are 
applied  at  length.  I  will  close  this  part  of  the  dis- 
cussion by  exhibiting  the  account  of  the  genesis  of 
Nerves  and  Nervous  Systems.  The  thesis  is,  that 
nerves  and  nervous  systems  are  formed  by  the  pas- 
sage of  motion  along  lines  of  least  resistance  ;  and 
the  argument  is  as  follows  : 

"When,  through  undifferentiated  tissue,  there  has 
passed  for  the  first  time  a  wave  of  disturbance  from 
some  place  where  molecular  motion  is  liberated  to 
some  place  where  it  is  absorbed,  the  line  of  least 
resistance  followed  must  be  an  indefinite  and  irreg- 
ular one.  Fully  to  understand  the  genesis  of  nerve, 
then,  we  must  understand  the  physical  actions  which 
change  this  vague  course  into  a  definite  channel, 
that  becomes  ever  more  permeable  as  it  is  more 
used.  .  .  . 

"To  aid  our  conceptions  we  will,  as  before,  take 
the  rude  analogy  furnished  by  a  row  of  bricks  on  end, 
which  overthrow  one  another  in  succession.  If  such 
bricks  on  end  have  been  adjusted  so  that  their  faces 
are  all  at  right  angles  to  the  line  of  the  series,  the 
changes  will  be  propagated  along  them  with  the  least 


136  Revieiv  of  Herbert  Spencer. 

hinderance  ;  or,  under  certain  conditions,  with  the 
greatest  multiplication  of  the  original  impulse.  For 
when  so  placed,  the  impact  each  brick  gives  the  next, 
being  exactly  in  the  line  of  the  series,  will  be  wholly 
effective ;  but  when  they  are  otherwise  placed  it  will 
not.  If  the  bricks  stand  with  their  faces  variously 
askew,  each  in  falling  will  have  a  motion  more  or  less 
diverging  from  the  line  of  the  series,  and  hence  only 
a  part  of  its  momentum  will  impel  the  next  in  the 
required  direction.  Now,  though  in  the  case  of  a 
series  of  molecules  the  action  can  be  by  no  means  so 
simple,  yet  the  same  principle  holds.  The  isomeric 
change  of  a  molecule  must  diffuse  a  wave  which  is 
greater  in  some  one  direction  than  in  all  others.  If 
so,  there  are  certain  relative  positions  of  molecules 
such  that  each  will  receive  the  greatest  amount  of 
this  wave  from  its  predecessor,  and  will  so  receive  it 
as  most  readily  to  produce  a  like  change  in  itself.  A 
series  of  molecules  thus  placed  must  stand  in  sym- 
metrical relations  to  one  another — polar  relations. 
And  it  is  not  difficult  to  see  that,  as  in  the  case  of 
the  bricks,  any  deviation  from  symmetrical  or  polar 
relations  will  involve  a  proportionate  deduction  from 
the  efficiency  of  the  shock,  and  a  diminution  in  the 
quantity  of  molecular  motion  given  out  at  the  far 
end.  But  now,  what  is  the  indirect  result  when  a 
wave  of  change  passes  along  a  line  of  molecules  thus 
unsymmetrically  placed  ?  The  indirect  result  is,  that 
the  motion  which  is  not  passed  by  the  unsymmetri- 


Review  of  Herbert  Spencer.  137 

cally-placed  molecules,  goes  toward  placing  them 
symmetrically.  Let  us  again  consider  what  happens 
with  our  row  of  bricks.  When  one  of  these  in  fall- 
ing comes  against  the  next  standing  askew,  its  im- 
pact is  given  to  the  nearest  angle  of  this  next,  and  so 
tends  to  give  this  next  a  motion  round  its  axis. 
Further,  when  the  next  thus  moved  delivers  its  mo- 
tion to  its  successor,  it  does  this  not  through  the 
angle  on  the  side  that  was  struck,  but  through  the 
diagonally-opposite  angle ;  and,  consequently,  the 
reaction  of  its  impact  on  its  successor  adds  to  the 
rotary  motion  already  received.  Hence  the  amount 
of  force  which  it  does  not  pass  on  is  the  amount  of 
force  absorbed  in  turning  it  toward  parallelism  with 
its  neighbors.  Similarly  with  the  molecules.  Each 
in  falling  into  its  new  isomeric  attitude,  and  passing 
on  the  shock  to  its  successor,  gives  to  its  successor 
a  motion  which  is  all  passed  on  if  the  successor 
stands  in  polar  relations  toward  it,  but  which  if  the 
relation  is  not  polar  is  only  partially  passed  on, 
some  of  it  being  taken  up  in  moving  the  successor 
toward  a  polar  relation.  One  more  consequence  is  to 
be  observed.  Every  approach  of  the  molecules  toward 
symmetrical  arrangement  increases  the  amount  of 
molecular  motion  transferred  from  one  end  of  the 
series  to  the  other.  Suppose  that  the  row  of  bricks, 
which  were  at  the  first  very  much  out  of  parallelism, 
have  fallen,  and  that  part  of  the  motion  given  by 
each  to  the  next  has  gone  toward  bringing  their 


138  Review  of  Herbert  Spencer. 

faces  nearer  to  parallelism  ;  and  suppose  that,  with- 
out further  changing  the  positions  of  their  bases,  the 
bricks  are  severally  restored  to  their  vertical  atti- 
tudes ;  then  it  will  happen  that  if  the  serial  overthrow 
of  them  is  repeated,  the  actions,  though  the  same  as 
before  in  their  kinds,  will  not  be  the  same  as  before 
in  their  degrees.  Each  brick,  falling  as  it  now  does 
more  in  the  line  of  the  series,  will  deliver  more  of  its 
momentum  to  the  next ;  and  less  momentum  will  be 
taken  up  in  moving  the  next  toward  parallelism  with 
its  neighbors.  If,  then,  the  analogy  holds,  it  must 
happen  that  in  the  series  of  isomerically-changing 
molecules,  each  transmitted  wave  of  molecular  motion 
is  expended  partly  in  so  altering  the  molecular  atti- 
tudes as  to  render  the  series  more  permeable  to  future 
waves,  and  partly  in  setting  up  changes  at  the  end 
of  the  series  ;  that  in  proportion  as  less  of  it  is  ab- 
sorbed in  working  this  structural  change,  more  of  it 
is  delivered  at  the  far  end  and  greater  effect  is  pro- 
duced there  ;  and  that  the  final  state  is  one  in  which 
the  initial  wave  of  molecular  motion  is  transmitted 
without  deduction — or  rather,  with  the  addition  of 
the  molecular  motion  given  out  by  the  successive 
molecules  of  the  series  in  their  isomeric  falls. 

"  From  beginning  to  end,  therefore,  the  develop- 
ment of  nerve  results  from  the  passage  of  motion 
along  the  line  of  least  resistance,  and  the  reduction 
of  it  to  a  line  of  less  and  less  resistance  continually. 
The  first  opening  of  a  route  along  which  equilibrium 


Review  of  Herbert  Spencer.  139 

is  restored,  between  a  place  where  molecular  motion 
is  in  excess  and  a  place  where  it  is  in  defect,  comes 
within  this  formula.  The  production  of  a  more  con- 
tinuous line  of  that  peculiar  colloid  best  fitted  to 
transmit  the  molecular  motion  also  comes  within 
this  formula,  as  does  likewise  the  making  of  this 
line  thicker  and  more  even.  And  the  formula  also 
covers  that  final  process  by  which  the  line,  having 
been  formed,  has  its  molecules  brought  into  the  polar 
order  which  least  resists,  and  indeed  facilitates,  the 
transmission  of  the  wave."  * 

This  entire  process,  it  must  be  remembered,  is  be- 
low the  microscopic  limit.  These  facts  are  seen  only 
with  the  mind's  eye,  and  I  greatly  question  whether 
they  have  any  objective  existence.  When  Mr.  Spen- 
cer began  the  paragraph,  he  was  in  doubt  con- 
cerning his  doctrine ;  but  after  he  had  imagined  the 
series  of  bricks  falling  down  and  standing  up  again 
of  themselves,  and  assumed  that  the  analogy  was 
perfect  between  the  bricks  and  the  unseen  molecules, 
he  waxes  bolder,  and  emerges  from  his  imaginations 
with  the  formula  that  nerves  are  formed  by  the  pas- 
sage of  motion  along  lines  of  least  resistance,  and 
this  formula  is  said  to  include  every  case.  Motion 
makes  the  nerve,  lays  down  the  line  of  gray  matter 
along  which  the  nervous  influence  travels,  and 
sheathes  it  with  the  white  coating  which  prevents 
its  dissipation.  The  argument  is  the  purest  imagina- 

*  Principles  of  Psychology,  vol.  i,  pp.  517,  518. 


140  Review  of  Herbert  Spencer. 

tion  ;  not  even  the  microscope  knows  any  thing  about 
the  process  here  indicated.  But  allowing  it  to  pass, 
it  throws  no  light  whatever  on  the  structure  of  the 
nervous  system.  For  if  it  were  admitted  that  mo- 
tion along  lines  of  least  resistance  can  build  up 
nerves,  the  lines  of  least  resistance  next  need  expla- 
nation. Consider  the  marvelous  interlacing  of  the 
nerves,  and  how  necessary  that  complexity  is  for  the 
uses  of  the  structure,  and  then  tell  us  how  it  came 
to  pass  that  the  lines  of  least  resistance  arranged 
themselves  so  happily.  An  eye  would  be  useless 
without  an  optic  nerve,  and  accordingly  a  line  of 
least  resistance  ran  down  to  the  eye.  An  ear  would 
be  worthless  without  the  auditory  nerve,  but,  fortu- 
nately, a  line  of  least  resistance  was  not  wanting. 
There  is  not  a  muscle  in  the  body  which,  apart  from 
nervous  connection,  is  of  the  slightest  use ;  and  to 
guard  against  this  waste,  the  lines  of  least  resistance 
run  to  every  one.  The  body  would  be  constantly 
exposed  to  injury  if  its  surface  were  not  sensitive, 
and  so  the  lines  of  least  resistance  establish  sentinels 
so  close  to  one  another  that  not  even  the  point  of  a 
needle  can  creep  betwen  them.  The  lines  of  least 
resistance,  upon  Mr.  Spencer's  theory,  are  the  real 
marvel ;  and  these  are  left  totally  unexplained. 

Let  us  now  steady  ourselves  for  a  moment  before 
that  mass  of  protoplasm  in  which  no  lines  of  commu- 
nication are  yet  set  up,  and  inquire  what  the  result  will 
be  when  motion  is  initiated  in  any  part  ?  Mr.  Spencer 


J 

Review  of  Herbert  Spencefr          141 

says  :  "  The  isomeric  change  of  a  molecule  must  dif- 
fuse a  wave  which  is  greater  in  some  one  direction  than 
in  all  others.  If  so,  there  are  certain  relative  positions 
of  molecules,  such  that  each  will  receive  the  greatest 
amount  of  this  wave  from  its  predecessor,  and  will 
so  receive  it  as  most  readily  to  produce  a  like  change 
in  itself."  Now  why  should  that  "some  one  direc- 
tion" in  which  the  wave  of  molecular  motion  is 
"  greater  than  in  all  others  "  be  in  any  case,  not  to 
say  in  each  case,  the  one  direction  which  the  needs 
of  the  organism  make  imperative  ?  Why  should  it 
take  the  complex  direction  of  the  complete  nervous 
system  ?  There  is  no  a  priori  necessity  for  such  an 
arrangement ;  on  the  contrary,  there  is  the  very 
strongest  a  priori  improbability  against  it.  The  bare 
possibility  is  a  thing  of  chance,  and  that  of  a  high 
infinitesimal  order,  while  the  argument  is  based 
upon  as  pure  fancies  as  ever  entered  Don  Quixote's 
brain.  Indeed,  Mr.  Spencer  himself  at  times  has 
misgivings  that  his  account  is  rather  fanciful,  and  he 
enters  the  caveat  that  he  does  not  insist  that  the 
primitive  nervous  system  was  formed  in  this  way ; 
he  only  suggests  this  as  a  possible  way.  He  further 
says :  "  A  critical  reader  may  ask,  How  can  a  state 
of  molecular  tension  between  two  places  separated 
by  a  great  mass  of  amorphous  organic  substance 
cause  transmission  along  a  definite  line  which  divides 
and  subdivides  in  the  way  described  ? 

"  Doubtless  such  a  process  is  not  easy  to  imagine 


142  Review  of  Herbert  Spencer. 

under  the  conditions  we  are  apt  to  assume.  But  the 
apparent  difficulty  disappears  when,  instead  of  the 
conditions  we  are  apt  to  assume,  we  take  the  condi- 
tions which  actually  occur.  The  error  naturally  fallen 
into  is  that  of  supposing  these  actions  to  go  on  in 
creatures  of  considerable  bulk  ;  whereas,  observation 
warrants  us  in  concluding  that  they  go  on  in  ex- 
tremely small  creatures.  .  .  . 

"  The  structure  described  having  been  first  formed 
on  this  extremely  small  scale  admits  of  eventual 
enlargement  to  any  scale.  Conducing  to  the  growth 
and  preservation  of  the  individual,  inherited  by  prog- 
eny capable  by  the  aid  it  yields  of  growing  still 
larger,  and  bequeathed  with  its  accumulated  incre- 
ments of  size  and  development  to  successively  higher 
types  that  spread  into  better  habitats  and  adopt 
more  profitable  modes  of  life,  this  mere  rudiment 
may,  in  course  of  geologic  epochs,  evolve  into  a  con- 
spicuous nervous  apparatus  possessed  by  a  creature 
of  large  size.  And  so  by  this  slow  indirect  method 
there  may  be  established  lines  of  nervous  communi- 
cation where  direct  establishment  of  them  would  be 
impossible."  * 

Two  critical  remarks  are  here  to  be  made : 
First.  The  extension  of  time  which  Mr.  Spencer 
bespeaks  explains  nothing.     An  evolved  steam-en- 
gine or  loom  would  be  no  less  the  work  of  intelli- 
gence than  one  made  in  a  day.     The  involved  rela- 

*  Principles  of  Psychology,  vol.  i,  p.  530. 


Review  of  Herbert  Spencer.  143 

tions,  the  adaptation  of  means  to  ends,  the  purpose 
which  it  displays — these  demand  intelligence  in  the 
maker,  no  matter  how  far  removed  he  may  be  from 
the  work.  I  repudiate  entirely  Mr.  Spencer's  sug- 
gestion, that  the  work  which  it  were  folly  to  attribute 
to  chance  to-day,  might  be  very  rationally  attributed 
to  it  in  geologic  epochs.  Mr.  Spencer  is  clearly  not 
anxious  to  make  many  nervous  systems  in  this  fash- 
ion. He  only  seeks  to  get  a  primitive  one  started 
in  some  very  simple  organism  ;  and,  once  set  agoing, 
it  can  take  care  of  itself  and  go  on  in  endless  im- 
provement. But  appearances  are  often  deceiving ; 
the  nature  of  any  thing  is  to  be  judged  by  what 
comes  out  of  it,  and  not  merely  by  its  size  and  seem- 
ing. If  that  primitive  system  contained  within  it 
capacities  for  such  astonishing  development  as 
Mr.  Spencer  claims  for  it,  then  it  was  not  the 
simple  thing  he  assumes  it  to  be,  and  the  ques- 
tion comes  back  again  in  all  its  force,  What  in- 
volved all  these  possibilities  ?  Mr.  Spencer  has  no 
answer. 

The  second  criticism  is,  that  Mr.  Spencer  seems  to 
have  forgotten  that  he  is  engaged  in  proving  the  doc- 
trine of  evolution,  and  cannot  be  allowed  to  assume 
it.  The  force  of  his  reply  lies  entirely  in  the  assump- 
tion that  evolution  is  an  established  fact.  This,  how- 
ever, is  not  the  only  time  that  Mr.  Spencer  has  done 
this.  Many  of  his  arguments,  as  we  shall  hereafter 
see,  assume  the  point  in  dispute,  and  are  worthless 


144  Review  of  Herbert  Spencer. 

without  the  assumption.  It  is  needless  to  comment 
upon  such  admirable  strategy. 

Such  is  the  scientific  account  of  the  origin  of 
nerves  and  nervous  systems.  As  a  piece  of  ingen- 
ious imagination  it  deserves  to  rank  very  high.  As 
an  example  of  nerve,  too,  it  deserves  an  equally  high 
rank  ;  for  surely  it  must  require  a  great  deal  of  nerve 
to  manufacture  nerves  in  this  fanciful  fashion,  and 
then  parade  the  result  as  having  the  exactness  of 
science  and  the  certitude  of  demonstration.  After 
these  luminous  imaginings,  and  the  caveat  previously 
mentioned,  Mr.  Spencer  goes  on  his  way  rejoicing, 
flattering  himself  that  he  has  proved  something,  and 
has  rendered  the  "  carpenter  theory "  of  a  superin- 
tending mind  entirely  superfluous  by  these  baseless 
and  inconsistent  fancies.  The  only  thing  more  aston- 
ishing than  the  argument  itself,  is  that  it  should  ever 
have  been  believed. 

But  what  need  to  pursue  weakness  and  folly  further  ? 
Let  us  sum  up  this  chapter.  We  have  seen  that  the 
philosophical  principles  of  Parts  I  and  II  are  in  abso- 
lute contradiction  to  each  other ;  that  if  Part  I  is  true, 
Part  II  must  be  sent  to  the  purgatory  of  "pseud-ideas  ;" 
while  if  Part  II  is  true,  the  sentence  of  banishment 
against  religious  ideas  must  be  recalled.  We  have 
seen  that  the  positive  proof  of  the  correlation  of  the 
physical  with  the  vital  and  mental  forces  is  of  the 
weakest  kind,  even  if  there  were  no  opposing  evi- 
dence ;  while  we  have  further  seen  that  the  doctrine 


Review  of  Herbert  Spencer.  145 

is  in  the  plainest  opposition  to  undoubted  facts.  We 
have  seen  in  addition  that  the  same  mental  law  which 
warrants  the  belief  in  external  power,  also  warrants 
the  resolution  of  that  power  into  a  personal  activity. 
Finally,  we  have  seen  that,  even  granting  to  Mr. 
Spencer  his  impersonal  force,  the  proof  that  it  can 
do  the  work  of  intelligence  is  a  compound  of  scien- 
tific terms  and  the  purest  romance.  When  stripped 
of  their  seeming  science,  his  explanations  are  those 
which  atheism  has  always  given — chance  and  time. 
These  are  the  great  wonder-workers.  The  future 
may  assign  the  "  First  Principles "  a  place  in  the 
"  Poetry  of  Science,"  but  I  am  confident  that  it  will 
do  no  more.  That  such  a  compound  of  inconsistent 
fancies  and  palpable  contradictions  should  have  held 
a  prominent  position  in  science  for  ten  years,  only 
shows  how  low  logical  and  metaphysical  studies  have 
fallen  among  us,  and  is  altogether  the  best  example 
I  can  recall  of  the  "  Stability  of  the  Heterogeneous." 

10 


146  Review  of  Herbert  Spencer. 


CHAPTER    IV. 

PRINCIPLES  OF  PSYCHOLOGY. 

XTTE  come  now  to  the  most  difficult  problem 
»  »  which  evolution  has  to  solve.  In  the  lower 
field  of  life  we  seem  still  to  be  dealing  with  matter 
and  force  in  space  relations,  and  the  evolutionists' 
argument  has  a  superficial  plausibility.  But  when 
we  rise  to  the  mental  plane  we  meet  with  a  new  set 
of  objects,  with  sensations,  with  emotions,  and  with 
thoughts,  in  all  of  which  we  detect  no  space  rela- 
tions and  no  mechanical  measures.  An  impassable 
gulf  seems  to  separate  the  world  of  mind  from  the 
world  of  matter.  If  there  be  any  mechanical  connec- 
tion it  is  an  occult  one,  and  the  reality  of  the  fact  must 
be  made  plain  before  we  can  yield  our  assent.  For, 
not  to  mention  the  difficulty  of  evolving  thought  and 
feeling  from  the  clashing  of  inert  atoms,  before  this 
doctrine  can  be  proved,  the  validity  of  logical  laws 
and  the  trustworthiness  of  all  our  mental  processes 
must  be  established.  Otherwise,  the  results  reached 
by  reasoning  will  be  untrustworthy,  and  all  science 
and  evolution  must  disappear  together.  I  expect  to 
find,  upon  a  psychological  examination,  that  the 
metaphysical  data  of  all  reasoning  transcend  the 
teaching  of  experience.  In  that  case  the  evolution- 


Review  of  Herbert  Spencer.  147 

1st  can  take  his  choice  :  either  he  can  admit  their 
validity,  which  will  prove  fatal  to  his  system,  or  he 
can  deny  it,  which  will  be  intellectual  suicide. 

In  examining  the  testimony,  let  us  bear  in  mind  the 
points  which  must  be  proved :  first,  that  the  physical 
forces  and  sensation  correlate ;  second,  that  thought 
is  only  transformed  sensation  ;  third,  that  the  intui- 
tions of  reason,  while  valid  for  all  space  and  time,  are 
the  product  of  experience  ;  and,  fourth,  that  the  soul 
has  no  self-determining  power.  If  any  of  these 
points  cannot  be  made  out,  the  theory  breaks  down 
hopelessly  in  its  application  to  mind. 

In  applying  his  theory  to  the  explanation  of  men- 
tal evolution,  Mr.  Spencer  finds  a  philosophy  ready- 
made  to  his  hand.  The  experience-philosophy  has 
sought,  for  ages,  to  prove  that  all  that  is  in  the  mind 
has  been  derived  from  sensation.  Beginning  with 
this,  it  aims  to  show  how  all  the  laws  of  thinking 
and  all  our  apparently  simple  beliefs  have  been  gen- 
erated. The  law  of  causation,  the  principles  of 
formal  logic,  the  reality  of  an  external  world,  the 
moral  postulates  of  conscience,  and  even  the  belief 
in  personality,  are  but  elaborated  and  refined  sensa- 
tions. The  astronomer  who  accepts  the  nebular 
theory  teaches  that  the  original  mist  must  condense 
and  build  up  solid  globes,  and  determine  all  their 
characteristics.  So  the  experience-philosophy,  postu- 
lating only  a  mist  of  sensation,  teaches  that  that  mist 
must  condense,  and  differentiate,  and  integrate  until 


148  Review  of  Herbert  Spencer. 

the  solid  frame-work  of  mind  is  built  up.  There 
is,  indeed,  much  in  the  mind,  at  present,  that  seems 
independent  of  experience,  like  the  belief  in  logical 
axioms  or  in  causation  ;  and  these  beliefs  even  put 
on  airs,  and  repudiate  their  parentage,  and,  worst  of 
all,  assume  to  lord  it  over  experience  itself.  Such 
filial  impiety  deserves  severe  rebuke ;  and  the  expe- 
rience-philosopher proceeds  to  reduce  these  pretend- 
ers to  becoming  humility  by  showing  them  the 
baseness  of  their  birth.  The  fragrance  and  beauty 
of  a  flower  are  but  transformations  of  the  mold  at 
its  root ;  so  all  that  seems  independent  or  noble  in 
the  mind,  is  but  transformed  pains  and  pleasures. 
The  mind  has  no  powers  of  its  own,  but  gains  them 
from  without,  and  its  laws  are  all  enacted  for  it  by 
experience.  Whatever  claims  to  be  independent  of 
this  source  is  an  impostor,  whose  claims  must  be 
met  with  becoming  scorn.  This  philosophy  is 
adopted  by  Mr.  Spencer,  without  any  important 
modifications,  as  illustrating  the  doctrine  of  evolu- 
tion. By  means  of  the  correlation  of  forces,  he 
hooks  the  beginnings  of  life  to  the  physical  world  ; 
and  the  experience-philosophy  is  offered  as  the 
explanation  of  mental  evolution.  In  the  hands  of 
all  its  defenders,  this  philosophy  has  always  taken 
an  insane  delight  in  knocking  out  its  own  brains  ; 
and,  as  habit  strengthens  with  age,  we  shall  find  it 
performing  this  interesting  feat  with  unusual  gusto, 
under  the  direction  of  Mr.  Spencer. 


Revieiv  of  Herbert  Spencer.  149 

But,  before  he  can  avail  himself  of  the  associa- 
tionalists'  teachings,  Mr.  Spencer  must  bridge  the 
gulf  which  separates  thought  from  motion,  mind 
from  matter.  Until  this  is  done,  he  cannot  assume 
to  explain  mental  evolution. 

His  chief  argument  has  already  been  given  in 
Chapter  III.  It  amounted,  as  we  said,  to  this : 
Nervous  states  affect  mental  states,  and  conversely ; 
therefore,  each  is  a  form  of  the  other. 

The  fact  alleged  is  undoubted,  and  has  been 
admitted  by  all  realists  since  the  world  began.  It 
is  no  new  revelation  that  sickness  has  a  depressing 
effect  upon  the  mind ;  that  the  various  physical 
stimuli  affect  mental  activity ;  that  powerful  emo- 
tions exalt  or  depress  the  functions  of  the  organism  ; 
that  an  injured  brain  entails  unconsciousness,  or 
that  a  mind  diseased  can  drag  the  body  down  into 
ruin.  None  of  these  facts  are  recent  discoveries  ; 
and  if  we  grant  the  truth  of  the  spiritualistic  doc- 
trine, this  interdependence  of  soul  and  body,  upon 
which  the  materialist  bases  his  belief,  is  precisely 
what  we  should  expect.  Admit,  as  we  must,  that 
at  present  the  activity  of  the  soul  is  conditioned 
by  the  organism,  and  all  these  consequences  follow. 
If  the  soul  communicates  with  the  external  world  by 
means  of  a  material  organism,  then  the  interests  of 
both  must  be  bound  up  together  as  long  as  the  part- 
nership continues.  If  the  external  world  report  itself 
through  nervous  tides,  then  the  condition  of  the 


150  Review  of  Herbert  Spencer. 

nervous  system  will  be  a  most  important  factor  of  the 
resulting  knowledge.  If,  on  the  other  hand,  the  body 
is  the  mechanism  for  revealing  thoughts  and  feelings, 
it  again  follows  that  the  state  of  the  instrument  must 
affect  the  manifestation.  If  the  appointed  pathways 
of  sensation  are  broken  up,  no  reports  can  pass 
within.  If  the  dial-plate  be  defaced  and  broken, 
signals  can  be  made  no  longer.  If  the  wires  be  dis- 
ordered, so  that  only  wild  and  fitful  currents  can 
flow  over  them,  the  result  must  be  mental  distrac- 
tion at  one  end,  and  aimless  action  at  the  other ; 
just  as  the  wandering  earth-currents,  which  interfere 
with  the  Atlantic  cable,  spell  out  only  illiterate  mes- 
sages and  inarticulate  cries.  To  suppose  it  other- 
wise would  make  the  connection  useless,  and  our 
bodies  would  be  of  no  more  interest  to  us  than  our 
cast-off  clothes. 

I  think,  too,  that  there  is  a  moral  reason  for  the  in- 
terdependence. If  the  soul  use  the  body  as  an  instru- 
ment for  sinning,  it  shall  find  itself  sold  into  degrad- 
ing and  bitter  bondage  by  its  partner  in  crime.  If  it 
make  itself  the  home  of  evil,  it  shall  find  the  body 
dragged  down  into  ruin  along  with  it,  and  turned  into 
a  bulletin  for  the  publication  of  its  shame.  If  it  were 
not  for  this  connection,  the  moral  discipline  of  our 
present  life  would  be  almost  entirely  lost.  But,  not 
to  rest  the  argument  upon  this,  I  repeat  that  the  in- 
terdependence of  physical  and  spiritual  conditions  is 
a  necessary  result  of  the  hypothesis.  Mr.  Spencer's 


Review  of  Herbert  Spencer.  151 

facts  are  admitted .  by  every  psychologist,  but  there 
are  insuperable  objections  against  assuming  that  the 
mental  state  is  but  a  transformation  of  its  physical 
antecedent ;  a  relation  undoubtedly  exists,  but  it  is 
impossible  to  believe  in  a  correlation. 

For  the  physical  antecedent  does  not  explain  the 
fact,  even  in  the  case  of  sensation — the  department 
in  which  the  argument  is  most  plausible.  Let  us 
follow  the  in-going  nerve-current  until  it  reaches  the 
center  of  the  brain.  Let  us  note  the  isomeric  changes 
of  the  nerves  and  the  vibrating  molecules  of  the  brain. 
We  do  not  come  upon  sensation.  On  the  contrary, 
motion,  molecular  machinery,  is  all  we  find.  There 
is  nothing  in  all  this  to  give  any  hint  of  the  world 
of  consciousness  beyond.  Mr.  Spencer  himself  re- 
cognizes a  difficulty  here,  and  says  : 

"  How  this  metamorphosis  takes  place  ;  how  a 
force  existing  as  motion,  heat,  or  light,  can  become  a 
mode  of  consciousness  ;  how  it  is  possible  for  aerial 
vibrations  to  generate  the  sensation  we  call  sound, 
or  for  the  force  liberated  by  chemical  changes  in  the 
brain  to  give  rise  to  emotion — these  are  mysteries 
which  it  is  impossible  to  fathom.  But  they  are  not 
profounder  mysteries  than  the  transformation  of  the 
physical  forces  into  each  other."  * 

Mr.  Spencer  is  mistaken.  If  the  received  doctrine 
about  the  physical  forces  be  true,  there  is  no  mystery 
at  all  in  the  change  of  one  into  another.  For  we  are 

*  First  Principles,  p.  280. 


152  Review  of  Herbert  Spencer. 

told  that  all  these  forces  are  motions ;  heat,  magnet- 
ism, light,  all  are  modes  of  motion.  The  transfor- 
mation, then,  of  the  physical  forces  is  simply  a  change 
of  one  kind  of  motion  into  another — which  is  not  so 
rare  a  thing  after  all ;  and  if,  as  seems  probable,  the 
difference  between  these  motions  is  only  a  difference 
of  faster  and  slower,  the  problem  becomes  simpler 
still.  Now,  with  all  deference  to  Mr.  Spencer's 
dictum,  I  must  say  that  the  change  of  one  kind  of 
motion  into  another  is  one  thing,  but  to  change  mo- 
tion into  feeling,  which  is  not  motion  and  which  can- 
not by  any  effort  be  thought  of  as  motion,  is  quite 
another.  If  we  follow  the  physical  forces  in  their 
transformations  with  one  another,  the  antecedent  ac- 
counts for  the  result ;  but  when  we  attempt  to  follow 
them  into  their  correlations  with  consciousness,  the 
assumed  cause  gives  no  explanation  whatever  of  the 
effect. 

Again,  if  there  be  a  mechanical  correlation  of 
thought  and  motion,  the  relation  must  be  necessary 
and  constant.  Now,  if  thought  and  sensation  are 
only  transformed  nerve-force,  the  connection  should 
be  invariable  ;  and  whenever  the  proper  forces  present 
themselves  at  the  chamber  of  the  mind,  the  corre- 
sponding mental  state  should  invariably  appear.  But 
in  truth  nine  tenths  of  the  physical  antecedents  of 
sensation  never  produce  any  sensation  at  all.  In  the 
concentration  of  thought,  the  hum  of  the  school-room, 
the  roar  of  the  street,  the  thousand  sights  and  sounds 


Review  of  Herbert  Spencer.  153 

of  nature  are  lost,  or  attract  no  attention.  This  is  a 
fact  familiar  to  every  one.  The  antecedents  of  sen- 
sation are  there.  From  drum  and  retina  come  up 
the  nervous  tides  which  are  said  to  correlate  with 
thought,  but  they  perish  without  notice.  And  so 
nerve-currents  are  constantly  pouring  up  from  skin, 
from  muscles,  from  eye,  from  ear,  but  the  most  of 
them  pour  unnoticed  over  into  the  abyss  which  divides 
thought  from  the  subtlest  motion  and  the  rarest  mat- 
ter. What  do  they  correlate  with  ?  The  sequence  of 
the  physical  forces  is  rigid  and  unvarying ;  but  the 
sequence  of  sensation  depends  entirely  upon  the  at- 
tention of  the  mind  within.  Sensation  is  impossible 
without  an  inner  activity  of  the  soul.  Often,  indeed, 
this  activity  is  only  semi-conscious  ;  but  let  it  be 
some  faint  sound  or  some  dim  sight  which  we  are 
trying  to  catch,  and  our  activity  rises  into  conscious 
effort  at  once.  We  attend,  we  listen,  we  concentrate 
ourselves  upon  the  particular  organ,  through  which 
we  look  for  the  report ;  and  without  this  attention, 
this  concentration,  this  conscious  effort,  there  is  no 
sensation.  This  fact  itself  is  sufficient  to  utterly  dis- 
prove the  correlation.  There  is  an  inhabitant  within, 
who  is  not  nerve-currents,  but  who  from  nerve-cur- 
rents reads  off  the  outer  world. 

Again,  if  this  theory  be  true,  the  same  physical 
antecedent  ought  to  produce  the  same  mental  states, 
which  is  far  enough  from  being  true.  The  same 
words  spoken  in  the  same  way  may  be  praise  or 


154  Review  of  Herbert  Spencer. 

insult,  and  the  mental  state  varies  accordingly.  If 
struck  by  accident  we  have  one  feeling ;  if  struck  on 
purpose  we  have  quite  another.  The  physical  ante- 
cedents are  the  same  ;  why  are  the  results  various  ? 
There  are  myriad  facts  of  this  nature,  none  of  which 
can  be  explained  by  a  mechanical  correlation  of 
thought  and  motion.  A  discriminating,  judging 
mind,  back  of  nerve-currents,  is  the  only  possible 
explanation. 

The  theory  fails,  then,  to  explain  even  those  mental 
states  which  stand  directly  related  to  physical  ante- 
cedents ;  but  it  breaks  down  completely  when  it  at- 
tempts to  explain  those  psychical  states  which  have 
no  direct  physical  antecedents,  and  which  constitute 
by  far  the  greatest  part  of  our  conscious  experience. 
One  sits  in  the  twilight  and  muses.  Pictures  come 
and  go.  He  wanders  again  through  scenes,  once 
familiar,  but  which  now  are  many  miles  and  years 
away.  The  friends  of  his  childhood  look  in  upon 
him,  and  tones  heard  long  ago  re-vibrate  on  his  ear. 
The  vast  dim  halls  of  memory  light  up,  and  from  the 
niches  where  stand  the  images  of  dead  affection, 
step  forms  of  life,  and  fall  into  his  arms  once  more. 
Faithful  hearts  driven  asunder  by  necessities  too 
sharp  to  be  resisted  meet  again,  and  the  living  man 
tells  the  dead  of  his  loneliness  and  longing.  What 
is  the  physical  antecedent  of  this,  and  similar  ac- 
tivity ?  It  is  a  world  of  our  own  creation  in  which 
we  pass  most  of  our  time.  What  physical  ante- 


Review  of  Herbert  Spencer.  1 5  5 

cedents  can  be  shown  to  be  the  creator?  That 
there  are  any  is  pure  assumption  without  the  shadow 
of  proof. 

Mr.  Spencer  does  indeed  offer  the  lame  and  impo- 
tent suggestion,  that  this  activity,  though  it  does  not 
correlate  directly  with  the  physical  forces,  does  corre- 
late with  the  vital,  which  in  turn  correlate  with  the 
physical ;  and  that  thus  all  mental  action  comes  back 
ultimately  to  the  physical  world.  The  proof  is  that 
mental  action  is  accompanied  by  nervous  waste,  and 
hence  the  two  are  identical.  But, -two  difficulties 
meet  us  in  accepting  this  reasoning :  first,  that  nerv-- 
ous  waste  may  be  effect  instead  of  cause,  and  hence 
explains  nothing ;  and,  second,  that  the  assumption 
that  it  is  the  cause,  is,  first,  a  bald  begging  of  the 
question,  and,  next,  is  no  explanation  in  any  case. 
The  combination  of  a  few  grains  of  carbon,  nitrogen, 
etc.,  throws  no  light  on  mental  phenomena. 

Again,  according  to  this  theory  there  can  be  no 
such  thing  as  self-determination,  and  if  there  is  such 
a  thing  the  theory  is  false.  Mr.  Spencer  admits  this, 
and  on  the  ground  that  freedom  is  destructive  to  his 
theory  he  distinctly  denies  its  possibility.  Once,  in- 
deed, for  the  sake  of  a  fling  at  an  opponent's  view, 
he  objects  to  that  view  that  it  teaches  a  most  rigid 
necessity  in  all  thought  and  action  ;  but,  after  he  has 
fittingly  rebuked  such  teaching,  he  falls  back  on  the 
same  doctrine.  But  we  have  already  seen  enough  to 
make  us  suspect  that  Mr.  Spencer  is  not  always  the 


156  Review  of  Herbert  Spencer. 

most  reliable  teacher ;  let  us  then  appeal  from  his 
decision.  Can  the  soul  initiate  action  or  can  it 
not? 

The  appeal  is  to  the  universal  consciousness,  and 
the  answer  is  undoubted.  Whatever  theory  it  may 
upset,  the  soul  is  self-determinant.  It  can  act,  or  not. 
It  can  act  in  this  direction,  or  in  that.  It  avails 
nothing  to  say  that  it  cannot  act  without  a  motive  ; 
motives  are  reasons  for  action,  not  causes,  in  philo- 
sophical sense.  It  is  equally  useless  to  say  that  with- 
out the  physical  forces  the  volition  could  not  be 
carried  out.  The  soul  manifests  itself  through  ma- 
terial media,  and  of  course  can  do  so  only  when  the 
so-called  material  forces  are  present.  But  what  was 
it  that  set  the  muscles  to  contracting  and  forces  to 
working  ?  What  was  it  that  overturned  the  original 
equilibrium  and  precipitated  effort  in  this  direction 
instead  of  that  ?  Did  the  forces  set  themselves  to 
work,  or  was  there  a  controlling  cause  behind  them  ? 
Which  supposition  is  true  ?  The  latter,  the  universal 
consciousness  being  witness,  and  that  hidden  cause, 
as  Dean  Alford  would  say,  "  that's  me." 

There  is  indeed  a  simplicity  in  this  doctrine  of  cor- 
relation which  is  very  attractive.  To  begin  with  only 
matter  and  attraction,  and  mount  by  successive  steps 
through  chemistry  and  physiology,  until  not  only  mat- 
ter and  force,  but  thought  and  mind  also,  are  under  our 
feet — until  love,  conscience,  and  faith  fall  into  line  with 
the  physical  sciences,  this  is  certainly  an  attractive 


Review  of  Herbert  Spencer.  157 

programme — it  offers  to  do  so  much  with  such  a  small 
capital !  Given  the  raw  rudiments  of  matter  and 
force,  and  an  unlimited  supply  of  time,  and  there  will 
be  no  difficulty  in  grinding  out  an  angel.  Unfor- 
tunately, it  cannot  be  done.  Mental  science  cannot 
be  studied  as  a  continuation  of  physical  science. 
There  is  no  doubt  a  psychological  value  in  physio- 
logical research,  but  such  research  can  never  blossom 
into  psychology.  As  I  have  previously  pointed  out, 
if  it  were  possible  to  observe  all  that  passes  in  the 
body,  and  gaze  to  the  center  of  the  brain,  we  should 
gain  no  mental  facts.  We  should  see  motion,  not 
sensation  ;  vibration,  not  thought.  Motion  in  the 
spinning  of  brain  molecules,  or  the  passage  of  nerve 
currents,  would  be  all  that  the  sharpest  observer 
could  detect ;  nor  would  there  be  any  thing  in  this 
to  suggest  the  world  of  thought  beyond.  This  can 
be  reached  only  through  self-consciousness  ;  indeed 
all  fact  is  reached  only  through  consciousness. 
Physiology  may  boast  as  it  will  of  the  light  it  has 
thrown  upon  mental  problems  ;  psychology  alone 
makes  physiology  possible. 

Now  the  soul  clearly.and  emphatically  distinguishes 
itself,  both  from  the  external  world  and  from  the  or- 
ganism which  it  inhabits.  It  rules  the  latter,  and 
causes  it  to  do  its  bidding ;  and  even  in  those  things 
in  which  the  soul  is  subject  to  the  body,  it  no  less 
clearly  distinguishes  itself  from  the  body.  It  con- 
sciously resists  sleep,  weakness,  fainting,  disease ; 


158  Review  of  Herbert  Spencer. 

and  even  when  it  is  overborne  and  conquered,  it  still 
testifies  to  its  independent  being. 

In  every  act  of  knowledge,  too,  the  soul  implicitly 
affirms  for  itself  a  separate  existence.  The  mind  is 
implicitly  given  in  all  knowledge,  as  the  eye  and  ear 
are  postulated  in  all  seeing  and  hearing ;  but  so  un- 
obtrusive is  the  mental  affirmation  that  men  fall  into 
the  folly  of  supposing  that  physical  science,  which 
mental  science  alone  makes  possible,  can  displace  the 
latter.  In  every  act  of  knowledge  two  things  are 
always  given — the  knower  and  the  known — and  they 
are  given  as  distinct  from  each  other.  We  may 
restrict  our  attention  to  the  subject,  and  the  result 
will  be  mental  science  ;  or  we  may  give  it  to  the 
object,  and  the  result  will  be  physical  science.  But 
in  every  act  of  knowing  both  are  given,  and  given,  I 
think,  in  exact  equipoise.  No  discredit,  then,  can  be 
cast  on  the  one,  without  also  destroying  the  other. 
Hence  physical  science  and  mental  science  are  twins, 
and,  like  the  Siamese  twins,  inseparable.  The  very 
nature  of  the  cognitive  act  renders  it  impossible  to 
arrange  them  in  linear  order,  and  the  science  which 
attempts  such  an  arrangement  must  commit  both 
logical  and  psychological  suicide.  The  discredit 
cast  on  the  subjective  does  and  must  destroy  the  ob- 
jective. I  submit,  then,  that  the  linear  arrangement 
of  the  sciences  which  Mr.  Spencer  contemplates  is 
psychologically  impossible. 

There    are    some,    however,  who,    while    admit 


Review  of  Herbert  Spencer.  159 

ting  the  fact  of  this  antithesis,  deny  that  it  is 
trustworthy.  To  be  sure  the  mind  does  distin- 
guish itself  from  the  scene,  but  this  distinction 
represents  no  reality  in  the  nature  of  things.  The 
so-called  object  is  but  a  representation  which  the 
mind  makes  to  itself,  through  the  operation  of  its 
own  laws.  I  believe,  on  the  contrary,  that  an  exam- 
ination would  show  that  this  primary  distinction 
cannot  be  argued  away,  but  that  it  is  sure  beyond  all 
question.  If  either  member  of  this  antithesis  is  to 
be  destroyed,  it  must  be  the  objective.  The  subjec- 
tive element  is  given  beyond  all  possibility  of  doubt. 
Self  as  perceiving,  is  the  most  fundamental  datum  of 
consciousness.  The  object  can  be  reached  only  by 
accepting  the  testimony  of  the  subject ;  deny  that 
testimony,  and  the  universe  disappears  in  a  bottom- 
less pit  of  nihilism.  I  insist  upon  it,  the  subjective 
element  must  stand,  to  make  any  science  possible. 
The  only  alternative  is  to  admit  the  distinction,  or  to 
deny  the  object ;  and  either  would  be  fatal  to  Mr. 
Spencer's  theory.  In  the  last  analysis,  materialistic 
science  is  a  contradiction. 

And,  strangely  enough,  no  one  insists  upon  this 
distinction  more  strongly  than  Mr.  Spencer  himself. 
He  says : 

"  Where  the  two  modes  of  being  which  we  dis- 
tinguish as  subject  and  object  have-  been  severally 
reduced  to  their  lowest  terms,  any  further  compre- 
hension must  be  an  assimilation  of  these  lowest 


160  Review  of  Herbert  Spencer. 

terms  to  one  another,  and,  as  we  have  already  seen, 
this  is  negatived  by  the  very  distinction  of  subject 
and  object,  which  is  itself  consciousness  of  a  differ- 
ence transcending  all  other  differences.  So  far  from 
helping  us  to  think  of  them  as  of  one  kind,  analysis 
but  serves  to  render  more  apparent  the  impossibility 
of  finding  for  them  a  common  concept — a  thought 
under  which  they  can  be  united." — Vol.  i,  p.  157. 
"  That  a  unit  of  feeling  has  nothing  in  common  with 
a  unit  of  motion  becomes  more  than  ever  manifest 
when  we  bring  the  two  into  juxtaposition." — P.  158. 
Again  he  says  :  "  Nevertheless  it  may  be  as  well  to 
say  here,  once  for  all,  that  if  we  were  compelled  to 
choose  between  the  alternatives  of  translating  mental 
phenomena  into  physical  phenomena,  or  translating 
physical  phenomena  into  mental  phenomena,  the 
latter  alternative  would  seem  the  more  acceptable 
of  the  two." — P.  162. 

If  I  had  not  been  aware  beforehand  of  Mr. 
Spencer's  almost  supernatural  appetite  for  self- 
contradiction,  I  should  have  thought  on  reading 
these  passages  that  he  intended  to  take  his  own 
advice,  and  "  rest  content  with  that  duality  of  them 
which  our  constitution  necessitates."  But  to  do 
this  would  be  to  destroy  his  theory,  and  that  is 
too  much  to  ask  of  any  one.  Accordingly,  though 
"a  unit  of  feeling  has  nothing  in  common  with  a 
unit  of  motion,"  and  though  "  analysis  but  serves  to 
render  more  manifest  the  impossibility  of  finding  for 


Review  of  Herbert  Spencer.  161 

them  a  common  concept,  and  though  "the  antithesis 
of  subject  and  object  is  never  to  be  transcended 
while  consciousness  lasts,"  Mr.  Spencer  neverthe- 
less assures  us  that  "it  is  one  and  the  same  ultimate 
reality  which  is  manifested  to  us  subjectively  and 
objectively." — P.  627.  How  he  found  it  out  I  don't 
know  ;  it  clearly  could  not  have  been  while  he  was 
conscious,  for  the  distinction  "  is  never  to  be  tran- 
scended while  consciousness  lasts."  Luckily,  how- 
ever, Mr.  Spencer  gives  us  a  much  more  concrete 
statement  as  to  the  way  in  which  subject  and  object 
are  united  in  the  following  paragraph : 

"  For  just  in  the  same  way  the  object  is  the  unknown 
permanent  nexus,  which  is  never  itself  a  phenomenon, 
but  is  that  which  holds  phenomena  together ;  so  is 
the  subject  the  unknown  permanent  nexus,  which  is 
never  itself  a  state  of  consciousness,  but  which  holds 
the  states  of  consciousness  together."  This  is  the 
definition  of  the  subject  ;  and  then,  though  it  is 
"unknown,"  he  proceeds  to  show  what  it  is:  "For,  as 
shown  in  the  earlier  part  of  this  work,  an  idea  is  the 
psychical  side  of  what  on  its  physical  side  is  an  in- 
volved set  of  molecular  changes  propagated  through 
an  involved  set  of  nervous  plexuses.  That  which 
makes  possible  the  idea  is  the  pre-existence  of  these 
plexuses  so  organized  that  a  wave  of  molecular  mo- 
tion diffused  through  them  will  produce,  as  its  psy- 
chical correlative,  the  components  of  the  conception 

in  due  order  and  degree.     This  idea  lasts  while  the 

11 


1 62  Review  of  Herbert  Spencer. 

waves  of  molecular  motion  last — ceasing  when  they 
cease ;  but  that  which  remains  is  the  set  of  plexuses. 
These  constitute  the  potentiality  of  the  idea,  and 
make  possible  future  ideas  like  it.  Each  such  set 
of  plexuses  perpetually  modified  in  detail  by  per- 
petual new  actions,  capable  of  entering  into  countless 
combinations,  and  capable  of  having  its  several  parts 
variously  excited  just  as  the  external  object  presents 
its  combined  attributes  in  various  ways — is  thus  the 
permanent  internal  nexus  for  ideas  answering  to  the 
permanent  external  nexus  for  phenomena." — Vol.  ii, 
p.  484. 

Thus  the  great  distinction  of  subject  and  object 
vanishes,  and  self  is  resolved  into  the  organism. 
The  distinction  disappears  ;  though  Mr.  Spencer  de- 
clares it  cannot  be  interpreted  away.  The  assimila- 
tion is  made  ;  though  he  says  that  analysis  but  serves 
to  make  manifest  its  impossibility.  Units  of  feeling 
are  resolved  into  units  of  motion,  though  the  two 
have  nothing  in  common.  Mr.  Spencer  insists  that 
the  criterion  of  truth  is  the  impossibility  of  conceiv- 
ing the  opposite  ;  and  argues  this  at  great  length 
against  the  skeptics  and  idealists.  It  appears  that 
he  has  changed  his  mind  since  he  wrote  "  First 
Principles,"  for  then  the  inconceivability  of  the  oppo- 
site was  no  proof  at  all — at  least,  in  the  earlier  part  of 
the  work.  But  since  this  is  the  criterion  of  truth,  it 
would  seem  that  a  distinction  which  is  insisted  upon 
as  the  most  fundamental  in  our  mental  operations, 


Review  of  Herbert  Spencer.  163 

ought  to  be  accepted  as  real.  But  this  would  put 
mind  outside  of  the  physical  chain,  and  accord- 
ingly Mr.  Spencer,  in  the  teeth  of  all  logic,  denies 
the  distinction.  When  it  suits  his  purpose,  he  ad- 
mits the  testimony  of  the  mind  ;  when  it  does  not, 
he  proceeds  to  worry  and  bully  it  out  of  countenance. 
All  that  the  mind  says  in  his  favor  is  true,  all  that 
it  says  against  him  is  false — this  is  Mr.  Spencer's 
position. 

To  this  the  associationalists  reply  that  the  idea  of 
subject  and  object,  the  distinction  of  myself  from  the 
world,  is  of  comparatively  recent  origin  ;  and,  instead 
of  being  simple,  is  consolidated  from  millions  of  expe- 
riences which  stretch  back  through  unknown  ages. 
There  was  a  time  in  the  history  of  mental  evolution 
when  this  distinction  was  unknown.  These  ideas  then 
are  not  elementary  but  highly  complex,  and  nothing 
can  be  built  upon  them. 

This  alleged  fact  is  only  a  fancy,  and  implicitly 
begs  the  question  ;  but  even  if  we  admit  it,  the  argu- 
ment is  not  helped.  Indeed,  this  constant  assump- 
tion of  the  experience-philosophers,  that  every  thing 
must  be  measured  in  its  beginnings,  is  a  profound 
fallacy,  if  not  a  gross  logical  imposition.  When  we 
refer  to  the  laws  of  thought  as  valid  for  all  space  and 
time,  and  to  the  law  of  conscience  as  binding  upon 
all  moral  beings,  they  seek  to  throw  discredit  upon 
these  ideas  by  showing  how  they  have  been  built  up. 
Do  you  see  that  jelly  quiver  when  touched  ?  that  is 


164  Review  of  Herbert  Spencer. 

the  raw  material  of  mind.  Do  you  see  that  cringing 
cur  ?  that  is  the  dawn  of  the  moral  sentiment. 

But,  gentlemen,  what  do  you  mean  ?  You,  who  talk 
of  development — tell  us  plainly  whether  we  are  devel- 
oping faculty,  knowledge,  power ;  or  whether  we  are 
developing  illusion,  delusion,  and  baseless  dreams. 
Give  us  a  plain  answer  here,  and  we  shall  know  what 
to  say.  If  the  former  supposition  be  true,  then  these 
faculties  as  we  have  them,  and  not  as  they  appeared 
in  some  early  cell,  or  even  as  they  manifest  them- 
selves in  infancy,  but  as  they  are  to-day  here  in  their 
highest  form,  in  their  latest  utterances,  are  the  most 
trustworthy.  If  we  are  indeed  developing,  we  need 
not  inquire  into  the  belief  of  the  first  polyp  to  reach 
the  truth  ;  but  the  last  utterances  of  our  faculties,  as 
they  have  disengaged  themselves  from  mental  chaos, 
must  be  accepted  as  of  the  highest  authority.  The 
product  must  be  judged  by  the  finished  work,  and  not 
by  its  raw  beginnings. 

But  if  the  latter  supposition — that  we  are  only 
growing  into  illusion — be  true,  then  we  must  seek 
truth  in  the  minds  of  pre-human  apes,  or  rather  in 
the  blind  stirrings  of  some  primitive  pulp.  In  that 
case  we  can  indeed  put  away  all  our  science,  but  we 
must  put  away  the  great  doctrine  of  evolution  along 
with  it.  The  experience-philosophy  cannot  escape 
this  alternative  ;  either  the  positive  deliverances  of 
our  mature  consciousness  must  be  accepted  as  they 
stand,  or  all  truth  must  be  declared  impossible. 


Review  of  Herbert  Spencer.  165 

What  then,  I  ask  again,  will  Mr.  Spencer  do  with 
this  plain  distinction  which  the  soul  makes  between 
itself  and  ail  else  ?  He  can  admit  it,  which  is  real- 
ism ;  he  can  deny  the  object,  which  is  idealism  ;  he 
can  deny  the  subject,  which  must  end  in  nihilism. 
But  any  one  of  these  alternatives  would  be  fatal  to 
his  system. 

Once  again  Mr.  Spencer's  system  breaks  down.  Not 
even  the  wonderful  flying  leaps  of  his  peculiar  logic 
serve  to  carry  him  across  the  gulf  which  separates 
mind  and  matter.  The  plainest  facts  of  mental  ex- 
perience, and  the  most  emphatic  utterances  of  con- 
sciousness, dispute  his  right  of  way.  If,  then,  we 
were  inclined  to  be  severely  logical,  we  might  issue 
an  injunction  restraining  Mr.  Spencer  from  any  fur- 
ther advance  until  this  pass  has  been  securely  bridged. 
But  inasmuch  as  our  logical  clemency  has  before  been 
extended,  even  so  far  as  to  wink  at  a  multitude  of 
logical  sins,  let  us  once  more  exercise  our  royal 
prerogative,  and  graciously  grant  to  Mr.  Spencer  the 
beginnings  of  life  and  sensation ;  and,  perhaps,  with 
this  capital,  he  will  be  able  to  accomplish  something. 

His  first  attempts,  however,  awaken  a  fear  that  this 
royal  clemency  will  be  abused.  Having  collected  a 
multitude  of  facts  concerning  nervous  structure  and 
function,  and  having  also  "  grouped  together  the 
inductions  drawn  from  a  general  survey  of  mental 
states  and  processes,"  Mr.  Spencer  declares  that  he 
is  "  prepared  for  a  deductive  interpretation."  The 


1 66  Review  of  Herbert  Spencer. 

nature  of  this  deduction  is  shadowed  forth  in  the  fol- 
lowing quotation  : 

"  If  the  doctrine  of  evolution  is  true,  the  inevitable 
implication  is  that  mind  can  be  understood  only  by 
observing  how  mind  is  evolved.  If  creatures  of  the 
most  elevated  kinds  have  reached  those  highly  inte- 
grated, very  definite,  and  extremely  heterogeneous 
organizations  they  possess  through  modifications  upon 
modifications  accumulated  during  an  unmeasurable 
past — if  the  developed  nervous  systems  of  such  creat- 
ures have  gained  their  complex  structures  and  func- 
tions little  by  little — then,  necessarily,  the  involved 
forms  of  consciousness,  which  are  the  correlatives  of 
these  complex  structures  and  functions,  must  have 
arisen'  by  degrees.  And  as  it  is  impossible  truly  to 
comprehend  the  organization  of  the  body  in  general, 
or  of  the  nervous  system  in  particular,  without  tracing 
its  successive  stages  of  complication ;  so  it  must  be 
impossible  to  comprehend  mental  organization  with- 
out similarly  tracing  its  stages.  Here,  then,  we  com- 
mence the  study  of  mind  as  objectively  manifested  in 
its  ascending  gradations  through  the  various  types  of 
sentient  beings." — Vol.  i,  p.  291. 

This  is  the  key-note  o'f  all  that  follows,  and  a  type 
of  evolution  logic.  Mr.  Spencer,  on  the  strength  of 
this  paragraph,  begins  with  the  yeast  plant  and  red 
snow  alga,  and  traces  life  and  mind  from  these  hum- 
ble beginnings  up  to  man.  There  are,  however, 
some  objections  to  the  procedure. 


Review  of  Herbert  Spencer.  167 

First,  all  knowledge  begins  at  home.  All  that 
we  know  is  known  in  consciousness,  and  what- 
ever cannot  report  itself  there  must  remain  for- 
ever unknown.  All  that  is  known  of  the  outer 
world,  is  known  only  through  modifications  of  con- 
sciousness ;  and  all  that  we  know  of  the  mental 
operations  of  others,  can  be  known  only  by  assim- 
ilating them  to  our  own.  HQW  do  we  know  that 
the  motions  of  animals  have  any  psychological 
meaning  at  all  ?  It  is  only  as  we  infer  that  like 
motions  mean  the  same  in  them  as  in  us,  it  is  only 
as  we  know  our  own  mind,  that  we  can  take  the  first 
step  toward  a  knowledge  of  mind  in  the  lower  orders. 
Now,  since  this  is  so,  since  human  psychology  must 
precede  all  others,  and  since  the  psychology  of  the 
yeast  plant  and  the  polyps  is,  to  say  the  least,  a  matter 
of  pure  conjecture,  I  submit  that  it  is  not  wise  to 
give  such  inquiries  any  great  weight.  To  attempt  to 
use  them  to  throw  discredit  upon  human  psychology, 
is  self-destructive  ;  for  their  psychological  value  de- 
pends upon  the  truth  of  our  self-knowledge. 

Still  another  objection  arises.  This  procedure  is 
warranted  only  on  the  assumption  that  evolution  is 
an  established  fact ;  whereas  I  understand  that  Mr. 
Spencer  is  trying  to  prove  the  doctrine.  What  is  the 
proof  of  the  doctrine  ?  Why,  all  these  arguments, 
running  through  a  thousand  pages.  But  the  argu- 
ments are  worthless  without  the  assumption  of  the 
doctrine.  The  arguments  support  the  doctrine,  and 


1 68  Review  of  Herbert  Spencer. 

the  doctrine  supports  the  arguments.  Do  you  object 
to  this?  It  is  no  more  than  iair  play.  One  good 
turn  deserves  another.  And  this  is  "  severe  logic," 
this  is  the  "  Modern  Aristotle."  The  mutual  atti- 
tude of  both  teacher  and  taught,  in  this  "  New  Phi- 
losophy," is  fitly  represented  only  by  that  ancient 
couplet : 

"  Open  your  mouth  and  shut  your  eyes, 

And  I'll  give  you  something  to  make  you  wise." 

That  the  conscious  ego  is  a  being  capable  of  knowl- 
edge and  thought,  and  able  to  direct  its  own  activity 
into  such  channels  as  it  may  choose,  is  a  conception 
which,  to  Mr.  Spencer,  is  supremely  "pseud."  He 
denies  it  in  the  plainest  terms,  and  insists  that  mind 
is  composed  throughout  of  feelings,  consolidated  or 
otherwise.  Of  course,  he  recognizes  the  existence 
of  self  as  constantly  as  any  one.  In  this  way  he 
gives  some  scanty  plausibility  to  his  argument ;  but 
as  soon  as  he  is  confronted  with  self  as  a  witness 
against  him,  he  unceremoniously  turns  the  "pseud- 
idea"  out  of  doors.  Plainly,  the  best  established 
facts  of  consciousness  must  expect  no  quarter  what- 
ever from  the  "  New  Philosophy,"  if  they  are  so  im- 
prudent as  to  raise  any  objections.  It  would  not  be 
very  strange  if  the  facts  of  consciousness  repudiated 
the  "  New  Philosophy  "  with  equal  emphasis. 

Feelings  are  all  in  all.  The  ultimate  units  of  mat- 
ter when  differently  combined  build  up  the  chemica 
elements,  the  crust  of  the  earth,  and  all  the  variety 


Review  of  Herbert  Spencer.  169 

of  organic  life ;  so  feelings,  which  are  the  ultimate 
mental  unit,  compose  by  their  different  combinations 
all  that  is  in  the  mind,  and  originate  all  its  powers. 
The  problem  is  to  show  that  a  string  of  feelings, 
which  existed  long  before  there  was  any  one  to  have 
them,  at  last  becomes  conscious  of  itself  and  of  its 
constituent  parts,  apprehends  their  relations  to  one 
another,  reflects  upon  them,  and  draws  conclusions 
from  them,  and  all  the  while  is  but  a  feeling,  and 
the  process  is  but  a  feeling.  In  this  way  conscious- 
ness, the  belief  in  self  and  the  outer  world,  the  ab- 
stract processes  of  thought,  etc.,  are  manufactured. 

We  should  have  less  difficulty  with  this  theory 
if  it  were  clearly  shown  that  a  feeling  can  exist 
apart  from  a  subject.  A  free  feeling  apart  from  a 
conscious  subject,  is  inconceivable ;  just  as  a  free 
thought  apart  from  a  thinker  is  inconceivable.  Such 
a  thing  might  be  possible  in  the  depths  and  deep 
night  of  the  unknowable ;  but  it  is  not  possible 
in  the  realm  of  rationality.  The  feelings  are  intro- 
duced to  create  the  subject ;  but  the  feelings  them- 
selves are  inconceivable  except  as  belonging  to  a 
conscious  subject.  This  may  be  a  weakness  of  our 
thought,  but  it  is  an  inveterate  one;  and  until  it  be 
disproved,  we  shall  feel  constrained  to  view  it  as  a 
power.  Every  thing  cannot  be  granted  to  the  needs 
of  Mr.  Spencer's  system. 

I  am  ready  to  learn ;  but  before  I  can  take  the  oath 
of  allegiance  to  this  doctrine,  another  difficulty  must 


1 70  Revieiv  of  Herbert  Spencer. 

be  resolved.     Thought,  and  sensation,  are  given  in 
consciousness  as  very  different  things.     To  have  a 
feeling  is  one  thing,  to  reflect  upon  it,  to  compare  it 
with  others,  to  draw  conclusions  from  its  perceived 
relations,  etc.,  these  seem  to  be  quite  another.    What 
kinship  is  there  between  a  sensation,  and  a  purely  in- 
tellectual operation,  such  as  the  study  of  a  mathemat- 
ical problem,  or  any  other  of  the  reflective  processes 
of  thought  ?     If  we  are  to  rely  upon  our  present  con-  \ 
sciousness,  they  have  no  common  measure.      A  per- 
ception of  things  through  sensation  is  one  act ;    a 
perception    of    their   relations    through    comparison 
and   reflection,  a   generalization   of   these   relations 
into  laws,  and   a  combination  of  these  laws  into  a 
system,   this  is  an   activity  of    another  kind.     The 
only  reason  for  denying  it  is  found  in  the  exigencies 
of  a  false  system — a  reason  which  logic  does  not 
recognize. 

Besides,  too,  in  all  this  activity  the  ego  plays  an 
important  part.  It  is  conscious  of  itself  as  active  and 
controlling,  and  it  insists  upon  saying  so.  This  is 
probably  an  unseemly  impertinence,  at  all  events,  a 
great  unkindness,  because  it  stands  very  much  in  the 
way  of  the  system ;  and  yet,  in  opposition  to  both 
courtesy  and  Mr.  Spencer,  it  insists  upon  itself  as 
active  and  controlling.  So  emphatic  is  this  self- 
assertion  that,  if  it  be  false,  we  seem  to  have  no  test 
of  truth  whatever,  save  the  unsupported  dictum  of 
Mr.  Spencer.  These  objections  would  probably  not 


Review  of  Herbert  Spencer.  1 7 1 

nave  much  weight  with  a  philosopher  of  the  "  New 
School ; "  but  surely  a  philosophy  whose  first  prin- 
ciples deny  all  our  primary  beliefs,  ought  to  be  re- 
ceived with  caution. 

But  we  must  not  be  too  scrupulous,  and,  besides, 
a  vigorous  profession  of  an  obnoxious  creed  is  said 
to  help  one's  faith  amazingly.  The  experience- 
philosophy  has  steadily  resisted  these  distinctions, 
and  has  sought  to  show  how  thought  and  reason 
and  self-determination  are  only  sensations  that  have 
grown  proud  and  forgotten  their  origin.  The  great 
instrument  for  the  contemplated  reduction  is  the 
association  of  ideas.  Sensations  and  feelings  cluster 
together,  and  so  pass  into  thought.  The  method  is 
as  follows : 

"The  cardinal  fact  to  be  noted  as  of  co-ordinate 
importance  with  the  facts  above  noted  is,  that  while 
each  vivid  feeling  is  joined  to  but  distinguished 
from  other  vivid  feelings,  simultaneous  or  successive, 
it  is  joined  to  and  identified  with  faint  feelings  that 
have  resulted  from  foregoing  similar  vivid  feelings. 
Each  particular  color,  each  special  sound,  each  sensa- 
tion of  touch,  taste,  or  smell,  is  at  once  known  as  un- 
like other  sensations  that  limit  it  in  space  or  time, 
and  known  as  like  the  faint  forms  of  sensations  that 
have  preceded  it  in  time — unites  itself  with  fore- 
going sensations,  from  which  it  does  not  differ  in 
quality  but  only  in  intensity. 

"  On  this  law  of  composition  depends  the  orderly 


1 72  Review  of  Herbert  Spencer. 

structure  of  mind.  In  its  absence  there  could  be 
nothing  but  a  kaleidoscopic  change  of  feelings — an 
ever  transforming  present  without  past  or  future.  It 
is  because  of  this  tendency  which  vivid  feelings  have 
severally  to  cohere  with  the  faint  forms  of  all  preced- 
ing feelings  like  themselves  that  there  arise  what  we 
call  ideas.  A  vivid  feeling  does  not  by  itself  consti- 
tute a  unit  of  that  aggregate  of  ideas  entitled  knowl- 
edge. Nor  does  a  single  faint  feeling  constitute  such 
a  unit.  But  an  idea,  or  unit  of  knowledge,  results 
when  a  vivid  feeling  is  assimilated  to,  or  coheres 
with,  one  or  more  of  the  faint  feelings  left  by  such 
vivid  feelings  previously  experienced.  From  moment 
to  moment  the  feelings  that  constitute  conscious- 
ness segregate — each  becoming  fused  with  the  whole 
series  of  others  like  itself  that  have  gone  before  it ; 
and  what  we  call  knowing  each  feeling  as  such  or 
such  is  our  name  for  this  act  of  segregation. 

"  The  process  so  carried  on  does  not  stop  with  the 
union  of  each  feeling,  as  it  occurs,  with  the  faint 
forms  of  all  preceding  like  feelings.  Clusters  of 
feelings  are  simultaneously  joined  with  the  faint 
forms  of  preceding  like  clusters.  An  idea  of  an  ob- 
ject or  act  is  composed  ot  groups  of  similar  and 
similarly  related  feelings  that  have  arisen  in  con- 
sciousness from  time  to  time,  and  have  formed  a 
consolidated  series  of  which  the  members  have  par- 
tially or  completely  lost  their  individualities." — Vol.  i, 
p.  183.  "  Consider  now,  under  its  most  general  form, 


Review  of  Herbert  Spencer.  1 73 

the  process  of  composition  of  mind  described  in  fore- 
going sections.  It  is  no  more  than  this  same  process 
carried  out  on  higher  and  higher  platforms,  with  in- 
creasing extent  and  complication.  As  we  have  lately 
seen,  the  feelings  called  sensations  cannot  of  them- 
selves constitute  mind,  even  when  great  numbers  of 
various  kinds  are  present  together.  Mind  is  consti- 
tuted only  when  each  sensation  is  assimilated  to  the 
faint  forms  of  antecedent-like  sensations.  The  con 
solidation  of  successive  units  of  feeling  to  form  a 
sensation  is  paralleled  in  a  larger  way  by  the  con- 
solidation of  successive  sensations  to  form  what  we 
call  a  knowledge  of  the  sensations  as  such  or  such — 
to  form  the  smallest  separable  portion  of  what  we 
call  thought  as  distinguished  from  mere  confused 
sentiency." — Vol.  i,  p.  185. 

We  have,  in  this, extract,  a  complete  outline  of  the 
associational  doctrine,  and  an  almost  complete  list  of 
its  errors.  The  process  here  described  is  sufficient 
to  account  for  all  the  mind's  beliefs  and  operations. 

Our  first  criticism  upon  it  is  that  the  language  in 
which  the  doctrine  is  expressed,  betrays  it.  "  Each 
particular  color,  each  special  sound,  each  sensation  of 
touch,  taste,  or  smell,  is  at  once  known  as  unlike  other 
sensations  that  limit  it  in  space  or  time,  and  known 
as  like  the  faint  forms  of  certain  sensations  that  have 
preceded  it."  Who  is  it  that  knows  these  sensations 
as  like  and  unlike?  Who  is  it  that  remembers  the 
faint  forms  of  past  sensation?  Who  is  it  that  sep- 


1/4  Review  of  Herbert  Spencer. 

arates  these  various  feelings  into  their  appropriate 
groups  ?  The  object  of  these  groupings  and  "  segre- 
gations" is  to  account  for  thought,  memory,  judg- 
ment, etc.,  and,  lo!  a  thinking,  judging,  recognizing 
mind  is  on  the  spot  to  attend  to  its  own  birth.  It 
would  hardly  be  surprising  if,  under  such  favorable 
circumstances,  the  process  proved  successful. 

Again,  Mr.  Spencer  will  not  allow  us  to  know  sensa- 
tions until  they  are  "  segregated,"  but  insists  that  a 
knowledge  of  them  as  like  or  unlike  must  precede  segre- 
gation. How,  indeed,  things  can  be  known  as  like  or 
unlike  when,  first,  we  know  nothing  about  them,  and, 
second,  when  there  is  no  one  to  know  them,  does  not 
very  clearly  appear.  There  is  also  some  difficulty  in 
understanding  how  memory  can  be  built  up  by  a 
process  which  assumes  it  at  the  start ;  nor  can  self- 
consciousness  be  very  far  away  when  we  begin  to 
remember  these  sensations  as  "past  experiences." 
Yet  these  are  the  absurdities  into  which  the  associa- 
tionalists  have  always  fallen.  This  association  of 
ideas  implies  the  very  things  which  it  is  supposed  to 
explain  away.  What  associates  the  ideas  ?  What  dis- 
tinguishes them  as  like  and  unlike  ?  What  recognizes 
them  as  "  past  experiences  ? "  What  is  it  which,  in 
all  perception,  so  combines  tactual,  visual,  and  other 
impressions,  that  the  object  presents  itself  as  a  unit 
in  consciousness  ?  At  this  point  the  associationalists 
have  always  left  a  fatal  gap  in  their  system.  To  sup- 
pose that  the  ideas  and  sensations  know  each  other 


Review  of  Herbert  Spencer.  175 

as  like  and  unlike,  and  then  enter  into  combination, 
is  absurd ;  yet  they  must  either  do  this,  or  refer  the 
association  to  the  activity,  partly  intentional,  partly 
constitutional,  of  the  soul  itself. 

To  escape  this  alternative,  Mr.  Spencer  ventures 
upon  the  astounding  proposition  that  the  association 
takes  place  primarily,  not  in  the  mind,  but  in  the 
nervous  system.  Like  nervous  states  get  together, 
and  difference  themselves  from  others  ;  and  whenever 
one  of  these  states  comes  into  consciousness,  it  drags 
all  its  kindred  along  with  it.  He  expounds  the  doc- 
trine thus : 

"  Changes  in  nerve-vesicles  are  the  objective  cor- 
relatives of  what  we  know  subjectively  as  feelings  ;  and 
the  discharge  through  fibers  that  connect  nerve-vesi- 
cles, are  the  objective  correlatives  of  what  we  know 
subjectively  as  relations  between  feelings.  It  follows 
that  just  as  the  association  of  a  feeling  with  its  class, 
order,  genus,  and  species,  group  within  group,  an- 
swers to  the  localization  of  the  nervous  change  within 
some  great  mass  of  nerve-vesicles,  within  some  part 
of  that  mass,  within  some  part  of  that  part,  etc. ;  so 
the  association  of  a  relation  with  its  class,  order, 
genus,  and  species,  answers  to  the  localization  of  the 
nervous  discharge  within  some  great  aggregate  of 
nerve-fibers,  within  some  division  of  that  aggregate, 
within  some  bundle  of  that  division.  Moreover,  as 
we  before  concluded  that  the  association  of  each  feel- 
ing, with  its  exact  counterparts  in  past  experience, 


1 76  Review  of  Herbert  Spencer. 

answers  to  the  re-excitation  of  the  same  vesicle  01 
vesicles  ;  so  here  we  conclude  that  the  association 
of  each  relation  with  its  exact  counterparts  in  past 
experience  answers  to  the  re-excitation  of  the  same 
connecting  fiber  or  fibers.  And  since,  on  the  recog- 
nition of  any  object,  this  re-excitation  of  the  plexus 
of  fibers  and  vesicles  before  jointly  excited  by  it,  an- 
swers to  the  association  of  each  constituent  relation 
and  each  constituent  feeling  with  the  like  relation 
and  the  like  feeling,  contained  in  the  previous  con- 
sciousness of  the  object,  it  is  clear  that  the  whole 
process  is  comprehended  under  the  principle  alleged. 
If  the  recognized  object,  now  lacking  one  of  its  traits, 
arouses  in  consciousness  an  ideal  feeling  answering 
to  some  real  feeling  which  this  trait  once  aroused, 
the  cause  is  that,  along  with  the  strong  discharge 
through  the  whole  plexus  of  fibers  and  vesicles  di- 
rectly excited,  there  is  apt  to  go  a  feeble  discharge 
to  those  vesicles  which  answer  to  the  missing  feeling, 
through  those  fibers  which  answer  to  its  missing  re- 
lations, involving  a  representation  of  the  feeling  and 
its  relations." — Vol.  i,  p.  270. 

As  a  work  of  the  creative  imagination,  this  extract 
must  certainly  rank  very  high  ;  but  as  a  scientific 
statement  it  can  hardly  be  considered  a  success  ;  for, 
in  the  first  place,  neither  psychology  nor  physiology 
knows  any  thing  about  the  process  here  indicated. 
When  the  brain  is  examined  with  a  microscope,  there 
are  no  indications  that  it  is  even  capable  of  vibrating 


Review  of  Herbert  Spencer.  177 

in  the  fashion  postulated,  to  say  nothing  of  exhibiting 
all  the  wonders  which  Mr.  Spencer  declares  to  be 
there.  Before  we  can  accept  this  account  it  must 
be  shown  that  there  is  a  nerve-vesicle  answering  to 
every  idea ;  and  next  it  must  be  shown  that,  for 
every  apprehended  relation,  there  is  a  fiber  connect- 
ing the  vesicles  which  represent  the  related  terms. 
There  is,  and  can  be,  no  proof  whatever  of  these 
statements.  Imagination,  prompted  by  the  necessi- 
ties of  the  system,  is  responsible  for  the  whole  ac- 
count. It  is  the  doctrine  which  suggests  the  facts, 
and  not  the  facts  which  suggest  the  doctrine.  The 
same  beggarly  begging  of  the  question,  so  palpable 
throughout  the  treatise,  underlies  this  whole  account. 
But  suppose  we  admit  that  there  is  a  nerve-vesicle 
for  each  idea,  still  the  association  of  ideas  is  not  ex- 
plained. What  is  it  which  associates  the  vesicles  ? 
What  separates  them  into  like  and  unlike  ?  Has  the 
nervous  system  the  power  of  recognizing  relations  ? 
of  appreciating  difference  ?  of  storing  up  in  an  appro- 
priate place  the  peculiar  nervous  combination  an- 
swering to  a  given  state  of  thought  ?  That  would  be 
to  attribute  to  the  nervous  system  the  very  powers 
of  memory,  judgment,  etc.,  which  it  is  expected  to 
explain.  But  Mr.  Spencer  is  prepared  with  an  an- 
swer. This  separation  of  nerve-vesicles  is  due  to  the 
law  of  segregation.  I  have  already  explained  this 
law  in  the  last  chapter  and  given  Mr.  Spencer's  illus- 
trations. The  same  wind  carries  off  dead  leaves  and 

12 


178  Review  of  Herbert  Spencer. 

allows  the  living  ones  to  remain  on  the  tree.  A  stream 
of  water  washes  sand  and  mad  from  among  stones 
and  segregates  them.  Now  because  dead  leaves  are 
blown  away,  and  sand  is  washed  out  of  gravel,  there- 
fore the  nerve-vesicles  answering  to  like  ideas  get  to- 
gether, and  pull  one  another  back  and  forth  through 
consciousness.  It  seems  incredible  that  Mr.  Spencer 
should  ever  have  deluded  himself  with  such  vague 
and  unmeaning  analogies  as  this.  That  he  has  de- 
luded others,  also,  is  the  highest  possible  proof  of  his 
statement  that  "most  men  do  not  think,  but  only 
think  that  they  think."  Surely  it  is  a  sublime  and 
touching  faith  in  the  great  doctrine  of  evolution, 
which  enabled  one  to  accept  as  science,  such  puerili- 
ties as  these. 

But  Mr.  Spencer  attempts  another  explanation  of 
association.  "  As  the  plexuses  in  these  highest  nerv- 
ous centers,  by  exciting  in  distinct  ways  special  sets 
of  plexuses  in  the  inferior  centers,  call  up  special 
sets  of  ideal  feelings  and  relations,  so  by  simulta- 
neously exciting  in  diffused  ways  the  general  sets  of 
plexuses  to  which  these  special  sets  belong,  they  call 
up  in  vague  forms  the  accompanying  general  sets  of 
ideal  feelings  and  relations — the  emotional  back- 
ground appropriate  to  the  general  conception.  In  the 
language  of  our  illustration,  we  \rnay  say  that  the 
superior  nervous  centers  in  playing  upon  the  inferior 
ones,  bring  out  not  only  specific  chords  and  cadences 
of  feelings,  but,  in  so  doing,  arouse  reverberating 


Review  of  Herbert  Spencer.  179 

echoes  of  all  kindred  chords  and  cadences  that  have 
been  struck  during  an  immeasurable  past — producing 
a  great  volume  of  indefinite  tones  harmonizing  with 
the  definite  tones." — Vol.  i,  p.  571. 

This  statement,  which  recalls  the  doctrine  of  Aris- 
toxenus,  that  mind  is  the  time  of  the  organism,  is 
the  completion  of  the  statement  on  page  125,  that 
emotions  are  only  remembered  sensations,  and  are 
aroused  by  wandering  currents  which,  in  racing  up 
and  down  the  nerves,  hit  upon  the  vesicles  that 
belong  to  the  old  sensations. 

In  reply,  it  is  sufficient  to  say  of  it,  first,  that 
there  is  no  proof  possible  in  the  nature  of  the 
case  ;  and  second,  that  this  view  does  not  explain 
why  the  **  specific  chords  and  cadences  of  feelings'5 
should  only  "  arouse  reverberating  echoes  of  all  kin- 
dred chords  and  cadences  ;"  nor  does  it  explain  why 
these  vagrant  nerve-currents  should  hit  upon  only 
those  emotions  which  harmonize  with  the  specific 
conception.  The  doctrine  is  that  a  nerve  current 
passes  upward  to  the  brain  and  appears  in  conscious- 
ness as  a  vivid  feeling,  that  is,  a  sensation.  But  the 
same  current  after  producing  the  sensation  proceeds 
to  "  reverberate  ;"  it  diffuses  itself  in  feebler  currents 
through  the  nervous  system,  and  re-excites  the  ves- 
icles which  answer  to  similar  sensations  in  the  past, 
and  thus  produces  faint  feelings,  that  is,  emotions. 
Wonderful  nerve-current  to  hit  upon  the  proper 
vesicles !  It  is  conceivable  that  mental  chaos  might 


1 80  Review  of  Herbert  Spencer. 

result  from  such  a  process,  but  certainly  mental 
order  cannot.  And  thus  Mr.  Spencer  goes  on,  first, 
confusing  himself;  second,  confusing  the  problem; 
and  third,  and  most  wonderful  confusion  of  all,  he 
mistakes  this  universal  confusion  for  a  solution. 

The  same  process  is  supposed  to  explain  memory. 
When  any  sensation  or  idea  is  aroused  in  conscious- 
ness, kindred  ideas  or  sensations  are  brought  out  of 
experience  by  the  process  described  ;  and  this  is 
memory.  The  explanation  misses  the  chief  distinc- 
tion of  memory.  To  remember  a  thing,  is  not  to 
have  the  same  idea  or  thought  again — this  might  be 
accounted  for  by  the  laws  of  association  ;  but  it  is  to 
have  it  with  the  consciousness  of  having  had  it  be- 
fore. This  relation  of  experience  to  self  is  the  diffi- 
cult part  of  the  question,  and  is  entirely  ignored  in 
the  explanation.  Mr.  Mill,  with  great  frankness,  con- 
fessed that  the  explanation  of  memory  surpassed  the 
resources  of  his  philosophy.  How  a  string  of  feel- 
ings should  become  conscious  of  itself  as  having  a 
past,  he  declared  to  be  a  great  mystery,  and  one 
which  he  could  not  fathom.  Yet  it  is  a  question 
which  the  associationalist  must  solve,  or  surrender. 
Knowledge  is  not  knowledge  until  it  is  related  to 
self.  It  is  only  the  enduring  and  identical  ego  which 
gives  unity  to  experience,  and  makes  memory  pos- 
sible. It  is  not  until  the  conception  of  an  abiding 
self  is  thrown  among  the  ever-shifting  shades  of  feel- 
ing, that  any  backward  glance  can  be  cast  upon  yes- 


Review  of  Herbert  Spencer.  181 

terday,  or  any  outlook  upon  to-morrow.  Here,  in 
this  fact  of  memory  we  have  a  confirmation  of  the 
universal  belief  in  an  enduring  self. 

But  Mr.  Spencer  recognizes  no  difficulty  whatever. 
Indeed,  he  does  not  even  seem  to  have  understood  what 
the  fact  implies.  If  he  had  he  would  probably  have 
explained  it  in  this  way  :  Every  idea  has  a  nerve-vesi- 
cle answering  to  it,  and  that  vesicle  constitutes  its  only 
existence.  To  the  idea  of  self,  therefore,  there  must 
be  an  enormous  vesicle,  because  it  is  such  a  great  idea. 
And,  since  every  mental  relation  answers  to  a  fiber  in 
the  brain  which  connects  the  vesicles  representing  the 
ideas  between  which  the  relation  is  perceived,  we  must 
conclude  that  the  reason  why  self  appears  in  all 
memory  is  that  there  is  an  indefinite  number  of 
fibers  connecting  the  vesicle  which  stands  for  self, 
with  the  other  vesicles  which  represent  all  our 
various  experiences.  Whenever,  then,  one  of  these 
vesicles  is  excited,  a  discharge  must  pass  along  the 
connecting  fiber  to  the  vesicle  which  stands  for 
self,  and  hence  both  ideas  must  appear  in  con- 
sciousness together.  This  explanation  is  in  com- 
plete harmony  with  the  hypothesis  of  evolution 
in  general ;  and  whoever  will  duly  weigh  the  evi- 
dence must  see  that  nothing  short  of  an  over- 
whelming bias  in  favor  of  a  preconceived  theory  can 
explain  its  non-acceptance.  This  account  is  as  good 
as  any  that  Mr.  Spencer  has  given.  It  has  just  as 
much  support  from  physiology  or  psychology  as  his 


1 82  Review  of  Herbert  Spencer. 

own  explanations  have.  Hartley's  doctrine,  of  vibra- 
tions and  vibratiuncles,  is  no  more  baseless  than  this 
so-called  science ;  and,  indeed,  they  do  not  differ 
materially,  except  in  terms. 

But  if  all  these  absurdities  came  to  pass,  the  prob- 
lem is  only  confused,  not  solved.  Sensation  is 
sensation,  and  nothing  more.  A  cluster  of  sensa- 
tions is  sensation  still,  and  in  whatever  way  sensa- 
tion may  be  massed,  it  acquires  no  new  character. 
Even  if  it  were  possible  to  conceive  of  a  feeling 
which  is  not  the  feeling  of  a  conscious  subject, 
there  is  no  warrant  except  the  desperate  extrem- 
ities of  a  false  system,  for  believing  that  feelings 
change  their  nature  by  being  massed.  Conscious- 
ness makes  the  clearest  and  sharpest  distinctions 
between  feeling  and  thinking ;  but  consciousness 
has  not  any  claim  to  respect  from  a  philosopher 
of  the  "  New  School." 

In  short,  the  explanations  of  this  philosophy  con- 
sist entirely  in  calling  the  most  diverse  powers  and 
operations  of  the  mind  sensations,  and  then  call- 
ing sensations  nerve-currents.  Mr.  Spencer,  when 
he  meets  with  a  difficulty,  simply  re-names  it,  and 
the  work  is  done.  If  ideas  associate,  he  explains 
it  by  the  magic  word  "  segregation."  If  they  unite 
to  form  a  unit  of  knowledge,  it  is  a  case  of  "in- 
tegration." If  knowledge  becomes  more  definite, 
it  is  called  "differentiation."  And  after  he  has 
grouped  every  thing  under  these  vague  and  un- 


Review  of  Herbert  Spencer.  183 

meaning  terms,  and  has  worked  himself  into  a 
fit  state  of  mental  confusion  in  the  process,  he 
seems  to  think  that  he  has  explained  something. 
To  explain  any  grouping  by  segregation,  is  only  to 
offer  the  very  fact  to  be  explained  as  an  explana- 
tion ;  and  the  same  is  true  for  the  other  cant  words 
of  the  scheme  which  are  made  to  cover  such  a  mul- 
titude of  logical  sins :  they  all  involve  the  very 
problem  they  pretend  to  solve.  Now,  I  hold  that 
the  only  value  of  psychology  lies  in  its  speaking 
clearly  and  directly  to  self-consciousness ;  but  the 
associational  philosophy  does  not  even  pretend  to  do 
that.  Every  one  of  its  characteristic  explanations 
flies  right  in  the  face  of  our  present  consciousness, 
and  when  we  complain  of  that,  an  appeal  is  made  to 
the  unknown.  Mr.  Mill  requires  us  to  look  in  upon 
the  mind  of  the  infant  as  it  lies  in  the  nurse's  arms ; 
and,  as  we  cannot  do  this,  there  is  nothing  for  us  to 
do  but  to  accept  Mr.  Mill's  statements  or  fancies 
about  the  matter.  Mr.  Spencer  will  have  us  go  back 
through  "  countless  ages  ; "  and  tells  us  that,  if  we 
could  have  been  there,  we  should  have  seen  all  that 
he  claims.  This  is  a  great  beauty  of  this  philos- 
ophy. It  works  its  wonders  before  the  critic  comes, 
and  when  he  appears  he  is  blandly  told  that  it  is  too 
late.  The  wonders  which  have  been  wrought  for 
him,  and  in  him,  are  such  as"  to  render  self-knowledge 
impossible.  All  its  ingenuity  is  expended,  not  in 
explaining  our  present  consciousness,  but  in  explain- 


1 84  Review  of  Herbert  Spencer. 

ing  it  away.  There  is  nothing  left  for  us  now,  but 
to  accept  the  equivalents  which  these  philosophers 
choose  to  give  ;  and  if  the  butchered  members  of 
our  knowledge  have  no  resemblance  to  the  living 
form,  they  are,  at  least,  as  life-like  as  could  be 
expected  after  the  process.  We  must  be  content  to 
walk  by  faith  hereafter,  and  must  no  longer  hope  to 
walk  by  sight.  If  at  any  time  the  suspicion  should 
cross  our  minds  that  this  philosophy  is  a  forgery,  we 
cannot  indeed  appeal  to  consciousness  or  experience 
for  support ;  but  we  have  the  assurance  of  the  philos- 
ophers that  this  is  the  only  genuine  autobiography 
of  mental  evolution.  This  is,  to  be  sure,  the  only 
warrant  it  has  ;  but,  except  for  those  who  have  an 
"  overwhelming  bias,"  this  is  more  than  enough.  As 
was  to  be  expected,  the  difficulties  thus  removed 
from  criticism  are  precisely  those  which  this  philos- 
ophy finds  it  most  difficult  to  answer.  When  Mr. 
Spencer  sought  to  establish  the  identity  of  thought 
and  motion,  it  was  done  "  in  a  superior  nerve-center 
in  a  mysterious  way;"  but  the  belief  in  causation 
and  logical  laws  was  provided  for  "  untold  ages  "  ago. 
Whenever  a  critical  point  is  reached,  Mr.  Spencer,  in 
common  with  all  others  of  this  school,  retreats  into 
the  unknown,  and,  with  the  aid  of  an  obliging  "  mys- 
tery," works  out  his  system  secure  from  all  molesta- 
tion. The  strategy  !  the  generalship  !  The  very  least 
that  should  be  decreed  to  such  masterly  tactics  is  an 
ovation,  if  indeed  they  do  not  deserve  a  triumph, 


Review  of  Herbert  Spencer.  185 

I  utterly  distrust  this  doctrine  which  begins 
with  sensations,  and  builds  knowledge  by  combining 
them.  The  subjective  unity  of  self  must  be  given 
before  knowledge  of  any  kind  is  possible ;  but,  even 
as  applied  to  external  things,  the  doctrine  seems  to 
me  to  invert  the  order  of  experience.  According  to 
this  teaching,  we  have  a  knowledge  of  sensations 
long  before  we  have  a  knowledge  of  things,  and  it  is 
only  an  extended  experience  of  feelings  that  sug- 
gests external  things.  On  the  contrary,  I  believe 
that  our  knowledge  postulates  being  at  the  very 
start.  Our  first  knowledge  is  of  things,  and  the 
knowledge  of  sensations  and  qualities  is  a  later 
birth,  and  is  impossible  until  considerable  advance 
in  abstraction  has  been  made.  There  is  a  primitive 
and  constitutional  synthetic  action  of  the  soul,  which 
gives  us  qualities  always  in  combination ;  and  it  is 
only  by  a  later  analysis  that  we  come  to  a  knowledge 
of  attributes,  etc.  Mr.  Spencer  has  all  along  been 
arguing  against  this  view  ;  but,  to  our  great  pleasure, 
it  appears  that  he  also  holds  the  same  opinion — a 
very  happy  example  of  his  belief  that  there  is  a  soul 
of  truth  in  all  things  false.  He  says  : 

"The  postulate  with  which  metaphysical  reason- 
ing sets  out  is  that  we  are  primarily  conscious  only 
of  our  sensations,  that  we  certainly  know  we  have 
these,  and  that  if  there  be  any  thing  beyond  these, 
serving  as  cause  for  them,  it  can  be  known  only  by 
inference  from  them. 


1 86  Review  of  Herbert  Spencer. 

"  I  shall  give  much  surprise  to  the  metaphysical 
reader  if  I  call  in  question  this  postulate,  and  the 
surprise  will  rise  into  astonishment  if  I  distinctly 
deny  it.  Yet  I  must  do  this.  Limiting  the  prop- 
osition to  those  epiperipheral  feelings  produced  in 
us  by  external  objects,  (for  these  alone  are  in  ques- 
tion,) I  see  no  alternative  but  to  affirm  that  the 
thing,  primarily  known,  is  not  that  a  sensation  has 
been  experienced,  but  that  there  exists  an  outer 
object.  Instead  of  admitting  that  the  primordial 
and  unquestionable  knowledge  is  the  existence  of  a 
sensation,  I  assert,  contrariwise,  that  the  existence 
of  a  sensation  is  an  hypothesis  that  cannot  be 
framed  until  external  existence  is  known.  This 
entire  inversion  of  his  conception,  which  to  the 
metaphysician  will  seem  so  absurd,  is  one  that  inev- 
itably takes  place  when  we  inspect  the  phenomena 
of  consciousness  in  their  order  of  genesis — using, 
for  our  'erecting  glass,'  the  mental  biography  of  a 
child,  or  the  developed  conception  of  things  held  in 
common  by  the  savage  and  the  rustic." — Vol.  ii, 
p.  369. 

Mr.  Spencer  then  goes  on  to  show  that  with  chil- 
dren, and  rustics,  and  all  who  have  not  been  dis- 
turbed by  metaphysical  reasonings,  the  certain 
knowledge  is  that  there  exist  external  things,  and 
that  these  are  directly  known ;  while  sensations, 
attributes,  etc.,  etc.,  are  utterly  unknown.  With 
some  qualifications,  this  statement  may  be  accepted 


Review  of  Herbert  Spencer.  187 

as  true  ;  but  if  it  is  true,  then  mental  evolution  takes 
place  in  a  way  directly  opposite  to  that  which  this 
philosophy  assumes,  and  the  doctrine  falls  to  the 
ground.  If  the  account  is  not  true,  the  argu- 
ment for  an  external  world,  which  Mr.  Spencer 
bases  upon  it,  vanishes.  In  either  case  his  system 
suffers. 

But,  before  passing  on  to  other  difficult  questions, 
let  us  rest  and  amuse  ourselves  by  the  following  bit 
of  pleasantry.  Mr.  Spencer's  account  of  nerves  and 
nervous  systems  we  found  extremely  luminous  ;  but 
even  that  cannot  compare  with  the  following  sun- 
clear  explanation  of  frowning.  To  appreciate  it 
fully,  we  must  remember  that  Mr.  Spencer's  philos- 
ophy assumes  to  prove  the  doctrine  of  evolution  ; 
and  that  it  is  one  of  the  first  principles  of  logic  that 
to  assume  the  point  in  dispute  is  inadmissible. 
Now  for  the  explanation  : 

"  If  you  want  to  see  a  distant  object  in  bright  sun- 
shine, you  are  aided  by  putting  your  hand  above  your 
eyes  ;  and  in  the  tropics,  this  shading  of  the  eyes  to 
gain  distinctness  of  vision  is  far  more  needful  than 
here.  In  the  absence  of  shade  yielded  by  the  hand  or 
by  a  hat,  the  effort  to  see  clearly  in  broad  sunshine 
is  always  accompanied  by  a  contraction  of  those 
muscles  of  the  forehead  which  cause  the  eyebrows  to 
be  lowered  and  protruded ;  so,  making  them  serve  as 
much  as  possible  the  same  purpose  that  the  hand 
serves.  The  use  of  a  sliding  hood  to  a  telescope,  to 


[88  Review  of  Herbert  Spencer. 

shield  the  object-glass  from  lateral  sight,  and  espe- 
cially from  the  rays  of  the  sun,  illustrates  the  use  of 
the  contracted  eyebrows  when  vision  is  impeded  by 
a  glare.  Now,  if  we  bear  in  mind  that,  during  the 
combats  of  superior  animals  which  have  various 
movements  of  attack  and  defense,  success  largely 
depends  on  quickness  and  clearness  of  vision — if  we 
remember  that  the  skill  of  a  fencer  is  shown  partly 
in  his  power  of  instantly  detecting  the  sign  of  a 
movement  about  to  be  made,  so  that  he  may  be  pre- 
pared to  guard  against  it  or  to  take  advantage  of  it, 
and  that  in  animals,  as,  for  example,  in  cocks  fight 
ing,  the  intentness  with  which  they  watch  each  other 
shows  how  much  depends  on  promptly  anticipating 
one  another's  motions,  it  will  be  manifest  that  a 
slight  improvement  of  vision,  obtained  by  keeping 
the  sun's  rays  out  of  the  eyes,  may  often  be  of  great 
importance,  and  where  the  combatants  are  nearly 
equal,  may  determine  the  victory.  Here  is,  indeed, 
no  need  to  infer  this  a  priori,  for  we  have  a  posteriori 
proof:  in  prize-fights  it  is  a  recognized  disadvantage 
to  have  the  sun  in  front.  Hence  we  may  infer  that 
during  the  evolution  of  those  types  from  which  man 
more  immediately  inherits,  it  must  have  happened 
that  individuals  in  whom  the  nervous  discharge  ac- 
companying the  excitement  of  combat,  caused  an 
unusual  contraction  of  those  corrugating  muscles  of 
the  forehead,  would,  other  things  being  equal,  be  the 
most  likely  to  conquer,  and  to  leave  posterity — sur- 


Review  of  Herbert  Spencer.  1 89 

vival  of  the  fittest  tending  in  their  posterity  to  estab- 
ash  and  increase  this  peculiarity." — Vol.  ii,  p.  546. 

This  account,  Mr.  Spencer  says,  "is  not  obvious, 
and  yet  when  found  is  satisfactory."  Yes,  about  as 
satisfactory  as  the  doctrine  that  hens  set  because  the 
pressure  of  the  eggs  serve  to  relieve  a  supposed  pain 
in  the  birds'  abdomen  ;  as  satisfactory,  perhaps,  as  the 
earlier  doctrine  of  appetencies — they  all  deserve  to 
be  put  upon  the  same  shelf,  for  all  have  about  equal 
support  in  fact.  1  have  quoted  the  paragraph  because 
it  brings  so  clearly  into  view  the  point  to  which  I 
have  so  often  referred — the  everlasting  assumption 
of  the  point  to  be  proved,  which  underlies  the  entire 
discussion.  Evolution  is  true — hence  matter  and  mind 
must  be  one.  Evolution  is  true — hence  when  it  is 
necessary  to  explain  the  nervous  system,  he  begins 
to  romance  on  what  might  have  been.  Evolution  is 
true — hence  to  account  for  emotions,  he  tells  us  of 
vagabond  currents  which,  in  their  aimless  wandering 
along  the  nerves,  hit  upon  the  vesicles  which  repre- 
sent ancient  sensations.  Evolution  is  true — hence 
nerve-vesicles  which  represent  kindred  ideas  must 
cling  together  and  coalesce  to  form  compound  ideas. 
Evolution  is  true — hence  to  interpret  human  phe- 
nomena we  are  referred  to  the  quarrels  of  the  early 
apes.  Evolution  is  true — hence  the  axioms  and  forms 
of  thought  must  be  formed  by  the  consolidated  expe- 
riences of  lower  forms  through  an  "  interminable  past/' 
Whatever  facts  do  not  harmonize  with  the  theory  are 


Review  of  Herbert  Spencer. 

stigmatized  as  ex  parte,  and  their  testimony  is  dis- 
credited. There  is  no  fancy  or  guess  too  wild  or  too 
absurd  to  be  greedily  swallowed,  if  only  it  support 
the  great  doctrine.  And  on  the  other  hand,  there  is 
no  fact  of  nature,  no  matter  how  well  ascertained ; 
there  is  no  deliverance  of  consciousness,  no  matter 
how  universal,  which  has  any  rights  which  the  phi- 
losopher is  bound  to  respect  if  it  is  opposed  to  his 
belief.  And  all  this  is  warranted,  because  evolution 
is  true.  The  evidence  brought  to  prove  the  theory 
gets  all  its  force  as  evidence  from  the  assumption 
that  the  theory  is  true.  It  is  the  most  fraternal,  ar- 
rangement possible — the  evidence  proves  the  theory, 
and  the  theory  gives  weight  to  the  evidence.  Truly, 
all  things  to  him  that  believeth.  A  mob  of  atoms,  if 
they  should  fall  to  reasoning,  could  scarcely  do  better 
than  this. 

But,  to  return  to  more  serious  discussion,  the  great- 
est difficulty  of  the  experience-philosophy  has  yet  to 
be  mentioned.  To  turn  sensation  into  thought,  re- 
flection, and  consciousness  is  difficult,  but  to  turn  it 
into  action  is  harder  still.  How  to  turn  passivity 
into  activity,  how  to  extract  from  mere  sentiency  the 
various  forms  of  conscious  effort,  has  always  been  a 
great  problem.  Why  should  inactive  receptivity 
transform  itself  into  the  idea  and  fact  of  conscious 
power  ? 

Mr.  Bain,   in   his  work,  introduced  a  novelty  into 


Review  of  Herbert  Spencer.  191 

his  system  for  the  purpose  of  answering  these  ques- 
tions. He  postulates  a  spontaneous  activity  of  the 
muscles  as  part  of  the  original  outfit  of  the  organ- 
ism ;  and  this  spontaneity,  reduced  to  shape  by  ex- 
perience, explains  the  difficulty.  To  this  it  is  suffi- 
cient to  say  that  if  this  activity  is  strictly  spontane- 
ous, it  lies  without  the  physical  forces  ;  and  if  it  does 
not  lie  without  them,  it  is  not  spontaneous.  In 
either  case,  Mr.  Bain  has  not  thrown  much  light  upon 
the  subject. 

Mr.  Spencer,  however,  cuts  the  knot.  There  is 
no  such  thing  as  spontaneity ;  because,  if  there 
is,  his  theory  fails.  This  alternative  is  not  to  be 
thought  of;  and  hence  there  is  nothing  left  us  but 
to  accept  Mr.  Spencer's  statement,  that  our  con- 
sciousness of  freedom,  of  being  the  causes  of  our 
actions,  is  an  utter  delusion.  In  reality,  every  thing 
which  we  do  is  done  for  us  ;  the  sequence  of  cause 
and  effect  is  as  rigid  here  as  it  is  in  physics,  and  the 
belief  that  we  have  any  thing  to  do  with  our  volitions 
is  a  superstition  that  deserves  no  quarter  whatever. 
It  has  long  been  evident  that  the  psychology  of  con- 
sciousness, and  that  of  Mr.  Spencer,  have  nothing  in 
common  ;  but,  inasmuch  as  consciousness  has  no 
rights  which  the  "  New  Philosophy  "  is  bound  to  re- 
spect, we  can  only  look  tearfully  on  as  one  after  an- 
other of  our  primary  beliefs  is  ruthlessly  turned  out 
of  doors.  Remonstrance  would  clearly  be  useless, 
and  might  even  provoke  further  indignity.  One 


1 92  Review  of  Herbert  Spencer, 

knows  not  what  extremes  of  violence  might  be  re- 
sorted to  if  it  should  become  apparent  that  we  have 
any  "pseud-ideas"  concealed  about  our  person,  to 
say  nothing  of  holding  a  belief  in  what  Mr.  Spencer 
calls  "  the  Hebrew  myth."  We  hold  our  peace,  then, 
while  Mr.  Spencer  explains  how  the  illusion  con- 
cerning freedom  has  arisen : 

"  Considered  as  an  internal  perception,  the  illusion 
consists  in  supposing  that  at  each  moment  the  ego 
is  something  more  than  the  aggregate  of  feelings  and 
ideas,  actual  and  nascent,  which  then  exists.  A  man 
who,  after  being  subject  to  an  impulse  consisting  of 
a  group  of  psychical  states,  real  and  ideal,  performs 
a  certain  action,  usually  asserts  that  he  determined 
to  perform  the  action  ;  and  by  speaking  of  his  con- 
scious self  as  having  been  something  separate  from 
the  group  of  psychical  states  constituting  the  im- 
pulse, is  led  into  the  error  of  supposing  that  it  was 
not  the  impulse  alone  which  determined  the  action. 
But  the  entire  group  of  psychical  states  which  con- 
stituted the  antecedent  of  the  action,  also  constituted 
himself  at  that  moment — constituted  his  psychical 
self,  that  is,  as  distinguished  from  his  physical  self. 
It  is  alike  true  that  he  determined  the  action,  and 
that  the  aggregate  of  his  feelings  and  ideas  deter- 
mined it ;  since,  during  its  existence  this  aggregate 
constituted  his  then  state  of  consciousness,  that  is, 
himself.  Either  the  ego  which  is  supposed  to  deter- 
mine or  will  the  action,  is  present  in  consciousness 


Review  of  Herbert  Spencer.  193 

or  it  is  not.  If  it  is  not  present  in  consciousness,  it 
is  something  of  which  we  are  unconscious — some- 
thing, therefore,  of  whose  existence  we  neither  have 
nor  can  have  any  evidence.  If  it  is  present  in  con- 
sciousness, then,  as  it  is  ever  present,  it  can  be  at 
each  moment  nothing  else  than  the  state  of  con- 
sciousness, simple  or  compound,  passing  at  that  mo- 
ment. It  follows  inevitably  that  when  an  impression 
received  from  without  makes  nascent  certain  appro- 
priate motor  changes,  and  various,  of  the  feelings  and 
ideas  which  must  accompany  and  follow  them ;  and 
when,  under  tbe  stimulus  of  this  composite  psychical 
state,  the  nascent  motor  changes  pass  into  actual 
motor  changes,  this  composite  psychical  state  which 
excites  the  action  is  at  the  same  time  the  ego  which 
is  said  to  will  the  action." — Vol.  i,  p.  500. 

This  description  shows  us  how  the  illusion  has 
arisen,  and  on  the  next  page  we  learn  how  it  has  been 
strengthened : 

"This  subjective  illusion  in  which  the  notion  of 
free-will  commonly  originates  is  strengthened  by  a 
corresponding  objective  illusion.  The  actions  of 
other  individuals,  lacking  as  they  do  that  uniformity 
characterizing  phenomena  of  which  the  laws  are 
known,  appear  to  be  lawless — appear  to  be  under  no 
necessity  of  following  any  particular  order,  and  are 
hence  supposed  to  be  determined  by  the  unknown 
independent  something  called  the  will.  But  this 

seeming  indeterminateness  in  the  mental  succession 

13 


IQ4  Review  of  Herbert  Spencer. 

is  consequent  on  the  extreme  complication  of  the 
forces  in  action.  The  composition  of  causes  is  so 
intricate,  and  from  moment  to  moment  so  varied, 
that  the  effects  are  not  calculable.  These  effects, 
however,  are  as  conformable  to  law  as  the  simplest 
reflex-actions.  The  irregularity  and  apparent  free- 
dom are  inevitable  results  of  the  complexity,  and 
equally  arise  in  the  inorganic  world  under  parallel 
conditions.  To  amplify  an  illustration  before  used  : 
A  body  in  space  subject  to  the  attraction  of  a  single 
other  body  moves  in  a  direction  that  can  be  accu- 
rately predicted.  If  subject  to  the  attractions  of  two 
bodies,  its  course  is  but  approximately  calculable. 
If  subject  to  the  attractions  of  three  bodies,  its  course 
can  be  calculated  with  still  less  precision.  And  if  it 
is  surrounded  by  bodies  of  all  sizes,  at  all  distances, 
its  motion  will  be  apparently  uninfluenced  by  any  of 
them  :  it  will  move  in  some  indefinable  varying  line 
that  appears  to  be  self-determined  ;  it  will  seem  to  be 
freer 

Passing  over  for  the  present  the  boundless  nihilism 
in  the  preceding  paragraphs,  I  remark  that  this  doc- 
trine of  necessity  is  here  put  into  far  more  explicit 
statement  than  we  commonly  find  in  Mr.  Spencer. 
As  a  rule,  his  views  are  rarely  expressed  in  definite 
form,  so  much  so  that  I  know  of  no  other  author 
whom  it  is  more  difficult  to  criticise.  Leading  doc- 
trines are  suggested  rather  than  stated,  and  assumed 
rather  than  proved ;  and  the  critic  is  forced  to  wade 


Review  of  Herbert  Spencer.  195 

through  a  sea  of  vague  and  meaningless  analogies,  in 
order  to  reach  any  precise  meaning.  But  there  can 
be  no  doubt  of  the  meaning  of  this  quotation.  Spon- 
taneity, freedom,  is  a  delusion ;  and  all  our  effort  is 
the  result  of  complex  reflex-action. 

It  it  were  needful,  it  would  be  easy  to  criticise  Mr. 
Spencer's  account  of  reflex-action  ;  and  to  show  that, 
in  concluding  it  to  be  the  reality  in  all  seeming  self- 
determination,  he  has  once  more  mistaken  the  confu- 
sion of  a  problem  for  its  solution.  The  truth  is,  that 
men  are  automata  running  about  on  two  legs,  with 
the  added  absurdity  of  supposing  themselves  free.  A 
book  lies  before  me  on  the  table.  I  think  I  can  draw  it 
toward  me  or  push  it  from  me,  or  let  it  alone.  I  feel 
conscious  that  I  can  determine  to  do  or  not  to  do  ;  to 
do  this  or  to  do  that.  But  I  am  mistaken.  If  I  draw 
that  book  toward  me,  it  is  because  I  cannot  help  it. 
If  I  push  it  from  me,  the  fact  is  proof  that  I  could 
not  do  otherwise.  If  I  let  it  alone,  it  is  because  an 
invincible  necessity  prevents  me  from  touching  it. 
The  manner  in  which  the  conflict  is  decided  is  as 
follows :  The  idea  of  a  book  to  be  drawn  arouses  a 
"  group  of  nascent  motor  changes,"  the  idea  of  a  book 
to  be  pushed  arouses  another  and  opposing  "  group 
of  nascent  motor  changes,"  and  these  two  groups 
proceed  to  fight  it  out.  If  the  first  group  wins,  the 
book  is  drawn  ;  if  the  second  group  wins,  the  book 
is  pushed ;  if  they  are  equally  matched,  then,  like 
the  ass  between  the  bundles  of  hay,  I  let  the  book 


196  Review  of  Herbert  Spencer. 

alone.  An  insulting  word  is  spoken  to  a  man.  The 
physical  antecedent  is  aerial  vibrations.  These  cor- 
relate with  nerve-currents,  which  at  once  start  for  some 
superior  nerve-center,  where  an  immense  amount  of 
molecular  motion  is  disengaged.  This,  in  turn,  starts 
for  the  muscles  of  the  arm,  taking  care  "  to  blow  up 
the  magazines"  of  force  in  the  ganglia  on  its  way 
down.  The  molecular  motion  on  reaching  the  mus- 
cles quickly  becomes  mechanical  motion  ;  the  mus- 
cles are  violently  extended  in  such  a  way  as  to  reach 
the  offender,  who  is  forthwith  collared  and  cuffed, 
and,  if  the  nascent  motor  changes  have  so  settled  the 
matter  among  themselves,  he  is  also  kicked.  This  is 
the  true  account  of  this  matter,  and  of  all  seeming 
self-determination.  One  would  never  have  thought 
it  if  he  had  not  been  told  ;  wherefore  for  this  exten- 
sion of  our  knowledge,  great  thanks  are  due  to  Mr. 
Spencer.  Consciousness,  of  course,  contradicts  the 
philosopher ;  but  so  much  the  worse  for  consciousness. 

And  lest  any  one  should  think  that  I  have  mis- 
represented Mr.  Spencer  for  the  sake  of  ridicule,  I 
commend  to  him  the  following  paragraph : 

"  When  the  automatic  actions  become  so  involved, 
so  varied  in  kind,  and  severally  so  infrequent,  as  no 
longer  to  be  performed  with  unhesitating  precision — 
when,  after  the  reception  of  one  of  the  more  complex 
impressions,  the  appropriate  motor  changes  become 
nascent,  but  are  prevented  from  passing  into  imme- 
diate action  by  the  antagonism  of  certain  other  nas- 


Review  of  Herbert  Spencer.  197 

cent  motor  changes  appropriate  to  some  nearly-allied 
impression,  there  is  constituted  a  state  of  conscious- 
ness which,  when  it  finally  issues  in  action,  we  call 
volition.  Each  set  of  nascent  motor  changes  arising 
in  the  course  of  this  conflict  is  a  weak  revival  of  the 
state  of  consciousness  which  accompanies  such  motor 
changes  when  actually  performed  ;  is  a  representa- 
tion of  such  motor  changes  as  were  before  executed 
under  like  circumstances  ;  is  an  idea  of  such  motor 
changes.  We  have,  therefore,  a  conflict  between  two 
sets  of  ideal  motor  changes  which  severally  tend  to 
become  real,  and  one  of  which  eventually  does  be- 
come real ;  and  this  passing  of  an  ideal  motor  change 
into  a  real  one  we  distinguish  as  volition." — Vol.  i, 
p.  496. 

There  is  warrant  enough  for  all  that  I  have  said. 
Consciousness  has  no  voice  in  this  matter ;  observa- 
tion has  no  voice  in  the  matter ;  fact  has  no  voice  in 
the  matter — only  unproved  and  unprovable  fancies, 
and  the  sore  needs  of  Mr.  Spencer's  system,  have 
any  claim  to  be  heard.  This  is  the  logic  of  the 
cuttle-fish ;  this  is  intellectual  soothsaying,  and,  like 
all  soothsaying,  can  only  be  received  by  faith. 

Compare  also  the  following  account  of  reason  and 
reasoning  : 

"  For  though  when  the  confusion  of  a  complex 
impression  with  some  allied  one  causes  a  confusion 
among  the  nascent  motor  excitations,  there  is  en- 
tailed a  certain  hesitation ;  and  though  this  hesitation 


198  Review  of  Herbert  Spencer. 

continues  as  long  as  those  nascent  motor  excitations 
or  ideas  of  the  correlative  actions  go  on  superseding 
one  another ;  yet,  ultimately,  some  one  set  of  motor 
excitations  will  prevail  over  the  rest.  As  the  groups 
of  antagonistic  tendencies  aroused  will  scarcely  ever 
be  exactly  balanced,  the  strongest  group  will  at 
length  pass  into  action  ;  and  as  this  sequence  will 
usually  be  the  one  that  has  recurred  oftenest  in  ex- 
perience, the  action  will  on  the  average  of  cases  be 
the  one  best  adapted  to  the  circumstances.  But  an 
action  thus  produced  is  nothing  else  than  a  rational 
action." — Vol.  i,  p.  455. 

I  had  intended  to  end  the  quotation  at  this  point, 
but  Mr.  Spencer  gives  such  a  lucid  and  convincing 
illustration  of  this  kind  of  reasoning  that  we  shall 
probably  understand  it  much  better  if  we  study  the 
example  given : 

"A  snarling  dog  commonly  turns  tail  when  a  stone 
is  thrown  at  him,  or  even  when  he  sees  the  stooping 
motion  required  for  picking  up  a  stone.  Suppose 
that,  having  often  experienced  this  sequence,  I  am 
again  attacked  by  such  a  dog,  what  are  the  resulting 
psychical  processes  ?  The  combined  impressions 
produced  on  my  senses,  and  the  state  of  conscious- 
ness which  they  arouse,  have  before  been  followed 
by  those  motor  changes  required  for  picking  up  and 
throwing  a  stone,  and  by  those  visual  changes  result- 
ing from  the  dog's  retreat.  As  these  psychical  states 
have  repeatedly  succeeded  one  another  in  experience, 


Review  of  Herbert  Spencer.  199 

they  have  acquired  some  cohesion — there  is  a  tend- 
ency for  the  psychical  states  excited  in  me  by  the 
snarling  dog,  to  be  followed  by  those  other  psychical 
states  that  have  before  followed  them.  In  other 
words,  there  is  a  nascent  excitation  of  the  motor 
apparatus  concerned  in  picking  up  and  throwing ; 
there  is  a  nascent  excitation  of  all  the  sensory  nerves 
affected  during  such  acts ;  and  through  these  there 
is  a  nascent  excitation  of  the  visual  nerves,  which  on 
previous  occasions  received  the  impression  of  a  flying 
dog.  That  is,  I  have  the  ideas  of  picking  up  and 
throwing  a  stone,  and  of  seeing  a  dog  run  away — for 
these  that  we  call  ideas  are  nothing  else  than  weak 
repetitions  of  the  psychical  states  caused  by  actual  im- 
pressions and  motions.  But  what  happens  further  ? 
If  there  is  no  antagonist  impulse,  if  no  other  ideas 
or  partial  excitations  arise,  and  if  the  dog's  aggressive 
demonstrations  produce  in  me  feelings  of  adequate 
vividness,  these  partial  excitations  pass  into  complete 
excitations.  I  go  through  the  previously-imagined 
actions.  The  nascent  motor  changes  become  real 
motor  changes,  and  the  adjustment  of  inner  to  outer 
relations  is  completed." — Vol.  i,  p.  455. 

Such  is  the  account  of  reason ;  and  it  is  supposed 
to  be  a  reasonable  account.  It  is  one  of  the  boasts 
of  this  philosophy  that  it  dispenses  with  scholastic 
doctrine  of  separate  faculties  in  the  soul,  and  reduces 
instinct,  reason,  will,  etc.,  to  modifications  produced 
by  the  single  principle  of  association.  We  have  just 


2OO  Review  of  Herbert  Spencer. 

seen  how  it  is  done.  To  reason,  is  to  be  dragged  off 
by  the  strongest  of  several  sets  of  opposing  "  nascent 
motor  changes  ;"  and  to  will,  is  to  suffer  similar  treat- 
ment. To  suppose  that  I  have  any  voice  in  the 
matter,  that  I  can  compare  the  claims  of  the  oppos- 
ing "  nascent  motor  changes  "  and  decide  for  myself, 
is  an  "  untenable  hypothesis."  The  nascent  motor 
excitations  settle  the  question  among  themselves  ; 
and  thus  the  "  adjustment  of  inner  to  outer  relations 
is  completed."  They  settle  the  question,  too,  much 
better  than  I  could ;  for  Mr.  Spencer  closes  his  dis- 
cussion of  this  topic  by  saying,  "  I  will  only  further 
say,  freedom  of  the  will,  did  it  exist,  would  be  at  vari- 
ance with  the  beneficence  recently  displayed  in  the 
evolution  of  the  correspondence  between  the  organ- 
ism and  its  environment.  .  .  .  There  would  be  a 
retardation  of  that  grand  progress  which  is  bearing 
humanity  onward  to  a  higher  intelligence  and  a 
nobler  character." 

This  mechanical  way  of  settling  all  disputed  ques- 
tions recalls  the  old  problem  of  the  ass  and  the  bun- 
dles of  hay.  If  while  lying  down  the  nascent  motor 
excitations  should  happen  to  balance  themselves, 
one  might  lie  there  forever.  If  they  should  do 
this  when  one  is  walking,  he  might  go  on  forever. 
These  disastrous  consequences  are  averted,  however, 
by  two  circumstances  :  first,  an  exact  balance  of  exci- 
tations is  only  infinitesimally  probable  ;  and,  second, 
the  homogeneous  is  unstable.  If,  then,  the  excita- 


Review  of  Herbert  Spencer.  20 1 

tions  ever  should  be  in  exact  balance,  the  instability 
of  the  homogeneous  would  soon  bring  about  a  differ- 
entiation of  the  homogeneous  groups  of  the  nascent 
motor  excitations,  whereby  the  inequality  of  power, 
resulting  from  the  heterogeneity  necessarily  produced, 
would  forthwith  settle  the  difficulty  in  favor  of  that 
set  of  nascent  motor  changes  which  would  be  best 
calculated  to  produce  an  adjustment  of  inner  to  outer 
relations,  or  to  maintain  the  necessary  equilibrium 
between  the  organic  and  its  environment.  It  would, 
indeed,  be  far  easier  to  allow  the  man  to  start  and 
stop  himself,  but  it  would  not  be  half  so  scientific  ; 
and,  besides,  there  would  be  an  interference  with 
"that  grand  progress  which  is  bearing  humanity 
onward  toward  a  higher  intelligence  and  a  nobler 
character." 

How  Mr.  Spencer  would  apply  this  formula 
to  the  abstract  reasonings  of  the  mathematician, 
scientist,  or  philosopher,  does  not  appear.  What 
kind  of  nascent  motor  excitation  precedes  the  con- 
clusion that  the  square  on  the  hypothenuse  is  equal 
to  the  sum  of  the  squares  on  the  other  two  sides  ?  or 
that  central  forces  vary  inversely  as  the  square  of 
the  distance  ?  What  nascent  motor  excitations  fight 
over  the  nominalistic  controversy  ?  What  nascent 
motor  excitations  discuss  the  nature  of  magnetism, 
and  the  polarization  of  light  ?  We  cannot  hope  for 
an  answer  to  any  of  these  questions  from  either 
consciousness  or  observation  ;  doubtless,  however, 


2O2  Review  of  Herbert  Spencer. 

Mr.  Spencer's  prolific  imagination  is  fully  equal  to 
the  occasion.  For  the  present,  we  must  rest  content 
with  knowing  that  all  the  abstractions  of  science 
and  philosophy,  and  all  our  voluntary  actions,  are 
the  necessary  resultants  of  conflicting  nascent  motor 
excitations. 

A  very  few  words  will  suffice  to  show  the  utter 
inconsistency  of  this  necessitarian  system.  Even  if 
it  were  not  emphatically  denied  by  every  man's  con- 
sciousness, even  if  it  were  not  totally  unsupported  by 
a  single  fact,  still  this  scheme  of  necessity  is  utterly 
self-destructive.  Mr.  Spencer  believes  in  a  universal 
and  ever-active  force ;  where  does  he  get  the  idea  ? 
The  veriest  tyro  in  metaphysics  now  admits  that  force 
is  not  an  observed  fact,  but  a  mental  datum.  It  is 
only  as  we  ourselves  put  forth  effort,  that  a  belief  in 
external  power  arises.  Our  own  effort,  our  own  con- 
scious self-determination,  stands  for  the  type  of  all 
power.  We  have  no  other  knowledge  nor  hint  of 
force  than  that  derived  from  our  own  free  volitions. 
If  they  play  us  false,  all  that  is  built  upon  them 
is  baseless.  Deny  internal  causation,  and  external 
causation  disappears  along  with  it,  and  a  universe 
of  unconnected  phenomena  is  all  that  is  left  us.  Yet 
Mr.  Spencer,  after  obtaining  the  belief  in  external 
causation  from  the  fact  of  internal  causation,  next 
proceeds  to  deny  the  fact  on  which  the  belief  rests, 
and  asks  us  still  to  accept  the  belief.  It  is  hard  to 
resist  this  appeal ;  for  if  the  belief  is  not  accepted, 


fainv 

Review  of  Herbert  Spencer^^g         203 

Mr.  Spencer's  system  has  no  power  to  work  with  ; 
and  if  the  internal  fact  is  not  rejected,  the  system 
breaks  down.  And  this  is  science  ;  this  is  logic  ; 
this  is  evolution.  It  is  hard  to  believe  that  Mr.  Spen- 
cer is  really  serious.  Is  it  not  possible  that  this  work 
is  meant  only  as  an  elaborate  satire  upon  the  loose 
reasoning  and  baseless  assumptions  of  much  that  calls 
itself  science  ?  The  internal  evidence  in  favor  of 
this  view  is  complete  ;  while  the  opposing  theory,  that 
it  is  meant  as  a  sober  exposition  of  fact,  is  beset  with  in- 
surmountable difficulties — it  is  positively  incredible. 
We  wait  for  Mr.  Spencer's  announcement  that  all 
this  time  he  has  been  perpetrating  a  tremendous 
sarcasm.  The  air  of  gravity  and  reality  with  which 
the  work  has  been  invested,  the  pains  with  which  it 
has  been  elaborated,  the  wide  range  of  illustration,  all 
will  serve  to  raise  it  at  once  to  the  foremost  place  in 
the  realm  of  satirical  literature.  It  is  to  be  hoped, 
for  the  sake  of  his  own  reputation,  that  Mr.  Spencer 
will  not  keep  the  secret  much  longer. 

Sensational  philosophy  has  never  been  able  to 
escape  nihilism.  I  have  already  shown  that  Mr. 
Spencer's  doctrine  of  the  unknowable  can  logic- 
ally result  only  in  idealism  ;  it  remains  to  show 
that  the  logical  necessity  of  the  experience-phi- 
losophy is  nihilism.  In  its  zeal  to  deny  the  existence 
of  a  knowing  power  which  takes  direct  cognizance 
of  external  being,  it  has  been  forced  to  build  up  both 


2O4  Review  of  Herbert  Spencer. 

the  mind  and  the  external  world,  from  the  raw  mate- 
rial of  sensation.  There  is  sensation,  according  to 
this  doctrine,  long  before  there  is  knowledge ;  and 
the  final  recognition  of  self  and  of  an  external  world, 
is  the  residuum  of  countless  sensations.  But  if  this 
be  so,  then  the  deposit  which  is  named  self,  has  at 
least  as  good  claim  to  substantial  being  as  the  deposit 
which  represents  the  outer  world.  It  is  logically  im- 
possible to  accept  one  and  reject  the  other ;  and,  in 
the  attempt  to  do  this,  materialism  has  always  tum- 
bled into  the  bottomless  pit  of  nothingness.  Mr.  Mill 
makes  matter  an  affection  of  mind,  and  mind  a  prod- 
uct of  matter.  Both  are  denied  substantial  exist- 
ence, and  both  go  off  into  the  void.  Mr.  Bain  reduces 
mind  to  nerve-currents,  and  then  says  that  nerve- 
currents  and  the  outer  world  generally  have  only  a 
hypothetical  existence — indeed,  are  but  "abstract 
names  for  our  sensations  and  exist  only  in  the  mind 
that  frames  them."*  But  inasmuch  as  nerve-currents 
are  abstractions,  the  mind,  which  is  the  product  of 
nerve-currents,  is  doubly  an  abstraction  ;  and  substan- 
tial existence  disappears  in  the  abysses.  Mr.  Spencer 
is  in  the  true  succession.  He  makes  a  desperate  at- 
tempt, indeed,  to  save  the  world  ;  but  in  his  execution 
of  self,  or  the  ego,  he  handles  the  ax  so  awkwardly  as 
to  dispatch  subject  and  object  together.  This  is  the 
historical  stone  which  kills  the  two  birds  :  "  Either 
this  ego,  which  is  supposed  to  determine  or  will  the 

*  "  Science  and  Intellect,"  p.  376. 


Review  of  Herbert  Spencer.  205 

act,  is  present  in  consciousness  or  it  is  not.  If  it  is 
not  present  in  consciousness,  it  is  something  of  which 
we  are  unconscious — something,  therefore,  of  whose 
existence  we  neither  have  nor  can  have  any  evidence. 
If  it  is  present  in  consciousness,  then,  as  it  is  ever 
present,  it  can  be  at  each  moment  nothing  else  than 
the  state  of  consciousness,  simple  or  compound,  pass- 
ing at  the  moment." — Vol.  i,  p.  500. 

Whenever  Mr.  Spencer  becomes  epigrammatic,  he 
is  apt  to  use  arguments  which  cut  both  ways.  I 
have  always  had  some  secret  doubts  about  the  pecul- 
iar feats  of  the  Australian  boomerang ;  and  have 
quietly  determined  if  I  ever  got  hold  of  one,  to  prac- 
tice a  little  with  it,  before  yielding  implicit  credence 
to  the  stories  one  hears.  But  here  is  the  clearest 
proof  that  boomerang  arguments  are  possible.  Let 
us  apply  this  argument  to  the  existence  of  the  un- 
knowable, and  see  how  it  lights  on  Mr.  Spencer's  own 
head.  I  manage  the  reasoning  in  this  way :  Either 
this  unknowable, which  is  said  to  underlie  phenomena, 
is  present  in  consciousness  or  it  is  not.  If  it  is  not 
present,  then  it  is  something  of  which  we  are  uncon- 
scious— something,  therefore,  of  whose  existence  we 
neither  have  nor  can  have  any  evidence.  If  it  is 
present  in  consciousness,  it  clearly  cannot  be  unknow- 
able, for  that  would  involve  the  contradiction  of  sup- 
posing that  a  thing  can  be  at  the  same  time  known 
and  unknowable.  In  either  case  we  must  conclude 
that  the  unknowable  is  something  of  whose  exist- 


206  Review  of  Herbert  Spencer. 

ence  we  neither  have  nor  can  have  any  evidence, 
My  reasoning  is  as  good  as  Mr.  Spencer's.  If  he 
insists  that  we  cannot  think  of  phenomena  without  a 
substantial  support,  I  reply  that  it  is  equally  impos- 
sible to  think  of  feelings  without  a  substantial  sup- 
port. If  the  argument  is  good  for  one,  it  is  good  for 
both,  and  that,  too,  in  whichever  way  it  is  taken. 

But,  says  Mr.  Spencer  again  and  again,  this  argu- 
ment of  mine  reduces  to  nonsense  without  the  postu- 
late of  external  existence.  Undoubtedly ;  and  it 
reduces  to  equal  nonsense  without  the  postulate  of 
internal  existence.  But,  he  says,  the  terms  used  sup- 
pose objective  existence.  They  do,  indeed;  but  no 
more  strongly  than  feeling  and  thought  and  conscious- 
ness suppose  subjective  existence.  The  argument 
which  reduces  mind  to  a  string  of  feelings,  reduces 
matter  to  a  bundle  of  qualities.  If  subjective  exist- 
ence has  no  warrant,  objective  existence  has  none 
also ;  and  the  void  and  formless  nothing  is  all  that  is 
left  us.  But  Mr.  Spencer  calls  the  "  Universal  Postu- 
late "  to  his  aid.  This  is,  that  we  cannot  help  believ- 
ing in  an  outer  world,  and  so  must  accept  it  whether  we 
can  justify  the  belief  or  not.  But  the  "  Postulate  " 
is  another  boomerang.  We  cannot  help  believing  in 
an  inner  world — in  the  reality  and  identity  of  self, 
and  in  our  self-determining  power ;  and  on  the  au- 
thority of  the  "  Postulate,"  we  must,  therefore,  con- 
clude that  this  belief  stands  for  a  fact.  It  clearly  will 
not  do  to  be  too  free  with  the  "  Postulate."  If  it  could 


Review  of  Herbert  Spencer.  207 

be  smuggled  in  at  the  back  door,  and  be  persuaded 
to  affix  the  seal  of  reality  to  the  outer  world,  and 
could  then  be  kicked  out  before  any  further  claims 
could  be  made  upon  it,  it  might  do  to  send  for  it ;  but 
if  it  is  to  be  free  to  all  parties,  it  will  be  as  likely  to 
blaspheme  as  to  bless.  There  is  no  help  for  it.  Mr. 
Spencer's  solid-looking  sensational  ground  vanishes 
from  under  his  feet,  and  leaves  him  in  the  abysses. 

The  loftiest  tumbling,  however,  of  the  experience- 
philosophy  has  probably  been  done  over  the  intui- 
tions. All  our  mental  operations  proceed  upon  cer- 
tain assumptions.  All  reasoning,  even  that  of  the 
skeptic,  necessarily  proceeds  in  logical  forms,  and 
assumes  the  validity  of  logical  laws.  The  argument 
brought  to  overthrow  them  implicitly  assumes  them, 
and  owes  all  its  value  to  the  assumption.  It  were 
easier  to  escape  from  one's  shadow,  or  for  a  bird  to 
outsoar  the  supporting  air,  than  for  reason  to  escape 
from  the  dominion  of  logical  laws.  The  law  of 
causation,  too,  is  the  necessary  postulate  of  all  sci- 
ence, and  the  one  which  alone  makes  science  possible. 
The  transcendental  philosopher  assumes  that  these 
data  are  contributed  by  the  mind  itself ;  that,  though 
not  prior  to  experience,  they  do  not  derive  their 
validity  from  it,  but  are  intuitively  known  to  be  true. 
It  is  not  taught  that  these  are  explicitly  present,  but 
only  implicitly  so,  in  every  mental  operation.  The 
savage,  the  rustic,  or  the  child,  probably  knows  as  lit- 


208  Review  of  Herbert  Spencer. 

tie  about  intuitions,  logical  laws,  or  thought-forms,  as 
he  does  about  the  doctrine  of  evolution  itself ;  yet 
each  one  implicitly  proceeds  upon  them. 

Now  these  constant  assumptions  of  all  reasoning 
the  transcendentalist  calls  the  intuitions ;  and  claims 
that  they  are  not  generalizations  from  experience,  b^t 
are  based  upon  direct  mental  insight.  There  must  be, 
indeed,  a  certain  amount  of  experience  to  make  the 
terms  of  the  proposition  intelligible.  If  we  should 
inquire  of  a  child  three  years  old  whether  two  straight 
lines  can  inclose  a  space,  or  whether  it  is  not  pos- 
sible that  events  can  happen  without  a  cause,  we 
should  probably  get  no  very  satisfactory  answer, 
because  the  terms  of  the  propositions  would  be  ut- 
terly unintelligible  to  him.  But  when  the  terms  can 
be  understood,  when  the  conception  of  straight  lines 
and  inclosed  spaces  can  be  formed,  then  the  mind 
needs  no  further  experience  to  know  that  two 
straight  lines  can  never  inclose  a  space.  We  are 
just  as  sure  of  the  fact  as  we  would  be  if  we  had 
followed  them  to  the  frontiers  of  the  infinite.  When 
there  is  sufficient  mental  development  to  follow  a 
geometrical  demonstration,  we  reach  a  certainty 
which  no  further  experience  can  confirm  or  shake. 
Indeed,  we  make  the  mental  conception  the  regula- 
tor of  experience,  and  not  conversely.  So,  too, 
when  the  doctrine  of  causation  becomes  intelligible, 
that  moment  it  is  perceived  to  be  real. 

This,  then,  is  the  doctrine  of  the  intuitions.     The 


Review  of  Herbert  Spencer.  209 

mind  has  the  power  of  knowing  some  things  to  be  true, 
without  any  process  of  verification  These  are  the 
intuitions ;  and  the  claim  for  thSrTisthat,  as  soon  as  the 
propositions  which  express  them  become  intelligible, 
they  are  seen  to  be  necessarily  and  universally  true. 
For  their  truth,  they  are  independent  of  experience  ; 
while  they  alone  give  to  experience  any  form  or 
meaning.  They  are  the  laws  which  transform  the 
chaos  of  unconnected  experience  into  a  creation  of 
orderly  thought.  This  is  the  only  doctrine  which 
corresponds  with  our  matured  consciousness. 

This  doctrine,  however,  the  experience-philos- 
opher is,  of  course,  bound  to  deny.  These  laws  of 
thinking  are  in  his  view,  like  every  thing  else  in 
the  mind,  but  consolidated  sensations  ;  and,  in  the 
lack  of  evidence,  the  philosopher  plunges  into  dark- 
ness of  the  unknown,  and  gropes  about  for  oppos- 
ing possibilities  which  can  never  be  brought  to 
a  test.  Both  Mr.  Spencer  and  Mr.  Mill  assure 
us  that  the  assumed  necessity  of  these  beliefs  is 
only  the  result  of  habit.  Even  the  simplest  math- 
ematical axioms  are,  according  to  Mr.  Mill,  the 
results  of  inveterate  associations ;  and  he  gravely 
suggests  that  if  our  training  had  been  different, 
we  might  have  looked  upon  their  contradictories 
as  equally  axiomatic.  Mr.  Spencer  tells  us  that 
"where  a  relation  has  been  perpetually  repeated  in 
our  experience  with  absolute  uniformity,  we  are 

entirely   disabled  from  conceiving  the  negation  of 

14  . 


2IO  Review  of  Herbert  Spencer. 

it."  This  is  the  origin  of  all  our  a  priori  beliefs. 
"  Being  the  constant  and  infinitely-repeated  elements 
of  thought,  they  must  become  the  automatic  ele- 
ments of  thought — the  elements  of  thought  which  it 
is  impossible  to  get  rid  of — the  'forms  of  intuition.'" 
Before  pointing  out  the  skeptical  consequences  of 
this  teaching,  I  notice  a  novelty  which  Mr.  Spencer 
has  introduced  into  the  discussion.  The  sensational 
doctrine,  hitherto,  has  been  greatly  pressed  for  time  in 
which  to  work  its  transformations.  It  is  not  claimed 
that  these  wonders  have  been  wrought  within  the  scope 
of  our  present  consciousness  ;  it  has  been  necessary 
therefore  to  do  the  work  in  infancy,  and  to  complete 
it  also  before  the  critical  faculties  make  their  ap- 
pearance. It  has  always  required  great  sleight-of- 
hand  to  complete  and  polish  a  full  set  of  mental 
furniture  in  the  limited  time  allowed.  Besides,  too, 
the  slightest  observation  shows  that  every  individual 
brings  with  him  tendencies  which  determine  both 
the  .line,  and  the  measure,  of  his  development ;  and 
these  tendencies,  so  far  as  they  go,  are  transcend- 
ental elements  in  his  mental  character.  The  fact 
is  undeniable  that,  both  physically  and  mentally,  we 
are  determined  more  by  our  constitution  than  by 
our  own  experience.  The  fact  of  transmitted  tend- 
encies has  become  so  prominent,  that  the  philos- 
opher who  attempts  to  deduce  every  thing  from 
individual  experience  finds  the  ground  slipping  from 
under  his  feet.  The  transcendental,  forces  its  way 


Revieiv  of  Herbert  Spencer.  211 

into  individual  experience ;    and  when  once  it  gets 
in,  who  can  tell  where  it  will  stop  ? 

In  this  sad  strait  of  the  doctrine,  Mr.  Spencer  ap- 
pears with  a  saving  suggestion,  and  the  eagerness  with 
which  it  has  been  adopted  serves  to  show  into  what 
sore  need  the  philosophy  had  fallen.  Mr.  Spencer 
suggests  that  these  intuitions  are  transcendental  for 
the  individual,  but  empirical  for  the  race.  He,  too, 
would  derive  everything  from  experience,  but  from  a 
race-experience.  To  the  experience-hypothesis  as 
commonly  understood,  he  shows  no  quarter  what- 
ever. "  If  at  birth  there  exists  nothing  but  a  passive 
receptivity  of  impressions,  why  is  not  a  horse  as 
educable  as  a  man  ?  Should  it  be  said  that  language 
makes  the  difference,  then  why  do  not  the  cat  and 
the  dog,  reared  in  the  same  household,  arrive  at 
equal  degrees  and  kinds  of  intelligence  ? "  "  Those 
who  contend  that  knowledge  results  wholly  from  the 
experiences  of  the  individual,  ignoring  as  they  do 
the  mental  development  which  accompanies  the 
autogenous  development  of  the  nervous  system,  fall 
into  an  error  as  great  as  if  they  were  to  ascribe  all 
bodily  growth  and  structure  to  exercise,  forgetting 
the  innate  tendency  to  assume  the  adult  form.  .  .  . 
Doubtless,  experiences  received  by  the  individual  fur- 
nish the  concrete  materials  for  all  thought.  Doubt- 
less, the  organized  and  semi-organized  arrangements 
existing  among  the  cerebral  nerves  can  give  no 
knowledge  until  there  has  been  a  presentation  of  the 


212  Review  of  Herbert  Spencer. 

external  relations  to  which  they  correspond.  And 
doubtless,  the  child's  daily  observations  and  reason- 
ings aid  the  formation  of  those  involved  nervous 
connections  that  are  in  process  of  spontaneous  evo- 
lution, just  as  its  daily  gambols  aid  the  development 
of  its  limbs.  But  saying  this  is  quite  a  different 
thing  from  saying  that  its  intelligence  is  wholly 
produced  by  its  experiences.  That  is  an  utterly 
inadmissible  doctrine — a  doctrine  which  makes  the 
presence  of  a  brain  meaningless ;  a  doctrine  which 
makes  idiotcy  unaccountable." — Vol.  i,  p.  470. 

We  have  classical  authority  for  believing  that  it  is 
lawful  to  be  taught  even  by  an  enemy ;  wherefore,  we 
must  thank  Mr.  Spencer  for  his  conclusive  showing 
that  the  current  form  of  the  experience-hypothesis  is 
utterly  untenable.  And  now  for  his  own  doctrine  : 
"  But  these  pre-determined  internal  relations,  though 
independent  of  the  experiences  of  the  individual,  are 
not  independent  of  experiences  in  general ;  they 
have  been  determined  by  the  experiences  of  pre- 
ceding organisms.  The  corollary  here  drawn  from 
the  general  argument  is,  that  the  human  brain  is  an 
organized  register  of  infinitely  numerous  experiences 
received  during  the  evolution  of  life,  or  rather  during 
the  evolution  of  that  series  of  organisms  through 
which  the  human  organism  has  been  reached.  The 
effects  of  the  most  uniform  and  frequent  of  these 
experiences  have  been  successively  bequeathed,  prin- 
cipal and  interest,  and  have  slowly  amounted  to  that 


Review  of  Herbert  Spencer.  2 1 3 

high  intelligence  which  lies  latent  in  the  brain  of  the 
infant,  which  the  infant  in  after-life  exercises,  and 
perhaps  strengthens  or  further  complicates,  and 
which,  with  minute  additions,  it  bequeaths  to  future 
generations." — Vol.  i,  p.  470. 

It  is  evident  that  Mr.  Spencer  has  greatly  in- 
creased the  resources  of  his  school  by  this  suggestion. 
It  greatly  extends  the  time,  and,  besides,  gives  fine 
opportunities  for  logical  mountebankery.  Viewed 
through  the  gloom  of  the  unknown,  sleight-of-hand 
may  pass  for  a  real  miracle ;  and  acrobatic  feats 
which,  upon  close  examination,  betray  only  the  com- 
mon clown,  might,  when  invested  with  the  haze  of 
distance,  seem  like  the  magic  movements  of  a  great 
enchanter.  But  clear  as  it  is  that  Mr.  Spencer  has 
increased  the  resources  of  his  school  by  his  sugges- 
tion, it  is  not  so  clear  that  he  has  any  logical  right 
to  it.  For  what  is  it  but  an  admission  that  unless 
evolution  be  assumed  as  a  fact,  it  cannot  possibly  be 
proved  ?  This  it  is,  and  nothing  more.  If  the  evolu- 
tionists can  get  much  comfort  out  of  the  admission, 
they  are  welcome  to  it. 

Another  difficulty  meets  us.  Experience  alone, 
tan  teach  nothing.  It  is  only  as  there  is  a  mind 
with  an  outfit  of  principles  to  organize  experience, 
that  we  can  advance  a  single  step.  Facts  alone,  are 
dead ;  and  can  tell  us  nothing  of  other  facts  except  we 
assume  the  reality  of  causation,  and  the  validity  of 
logical  laws.  Otherwise  the  syllogism  begs  the  ques- 


214  Review  of  Herbert  Spencer. 

tion,  and  the  induction  concludes  from  particulars  to 
a  universal.  Argument  in  either  form,  is  illogical, 
unless  the  mind  is  allotved  to  contribute  its  meta- 
physical data.  In  this  way  alone  can  the  dead  ma- 
terials of  experience  be  put  in  motion,  and  a  living 
advance  be  secured.  The  fabric  of  knowledge  falls 
into  indistinguishable  chaos,  except  as  supported  by 
the  forms  of  thought  and  logic.  Whence  I  submit 
that,  instead  of  organizing  thought-forms  from  expe- 
rience, we  must  postulate  thought-forms  at  the  start 
to  give  experience  any  form  or  meaning. 

Another  consequence  must  be  noticed.  If  sensa- 
tion is  the  raw  material  out  of  which  mind  has  been 
built  up,  if  it  is  the  only  source  of  knowledge,  then 
whatever  is  not  in  sensation  has  no  claim  to  reality. 
All  the  higher  powers  and  beliefs  of  the  mind,  which 
differ  in  kind  from  sensation,  must  be  looked  upon 
as  impostors  who,  having  forgotten  their  ignoble 
birth,  set  up  a  claim  to  the  throne.  The  existence 
and  infinity  of  space  and  time,  the  belief  in  causation, 
the  axioms  of  mathematics,  and  the  universal  validity 
of  logical  processes,  these  doctrines  have  no  claim  to 
belief  whatever.  They  are  not  found  in  sensation, 
and  bear  no  resemblance  to  it ;  and  as  this  is  the 
only  legitimate  source  of  knowledge,  these  pretenders 
must  be  banished  from  the  realm  of  knowledge.  If. 
I  repeat,  this  doctrine  be  strictly  true,  we  know  what 
we  have  experienced,  and  we  know  absolutely  noth- 
ing more.  Of  course,  finite  experience  cannot  teach 


Review  of  Herbert  Spencer.  2 1 5 

universal  truth,  and  the  so-called  intuitions  must  be 
reduced  to  the  scale  of  experience.  As  a  necessary 
result,  science  disappears  ;  and  the  great  doctrine  of 
evolution,  which  postulates  the  universal  validity  of 
the  laws  of  thought,  disappears  along  with  it.  In- 
deed, not  even  a  limited  objective  validity  can  be 
attributed  to  these  laws  ;  for  the  doctrine  is  that  they 
are  the  result  of  habit,  and  derive  all  their  necessity 
from  inveterate  association.  They  represent,  then, 
no  external  facts,  but  only  internal  delusions.  In  the 
dissolving  chemistry  of  this  doctrine,  the  subjective 
world  disappears,  the  objective  world  also  disappears, 
and  all  that  is  left  is  a  limitless  void  ;  nay,  not  even 
that  is  left.  All  that  remains  of  the  universe  is  a 
jumble  of  qualities  which  are  qualities  of  nothing, 
and  a  string  of  feelings  which  belong  to  nobody. 

To  this  fatal  inference  Mr.  Spencer  has  nought 
but  the  following  brief  reply :  "  In  spite  of  logical 
objections  we  cannot  help  trusting  these  intuitions, 
and  this  is  our  highest  warrant  for  belief  in  any  thing." 
But  by  his  own  principles  our  subjective  inability  to 
get  rid  of  these  intuitions,  is  no  proof  of  their  ob- 
jective validity.  The  inability  results  entirely  from 
habit.  If  we  had  formed  other  habits  we  should  have 
thought  otherwise.  Besides,  Mr.  Spencer  is  the  last 
man  who  should  appeal  to  our  necessary  beliefs  in 
support  of  any  thing,  for  no  one  has  done  them 
greater  violence.  We  have  already  seen  how  he  in- 
sists upon  the  duality  of  subject  and  object  as  the 


2l6  Review  of  Herbert  Spencer. 

most  fundamental  datum  of  thought,  and  one  uhich 
it  is  impossible  for  us  to  transcend  ;  yet,  in  spite  of 
the  impossibility,  Mr.  Spencer  declares  them  one. 
He  further  insists  that  no  effort  will  enable  us  to 
think  of  thought  and  motion  as  alike  ;  yet  he  assumes 
as  a  first  principle,  that  they  are  identical.  We  inev- 
itably believe  that  personality  is  more  than  a  bundle 
of  feelings  ;  but  Mr.  Spencer  turns  this  belief  out  of 
doors  without  ceremony.  We  cannot  help  thinking 
that  we  see  things  as  they  are,  that  the  qualities  we 
attribute  to  them  are  really  in  them ;  but  this  belief, 
too,  Mr.  Spencer  cannot  abide.  We  cannot  help 
thinking  that  we  are  free,  but  this  also  is  a  "  pseud- 
idea."  There  is  scarcely  a  deliverance  of  our  mature 
consciousness  which  Mr.  Spencer  has  not  insulted 
and  denied.  However,  something  must  be  saved  in 
the  midst  of  this  universal  denial,  or  the  universe 
would  vanish  in  the  abyss  of  nihilism  ;  and,  accord- 
ingly, Mr.  Spencer  asks  us  to  grant  him  objective 
existence,  and  an  infinite  force,  on  the  sole  testimony 
of  the  same  mind  which  he  has  loaded  with  opprobri- 
um as  a  false  witness.  He  insists  upon  these  things 
because  he  cannot  even  start  his  system  without 
them  ;  he  denies  all  the  rest,  because  they  are  hostile 
to  his  system.  Can  any  thing  be  more  convenient 
than  this  privilege  of  taking  what  we  like  and  reject- 
ing what  we  like  ?  Who  could  not  build  up  a  sys- 
tem if  we  would  indulge  in  this  little  thing?  We 
cannot  grant  it,  however.  The  elementary  affirma- 


Review  of  Herbert  Spencer.  217 

tions  of  the  mind  must  stand  or  fall  together,  for  no 
one  has  any  better  warrant  than  the  rest.  Doubt- 
less, the  exigencies  of  his  system  may  seem  sufficient 
reason  to  Mr.  Spencer  for  accepting  some  and  reject- 
ing others  ;  but  they  will  hardly  seem  so  to  those 
whose  interest  in  the  great  doctrine  is  less  paternal. 
Now  what  shall  we  say  of  this  theory  ?  Has  it  not 
failed  at  every  point  indicated  in  opening  the  discus- 
sion ?  Even  permitting  it  to  ransack  imagination  for 
its  arguments  and  its  facts,  it  utterly  breaks  down. 
And  the  purpose  of  all  this  subtle  misconstruction  of 
our  experience,  of  this  labored  denial  of  what  we 
know,  of  these  fanciful  guesses  at  the  unknown,  is 
only  to  escape  from  the  necessity  of  admitting  that, 
back  of  nerves  and  muscles,  there  is  a  knowing,  self- 
active  mind.  To  accomplish  this  purpose,  incon- 
ceivabilities are  postulated,  irrationalities  are  multi- 
plied, consciousness  is  insulted,  and  logic  is  outraged. 
They  have  their  revenge.  Mr.  Spencer  repudiates 
reason  and  consciousness  ;  and  they  repudiate  Mr. 
Spencer. 


2 1 8  Review  if  Herbert  Spencer. 


CHAPTER   V. 

THE   THEISTIC    ARGUMENT. 

^HE  study  of  nature  has  effected,  within  a  few 
•^  years,  a  complete  change  in  our  conception  of 
the  physical  universe.  Whether  we  consider  it  as 
extended  in  space  and  time,  or  as  the  subject  of  law, 
as  a  supreme  order,  it  is  equally  apparent  that  the 
eailier  view  had  nothing  in  common  with  the  con- 
ception of  to-day.  In  space,  the  blue  vault  and  crys- 
tal floors  have  broken  up  and  passed  away.  We  no 
longer  argue,  with  Lucretius,  that  the  sun  cannot 
possibly  be  more  than  a  foot  in  diameter ;  nor  do  we 
now  think  of  the  stars  as  holes  in  the  floor  of  heaven, 
through  which  beams  the  upper  glory.  The  astron- 
omer has  come  back  from  the  depths  of  infinite  space, 
with  wondrous  stories  of  the  suns  that  glow  and 
systems  that  circle  there.  At  his  bidding,  we  have 
learned  to  view  those  twinkling  points  of  light  as 
suns,  which,  though  small  through  distance,  do  yet 
blaze,  many  of  them  with  the  force  of  thousands  of 
suns  like  ours.  All  terrestrial  units,  of  either  size  or 
distance,  fail  to  measure  the  quantities  with  which 
he  deals.  When  he  attempts  to  weigh  the  stars,  he 
rolls  the  earth  into  the  scales  as  his  pound-weight ; 


Review  of  Herbert  Spencer,  219 

but  soon  he  has  to  roll  in  so  many,  to  secure  a  bal- 
ance, that  imagination  is  outrun.  To  measure  his 
distances,  he  first  tries  the  sun's  distance,  as  a  unit, 
but  quickly  finds  it  inapplicable.  Next  he  tries  the 
speed  of  light,  as  a  unit,  and  measures  distances  by 
the  time  light  spends  in  crossing  them  ;  but  this, 
too,  soon  leaves  imagination  dizzy  and  powerless. 
The  rays  which  reached  our  earth  last  night  from 
the  pole-star,  started  forty-six  years  ago.  Rays 
which  started  from  more  distant  orbs,  when  the 
Roman  empire  was  young,  or  when  Leonidas  and 
his  Spartans  were  making  history,  are  still  upon 
their  way.  Since  light  left  some  of  the  outlying 
pickets  of  the  celestial  host,  the  entire  drama 
of  human  history  has  been  enacted.  Civilizations 
have  come  and  gone.  Empires  have  risen  and  de- 
cayed. Homer  has  sung,  Plato  has  speculated,  and 
Socrates  has  nobly  died.  But  the  light  which  left  its 
distant  home  when  human  history  was  still  far  down 
the  future,  has  not  yet  accomplished  half  its  way. 
The  sphere  of  telescopic  vision  has  a  diameter  of 
seven  millions  of  years  as  the  light  flies  ;  and  could 
the  heavens  above  us  be  blotted  out  to-night,  we 
should  continue  to  receive  light  for  thousands  of 
years  to  come.  Swift-footed  as  the  messenger  is, 
earth  would  grow  old  and  gray  before  it  learned  the 
occurrence  of  the  catastrophe.  Such  are  some  of  the 
facts  by  which  the  astronomer  seeks  to  illustrate  the 
extent  of  the  universe  in  space  and  time. 


22O  Review  #f  Herbert  Spencer. 

If  from  astronomy  we  turn  to  geology,  we  learn 
the  same  lesson.  The  idea  of  a  creation  instantane- 
ously perfected  is  fading  from  the  minds  of  men  ; 
much  more  the  thought  that  it  took  place  but  six 
thousand  years  ago.  Earth  is  written  all  over  with 
the  marks  of  a  more  ancient  birth.  The  very  pav- 
ing-stones beneath  our  feet  have  in  them  the  rustle 
of  ancient  woods  and  the  wash  of  primeval  seas. 
The  slow,  cyclic  changes  which  have  fitted  up  our 
earth  for  human  habitation,  demand  years  by  the 
million  for  every  day  of  creation's  week,  and  give  a 
mushroom  air  to  the  oldest  human  monuments.  We 
cannot,  indeed,  assume  nature's  flowing  differential 
to  be  exactly  constant ;  yet,  when  all  allowance  has 
been  made  for  its  variation,  it  is  still  beyond  ques- 
tion that  the  integrated  function  cannot  be  expressed 
in  years. 

Still  more  clearly  is  this  seen  if  we  listen  again 
to  the  astronomer  as  he  tells  of  a  time  when  our 
earth  itself,  with  its  granite  pillars  and  everlasting 
hills,  was  but  a  morning-mist  of  creation,  which 
spun  and  wove  until  the  pattern  of  creation  stood 
complete.  And  hence  creation  is  coming  to  be 
viewed  as  an  evolving  rather  than  an  event ;  as  a 
process  demanding  the  roll  of  indefinite  years  ;  as 
being,  what  the  Bible  calls  it,  a  genesis,  that  is,  a 
birth,  with  the  necessarily  accompanying  ideas  of 
long  time,  and  deferred  perfection.  The  conception 
of  sudden  bursts  of  creative  power  from  without,  is 


Review  of  Herbert  Spencer.  221 

changing  for  the  conception  of  an  orderly  and  con- 
stant development  from  within.  Yet  this  stupen- 
dous chronometry  of  geology  and  astronomy  reveals 
no  trace  of  a  lonely  God.  Though  we  go  back  until 
the  sky  comes  down  to  the  hills,  and  imagination 
will  go  no  further,  we  find  nature's  forces  toiling  as 
busily  as  now. 

But  still  more  astonishing  than  its  vast  extent  and 
indefinite  duration,  is  the  profound  order  which  the 
universe  displays.  The  disorderly  mob  of  appear- 
ances, which  formed  the  content  of  the  earlier  con- 
ception, has  disclosed  its  uniformities,  and  the  won- 
der grows  every  day.  The  whole  drove  of  invisibles 
which  filled  the  early  imagination,  and  engineered 
the  machinery  of  nature,  has  been  relieved  from  fur- 
ther duty ;  and  their  places  have  been  assumed  by 
the  steady  laws — laws  whose  control  the  atom  cannot 
escape,  and  the  system  cannot  defy.  The  belief  in 
an  unbroken  chain  of  cause  and  effect  throughout 
all  nature,  is  growing  constantly ;  and  science  is  dis- 
closing as  never  before  the  continuity  of  nature,  from 
the  lowest  to  the  highest  forms.  Many  breaks  in 
the  chain  have  been  insisted  upon,  but  one  by  one 
these  are  filling  up,  and  grassing  over.  And  such 
hold  has  this  fact  of  order  and  continuity  taken  upon 
the  scientific  imagination,  that  very  many  scientists 
profess  themselves  unable  to  think  that  it  ever  has 
been  broken,  and  others  will  not  so  much  as  listen  to 
a  doctrine  which  involves  the  supernatural.  What- 


I5Ut,  W 

magnify 


222  Review  of  Herbert  Spencer 

ever  seems  chaotic  has  a  hidden  order ;  whatever 
seems  discordant  has  a  secret  harmony.  Wait  a  little, 
and  both  the  order  and  harmony  will  be  disclosed. 
But,  while  the  effect  of  scientific  study  has  been  to 
the  extent  and  wonder  of  creation,  it  has 
also  served  to  weaken  faith  in  the  existence  of  a 
Creator.  Never  was  nature  so  harmonious  to  the 
conception  of  a  superintending  mind  ;  and,  perhaps, 
the  absence  of  that  mind  was  never  more  suspected. 
Never  was  the  universe  so  fit  to  be  a  manifestation 
of  the  eternal  all-wise  God  as  it  is  to-day  ;  and,  from 
a  scientific  stand-point,  never  was  faith  more  weak. 
A  study  of  the  Creator's  methods  has  awakened 
doubts  of  his  existence ;  and  the  discovery  that  the 
work  is  infinitely  more  wonderful  than  we  had  been 
taught  to  believe,  warrants  the  conclusion  that  there 
is  no  worker.  It  would  seem,  at  first  sight,  as  if 
theism  ought  to  find  its  strongest  advocates  among 
the  students  of  science  ;  but  it  is  a  fact  that,  from 
the  time  of  Anaxagoras,  scientific  study  has  had  a 
tendency  to  embarrass  belief.  I^Atheism  might  seem 
excusable  in  the  student  of  history  or  social  science  ; 
for  to  him,  as  to  Macbeth,  life  must  often  seem 

"A  tale 

Told  by  an  idiot,  full  of  sound  and  fury, 
Signifying  nothing."          fr 

But  atheism  begins  not  with  him.  Indeed,  belief 
and  trust  are  generally  strongest  among  those  best 
acquainted  with  the  despair-provoking  facts  of  his- 


Review  of  Herbert  Spencer.  223 

tory.  It  is  the  student  of  science,  the  man  best 
acquainted  with  nature's  calm  uniformity,  with  its 
stupendous  powers,  and  the  ineffable  perfection  of 
its  mechanism  ;  it  is  this  man  who,  though  sur- 
rounded by  the  choicest  tokens  of  a  Divine  wisdom, 
first  learns  to  suspect  the  absence  of  the  Eternal  Mind. 
It  must  be,  then,  that  science  has  made  some  new 
discovery  which  renders  less  imperative  the  need  of 
a  guiding  intelligence.  If  the  argument  from  the 
universe  to  God  were  ever  true,  it  must  be  truer 
now  than  ever.  If  the  narrow  heavens  upon  which 
the  Psalmist  looked  out,  declared  the  glory  of  God, 
much  more  must  the  boundless  cosmos  of  to-day. 
But  since  the  heavens,  to  use  the  words  of  Comte, 
no  longer  declare  the  glory  of  God,  but  the  glory  of 
Newton,  La  Place,  and  Lagrange,  we  must  conclude 
that  the  theistic  argument  was  never  true ;  and  that 
science  has  found,  in  a  deeper  knowledge  of  matter 
and  force,  a  complete  explanation  of  the  universe. 
The  question,  then,  which  I  wish  to  discuss  is,  wheth- 
er there  is  any  thing  in  the  established  theories  and 
observed  facts  of  science  to  warrant  this  wide-spread 
\skepticism  ;  or  whether  this  revived  atheism,  so  far 
as  it  is  not  the  child  of  desire,  is  not  due  to  an  in- 
complete analysis  of  scientific  teaching,  and  to  con- 
fused and  contradictory  notions  of  force  and  causa- 
tion. Science,  of  course,  abhors  metaphysics  ;  but  I 
suspect  we  shall  find  some  bad  metaphysics  at  the 
bottom  of  the  atheistic  argument. 


224  Review  of  Herbert  Spencer. 

In  opening  the  argument  let  us  get  the  case  clear- 
ly before  us.     It  is  universally  admitted  that  nature. 

\seems  to  be  the  work  of  intelligence.  Inductive 
science  in  general  proceeds  implicitly  upon  the  pos- 
tulate that  the  reasonable  and  the  natural  are  one  ; 
and  without  the  assumption  of  this  identity,  science 
would  be  impossible.  No  scientific  man  ever  dreams 
of  proposing  a  system  or  hypothesis  which  is  clearly 
seen  to  be  unreasonable  ;  and  of  two  hypotheses  we 
cannot  help  preferring  the  most  simple,  direct,  and 
rational.  Who  could  accept  the  cumbrous  Ptolemaic 
system,  after  the  simpler  and  more  rational  one  of 
Newton  had  been  discovered?  Even  if  the  former 
were  so  aided  by  cycle  and  epicycle  as  to  account 
for  all  the  motions  of  the  planets,  it  could  not  be 
held  in  the  presence  of  its  simpler  rival.  The  detec- 
tion of  any  theory  as  cumbrous  and  needlessly  indi- 
rect, seals  its  doom.  When  we  make  such  a  dis- 
covery, we  do  not,  like  the  Spanish  astronomer,  think 
that  we  could  have  given  good  advice  if  we  had  been 
consulted  at  creation  ;  but  we  do  begin  to  abandon 
the  theory. 

And  yet,  why  abandon  it  ?    Why  should  nature  be 
symmetrical  and  harmonious  to  our  reason  ?     Why 

'  should  the  methods  of  nature  be  also  the  methods 
of  thought?     Why   should   not  nature   be   the   un- 

Veasonable  and  discordant  ?  Why  should  we  take 
our  feeling  of  fitness,  of  simplicity,  of  harmony,  as  a 
standard  by  which  to  judge  the  external  world  ?  It 


Review  of  Herbert  Spencer,  225 

Is  clear  that  if  we  cannot  do  so,  science  becomes  im- 
possible ;  but  why  should  not  science  be  impossible  ? 
It  is  plainly  an  implicit  postulate  of  all  induction 
that  the  natural  and  the  rational  are  one.  Nature 
presents  us  with  no  laws,  but  only  with  disconnected 
individuals.  The  intellect  is  the  crucible  in  which 
the  many  are  fused  into  one.  The  order  of  nature 
is  a  thought-order,  which  was  first  born  in  the  mind 
as  an  hypothesis,  and  afterward  verified  by  experi- 
ment and  observation.  And  this  agreement  of  the 
order  of  our  thought  with  the  procedure  of  external 
nature  is  utterly  unintelligible,  unless  nature  is  in- 
formed with  a  reason  other  than  ours. 

Again,  it  is  admitted  that  nature  cannot  be  ex- 
plained,- or  even  described,  without  assuming  the 
presence  of  purpose  therein.  Even  in  the  inorganic 
world,  we  find  a  multitude  of  adaptations  which,  upon 
the  assumption  of  purpose,  become  luminous  and 
intelligible,  but  which  are  totally  unaccounted  for 
upon  any  other  supposition.  Without  the  law  of 
chemical  equivalence  and  proportion,  nature  would 
be  an  irredeemable  chaos.  With  it,  through  all  the 
myriad  changes  which  force  is  constantly  working, 
the  same  chemical  compounds  remain.  If  they  are 
resolved  into  their  elements,  they  return  to  the  orig- 
inal combination,  instead  of  forming  new  and  strange 
compounds.  The  operation  of  this  law  moved  Fara- 
day to  profound  admiration.  He  says  :  "  There  are 

different  elements  with  the  most  manifold   powers 

15 


226  Review  of  Herbert  Spencer. 

and  the  most  opposed  tendencies.  Some  are  so  lazy 
and  inert,  that  a  superficial  observer  would  take  them 
for  nothing  in  the  grand  resultant  of  powers  ;  and 
others,  on  the  contrary,  possess  such  violent  proper- 
ties that  they  seem  to  threaten  the  stability  of  the 
universe.  But  upon  a  deeper  examination  of  the 
same,  and  a  consideration  of  the  role  which  they  play, 
one  finds  that  they  agree  with  one  another  in  a  great 
scheme  of  harmonic  adaptation.  The  power  of  no 
single  element  could  be  changed  without  at  once 
destroying  the  harmonious  balance,  and  plunging 
the  world  into  ruin."  Except  this  law  had  been  im- 
posed upon  matter  chaos  must  have  remained  chaos 
forever.  If  we  look  upon  it  as  the  result  of  purpose, 
the  mind  rests  satisfied ;  if  we  do  not,  there  is  no 
answer  except  the  positivistic  utterance :  The  law 
exists,  and  that  is  all  we  can  know  about  it. 

The  relation  of  the  soil  to  plant-life,  and  mediately 
to  animal-life,  is  another  fact  which  becomes  intelli- 
gible upon  the  assumption  of  purpose  in  nature,  but 
is  utterly  incomprehensible  without  it.  Of  this  rela- 
tion Liebig  says  : 

"  There  is  in  chemistry  no  more  wonderful  appear- 
ance, none  which  more  confounds  all  human  wisdom, 
than  that  shown  in  the  adaptation  of  the  soil  to  plant- 
growth.  Through  the  simplest  experiments  every 
one  can  convince  himself  that,  in  filtering  rain-water 
through  soil,  it  dissolves  no  trace  of  potash,  ammonia, 
silicic  acid,  phosphoric  acid,  as  it  otherwise  does ; 


Review  of  Herbert  Spencer.  227 

and  that,  much  more,  the  earth  gives  no  part  of  the 
plant-food  which  it  contains  to  the  water.  The  most 
continuous  rain  is  unable,  except  by  mechanical 
washing,  to  deprive  it  of  any  of  the  chief  conditions 
of  its  fertility.  And  the  soil  not  only  holds  fast  what 
it  possesses,  but  if  rain,  or  other  water  which  holds 
ammonia,  potash,  phosphoric,  and  silicic  acid  in  solu- 
tion, is  mixed  with  earth,  they  are  almost  instantly 
taken  up  by  it.  And  only  such  materials  are  en- 
tirely withdrawn  from  the  water  as  are  indispensable 
to  plant-nutrition  ;  the  others  are  entirely,  or  for  the 
most  part,  unaffected."  * 

Here  is  another  law,  and  one  scarcely  less  wide- 
reaching  than  that  of  chemical  equivalence.  If  we 
suppose  it  to  be  the  result  of  purpose,  if  we  suppose 
it  to  have  been  imposed  upon  matter  that  plants  and 
animals  might  live,  the  mind  is  satisfied.  A  suffi- 
cient reason  for  the  fact  has  been  found,  and  a  suffi- 
cient explanation  has  been  given.  But  if  we  reject 
this  explanation,  as  in  the  case  of  the  chemical  law, 
no  account  whatever  of  the  fact  is  possible  ;  and  we 
must  fall  back  once  more  on  positivism,  and  content 
ourselves  with  the  affirmation  of  the  fact,  and  attempt 
no  explanation. 

The  peculiar  action  of  heat  with  relation  to  trans- 
parent media  is  another  fact  of  even  greater  impor- 
tance than  the  one  just  mentioned.  Heat  of  high 
tension  has  vastly  greater  penetrative  power  than 

*  Chem.,  Brief,  vol.  ii,  p.  261. 


228  Review  of  Herbert  Spencer. 

heat  of  low  tension.  The  result  is,  that  the  heat 
from  the  sun  passes  with  little  obstruction  through 
our  atmosphere,  and  delivers  its  warmth  upon  the 
earth.  But  in  so  doing  it  loses  tension,  and  is  en- 
tirely unable  to  pass  through  atmosphere  into  space 
again.  The  air  lets  it  in,  but  will  not  let  it  out. 
Upon  this  fact  alone  rests  the  possibility  of  maintain- 
ing the  temperature  which  organic  needs  make  im- 
perative. The  fact  is  explained  if  we  consider  it  as 
the  result  of  purpose ;  otherwise,  it  remains  unex- 
plained and  unexplainable.  The  same  general  adap- 
tation is  also  seen  in  the  reciprocal  action  of  the 
plant  and  animal  kingdoms,  and  in  the  relation  of  the 
sea  and  land.  Physical  geography  proves  that  a 
slight  change  in  the  mutual  adjustment  of  land  and 
water,  would  be  sufficient  to  destroy  the  present 
harmony  of  the  organic  world.  Passing  to  organic 
existence,  the  evidences  of  plan  and  purpose  accumu- 
late so  rapidly,  and  are  so  strong  withal,  that  the 
most  skeptical  as  to  final  causes  cannot  avoid  using 
the  language  of  contrivance.  Scientific  men  assume 
it  as  an  axiom  that  every  organ  has  its  purpose  and 
balanced  function  ;  and  whole  sciences,  as  compara- 
tive anatomy,  are  built  upon  the  assumption.  Cuvier 
finds  a  bone,  and  reasoning  upon  the  principle  of 
adaptation  and  fitness,  proceeds  to  construct  the 
animal  to  which  it  belonged.  Finally  the  complete 
skeleton  itself  is  found,  and  the  prophecy  of  ,the 
philosopher  accords  with  the  fact  of  nature. 


Review  of  Herbert  Spencer.  229 

Perhaps  no  one  has  used  the  language  of  con- 
trivance more  freely  than  Mr.  Darwin  himself.  He 
denies  the  fact,  to  be  sure  ;  but  he  cannot  avoid  using 
the  language. 

Mr.  Huxley,  too,  in  speaking  of  the  development 
of  a  salamander  from  the  egg,  says  :  "  After  watching 
the  process,  hour  by  hour,  one  is  almost  involuntarily 
possessed  by  the  notion  that  some  more  subtle  aid 
to  vision  than  an  achromatic  would  show  the  hidden 
artist,  with  his  plan  before  him,  striving  with  skill- 
ful manipulation  to  perfect  his  work."  At  every 
unguarded  minute,  the  most  cautious  and  skeptical 
naturalists  fall  into  the  very  error  they  so  vigorously 
denounce. 

Let  us  now  collect  the  results  at  which  we  have 
arrived.  •  It  is  admitted  by  all — it  is  not  even  ques- 
tioned by  any — that  nature  is  more  harmonious  to  the 
conception  of  a  guiding  mind  than  to  any  other 
scientific  view.  It  is  admitted,  too,  that  the  evidence 
of  purpose  is  so  strong  that  not  even  the  most  skep- 
tical can  avoid  assuming  it ;  and  if  he  is  to  speak  in- 
telligibly about  nature,  he  must  assume  it.  It  is  also 
admitted  that  science,  even  while  denying  that  nature 
is  the  work  of  reason,  must  still  assume  as  a  necessary 
postulate  that  nature  is  reasonable,  that  its  methods 
correspond  to  those  of  a  rational  mind.  It  is  further 
admitted,  that  no  explanation  at  all  is  possible  of 
many  most  purpose-like  laws  and  facts  of  nature,  ex- 
cept upon  the  assumption  that  they  do  indeed  repre- 


230  Review  of  Herbert  Spencer. 

sent  the  fulfillment  of  a  plan  or  purpose.  In  short,  it 
is  admitted  that,  assuming  contrivance  and  purpose 
in  nature,  the  universe  becomes  luminous  and  har- 
monious ;  and,  denying  it,  the  universe  remains  an 
incomprehensible  enigma.  It  is  plain,  then,  that  as 
a  scientific  hypothesis  the  theistic  conception  has 
infinitely  the  advantage  over  all  others.  The  uni- 
versal scientific  method  is  to  adopt  that  theory  which 
best  explains  the  facts.  The  vibratory  theory  of 
light  and  heat  explains  more  phenomena  than  the 
emission  theory,  and  owes  its  acceptance  entirely  to 
this  fact.  If  any  other  theory  should  ever  be  pro- 
posed which  would  better  explain  the  facts,  it  would 
in  turn  be  received. 

Now,  in  offering  the  hypothesis  of  intelligent 
Creator  as  the  explanation  of  the  universe,  we  are 
not  proposing  any  strange  theory.  We  are  only 
extending  to  the  working  of  the  world,  the  law 
which  we  know  holds  in  our  own  conscious  ac- 
tions ;  and  there  is  nothing  whatever  in  such  a  con- 
ception which  is  at  variance  with  just  scientific 
methods.  If,  now,  we  apply  the  accustomed  reason- 
ing of  science  to  this  question,  the  decision  is  sure. 
The  hypothesis  of  a  living  God  is  admitted  by  every 
one  to  be  all-sufficient  to  explain  the  universe,  while 
all  others  are  allowed  to  be  full  of  breaks  which,  in 
the  present  state  of  science,  are  simply  impassable. 
If,  then,  we  are  to  reason  scientifically,  we  must  ac- 
cept the  theistic  doctrine.  To  appeal  from  it  on  the 


Review  of  Herbert  Spencer.  231 

authority  of  possible  future  discoveries,  is  to  adopt  a 
principle  of  reasoning  which  would  make  all  scientific 
truth  impossible.  If  a  disciple  of  the  Ptolemaic  as- 
tronomy should  object  against  the  Copernican  sys- 
tem :  It  is,  indeed,  much  simpler  and  more  rational 
than  my  own  ;  it  gives  a  far  more  comprehensive 
explanation  of  the  facts  than  mine  does  ;  I  admit  all 
that.  I  admit,  too,  that  my  system  gives  no  account 
at  all  of  very  many  most  important  facts  ;  yet  I  am 
not  going  to  give  it  up.  You  cannot  tell  what  may 
be  found  out  yet.  You  cannot  show  that  cycle  and 
epicycle  may  not  be  so  combined  that  my  system  shall 
give  a  complete  account  of  the  observed  facts  ;  and 
until  you  can  prove  this,  I  shall  not  change  my  faith. 
If  one  should  talk  in  this  fashion  we  should 
dismiss  him  as  an  idiot ;  and  yet  it  is  hard  to  see  in 
what  respect  his  reasoning  would  differ  from  that  of 
those  scientific  men  who  maintain  their  limping, 
atheistic  doctrine,  solely  upon  the  authority  of  what 
they  expect  to  discover  at  some  unknown  time.  But 
,6ien  do  this.  It  is,  indeed,  true  that  nature's  har- 
(  mony  outruns  our  highest  reason  ;  but  it  is  equally 
true  that  this  harmony  is  the  product  of  no  reason. 
There  must  be  some  weighty  scientific  facts  which 
warrant  such  a  conclusion ;  what  they  are,  we  have 
now  to  inquire. 

The  fact  of  law,  by  a  most  remarkable  confusion 
of  thought,  is  offered  by  some  scientists  as  a  suffi- 


232  Review  of  Herbert  Spencer. 

cient  explanation  of  the  universe.  I  had  supposed 
that  this  transparent  delusion  had  long  since  ceased 
to  deceive  any  one ;  but  having  recently  met  with 
some  wretched  conjuring  with  it  in  the  interests  of 
atheism,  I  must  ask  the  reader's  indulgence,  and 
venture  another  explanation  of  this  trite  term. 
What,  now,  is  a  scientific  law  ? 

Without  waiting  to  explain  the  method  of  discov- 
ery, it  is  admitted  by  every  one  that  the  laws  of 
strictly  inductive  science  are  but  generalizations 
from  observed  facts  ;  and  that  even  when  correct, 
they  express  nothing  but  orders  of  co-existence 
and  succession.  Such  a  law  is  nothing  but  a 
summation  of  the  inductions,  and  gives  no  new 
knowledge.  It  is  only  an  epitome,  a  short-hand 
expression,  of  the  observed  facts.  But  if  this  is 
the  gist  of  the  scientific  idea  of  law,  it  is  needless 
to  point  out  how  incapable  law  is  of  explaining  any 
thing.  For,  suppose  our  statement  of  the  law  cor- 
rect, which  it  seldom  is  ;  suppose  the  whole  universe 
arranged  in  lines  of  co-existence  and  succession  ; 
then,  when  science  had  done  its  work,  nothing  would 
be  explained.  It  is  a  matter  for  the  deepest  wonder 
that  any  one  should  have  ever  been  deluded  by  this 
empty  gabble  about  "creation  by  law,"  "result  of 
law,"  etc.  The  tendency  of  the  human  mind  to 
personify  its  abstractions  is  indeed  remarkable  ;  but 
the  whole  history  of  metaphysics  cannot  furnish  a 
more  striking  example  of  it  than  this  illustration 


Review  of  Herbert  Spencer.  233 

given  by  "  exact  science."  The  schoolmen  have  fur- 
nished many  a  frightful  example  of  this  metaphysical 
tendency,  wherewith  to  point  a  scientific  moral  or 
adorn  a  scientific  tale.  But  so  long  as  scientists 
hold  up  this  most  inane  conception  as  the  explana- 
tion of  the  world,  they  have  little  right  to  rail  at  any 
set  of  opinions  under  heaven.  The  laws  of  nature 
are  the  methods  of  nature,  and  are  the  very  things  to 
be  explained.  Why  does  nature  move  along  lines  of 
order  ?  why  not  along  lines  of  confusion  and  chaos  ? 
The  latter  are  infinite,  the  former  are  few.  How 
does  it  happen  that  the  former  are  chosen  and  the 
latter  avoided  ?  It  is  greatly  to  be  desired  that  such 
reasoners  would  remember  that  law  is  method,  not 
cause.  Surely  when  one  begins  to  offer  the  very 
fact  to  be  explained  as  its  sufficient  explanation,  he 
would  not  be  very  far  wrong  if  he  should  begin  to 
suspect  that  his  mind  is  not  adapted  to  logical  inves- 
tigation. He  had  better  turn  his  attention  to  poetry, 
and  leave  the  cramping  rigors  of  logic  to  others. 

The  logical  and  scientific  value  of  atheism  depends 
upon  the  atomic  theory  and  two  assumed  facts. 
Science  conceives  matter  as  composed  of  ultimate 
atoms  which  are  endowed  with  certain  powers  of 
attraction  and  repulsion.  Now  these  ultimate  atoms 
bear  no  trace  of  origination,  and,  in  default  of  proof 
that  they  have  been  created,  we  may  assume  them 
to  be  eternal.  We  have,  then,  in  this  conception, 
first,  substantial  being  ;  and,  second,  inherent  power  ; 


234  Review  of  Herbert  Spencer. 

and  in  looking  for  the  reason  of  things  we  must  not 
go  beyond  this  until  it  becomes  plainly  incompetent 
to  explain  the  facts.  Causes  must  not  be  multiplied 
beyond  necessity ;  and  until  it  can  be  shown  that 
the  forces  actually  at  work  in  the  world  do  not 
suffice  for  its  explanation,  we  must  decline  to  postu- 
late any  additional  causes.  If  the  various  manifesta- 
tions of  the  world  can  be  explained  by  referring  them 
to  the  mutual  attractions  and  repulsions  of  these 
atoms,  then  not  only  is  there  no  need  to  postulate 
any  more  causes,  but  we  cannot  logically  do  so. 

With  this  theory  as  a  starting-point,  the  atheist 
next  proceeds  to  show  that  these  atoms  are  capa- 
ble of  doing  the  work  of  intelligence.  To  accom- 
plish this,  he  brings  forward  the  nebular  hypothesis 
to  show  how  gravitation  and  inertia  are  capable 
of  building  up  a  solar  system,  which  bears  many 
marks  of  design ;  and  for  the  seeming  adaptation  of 
organic  forms,  he  offers  the  Darwinian  theory.  By 
means  of  these  two  theories,  which  he  assumes  to  be 
established  beyond  question,  he  claims  to  have  de- 
prived the  argument  from  design  of  a  great  part  of 
its  force,  and  to  have  made  it  extremely  probable 
that  a  deeper  knowledge  would  destroy  it  altogether. 

We  shall  see  the  force  of  the  argument  more 
clearly  if  we  examine  the  nebular  theory.  When  it 
was  believed  that  the  members  of  the  solar  system 
were  formed  as  they  now  exist,  and  placed  in  their 
orbits  by  Divine  power,  natural  theologians  saw 


Review  of  Herbert  Spencer.  235 

evidence  of  purpose  and  wisdom  in  the  relative 
arrangement  of  the  parts.  The  existence  of  the  sun 
in  the  center  of  the  system ;  the  small  eccentricity 
of  the  planets'  orbits,  whereby  any  great  variation  of 
light  and  heat  is  avoided ;  the  exact  balance  of  cen- 
tral and  tangential  forces,  by  which  the  planets  are 
kept  in  their  orbits — all  these  things  told  of  an 
adapting  intelligence.  On  our  own  planet  they 
found  marks  of  mind,  in  the  alternation  of  the  sea- 
sons, and  of  day  and  night.  The  relative  adjust- 
ment of  land  and  water,  and  a  thousand  other  things, 
told  the  same  story  of  a  superintending  mind. 

But  the  nebular  theory  claims  to  explain  all  the 
phenomena  by  simple  mechanical  laws,  and  without 
the  intervention  of  intelligence.  It  assumes  only 
that  its  atoms  were  once  widely  diffused  in  space, 
and  from  this  assumption  it  mathematically  deduces 
the  whole  solar  system.  The  nebulous  matter  began 
to  condense  by  virtue  of  attraction,  and  the  chances 
were  infinite  that  it  would  not  contract  accurately 
on  its  center,  which  must  produce  revolution.  This 
revolution  called  into  play  the  inertia  of  matter, 
and  thus  produced  a  centrifugal  force.  By  further 
condensation  the  rate  of  revolution  was  necessarily 
increased,  as  can  be  mathematically  demonstrated, 
and  the  centrifugal  force  increased  also.  Finally,  at 
the  orbit  of  Neptune,  over  the  equator  of  the  revolv- 
ing mass,  the  centrifugal  force  became  equal  to  the 
attraction,  and,  upon  further  contraction,  a  ring  of 


236  Review  of  Herbert  Spencer. 

matter  was  left  behind.  Now,  unless  this  ring  was 
absolutely  homogeneous  and  equally  exposed  to  ex- 
ternal influences,  it  must  contract  unequally,  and  the 
iCsult  would  be  a  disruption  of  the  ring  into  frag- 
ments, which  would  at  once  assume  the  globular 
form.  These  smaller  planets,  unless  they  were  of 
the  same  size  and  were  symmetrically  disposed 
throughout  the  orbit,  must  collect  into  one — the 
planet  Neptune.  Formed  in  this  way,  the  planets 
would  necessarily  have  orbits  of  small  eccentricity — 
the  first  mark  of  design.  Owing  to  the  greater 
velocity  of  the  outer  part  of  the  ring  over  the  inner 
part,  the  planets  would  all  revolve  upon  their  axes, 
which  would  produce  day  and  night — the  second 
mark  of  design.  The  shock  at  collecting  into  one 
mass  would  almost  inevitably  shift  the  plane  of  the 
orbit,  which  would  produce  seasons — the  third  mark 
of  design.  The  sun,  too,  would  be  in  the  center  of 
the  system — the  fourth  mark  of  design. 

Again,  in  condensation,  heat  would  be  produced. 
This  would  call  into  action  magnetic,  electric,  and 
chemical  forces ;  and  these  by  their  interactions 
would  finally  bring  the  earth  to  its  present  form  and 
condition.  It  is  claimed,  for  these  reasons,  that  the 
present  condition  of  the  solar  system,  together  with 
all  those  prominent  aspects  which  once  seemed  the 
work  of  purpose,  are  an  exact  though  undetermined 
function  of  gravitation  and  inertia.  How,  then,  can 
they  be  expressive  of  intelligence?  What  need  is 


Review  of  Herbert  Spencer.  237 

.here  to  postulate  intelligence  to  account  for  them  ? 
Gravitation  and  inertia  give  an  exhaustive  explana- 
tion of  the  facts  ;  why  seek  further  ?  We  may  shrink 
from  the  conclusion,  but  the  reason  is  satisfied.  A 
physical  explanation  of  the  facts  is  found,  and  honor 
binds  us  to  accept  it. 

Here,  then,  in  a  most  conspicuous  case,  matter 
seems  to  be  doing  the  work  of  mind  ;  and  the  radical 
scientific  position  is  that,  if  our  faculties  were  more 
acute  and  our  analysis  more  subtle,  we  could  explain 
the  most  complex  organization  in  the  same  way  ;  that 
we  could  begin  with  the  simplest  properties  of  matter, 
and  mount  by  an  unbroken  chain  of  cause  and  effect  to 
the  highest  forms  of  life.  Already  molecular  mechan- 
ics are  claiming  control  of  chemistry,  chemistry  is 
pushing  its  frontiers  over  into  physiology,  and  physi- 
ology is  heir  prospective  to  the  mental  and  moral 
sciences.  The  nebular  theory  has  made  it  plain  that 
the  solar  system  can  be  built  up  without  intelligence  ; 
and  Darwinism  has  shown  that  the  most  complex  and 
artificial  forms  can  be  developed  from  forms  so 
rude  and  simple  that  no  trouble  need  be  taken  to  ac- 
count for  them.  Upon  the  strength  of  these  facts  it 
is  claimed  that  teleology  has  received  its  death-blow. 
Matter  and  its  inherent  forces  already  explain  much, 
and  are  daily  explaining  more.  Besides,  since  the 
origination  of  matter  cannot  be  proved,  every  fact 
ranged  under  a  physical  law  is  so  much  wrested  from 
the  government  of  God.  The  goal  is  evident.  Nat- 


238  Review  of  Herbert  Spencer. 

ural  laws  are  able  to  administer  themselves.  God  is 
only  a  provisional  hypothesis  to  explain  outstand- 
ing facts,  and  is  sure  to  be  displaced  by  advancing 
knowledge. 

Here  is  the  real  root  of  the  inveterate  quarrel  be- 
tween science  and  religion ;  here  is  the  fundamental 
cause  of  the  strange  fact,  before  noticed,  that  scientific 
study  has  always  tended  to  embarrass  belief.  It  is  the 
thought,  that  whatever  is  the  product  of  physical  neces- 
sity cannot  at  the  same  time  be  expressive  of  purpose  ; 
that  the  realms  of  nature,  and  of  God,  are  mutually 
exclusive.  This  has  been  the  claim  of  science,  and 
the  admission  of  religion.  No  wonder,  then,  that 
religion,  prompted  by  an  unerring  instinct,  has  always 
looked  with  suspicion  upon  all  attempts  to  formulate 
nature.  Not  that  order  is  incompatible  with  will — 
for  the  theist  has  always  held  that  with  Him  is  no 
variableness,  neither  shadow  of  turning — but  because 
this  necessary  working  of  matter  seems  to  exclude 
both  the  action,  and  the  need,  of  intelligence.  Upon 
this  assumption,  science  at  once  puts  on  a  fixed  and 
fate-like  aspect,  before  which  every  high  faith  silently 
withers,  and  every  high  emotion  cries  out  in  mortal 
anguish.  Having  made  nature  over  to  science,  relig- 
ion has  been  forced  to  look  for  God  outside  of  nature  ; 
and,  as  the  proofs  of  ancient  birth  have  accumulated, 
God  has  been  driven  farther  and  farther  away.  Hence 
the  pertinacity  with  which  theists  have  sought  for 
breaks  in  the  physical  chain  ;  and  hence  it  is  that,  as 


Review  of  Herbert  Spencer.  239 

chasm  after  chasm  has  filled  up,  they  have  felt  as  if 
the  ground  were  slipping  from  under  their  feet,  and 
the  end  of  physical  inquiry  must  be  to  elevate  mat- 
ter to  the  throne  of  God.  But  I  must  confess  that  I 
feel  rather  suspicious  of  an  argument  for  the  Divine 
existence  which  is  based  upon  nature's  disorder  and 
breaks,  rather  than  upon  its  order  and  continuity. 
For  if  the  disorder  should  ever  be  reduced,  and  the 
breaks  mended,  which  is  not  at  all  unlikely,  what  then 
would  become  of  the  conclusion  ? 

I  believe  that  I  have  here  represented  the  atheistic 
argument  fairly.  The  claim  is  that  a  cloud  of  atoms 
endowed  with  definite  spheres  of  attraction  and  repul- 
sion is  able  to  work  out  all  the  results  which  seem  to 
us  to  manifest  intelligence  and  purpose.  As  speci-\ 
mens  of  atomic  working,  they  exhibit  the  solar  sys-  / 
tern  and  organic  development.  Teleology  is  driven 
out  of  astronomy  and  biology,  and  surely  it  requires 
little  faith  to  believe  that  advancing  knowledge  will 
displace  it  altogether.  Mr.  Spencer  says  that  the 
atoms  and  atomic  forces  are  all  he  needs  to  build  up  the 
universe,  and  claims  to  have  shown  "  that  this  trans- 
formation of  an  indefinite,  incoherent  homogeneity 
into  a  definite,  coherent  heterogeneity,  which  goes 
on  every-where  until  it  brings  about  a  reverse  trans- 
formation, is  consequent  upon  certain  simple  laws  of 
force. 

"  Given  these  universal  modes  of  action  which  are 
from  moment  to  moment  illustrated  in  the  common- 


240  Review  of  Hei  bert  Spencer. 

est  changes  about  us,  and  it  follows  that  there  cannot 
but  result  the  observed  metamorphosis  of  an  indeter- 
minate uniformity  into  a  determinate  multiformity." 
We  have  seen  some  specimens,  however,  of  his  argu- 
ment, and  need  not  vex  ourselves  with  its  weakness 
and  debility  any  further. 

Now  I  have  no  purpose  of  running  a  muck  against 
the  nebular  hypothesis,  or  of  blaspheming  the  atomic 
theory ;  but  I  think  it  can  be  easily  shown  that  even 
admitting  both  as  facts  of  nature,  they  necessarily 
postulate  an  extra-material  power  to  account  for  their 
action. 

Let  us  place  ourselves  in  thought  back  in  the  nebu- 
lous period  and  see  what  will  happen.  The  atoms  with 
their  attractive  and  repulsive  forces  are  sown  through 
space,  constituting  a  gas  almost  infinitely  rarer  than 
the  most  perfect  vacuum  we  can  produce  with  an  air- 
pump.  Out  of  this  void  and  formless  gas,  the  entire 
physical  universe  has  been  built  up.  I  say  the  entire 
physical  universe,  because  if  this  theory  leaves  any 
thing  unexplained,  the  teleological  difficulties  which 
it  seeks  to  escape  all  come  back  in  full  force.  It  will 
hardly  be  claimed  that  this  gas  extended  through  in- 
finite space ;  and,  if  the  claim  were  made,  it  would 
paralyze  the  theory.  For  in  that  case  no  centers  of 
attraction  could  be  set  up,  and  all  parts  being  equally 
drawn  in  all  directions  no  motion  could  result .  The 
atoms  would  be  powerless  to  initiate  motion  until 
some  external  force  overset  the  equilibrium  and  set 


Review  of  Herbert  Spencer.  241 

up  centers  of  attraction.  The  original  nebula,  how- 
ever, is  supposed  to  be  finite  in  extent ;  let  us  see  what 
will  happen  on  this  supposition.  It  is  assumed  that 
it  will  contract ;  but  why  should  it  not  expand  ? 
Gases,  so  far  as  we  know  them,  tend  to  indefinite 
expansion.  If  this  gas  follow  the  law  of  gases  in 
general,  we  should  expect  it  to  expand  instead  of  con- 
tracting. It  must  do  so,  indeed,  unless  the  repulsive 
force  of  the  gas  is  satisfied,  in  which  case  it  will 
neither  expand  nor  contract,  but  remain  in  equilibrium. 
The  only  possible  result  of  such  a  warfare  of  attract- 
ive and  repulsive  forces  must  be  a  lifeless  balance. 
There  is  no  more  reason  why  such  a  gas  should  con- 
dense than  there  is  for  the  condensation  of  the  at- 
mosphere, or  of  the  light-bearing  ether.  If  such  a 
gas  does  contract,  it  can  only  be  because  there  is  an- 
other power  than  attraction  and  repulsion  constantly 
at  work  to  overturn  the  balance  into  which  they  con- 
stantly tend  to  fall.  If  the  astronomer  will  not  admit 
a  power  outside  of  the  atoms,  he  must  be  content  to 
see  his  theory  perish. 

And  even  supposing  contraction  to  be  possible 
without  the  mediation  of  an  external  power,  it  is  dif- 
ficult to  see  how  the  revolving  mass  can  throw  off 
rings  in  the  manner  assumed.  If  an  external  power 
revolves  a  body,  the  centrifugal  force  can  be  so  in- 
creased as  to  overcome  the  cohesion.  In  this  way 
water  is  thrown  from  the  rim  of  a  wheel,  and  grind- 
stones often  burst.  Professor  Doremus  a  few  years 

16 


242  Review  of  Herbert  Spencer. 

ago  exhibited  an  experiment  illustrating  the  way  in 
which  rings  were  formed  in  the  evolution  of  the  solar 
system.  In  all  these  cases,  however,  the  revolving 
power  was  external  to  the  mass  ;  but  in  the  assumed 
evolution  of  the  planets,  the  revolving  force  was  in- 
ternal. The  cause  of  the  revolution  was  the  contrac- 
tion of  the  mass,  and  hence  the  cause  of  the  centrifugal 
force  was  also  the  attraction  of  the  mass.  Hence, 
as  the  centrifugal  force  increased  the  attraction  in- 
creased ;  and  no  reason  can  be  given  why  one  should 
overbalance  the  other.  It  follows,  then,  that  they 
must  remain  in  constant  balance,  and  a  ring  could 
never  be  detached  unless  an  external  power  be  sup- 
posed which  overturns  the  equilibrium.  Here,  again, 
the  astronomer  is  forced  to  suppose  some  power  be- 
yond the  attractions  and  repulsions  of  his  atoms. 

Indeed,  no  aggregate  of  atoms  whatever  can  exist 
as  a  resisting  body,  by  means  of  simple  attractions 
and  repulsions.  For  both  being  central  forces,  it  is 
demonstrable  that  both  must  vary  inversely  as  the 
square  of  the  distance.  It  follows,  then,  that  the 
atoms  of  a  body  are  in  equilibrium  at  all  possible 
distances,  and  can  offer  no  resistance  to  change  of 
form.  If  you  halve  the  distance  you  double  both 
attraction  and  repulsion.  If  you  double  the  distance, 
you  halve  both  attraction  and  repulsion.  It  is  clear, 
then,  that  the  atoms  can  offer  no  resistance  whatever 
to  change  of  form,  because  at  all  distances  the  exist- 
ing forces  are  in  equilibrium.  Mr.  Spencer  notices 


Review  of  Herbert  Spencer.  243 

this  fact,  and  concludes  that  we  don't  know  any  thing 
about  it.  The  true  conclusion  is,  that  body  under 
simple  attractions  and  repulsions  is  impossible.  A 
co-ordinating  force  outside  of  the  atoms,  must  be 
assumed  as  the  possibility  of  a  resisting  mass. 

But  we  have  further  difficulties  with  this  cloud  of 
atoms  which  claims  to  be  independent.  When  we 
reach  a  clear  understanding  of  the  conception,  it 
seems  to  involve  positive  contradictions.  We  are 
distinctly  taught  that  no  atom  can  move  itself — it 
moves  only  as  it  is  moved.  This  is  the  law  of  in- 
ertia— a  law,  too,  which  is  at  least  as  well  established 
as  any  in  all  science.  In  order,  then,  to  conceive  of 
these  atoms  as  independent  workers,  we  must  con- 
ceive of  a  series  of  dependent  motions  which  at  the 
same  time  depends  on  nothing.  The  motion  of  each 
atom  depends  entirely  upon  the  motion  of  an  ante- 
cedent atom  ;  and  unless  we  can  conceive  that  a  thing 
should  be  at  the  same  time  dependent  and  independ- 
ent, conditioned  and  unconditioned,  we  cannot  admit 
the  independence  of  atomic  working. 

But  cannot  the  totality  of  the  atoms  be  independ- 
ent, though  the  individual  atoms  be  conditioned  ? 
This  involves  the  same  contradiction  ;  and  is,  besides, 
in  hopeless  opposition  to  the  doctrine  of  the  equiva- 
lence of  forces.  Working  force  is  constantly  falling 
into  equilibrium,  and  is  lost  to  the  dunamis  of  the 
universe  ;  hence  the  totality  of  atoms  could  only  come 
to  a  stand-still  from  which  they  could  never  emerge. 


244  Review  of  Herbert  Spencer. 

If,  then,  we  grant  that  the  atoms,  when  once  in  motion, 
can  work  the  machinery  of  the  world,  we  cannot  grant 
the  sufficiency  of  the  materialistic  explanation  until 
we  learn  what  set  them  in  motion.  That  first  motion, 
that  initial  action,  can  only  be  viewed  as  self-deter- 
mined, and  hence  extra-material.  Self-motion  there 
must  be.  To  put  it  in  the  atom,  removes  the  atom 
from  the  category  of  matter  and  denies  the  law  of 
inertia.  To  put  it  outside  of  the  atom  admits  the  insuf- 
ficiency of  the  atomic  explanation.  All  mechanical 
motion  implies  the  self-moved,  and  thought  cannot 
stop  short  of  affirming  self-motion  as  the  explanation 
of  all  physical  activity.  Science  can  choose  between 
positivism  and  theism  ;  its  atheistic  conjurings  must 
cease.  Once  upon  the  metaphysical  road,  there  is  no 
stopping  at  the  half-way  house  of  atheism.  "  Athe- 
ists must  be  viewed  as  the  most  inconsequent  of 
theologians." 

But  difficulties  thicken  as  we  advance.  We  can- 
not even  grant  that  the  atoms  can  take  care  of 
themselves  after  they  have  been  set  in  motion.  I 
have  already  pointed  out  that  mere  attraction  and 
repulsion  can  only  result  in  a  dead  balance,  but  a 
still  greater  difficulty  meets  us  upon  nearer  examina- 
tion. The  doctrine  assumes  that  no  atoms  are  in  con- 
tact, but  are  separated  by  void  spaces.  It  is  forced 
to  this  assumption  by  the  facts  of  expansion  and  con- 
traction, and  also  in  order  to  make  the  conception  of 
motion  possible.  Let  us,  then,  picture  one  of  these 


Review  of  Herbert  Spencer.  245 

atoms  as  it  exists,  cut  off  by  an  absolute  void  from 
all  its  neighbors.  What  can  it  do  ?  What  influ- 
ence can  it  exert  upon  any  other?  Can  matter  act 
where  it  is  not  ?  across  an  absolute  void  ?  without 
any  medium  whatever  ?  Are  these  possible  concep- 
tions ?  Can  a  theory  which  involves  such  doctrines 
as  these  assume  to  be  rational  ?  To  escape  this  diffi- 
culty, some  scientists  have  postulated  an  ether  which 
penetrates  the  interatomic  spaces  and  serves  as  the 
medium  of  communication.  But,  if  that  ether  is  im- 
material, this  conception  is  an  abandonment  of  the 
atomic  theory  as  a  sufficient  explanation.  If  on  the 
other  hand  it  is  material,  the  difficulty  returns  when 
we  inquire  into  its  constitution.  It  in  turn  is  con- 
ceived as  formed  of  atoms,  and  these  atoms  are  either 
in  contact  or  not.  If  in  contact  we  have  a  plenum, 
and  motion  is  impossible.  If  not  in  contact  we  have 
the  difficulty  of  action  across  a  void,  and  where  the 
actor  itself  is  not.  But  these  are  impossible  and 
contradictory  conceptions.  For  it  is  plain  that  the 
cause  must  be  where  the  effect  is — the  force  and  its 
working  cannot  be  conceived  as  separated.  If,  then, 
the  effect  of  this  solitary  atom  is  produced  over  yon- 
der, the  power,  the  force  of  the  atom  must  be  over 
yonder  also ;  and  the  matter  of  the  atom,  and  its 
forces,  are  divorced  by  an  absolute  void.  But  it  is 
one  of  the  axioms  of  science,  one  too  of  which  we 
hear  a  great  deal,  that  no  force  can  exist  apart  from 
substance.  But  if  such  a  conception  of  atomic  work- 


246  Review  of  Herbert  Spencer. 

ing  does  not  imply  a  separate  existence,  it  would  be 
hard  to  say  what  does.     Clearly  the  force  is  entirely 
separate  from  the  atom  and  independent  of  it,  when 
it  wanders  off  in  this  fashion.     Besides,  since  force 
can  exist  separately,  the  atom  itself  has  no  further 
function,  it  is  only  postulated  as  the  base  of  the 
forces  ;  and  since  it  is  useless  for  this  purpose,  it 
may  be  allowed  to  drop  out  of  existence.     But  as 
force  cannot  exist  apart  from  substance,  so  the  scien- 
tists say,  and  since  these 'forces  are  independent  of 
the  substance  of  the  atom,  we  must  look  for  some 
other  foundation  for  the  working  powers  of  nature. 
The  scientists  may  solve  these  contradictions  at  their 
leisure.     It  would  not  be  difficult  to  criticise  the 
atomic  conception  in  general;  but,  however  just  that 
conception  may  be,  it  is  sure  that  this  doctrine  of 
atomic  action  is  contradictory  and  self-destructive. 
I  allow  the  scientist  to  look  upon  his  atoms  as  cen- 
ters of  attractive  and  repulsive  forces  ;  and  I  then 
affirm,  plainly  and  distinctly,  that  these  powers  are 
powerless  without  an  extra-atomic  power.     I  affirm 
that  all  the  working  forces  of  nature,  from  the  attrac- 
tion of  gravitation  down  through  light,  heat,  elec- 
tricity, magnetism,  chemical  affinity,  cohesion,  and 
adhesion,  are  utterly  helpless  without  the  existence 
of  an  overruling,  immaterial  force  by  which  the  scat- 
tered atoms  are  co-ordinated  and  controlled,  and  by 
which  the  atomic  forces  are  enabled  to  work  their 
appropriate  effects.     I  say,  then,  not  only  that  atoms 


Review  of  Herbert  Spencer.  247 

are  unable  to  construct  a  solar  system  without  the 
aid  of  an  immaterial  power,  not  only  that  they  can- 
not keep  out  of  a  dead  balance  of  attraction  and 
repulsion  without  an  immaterial  power;  but  I  say 
firmly  that  they  cannot  do  any  thing  at  all,  cannot 
effect  even  the  slightest  motion,  without  the  working 
of  an  immaterial  power. 

To  the  atheistic  objection,  that  we  must  not 
postulate  any  supernatural  cause  until  we  have 
found  out  all  that  natural  causes  can  accomplish, 
I  answer,  that  natural  causes,  as  such,  can  do 
nothing ;  instead  of  being  competent  to  an  indefi- 
nite amount  of  work,  they  are  competent  to  noth- 
ing whatever.  I  say,  then,  science,  as  well  as  relig- 
ion, postulates  as  its  sole  possibility,  the  existence 
of  a  spiritual,  universal,  ever-active  power;  and, 
by  consequence,  a  spiritual,  universal,  ever-active 
Being.  To  the  objection  (weighty  only  from  its 
senselessness)  that  this  is  metaphysics,  I  answer, 
that  it  is  metaphysics  from  which  there  is  no  escape. 
Science  must  either  adopt  positivism,  and  give  up  all 
attempt  at  explanation,  or  it  must  accept  this  conclu- 
sion. If  we  are  to  think  at  all  on  this  subject,  and 
think  rationally,  we  can  reach  no  other.  Positivism 
or  theism  ;  there  is  no  middle  ground.  The  athe- 
istic argument  is  the  exact  parallel  of  the  renowned 
snake  which  began  at  his  tail  and  swallowed  himself, 
leaving  zero  as  the  result  of  the  process.  The  atomic 
theory  serves  well  enough  as  the  elephant  which  up- 


248  Review  of  Herbert  Spencer. 

holds  the  world,  but  is  in  equal  need  of  support  itself. 
If  our  faith  is  sufficiently  robust  to  conceive  the 
atoms  as  standing  alone,  we  may  as  well  dispense 
with  both  elephant  and  tortoise  and  poise  the  world 
on  nothing. 

The  administration  of  things  being  taken  out  of 
the  atoms'  hands,  we  are  prepared  to  listen  with 
greater  equanimity  to  the  claim  that  Mr.  Darwin 
has  demonstrated,  that  purpose  is  needless  to  explain 
the  complexity  of  organic  existence.  We  have  seen 
how  the  nebular  theory  failed  in  its  attempt  to  be  in- 
pendent  ;  we  have  now  to  inquire  whether  this  claim 
has  any  greater  weight  of  evidence. 

Considered  as  a  theory,  no  one  will  claim  that 
Darwinism  is  established.  Very  many,  and  at  pres- 
ent unanswerable,  objections  stand  out  against  it ; 
and  it  is  beginning  to  be  apparent  that  the  doctrine, 
if  true,  can  only  be  true  in  a  greatly  modified  form. 
But  granting  the  truth  of  the  theory,  the  claim  that 
it  removes  the  need  of  a  guiding  intelligence  from 
the  development  of  organic  nature  is  a  most  curious 
logical  inconsequence.  There  is  not  much  agree- 
ment among  the  disciples  of  the  development  theory, 
and  hence  it  is  difficult  to  say  what  the  precise 
teaching  is.  Lotze,  a  most  able  expounder  of  the 
doctrine,  declares  that  the  theory  cannot  be  worked 
out  unless  we  assume  in  the  original  nebula  the 
seeds  of  all  that  afterward  appear.  Even  the  seeds 
of  life  and  mind  must  be  scattered  there  to  make  the 


Review  of  Herbert  Spencer.  249 

development  possible.  Mr.  Darwin's  strange  theory 
of  pan-genesis,  which  makes  the  original  germ  not 
only  the  parent,  but  the  actual  possessor  of  endless 
germs  which  are  afterward  to  be  developed,  implies 
the  same  assumption.  Now  surely  a  view  which  ex- 
plains evolution  by  a  previous  involution,  without 
giving  any  account  of  that  involution,  does  not  throw 
any  very  brilliant  light  upon  the  cause  of  organic 
development.  Such  a  doctrine  merely  removes  the 
question  one  step  further  back,  and,  so  far  from  ex- 
plaining nature,  rather  increases  the  mystery. 

Whether  the  doctrine  implies  a  necessary  progress 
of  organic  forms  is  also  a  question.  Some  teach  that 
development  is  necessarily  upward,  and  others  will 
hear  nothing  of  such  a  doctrine.  The  naturalists 
may  be  left  to  settle  this  question  among  themselves  ; 
but  whichever  alternative  is  adopted  the  denial  of 
purpose  is  in  no  way  warranted.  If  this  develop- 
ment is  necessarily  upward,  the  only  rational  ex- 
planation would  be  that  such  upward  movement  is 
due  to  the  fact  that  a  supreme  intelligence  is  real- 
izing in  such  development  his  own  pre-determined 
plan  and  purpose.  Mechanism  knows  nothing  of 
higher  and  lower ;  and  when  the  blind  forces  of  na- 
ture (if  there  be  such)  are  seen  holding  on  an  upward 
course  for  untold  millions  of  years,  ever  climbing  to 
higher  forms  and  giving  birth  to  growing  harmony 
and  adaptation,  the  only  supposition  which  at  all  ac- 
counts for  the  fact  is  that  there  is  a  controlling  pur- 


250  Revieiv  of  Herbert  Spencer. 

pose  at  work  which  guides  these  powers  to  a  foreseen 
goal.  No  mechanical  necessity  whatever  can  be 
shown  for  the  steady  progress  ;  and  as  science  in- 
creases the  time  during  which  the  toiling  forces  have 
been  faithful  to  what  can  only  be  described  as  a  plan, 
the  mechanical  explanation  becomes  so  incredible 
that  it  can  only  be  accepted  by  one  who  is  deter- 
mined to  believe  whatever  suits  himself,  in  defiance 
of  all  probability  and  all  fact.  Let  Darwinism  be 
true  ;  if  it  holds  a  doctrine  of  progressive  development, 
it  makes  a  sorry  figure  in  attempting  to  deny  a  con- 
trolling purpose. 

More  commonly,  however,  the  theory  is  held  to 
imply  no  such  necessity.  Mr.  Darwin  himself,  I 
think,  will  not  accept  progressive  development  as  an 
integral  part  of  his  theory.  At  all  events,  those  who 
hold  it  atheistically,  expressly  repudiate  such  teach- 
ing. With  them  the  primitive  organism  is  looked 
upon  as  a  variable  which  develops  in  all  directions, 
and  those  forms  live  which  can  live.  The  principle 
of  natural  selection,  or  the  survival  of  the  fittest,  cuts 
off  all  unadapted  forms,  leaving  the  others  to  survive, 
and  propagate  their  own  peculiarities.  Keep  up  this 
sifting  process  through  indefinite  time,  and  it  must 
be  a  weak  imagination  which  would  be  unable  to  con- 
ceive that  the  forms  of  life  must  become  indefinitely 
various,  while  their  continuous  existence  would  im- 
ply an  adaptation  to  their  circumstances.  This  prin- 
ciple of  natural  selection,  too,  would  constantly  tend 


Review  of  Herbert  Spencer.  251 

to  make  this  adaptation  more  complete.  As  the  re- 
sult of  such  a  process  we  should  finally  have  a  world 
stocked  with  the  most  complex  living  forms,  all  dis- 
playing a  most  accurate  adaptation  to  their  condition, 
and  yet  this  adaptation  would  be  entirely  unex- 
pressive  of  purpose.  In  such  case,  we  should  be 
compelled  to  turn  the  teleologist's  argument  around 
and  say,  not  that  organisms  are  adapted  to  their  sur- 
roundings in  order  that  they  may  live,  but  that  they 
live  because  they  are  adapted  to  their  surroundings. 
Mr.  Huxley  illustrates  the  argument  as  follows  : 

"  That  which  struck  the  present  writer  most  for- 
cibly on  his  first  perusal  of  the  '  Origin  of  Species ' 
was  the  conviction  that  teleology,  as  commonly  un- 
derstood, had  received  its  death-blow,  for  the  teleolog- 
ical  argument  runs  thus  :  An  organ  or  organism  (A)  is 
precisely  fitted  to  perform  a  function  or  purpose  (B) ; 
therefore  it  was  specially  constructed  to  perform  that 
function.  In  Paley's  famous  illustration,  the  adapta- 
tion of  all  the  parts  of  the  watch  to  the  function,  or 
purpose,  of  showing  the  time,  is  held  to  be  the  evi- 
dence that  the  watch  was  specially  contrived  to  that 
end,  on  the  ground  that  the  only  cause  we  know  of 
competent  to  produce  such  an  effect  as  a  watch 
which  shall  keep  time,  is  a  contriving  intelligence 
adapting  the  means  directly  to  that  end. 

"  Suppose,  however,  that  any  one  had  been  able  to 
show  that  the  watch  had  not  been  made  directly  by 
any  person,  but  that  it  was  the  result  of  the  modifi- 


252  Review  of  Herbert  Spencer. 

cation  of  another  watch  which  kept  time  but  poorly, 
and  that  this  again  had  proceeded  from  a  structure 
which  could  hardly  be  called  a  watch  at  all,  seeing 
that  it  had  no  figures  on  the  dial  and  the  hands 
were  rudimentary  ;  and  that  going  back  and  back,  in 
time  we  came  at  last  to  a  revolving  barrel  as  the 
earliest  traceable  rudiment  of  the  whole  fabric  ;  and 
imagine  that  it  had  been  possible  to  show  that  all 
these  changes  had  resulted,  first,  from  a  tendency 
of  the  structure  to  vary'  indefinitely ;  and  secondly, 
from  something  in  the  surrounding  world  which 
helped  all  variations  in  the  direction  of  an  accurate 
time-keeper,  and  checked  all  those  in  other  directions  ; 
then  it  is  obvious  that  the  force  of  Paley's  argument 
would  be  gone,  for  it  would  be  demonstrated  that  an 
apparatus  thoroughly  well  adapted  to  a  particular 
purpose  might  be  the  result  of  a  method  of  trial  and 
error  worked  by  unintelligent  agents,  as  well  as  of 
the  direct  application  of  the  means  appropriate  to 
that  end  by  an  intelligent  agent."* 

I  am  not  aware  that  Paley's  argument  necessitates 
any  peculiar  conception  of  the  method  of  organic 
creation.  No  natural  theologian  pretends  to  any 
conception  of  the  mode  of  the  Divine  working.  He 
only  insists  that  when  we  find  a  result  which  is  re- 
plete with  relations  and  adaptations  which  are  unin- 
telligible without  the  conception  of  purpose,  we  must 
conclude  that  it  is  the  work  of  purpose.  With  this 

*"Lay  Sermons,"  p.  301. 


Review  of  Herbert  Spencer.  253 

fact  in  mind,  consider  Mr.  Huxley's  illustration. 
It,  of  course,  leaves  the  rudimentary  watch  unex- 
plained, and  also  all  those  purpose-like  arrangements 
in  nature  which  make  the  watch  possible.  The 
"method  of  trial  and  error"  is  worked  by  unintelli- 
gent agents,  but  no  account  whatever  is  given  of 
their  origin  and  action.  Yet,  granting  all  this  capital 
to  the  illustration,  it  does  not  get  along  very  well. 
There  is  a  "  something  in  the  surrounding  world 
which  helps  all  variations  in  the  direction  of  a  good 
time-keeper,  and  checks  all  those  in  other  direc- 
tions." But  when  this  process  is  kept  up  for  a  long 
time,  and  this  variable,  indeterminate  barrel  is  held  to 
the  single  direction  of  a  good  watch,  it  begins  to  look 
as  if  some  power  had  the  creation  of  a  watch  in 
view.  Surely  if  we  were  told  that  a  florist  had  es- 
tablished a  certain  variety  of  flower  by  carefully 
selecting  specimens  which  tended  in  that  direction, 
and  by  rejecting  all  others,  we  should  hardly  feel 
justified  in  concluding  that  he  had  no  purpose  in 
such  selection.  The  very  indetermination  which 
this  illustration  ascribes  to  the  primitive  organism,  is 
the  strongest  reason  for  introducing  a  controlling 
plan  or  purpose,  for  there  is  no  reason  why  this 
variable  should  develop  up  instead  of  down.  There 
is  no  reason  why  at  any  point  it  should  not  turn 
back  upon  itself  and  destroy  all  that  it  had  gained. 
If  then  we  put  such  a  germ  at  the  beginning  of  things, 
we  are  forced  to  admit  that  it  has  developed  upward, 


254  Review  of  Herbert  Spencer. 

and  along  lines  of  order  and  purpose.  It  has  been 
met  and  molded  by  such  conditions  that  the  best  has 
proved  also  the  strongest ;  and  in  this  way,  out  of  a 
primitive  indeterminateness,  has  been  brought  a 
most  intelligent,  orderly,  and  harmonious  system. 
Why?  Before  the  doctrine  can  claim  to  have  dis- 
proved the  existence  of  purpose  in  nature,  it  must 
answer  this  question.  No  mechanical  necessity  can 
be  shown.  Assume  a  controlling  purpose,  and  all 
becomes  luminous  and  intelligible.  Deny  it,  and  all 
is  incomprehensible. 

Mr.  Spencer,  indeed,  claims  that  he  has  explained 
it,  but  we  must  hesitate  to  give  him  our  confi- 
dence. His  argument,  in  brief,  is  that  the  homo- 
geneous nebula  must  do  something.  It  must  lapse 
into  the  heterogeneous,  and  something  important 
must  happen.  When  things  begin  to  "differen- 
tiate "  and  "  integrate,"  and  "  effects "  take  to 
"  multiplying,"  creation  is  fairly  set  upon  its  feet. 
Why  they  should  not  "  differentiate "  and  "  inte- 
grate" themselves  into  chaos,  and  "multiply"  eternal 
confusion,  he  does  not  take  the  pains  to  tell.  Besides, 
all  this  happened  so  long  ago  that  criticism  is  im- 
possible. He  has  no  confidence  in  these  great  prin- 
ciples in  recent  times,  however ;  for  now  organic 
development  is  chiefly  controlled  by  "  the  yet  unex- 
plained principle  of  hereditary  transmission."  The 
saving  suggestion,  however,  is  added  that  this  princi- 
ple is  itself  due  to  the  differentiations,  etc.  He  defines 


Review  of  Herbert  Spencer.  255 

evolution  as  follows :  "  Evolution  is  a  change  from 
an  indefinite,  incoherent  homogeneity  to  a  definite, 
coherent  heterogeneity,  through  continuous  differ- 
entiations and  integrations."  Now  I  defy  any  one 
to  give  any  reason  why  such  a  process  should  ever 
pass  out  of  chaos.  But  must  not  something  come 
out  of  such  a  process  ?  Is  not  force  persistent  ? 
Certainly,  something  must  happen.  A  lawless  and 
eternal  confusion  must  certainly  happen,  and  nothing 
more.  The  argument  starts  with  the  nebula,  and 
postulates  that  something  must  happen  ;  and  then, 
plunging  out  of  sight  in  the  darkness  of  the  un- 
known, suddenly  re-appears  in  the  daylight  of 
creation,  and  without  further  argument  triumphantly 
assumes  that  all  this  must  have  happened.  To 
question  this,  is  to  convict  one's  self  of  denying  the 
persistence  of  force;  even  to  suggest  that  force  must 
have  been  controlled  in  its  working,  is  to  be  guilty 
of  the  same  crime ;  and  as  this  is  the  unpardonable, 
logical  sin,  it  follows  conclusively  that  the  argument 
is  a  demonstration.  Whatever  has  happened  must 
have  happened ;  hence  the  nebula  must  transform 
itself  into  order  and  harmony. 

Again,  until  the  correlation  of  physical  and  vital 
force  is  established,  this  doctrine  of  organic  develop- 
ment from  low  and  simple  forms  is  in  opposition  to 
the  law  of  identity  and  contradiction.  The  under- 
lying thought  of  the  atheistic  argument  is  that  a 
mere  speck  of  organization,  such  as  might  well  be 


256  Review  of  Herbert  S fencer. 

the  product  of  chance  combination  of  forces,  would, 
with  an  infinitesimal  increment  and  infinite  time,  de- 
velop into  the  sum  of  organic  existence.  Such  a 
conception  is  possible  if  the  vital  and  physical  forces 
correlate  ;  for  in  that  case  the  power  which  appears 
in  organic  forms  is  only  a  change  of  mode,  and  not  a 
creation.  But  we  have  seen  that  there  are  insuper- 
able difficulties  in  the  way  of  assuming  such  an 
identity,  and  that  hence  vital  force  must  be  conceived 
as  something  altogether  peculiar  and  unique.  Now 
the  law  of  identity  forces  us  to  conceive  a  thing  as 
always  identical  with  itself.  We  can  neither  write 
A  =  A-j-B  nor  A  =  A—  B,  except  upon  the  supposition 
B  =  0.  Hence  at  any  point  of  organic  development, 
we  can  only  view  the  actual,  as  the  realization  of  the 
potential.  The  evolving  germ  is  not  creating  but  un- 
folding ;  the  implicit  is  becoming  explicit.  Until  the 
development-man  proves  that  vital  force  is  only  trans- 
formed physical  force,  he  must  put  into  that  seed 
which  he  plants  at  the  root  of  things,  all  that  actually 
comes  out  of  it.  If  he  does,  he  throws  no  light  upofi, 
the  origin  of  things.  If  he  don't,  his  argument  re- 
quires us  to  accept  the  equation  :  zero=infinity.  In 
either  case  he  is  in  a  sad  plight. 

The  reasoning  by  which  the  fact  of  purpose  in 
nature  is  disproved,  is  thus  seen  to  be  wretched 
enough,  even  if  we  allow  the  atheist  his  atomic  forces. 
But  we  have  shown,  in  addition,  that  these  atoms 
themselves  postulate,  as  the  necessary  condition  of 


Review  of  Herbert  Spencer.  257 

their  working,  a  universal,  ever-active,  spiritual  power. 
The  atoms  then  must  drop  out  of  sight  in  the  argu- 
ment, and  the  question  becomes  :  What  is  the  nature 
of  this  all-ruling  power?  This  universal  being,  in 
whom  all  nature  lives  and  moves,  what  is  it  ?  By  the 
previous  arguments,  we  were  forced  to  admit  its  spir- 
ituality and  freedom.  The  continuous  plan  and  order 
of  nature,  its  countless  adaptations,  its  complex  and 
exquisite  mechanism,  its  harmonious  balance  of  war- 
ring powers,  are  all  utterly  unintelligible  without  the 
supposition  that  this  being  is  a  self-conscious  intelli- 
gence. The  so-called  mechanical  forces  serve  a  con- 
trolling purpose.  The  chemical  forces  serve  a  con- 
trolling purpose.  The  organic  forces  seem  instinct 
with  intelligence.  Both  in  the  single  organ,  and  in 
the  wide-reaching  law,  we  mark  the  presence  of 
mind.  The  .units  and  the  totality  are  alike  informed 
by  what  is  inconceivable  except  as  a  guiding  reason. 
This  hypothesis^  is  not  unwarranted.  It  postulates 
nothing  strange.  We  refer  our  own  activity  to  our 
conscious  will  and  purpose,  and  we  but  extend  this 
principle  when  we  refer  nature's  activity  to  a  con- 
scious will  and  purpose.  Purpose  rules  in  the  action 
of  a  rational  man  ;  and,  finding  nature  replete  with 
marks  of  purpose,  he  concludes  that  it  rules  in  nature 
too.  And  this  hypothesis  is  the  only  one  that  ex- 
plains the  facts.  There  is  no  scientific  discovery 
which  in  the  least  weakens  its  force.  All  the  theories 

brought  against  it,  at  best,  are  full   of  impassable 

17 


258  Review  of  Herbert  Spencer. 

breaks  ;  while  a  closer  examination  shows  that  ever)* 
one  of  them  is  self-destructive.  Science,  then,  is  shut 
up  to  positivism  or  theism.  If  it  chooses  to  content 
itself  with  a  lifeless  registration  of  coexistence  and 
sequence,  it  can  make  the  attempt.  But  if  it  enters 
upon  any  explanation  at  all,  it  cannot  stop  short  of  a 
personal  God.  I  gather  this  argument  from  a  con- 
sideration of  the  teachings  of  natural  science,  with- 
out touching  upon  the  psychological  question.  A 
study  of  the  existence  and  nature  of  the  human 
mind,  would  serve  to  show  still  more  clearly  the  con- 
tradictory nature  of  the  atheistic  argument.  But 
that  is  needless.  Theism  is  the  only  doctrine  that 
has  any  rational  or  scientific  evidence,  and  both 
reason  and  science  bind  us  to  accept  it. 

It  might  be  claimed,  however,  that  we  have  estab- 
lished pantheism  instead  of  theism  ;  that  the  previ- 
ous arguments  all  tend  to  merge  the  world  and  its 
activities  into  God,  and  make  him  the  only  worker  in 
the  universe.  I  think  it  could  be  dialectically  shown 
that  even  the  previous  arguments  necessitate  a  dis- 
tinction between  God  and  the  world  ;  but  not  to  vex 
the  reader  with  such  a  metaphysical  discussion,  the 
argument  does  not  establish  that  comprehensive 
pantheism  which  alone  is  morally  pernicious.  As 
long  as  the  human  will  and  personality  are  left  intact, 
all  the  conditions  of  religion  are  met ;  and  the  external 
world  might  be  given  over  to  pantheism  without  prej- 


Review  of  Herbert  Spencer.  259 

udice  to  any  moral  interests  whatever.  But  the  fact 
of  personality  and  freedom  is  so  emphatically  given 
in  consciousness  that  it  cannot  be  denied  without 
discrediting  consciousness  in  general,  and  wrecking 
the  whole  fabric  of  knowledge.  We  have  here  an 
insuperable  barrier  to  that  comprehensive  pantheism 
which  swallows  up  the  human  will  and  makes  religion 
impossible  ;  and  I  am  not  careful  to  escape  panthe- 
ism in  its  more  restricted  meaning.  Indeed,  I  am 
persuaded  that  the  piety  of  our  time  pines  most  of 
all  for  a  conception  of  theism  which  will  enable  us 
to  find  God  in  the  world,  and  also  make  a  place  for 
the  world  in  God.  The  old  deistic  conception  of  God 
as  prime-mover,  and  of  the  world  as  a  machine 
which  only  needs  to  be  set  a-going  to  run  on  forever, 
is  scarcely  less  fatal  to  religion  than  atheism  itself. 
Both  science  and  religion  have  adopted  this  concep- 
tion to  a  very  great  degree,  and  the  result  has  been 
the  unnatural  divorce  and  strife  which  have  marked 
their  entire  history. 

Such  a  conception  was  comparatively  harmless 
while  the  world  was  young;  but  as  the  universe 
grew  in  space  and  time,  and  marks  of  an  ancient 
birth  accumulated  on  every  side,  religion  began 
to  grow  uneasy.  The  date  of  the  Divine  working 
was  put  farther  and  farther  away,  and  belief  in  such 
working  grew  more  faint.  The  world  had  taken 
care  of  itself  so  long,  that  it  became  quite  credible 
that  it  might  yet  make  a  declaration  of  independence. 


260  Review  of  Herbert  Spencer. 

The  secondary  causes  which  had  managed  the  affairs 
of  the  empire  through  so  many  years,  began  to  act  as 
if  they  intended  to  usurp  the  throne.  By  the  very 
supposition,  nature  was  emptied  of  God,  and  the  divine 
presence  could  be  looked  for  only  outside  of  nature. 
To  this  thought  is  due  the  pertinacity  with  which 
religion  has  insisted  upon  the  fact  of  miracles ;  and 
each  infraction  of  nature's  order  has  been  a  carefully- 
treasured  proof  of  a  power  above  the  world,  and 
beyond  it.  But  in  general,  the  ever-widening  realm 
of  law  has  had  a  paralyzing  effect  upon  religion  ;  and 
piety  has  pined  and  ached  for  some  token  of  a  living 
God.  A  being  whose  activity  is  purely  historical  will 
not  satisfy  its  longings.  It  is  not  enough  to  make 
him  the  author  of  nature  ;  he  must  be  its  adminis- 
trator as  well.  If  religion  is  to  live,  some  way  must 
be  found  of  reaching  God,  in  the  movements  of  the 
world  about  us.  And  it  seems  to  me  that  this  de- 
mand is  met  by  the  theistic  conception  which  science 
now  enforces,  of  a  universal,  ever-living,  ever-active 
God,  in  whom  all  things  live  and  move  and  have 
their  being.  Viewed  in  this  way,  nature,  from  being 
a  dead  mechanism,  lights  up  with  life,  and  becomes 
instinct  with  thought  and  beauty.  Instead  of  being 
an  impenetrable  wall  which  separates  us  from  the 
Eternal,  it  becomes  rather  one  mode  in  which  he  man- 
ifests himself  to  us.  It  is  no  longer  an  obscuring  vail 
which  no  effort  of  ours  can  pierce,  but  is  rather  the 
background  upon  which  the  lights  and  shadows  of  the 


Review  of  Herbert  Spencer.  261 

infinite  thought  are  seen  to  play.  Instead  of  being 
rigid,  and  incompetent  to  spiritual  uses,  it  becomes 
rather  the  pliant  and  subtle  instrument  of  expression, 
whereby  God  communicates  to  us  his  thought  and 
purpose. 

This  conception,  too,  serves  to  relieve  theism  of 
a  certain  hardness  which  the  doctrine  of  final  causes 
always  tends  to  produce.  That  doctrine,  assuming 
that  every  thing  is  done  for  some  purpose  beyond 
itself,  leaves  no  room  for  a  spontaneous  activity  which 
needs  no  ulterior  justification.  The  error  is  similar 
to  that  into  which  religion  falls  when  it  insists  that 
all  the  movements  of  the  soul  should  have  a  con- 
scious moral  purpose.  In  this  way  religion  often 
brings  a  hardness  and  stiffness  into  life,  which  is  at 
once  unlovely  and  unhappy.  The  free  movement  of 
innocent  mirth  and  feeling  is  looked  upon  with  sus- 
picion ;  and  the  unpurposed  outflow  of  sympathy  and 
affection  into  acts  of  tenderness  and  gentleness  is 
visited  with  rebuke,  because  it  can  give  no  moral 
account  of  itself.  As  if  it  needed  any  justification 
beyond  its  own  tenderness  and  beauty  !  Now  as  a  too 
rigid  interpretation  of  life  by  a  moral  standard  over- 
looks its  atmosphere,  and  misses  all  that  is  spontane- 
ous, so,  I  think,  a  too  rigid  interpretation  of  nature 
by  a  scheme  of  final  causes,  misses  completely  a  most 
important  aspect  of  creation.  Nature  no  doubt  ex- 
ists for  the  instruction  and  development  of  created 
minds  ;  and  its  steady  laws  are  the  faithful  covenant 


262  Review  of  Herbert  Spencer. 

which  the  Eternal  keeps  with  his  children.  Think 
away  nature's  uniformity,  and  it  becomes  useless  as 
an  instrument  of  instruction.  Think  away  the  minds 
which  are  to  be  developed  by  it,  and  a  large  aspect 
of  nature  becomes  meaningless,  a  purposeless  and 
idle  stir. 

But  creation  has  other  uses  too.  It  is  not  merely 
a  book  of  science  with  its  didactic  purpose ;  it  is 
also  a  book  of  song  which  seems  the  spontaneous 
utterance  of  emotion.  It  exists  not  only  for  teach- 
ing, but  also  for  expression.  The  beauty  of  cloud 
and  sky ;  the  beauty  which  lies  hidden  in  the  snow- 
and-ice  crystals  which  sheet  the  frozen  regions  of  the 
Pole ;  the  beauty  of  coral  and  sponge  and  shell  with 
which  the  ocean's  floor  is  spread  ;  the  beauty  of  grass 
and  flower  in  forest  depths,  and  far  out  upon  the 
prairie,  and  deep  beneath  the  waves  of  the  sea — 
what  is  all  this  for  ?  For  a  didactic  purpose  ?  Surely 
not.  It  exists  for  itself,  and  is  its  own  justification. 
Take  away  created  minds,  and  order  and  beauty  and 
harmony  must  still  exist.  It  is  not  to  be  thought  of, 
that  chaos  should  forever  abide  in  the  presence  of  the 
Eternal.  Be  it  physical  or  be  it  moral,  chaos  must 
make  way  for  a  new  earth.  These  ask  no  leave  from 
man,  and  need  no  audience  from  him.  They  are  in- 
deed related  to  man,  but  do  not  exist  solely  for  him. 
They  express  not  so  much  the  thought,  as  the  medi- 
tation, of  the  Eternal ;  not  so  much  a  purposed 
outgoing  as  a  spontaneous  overflow.  Except  we 


Review  of  Herbert  Spencer.  263 

bear  this  in  mind,  we  shall  be  in  danger  of  judging 
nature  by  too  narrow  a  standard,  and  of  erecting 
human  needs  as  the  sufficient  reason  why  the  uni- 
verse exists. 

Yet,  after  all  that  can  be  said  about  the  order  and 
grandeur  of  the  external  world,  it  must  still  be  held 
that  sense  and  external  nature  are  but  poor  inter- 
preters of  the  Eternal.  They  ask  questions  which 
they  cannot  answer,  and  force  upon  us  problems  for 
which  the  senses  furnish  no  solution.  The  clearer 
the  proof  of  a  supreme  intelligence,  the  darker  and 
more  perplexing  does  the  moral  problem  of  the  world 
become.  The  whole  creation  groaneth  and  travaileth 
together  in  pain.  From  the  very  beginning,  nature  has 
been  "  red  in  tooth  and  claw  with  ravin."  On  every 
side  we  see  the  most  prodigious  waste  of  faculty,  of 
happiness,  and  of  life.  "  Of  fifty  seeds  she  often  brings 
but  one  to  bear."  Generations  and  races  of  men  seem 
born,  only  to  be  beaten  and  pelted,  by  want  and  misery. 
A  positive  malignity,  even,  seems  to  exist  in  nature, 
producing  contrivances  for  the  production  of  pain,  dis- 
torting, thwarting,  destroying.  What  does  it  all  mean  ? 
What  purpose  does  it  serve  ?  If  chance  controlled  all 
events,  we  might  expect  such  things  ;  but  how  can  they 
be  reconciled  to  the  control  of  a  supreme  wisdom  ? 
What  must  be  the  character  of  the  being  who  can  even 
permit  such  disorder  in  his  empire  ?  These  are  ques- 
tions which  nature  suggests,  but  does  not  answer. 

Such  hold  has  this  aspect  of  things  taken  upon  the 


264  Review  of  Herbert  Spencer. 

thought  of  some,  that  men  like  Schopenhauer  and 
Hartmann  have  ventured  to  say  that  existence  is  a 
huge  slough  of  woe  and  wretchedness,  from  which 
every  rational  man  will  seek  to  escape.  The  goal  for 
which  every  one  must  long  is  annihilation.  To  fuse 
the  skirts  of  being,  and  sink  into  the  void,  is  the 
bright  hope  which  the  future  offers  ;  and  for  its  ful- 
fillment, we  must  long  as  the  tired  and  tossing  inhab- 
itant of  the  sick-bed  waits  for  the  coming  of  the 
morning.  Yonder  are  the  frontiers  of  being,  and 
quickly  we  shall  reach  them.  Then  the  last  grand 
rush  of  darkness,  the  healing  wave  of  annihilation, 
and  the  wicked  cease  from  troubling  and  the  weary 
are  at  rest. 

It  is  clear  enough  that  this  is  a  partial  and  dis- 
torted view  of  life  ;  and  yet,  if  we  were  restricted 
to  the  theism  of  nature  alone,  we  must  be  left  in 
painful  suspense  concerning  the  moral  character 
of  God.  It  is  only  as  we  consult  our  own  moral 
nature,  that  we  are  enabled  to  resist  the  distressing 
suggestions  which  the  world  at  times  forces  upon  us. 
/  The  highest  revelation  of  God  is  found,  not  in  nature, 
"•  but  in  those  rare  and  noble  souls  which  have  been 
the  pole-stars  of  the  race.  We  cannot  but  think 
that  these  most  truly  represent  the  Divine  character. 
We  cannot  but  think  that  the  goodness  in  us  is 
a  faint  type  of  a  goodness  more  august  than  our 
own.  Men  may  have  a  narrower  vision  from  the 
observatory  of  astronomy  than  from  the  closet  of 


Review  of  Herbert  Spencer.  26$ 

private  prayer.  The  repented  sin,  the  grief  over  the 
foul  sui render,  the  renewal  of  the  abandoned  strife, 
the  stirrings  of  a  pure  affection,  the  loyalty  to  duty, 
may  teach  us  more  of  God  than  we  could  learn  from 
volumes  of  natural  theology.  Given  the  idea  of  God, 
the  study  of  nature  serves  for  its  expansion  and  veri- 
cation  ;  but  nature  alone  could  furnish  no  adequate 
conception.  From  within  we  learn  that,  in  spite  of 
all  opposing  appearances,  there  is  an  essential  good- 
ness at  the  heart  and  root  of  things,  which,  in  time, 
will  justify  itself  and  make  its  vindication  plain. 
Men  in  general  have  never  been  able  to  believe  other- 
wise. The  disorder  has  been  due,  not  to  Divine 
malignity,  but  to  an  "  adversary  "  who,  in  the  world's 
harvest-field,  sowed  tares.  Nor  have  they  failed  to 
attribute  to  the  good  a  final  victory.  Ormuzd  and 
Ahriman  strive,  but  the  contest  shall  not  last  forever. 
At  the  end  of  the  great  cycle  Ormuzd  must  con- 
quer ;  and  Ahriman  is  to  be  thrust  into  unfathomable 
depths,  to  disturb  and  distort  no  longer.  Nor  is  it 
otherwise  in  our  own  Scriptures.  As  the  curtain  of 
revelation  is  about  to  fall,  the  river  of  life,  foul  from 
the  taint  of  human  history,  is  seen  to  grow  clear  as 
crystal  once  more.  The  discord  which  had  vexed 
earth's  harmony  so  long,  is  heard  to  cease.  The  un- 
known depths  of  an  outer  darkness  swallow  up  all 
that  is  foul  and  polluting,  and  in  far  perspective  ap- 
pear the  new  heaven  and  the  new  earth.  That  it 
shall  be  so,  is  an  inextinguishable  conviction  of  the 


266  Revieiv  of  Herbert  Spencer. 

human  soul ;  and  the  distressing  aspects  of  nature 
are  powerless  against  it. 

Meanwhile,  too,  a  deeper  knowledge  is  ever  serv- 
ing to  show  that  all  things  have  their  place ; 
and,  one  by  one,  the  dark  aspects  of  nature  lose 
their  gloomy  character,  and  light  up  with  benevo- 
lent purpose.  Nature  cannot  be  judged  by  the 
experience  of  a  day.  Brief  observation  shows  that 
the  moon  rolls  around  the  earth.  It  requires  a 
longer  time  to  discover  that  both  earth  and  moon 
roll  around  the  sun.  But  the  fact  that  earth,  moon, 
and  sun  are  in  motion  around  some  point  in  the  con- 
stellation of  Hercules,  unfolds  itself  only  to  the  ob- 
servation of  years.  It  is  the  same  in  our  judgment 
of  nature.  There  is  much  which,  at  first  glance, 
seems  isolated  and  discordant ;  but  as  our  vision 
sweeps  a  wider  circle  order  is  more  clearly  seen. 
The  direction  of  nature  begins  to  manifest  itself; 
and  that  which  we  thought  a  reflux  of  the  current 
proves  to  be  only  an  eddy  which  in  nowise  disturbs 
the  onward  flow.  Looking  at  the  general  course  of 
things,  it  is  clearly  seen  to  be  upward,  and  prophetic 
of  a  better  yet  to  come.  The  discordant  event  be- 
comes harmonious  at  last,  and  the  underlying  good- 
ness and  righteousness  vindicate  themselves.  It  is 
no  malignant  being  who  has  lighted  up  our  hearts 
and  homes  with  affection.  It  is  no  immoral  being 
who  has  planted  in  the  human  soul  an  ineradicable 
reverence  for  goodness.  It  is  no  immoral  being  who 


Revieiv  of  Herbert  Spencer.  267 

has  sent  nation  after  nation  down  into  the  dust,  and 
compelled  them  to  drink  the  cup  of  a  bitter  and  ter- 
rible retribution,  because  they  dared  to  do  injustice. 
If  at  any  time  Belshazzar  has  committed  sacrilege,  in 
that  same  hour  and  hall,  invisible  hands  have  written 
his  doom.  Whoever  is  attentive  to  history  can,  in 
the  very  hour  in  which  successful  iniquity  is  crowned, 
hear  the  words,  Thou  art  weighed  in  the  balances, 
and  art  found  wanting.  That  final  purpose,  in  which 
all  lower  cycles  of  purpose  are  included,  is  as  yet  but 
dimly  seen ;  but  nature  and  history  both,  more  and 
more  clearly  testify  to 

"  One  God  that  ever  lives  and  loves  ; 

One  law,  one  life,  one  element ; 

And  one  far-off,  divine  event, 
To  which  the  whole  creation  moves." 

"  What  I  do  thou  knowest  not  now,  but  thou  shalt 
know  hereafter,"  was  the  word  uttered  long  ago. 
Meanwhile  we  are  content  to  know  that  in  Him  all 
things  live  and  move  and  have  their  being.  His 
working  is  not  historical,  but  eternal.  Still  he  hold- 
eth  the  deep  in  the  hollow  of  his  hand,  and  calleth 
out  the  host  of  heaven  by  number.  The  Divine 
presence  is  no  less  real  in  the  dome  of  Newton's  sky 
than  in  that  which  overhung  the  garden  of  Eden. 
And  I  count  it  a  great  religious  gain  that  science 
has  completely  discredited  the  old  deistic  conception, 
and  vindicated  the  existence  and  the  presence  of  the 
living  God. 


268  Review  of  Herbert  Spencer. 

When  any  doctrine,  however  clear,  is  disproved, 
we  intend  to  give  it  up.  As  friends  bear  their  dead 
forth  to  the  green  fields,  and  lay  the  cherished  forms 
away  forever  out  of  sight,  so,  when  science  renders  it 
impossible  longer  to  hold  them,  will  we  gather  up 
our  most  cherished  beliefs  and  bury  them  forever. 
We  seek  truth,  though  it  leave  us  in  the  world 
orphans,  and  write  upon  every  tombstone,  "  Death 
is  an  eternal  sleep."  But  there  need  be  no  fears  of 
such  a  result.  Again  and  again  has  the  death  of  the 
Eternal  been  proclaimed,  but  in  every  case  it  proved 
that  the  wish,  not  reason,  was  father  to  the  thought. 
Times  innumerable  has  religion  been  overthrown ; 
but  still  the  devout  soul  kneels  and  prays.  Aye, 
more,  as  in  the  retreat  of  the  ten  thousand,  the 
weapons  cast  into  our  camp  have  been  used  to  kindle 
our  fires.  We  could  not  have  spared  the  criticism 
to  which  we  have  been  subjected.  In  its  fierce  blaze 
superstitions  have  shriveled  and  perished.  Narrow 
and  unworthy  creeds  have  gone  out  in  flame,  and 
left  the  human  mind  free  for  a  truer  and  nobler 
thought.  Nature's  calm  uniformities  overawed  the 
tendency  to  find  tokens  of  Divine  displeasure  in 
every  untoward  event,  and  taught  man  that  there  is 
no  especial  smile  in  the  sunshine,  and  no  peculiar 
judgment  in  the  storm.  Its  vast  extent  also  warned 
him  against  the  egotism  of  supposing  that  the  uni- 
verse exists  for  him  alone. 

But   now  that  we   have    in    a    measure    learned 


Review  of  Herbert  Spencer.  269 

these  lessons,  we  look  round  to  find  that  we  would 
not  have  back  the  old  conceptions,  if  they  could 
be  had  for  the  wishing.  Who  would  longer  care 
in  the  interests  of  piety  to  set  up  the  date  of  crea- 
tion 4004  B.  C.  ?  or  to  restore  the  crystal  firma- 
ment with  its  points  of  light?  The  long  times 
of  geology  and  astronomy  seem  sublimest  sym- 
bols of  His  infinite  years.  And  surely  the  flash- 
ing splendors  of  the  skies,  the  ponderous  orbs,  the 
blazing  suns,  the  measureless  distances,  the  mighty 
periods,  are  infinitely  more  worthy  of  the  Creator 
than  the  pitiful,  peep-show  heaven  for  which  the 
Church  once  contended.  Never  before  was  the  uni- 
verse so  fit  a  manifestation  and  abode  of  the  God  we 
love  as  it  is  to-day.  Never  did  the  heavens  so  de- 
clare the  glory  of  God  as  they  do  now.  The  most 
impressive  lesson  of  the  past  is  to  fear  nothing  that 
is  true,  and  to  despair  of  nothing  that  is  good.  It 
bids  us  lay  aside  that  secret  skepticism  of  our  own 
teachings,  which  is  at  once  our  weakness  and  our 
disgrace,  and  fear  nothing  from  the  truth,  and  fear 
nothing  for  it.  We  listen  without  dread,  or  even 
fear,  for  the  last  and  worst  word  that  science  can 
utter ;  and  we  are  confident  that  when  that  word 
shall  have  been  uttered,  the  devout  soul  will  still 
have  the  warrant  of  reason,  as  well  as  of  faith,  for 
joining  in  that  ancient  ascription  of  praise  to  the 
"  King  eternal,  immortal,  invisible,  the  only  wise 
God." 


270  Review  of  Herbert  Spencer. 


CHAPTER   VI. 

SUMMARY   AND    CONCLUSION. 

T  T  only  remains  to  collect  the  results  of  our  ex- 
-*•  amination,  that  we  may  get  a  connected  view 
of  the  principles  of  the  New  Philosophy.  As  be- 
tween science  and  religion  in  general,  we  found  that 
Mr.  Spencer's  arguments  were  such  as  to  make  both 
impossible.  The  ideas  involved  in  religion  are,  in 
the  last  analysis,  no  less  conceivable  than  those  in- 
volved in  science.  If,  then,  the  inconceivability  of 
these  ideas  is  a  sufficient  reason  for  discarding  re- 
ligion, it  is  also  warrant  enough  for  discarding  science. 
But  if  the  fundamental  reality  can  so  manifest  itself 
as  to  make  a  true  science  possible,  there  is  no  reason 
why  it  should  not  so  manifest  itself  as  to  make  a  true 
religion  possible — no  reason  in  the  argument,  I  mean  ; 
the  needs  of  Mr.  Spencer's  system  are  reason  enough 
for  him. 

The  claim  that  the  limited  and  conditioned  nature 
of  our  faculties  renders  religious  knowledge  impossi- 
ble, tells  with  equal  force  against  all  knowledge. 
The  limited  nature  of  our  faculties  does,  indeed,  con- 
fine us  to  a  limited  knowledge — but  a  limited  knowl- 
edge may  be  true  as  far  as  it  goes.  If  so,  we  may 


Review  of  Herbert  Spencer.  271 

trust  the  knowledge  we  have  ;  if  not,  all  truth  disap- 
pears. To  deny,  then,  the  validity  of  religious  knowl- 
edge, on  the  ground  of  its  limitation,  can  only  end  in 
the  denial  of  all  knowledge.  It  must  be  borne  in 
mind  that,  with  Mr.  Spencer,  the  unknowable  is  one 
and  identical,  though  there  is  nowhere  any  proof  of 
this  unity.  For  any  argument  he  offers,  there  might 
be  an  infinite  number  of  unknowables,  all  quantita- 
tively and  qualitatively  different.  His  position,  then, 
is  that  the  limited  nature  of  our  faculties  utterly  pro- 
hibits us  from  reaching  the  unknowable  on  its  relig- 
ious side,  while  we  are  entirely  competent  to  deal 
with  it  on  its  scientific  side.  The  truth  is,  that  the 
unknowable  is  simply  formless,  indeterminate,  dead 
substance,  which  obeys  only  mechanical  laws,  and 
has  no  religious  side.  Mr.  Spencer,  however,  does 
not  admit  this,  and  confuses  both  himself  and  his 
readers  with  logical  jugglery  and  thimble-rigging 
over  the  absolute,  the  infinite,  the  unconditioned,  the 
first  cause,  etc.  The  following  conclusions  emerge 
at  the  end  of  the  show  : 

Religion  is  impossible,  because  it  involves  unthink- 
able ideas ; 

Science  is  possible,  though  it  involves  the  same 
unthinkable  ideas. 

God  must  be  conceived  as  self-existent,  and  is, 
therefore,  an  untenable  hypothesis  ; 

The  fundamental  reality  must  be  conceived  as  self- 
existent,  and  is  not  an  untenable  hypothesis. 


272  Review  of*  Herbert  Spencer. 

God  must  be  conceived  as  eternal ;  and  is,  hence, 
an  untenable  hypothesis  ; 

The  fundamental  reality  must  also  be  conceived  as 
eternal,  and  is  not  an  untenable  hypothesis. 

To  affirm  the  eternity  of  God,  would  land  us  in  in- 
soluble contradictions  ; 

To  affirm  the  eternity  of  matter  and  force,  is  the 
highest  necessity  of  our  thought. 

God  must  be  conceived  as  first  cause  and  absolute. 
But  these  conceptions  contradict  each  other — a  cause 
cannot  be  absolute,  since  it  stands  in  relation  to  its 
effect ;  the  absolute  cannot  be  cause,  since  cause  im- 
plies relation. 

Yet  the  only  absolute  we  know  is  known  as  first 
cause,  is  known  in  causal  relation  to  the  universe. 
All  other  absolutes  are  metaphysical  impostors,  and 
the  alleged  difficulty  vanishes. 

God  must  also  be  conceived  as  infinite.  "He  must 
contain  all  power  and  transcend  all  law,"  and  "can- 
not be  distinguished  from  the  finite  by  the  absence 
of  any  quality  which  the  finite  possesses. 

God  possesses  all  power,  but  cannot  reveal  himself. 

God,  though  possessing  all  that  the  finite  does,  has 
no  knowledge,  no  consciousness,  no  intelligence,  no 
personality. 

Our  highest  wisdom  is  to  recognize  the  mystery 
of  the  absolute,  and  abandon  the  "  carpenter  theory  " 
of  creation  for  the  higher  view,  that  "  evolution  is  a 
change  from  an  indefinite,  incoherent  homogeneity 


Review  of  Herbert  Spencer.  273 

to  a  definite,  coherent  heterogeneity,  through  con- 
tinuous differentiations  and  integrations." 

The  discussion  which  involves  all  these  harmonies 
is  fitly  called  the  "Laws  of  the  Unknowable  ;"  at  all 
events,  the  ways  of  this  logic  are  past  finding  out. 
Henceforth  the  unknowable  serves  as  a  kind  of 
prison-house  in  which  to  lock  up  all  troublesome 
questions  and  questioners,  and  the,  discussion  pro- 
ceeds to  the  "  Laws  of  the  Knowable." 

This  part  comprises  Mr.  Spencer's  attempt  to  get 
rid  of  the  "  carpenter  theory,"  by  showing  that  mat- 
ter and  force  are  able  to  turn  chaos  into  creation. 
He  first  provides  himself  with  a  homogeneous  nebula, 
and  then  lets  loose  upon  it  the  "  Instability  of  the 
Homogeneous,"  the  "  Multiplication  of  Effects,"  and 
the  "  Integration  of  Correspondences."  The  argu- 
ment, which  has  been  epitomized  already,  may  be  re 
stated  thus :  The  homogeneous  must  lapse  into  the 
heterogeneous,  that  is,  into  creation.  Three  such 
formidable  principles  as  those  just  mentioned,  must 
do  something.  The  absurdity  of  the  argument  has 
been  sufficiently  pointed  out  already ;  attention  may 
be  called,  however,  to  the  inner  contradiction  of  these 
creative  principles. 

This  instability  of  the  homogeneous  depends  en- 
tirely upon  the  fact  that  force  is  constantly  at  work 
producing  change.  But  such  force  is  as  powerful 
against  the  heterogeneous  as  against  the  homogene- 
ous ;  and  there  is  really  no  more  reason  for  erecting 

18 


274  Review  of  Herbert  Spencer. 

the  instability  of  the  homogeneous  into  a  principle 
than  for  erecting  the  instability  of  the  heterogeneous 
into  a  principle.  From  the  assumed  working  of 
force,  instability  in  general  must  result ;  and  no  gain 
or  advance  can  be  held.  All  things  must  flow,  and 
nothing  could  stand,  under  a  principle  like  this. 

Even  granting,  however,  that  the  principle  is  a  fact 
instead  of  a  shapeless  fancy,  all  organic  stability  at 
least,  would  be  impossible  under  its  operation.  For 
even  the  heterogeneous,  in  Mr.  Spencer's  view,  is  but 
j  a  collection  of  homogeneities  ;  the  heterogeneous  body 
is  an  aggregate  of  homogeneous  bone,  muscle,  nerve, 
etc. ;  and,  since  these  single  homogeneities  are  all 
subject  to  the  law,  they  must  all  proceed  to  differen- 
tiate and  fall  into  the  heterogeneous,  and  destroy 
the  organism.  The  "  Integration  of  Correspond- 
ences" is  a  contradiction  of  the  "Instability  of  the 
Homogeneous."  The  "Integration,"  etc.,  is  trying 
to  get  like  with  like,  that  is,  to  produce  the  homo- 
geneous. But  the  "  Instability,"  etc.,  resolutely  sets 
its  face  against  this  procedure ;  and  we  must  leave 
them  to  settle  the  matter  between  themselves.  I 
will  only  point  out  that,  whichever  wins,  the  other 
must  perish;  and,  if  either  perishes,  the  argument 
falls  to  the  ground.  But  because  this  folly  has  been 
put  into  ten-syllabled  words  it  has  passed  for  wis- 
dom. Polysyllabic  nonsense  has  usurped  even  the 
name  of  science. 

Bu%  looking  away  from  this  inner  contradiction, 


Review  of  Herbert  Spencer.  275 

why  are  not  all  homogeneities  unstable  ?  Take 
the  light-bearing  ether,  or  even  our  atmosphere ; 
and  how  long  would  it  take  to  develop  them  into 
any  thing  ?  They  are  homogeneous  enough  to  be 
unstable,  why  don't  they  make  something  out  of 
themselves  ?  Here  is  a  capital  chance  for  the  great 
principles  to  work ;  but  the  moment  the  sugges- 
tion is  made,  we  see  that  the  so-called  principles 
are  only  powerless  and  baseless  fancies.  It  might 
be  claimed,  however,  that  the  reason  for  non-develop- 
ment in  these  cases  is,  that  "correspondences"  are 
pretty  stoutly  "integrated."  In  truth  we  are  not 
dealing  with  science  at  all.  Mr.  Spencer  has  de- 
luded himself  with  a  mass  of  vague  and  empty  anal- 
ogies, and  has  actually  persuaded  himself  that  he  has 
proved  something.  His  cumbrous  and  inflated  ter- 
minology has  been  taken  for  science,  and  under  its 
cover  the  profoundest  trash  has  passed  for  deepest 
wisdom.  And  this  is  the  New  Philosophy !  This  is 
the  new,  the  scientific  book  of  Genesis  !  This  is  the 
luminous  reasoning  by  which  the  need  of  a  guiding 
mind  is  dispensed  with !  This  is  the  firm  scientific 
procedure  which  is  so  superior  to  the  "carpenter 
theory"  of  the  "  Hebrew  Myth."  Still,  until  the  new 
book  is  revised  and  corrected,  I  must  think  that  it 
requires  vastly  more  faith  than  the  old  one. 

This  reasoning  was  supplemented  by  the  powerful 
argument  that  mind  could  not  control  the  universe, 
and  we  must  therefore  adopt  the  more  rational  view, 


276  Review  of  Herbert  Spencer. 

that  chance  alone  is  competent  to  create  and  main- 
tain the  order  of  creation. 

We  next  passed  to  the  Principles  of  Psychology. 
Here  we  came  upon  the  crowning  absurdity,  and 
the  deepest  contradictions,  of  the  system.  Before 
Mr.  Spencer  could  claim  to  have  entered  the  psycho- 
logical territory  it  was  necessary  to  prove,  first,  that 
life  and  the  physical  forces  correlate ;  and,  second, 
that  mind  and  the  physical  forces  correlate.  Neither 
of  these  points  was  proved,  or  even  made  probable. 
To  offer,  as  the  explanation  of  a  thought,  a  mechani- 
cal motion  of  brain-molecules,  is  no  explanation  what- 
ever. The  question,  How  comes  it  that  a  vibrating 
nerve  becomes  or  produces  a  perception,  a  thought  ? 
was  slurred  over  by  calling  it  a  mystery — a  most 
convenient  method  of  escaping  difficulties.  The  in- 
genuity becomes  all  the  more  striking,  when  we 
remember  that  this  question  is  one  which  this  phi- 
losophy has  no  means  of  answering.  Once  over  the 
gulf  which  separates  life  and  mind  from  mechanically- 
acting  matter,  Mr.  Spencer  postulated  and  proved  the 
following  principles : 

A  unit  of  feeling,  and  a  unit  of  motion,  have  noth- 
ing whatever  in  common,  and  all  attempt  to  assim- 
ilate them  to  each  other,  but  renders  the  fact  more 
apparent. 

Though  they  have  nothing  in  common,  yet  are 
they  opposite  sides  of  the  same  thing. 

The  distinction  of  subject  and  object  is  one  which 


Review  of  Herbert  Spencer.  277 

transcends  consciousness  by  underlying  it ;  and  can 
by  no  effort  be  thought  away. 

For  all  that,  the  subject  is  only  a  modification  of 
the  organism ;  that  is,'  the  subject  disappears  in  the 
object. 

Mind  is  composed  of  units  of  feeling,  and  all  its 
powers  and  activities  are  modifications  of  primitive 
sensations.  To  think  is  to  feel.  How  we  can  ration- 
ally speak  of  feelings  when  there  is  no  subject  of  the 
feelings,  was  not  shown. 

Feelings  cluster  together  and  form  new  compounds 
— consciousness,  thought,  etc.  Why  feeling  should  do 
so,  why  a  dozen,  or  a  million  feelings  should  take  on 
any  new  character,  was  not  made  plain — the  ques- 
tion, as  being  a  disagreeable  one,  was  not  even  men- 
tioned. To  work  out  the  system,  we  must  assume 
that  feelings  can  become  conscious  of  themselves, 
and  think  about  themselves,  and  compare  themselves 
with  one  another ;  and  surely  the  needs  of  the  sys- 
tem are  reason  enough  for  any  one  who  has  not  "  an 
overwhelming  bias  in  favor  of" — sound  logic. 

There  is  a  nerve-vesicle  in  the  brain  which  repre- 
sents every  past  experience ;  and  all  memory,  etc.,  is 
but  a  re-excitation  of  those  vesicles.  A  perception 
of  relation  is  due  to  the  fact  that  the  related  ideas 
are  connected  by  nerve-fibers.  These  statements 
can  only  be  received  by  faith.  This  wisdom  is  only 
justified  of  its  children. 

The  association  of  ideas  is  the  "  Integration  of  Cor- 


278  Review  of  Herbert  Spencer. 

respondences " — which  relieves  the  question  of  all 
difficulty. 

The  test  of  truth  is  thought-necessity.  What  we 
must  think  as  real  is  real. 

Thought-necessity  is  only  the  result  of  habit ; 
hence,  thought-necessity  represents  no  objective  fact, 
but  only  a  subjective  delusion  produced  by  inveter- 
ate association. 

The  test  is  applied  in  the  following  instructive 
fashion  : 

We  cannot  help  thinking  that  we  are  causes  of 
our  own  actions,  that  we  are  capable  of  spontaneous 
activity. 

Though  a  thought-necessity  compels  us  to  think 
so,  this  thought-necessity  deceives  us. 

We  are  also  forced  to  believe  in  the  reality  and 
identity  of  self;  but  this  thought-necessity  is  a  false 
witness. 

In  short,  all  the  thought-necessities  are  vile  de- 
ceivers except  the  one  which  supports  Mr.  Spencer. 
The  belief  in  an  external  world  he  graciously  accepts, 
upon  the  warrant  of  a  thought-necessity.  All  others 
are  spurned  from  his  presence  with  contempt  and 
indignation. 

The  ground  for  this  distinction  between  the 
thought-necessities  lies  in  the  sore  needs  of  Mr. 
Spencer's  system.  These  serve  as  a  supreme  logical 
category,  the  genuine  philosopher's  stone  for  dis- 
tinguishing the  false  and  the  true.  Its  discovery 


Review  of  Herbert  Spencer.  279 

certainly  entitles  Mr.  Spencer  to  rank  with  the  great 
creative  logicians  of  the  past.  The  invention  of  a  new 
method  in  logic  or  philosophy  is  the  highest,  the 
supreme  mark  of  genius. 

But  inasmuch  as  thought-necessities  express  only 
the  result  of  habit,  their  claim  to  represent  reality  is 
utterly  without  foundation.  The  logical  laws  them- 
selves become  untrustworthy,  the  principle  of  causation 
has  no  assured  validity ;  and,  as  the  necessary  result, 
science  and  knowledge,  the  internal  world  and  the 
external  world,  disappear  into  the  void  of  a  bottom- 
less and  boundless  nihilism.  All  this  follows  neces- 
sarily from  the  attempt  to  lead  all  our  mental  opera- 
tions back  to  experience.  A  closer  examination, 
however,  reveals  the  fact  that  experience  itself  is  im- 
possible without  the  presence  of  the  very  powers 
which  it  is  supposed  to  create.  Out  of  sensation,  as 
such,  nothing  can  come.  Unless  there  be  a  power 
which  imposes  law  upon  it,  it  must  remain  a  mean- 
ingless chaos  forever.  The  science  of  the  doctrine 
is  complete.  If  true,  both  knowledge  and  experience 
are  impossible. 

Again,  though  the  mind  is  the  product  of  organ- 
ization, and  has  no  existence  apart  from  the  organism, 
my  system  is  not  materialistic.  It  teaches  "  a  grand 
progress  which  is  bearing  humanity  onward  to  a 
higher  intelligence  and  a  nobler  destiny."  It  in  no- 
wise diminishes  the  beauty  of  this  "  grand  progress  " 
to  know  that  it  ends  in  annihilation. 


280  Review  of  Herbert  Spencer. 

Finally,  after  having  examined  these  astonishing 
acrobatic  feats  of  logic,  and  having  duly  recorded  our 
admiration  of  them,  we  saw  that  the  very  terms  of 
the  incantation  were  secret  traitors.  Upon  a  closer 
examination  into  scientific  teaching  we  found  that 
mechanical  forces  (if  there  be  such)  are  utterly  help- 
less without  the  postulate  of  an  ever-ruling,  ever- 
active,  spiritual  power.  The  atomic  bottom  fell  out 
of  the  atheistic  argument,  and  left  science  no  alterna- 
tive except  positivism  or  theism.  The  great  medi- 
cine-man's charm,  when  brought  into  the  daylight 
and  examined,  lost  its  magic  power  ;  and  when  prop- 
erly disinfected  proved  entirely  harmless.  As  long 
as  it  was  shrouded  in  the  mystery  of  the  unknowable, 
the  confused  noises  which  saluted  the  ears  of  awe- 
struck listeners  passed  for  the  awful  flapping  of  some 
dragon's  dreadful  wings  ;  but  as  soon  as  it  was  sum- 
moned to  give  an  account  of  itself  at  the  bar  of  logic, 
it  folded  its  tents  after  the  high  and  far-famed  Arabian 
fashion,  and  failed  to  put  in  an  appearance. 

There  is  no  need  to  delay  the  verdict  longer.  I 
cannot  agree  with  the  popular  estimate  of  Mr.  Spencer. 
Though  this  system  has  been  lauded  to  the  skies  as 
one  cf  the  greatest  products  of  philosophical  thought, 
T  must  say,  on  the  contrary,  that  its  principles  are  a 
miracle  of  confusion  and  absurdity.  Comprehensive 
as  is  Mr.  Spencer's  scientific  knowledge,  he  seems 
utterly  unable  to  take  a  comprehensive  view  of  the 
logical  relations  of  a  system.  The  most  palpable 


Review  of  Herbert  Spencer.  281 

contradictions  nestle  side  by  side  in  the  most  friendly 
fashion,  constituting  a  kind  of  logical  "  happy  family." 
Yes  and  no  lay  aside  their  ancient  enmity,  contra- 
dictions swear  eternal  friendship,  and  the  true  logical 
millennium  is  ushered  in.  Mr.  Spencer  has  picked 
up  the  loose  and  ill-defined  notions  of  popular  science 
and  popular  metaphysics,  and  without  stopping  to 
analyze  their  content,  to  say  nothing  of  comparing 
them,  he  has  proceeded  to  build,  and  the  result  is 
before  us.  A  very  little  consideration  would  have  suf- 
ficed to  show  that  his  psychology  is  fatal  to  rational 
science.  A  thoughtful  criticism  would  have  revealed 
the  contradiction  of  his  creative  principles.  One 
single,  steady  gaze  into  the  fog  of  his  argument 
would  have  shown  the  absence  of  every  thing  but  im- 
agination. But  the  mania  of  system-building  proves 
too  strong  for  rational  judgment,  and  the  system  bears 
abundant  marks  of  having  originated  in  a  mania. 

If  it  were  not  that  the  history  of  philosophy 
abounds  in  similar  absurdities,  it  would  be  impossible 
to  believe  that  Mr.  Spencer  is  serious.  The  grandeur 
which  is  claimed  for  his  system  is  entirely  due  to 
the  factors  with  which  it  deals.  Any  discussion  of 
solar  systems,  of  infinite  space,  time,  and  power, 
necessarily  has  an  air  of  vastness  about  it  which 
proves  attractive.  Mr.  Spencer  has  painted  a  big 
picture  with  a  big  brush,  and  the  popular  imagina- 
tion, which  finds  it  easier  to  wonder  than  to  under- 
stand, will  have  it  that  he  must  be  a  great  painter. 


282  Review  of  Herbert  Spencer. 

Upon  a  sober  survey  it  cannot  be  claimed  that  he 
has  added  much  to  our  stock  of  knowledge.  The 
associational  doctrine  has  been  expounded  with  far 
greater  lucidity  and  far  better  logic.  The  same  is 
true  of  cerebral  psychology,  while  the  gist  of  his  ar- 
gument in  general  is  identical  with  that  of  Lucretius. 
He  has  merely  combined  facts  which  we  knew  before 
into  a  huge,  fantastic,  contradictory  system,  which 
hides  its  nakedness  and  emptiness,  partly  under  the 
vail  of  an  imposing  terminology,  and  partly  in  the 
primeval  fog.  The  doctrine  began  in  a  fog,  and 
never  succeeded  in  getting  out  of  it.  An  ambitious 
attempt,  and  a  dismal  failure,  is  our  deliberate  verdict 
upon  the  so-called  New  Philosophy.  There  are,  to 
be  sure,  many  ingenious  and  profound  remarks  scat- 
tered through  Mr.  Spencer's  books.  There  are,  too, 
faint  glimpses  of  many  of  the  deepest  truths  of  psy- 
chology, but  there  is  an  utter  failure  to  appreciate 
their  meaning.  Philosophy  is  not  to  be  estimated 
by  its  epigrams  and  profound  remarks,  but  by  its 
underlying  principles ;  and  applying  this  rule  of  criti- 
cism to  this  system,  I  reiterate  my  verdict.  Apo- 
thegms and  proverbs  serve  for  quotation,  but  they 
are  not  philosophy. 

Science  has  fallen  upon  evil  days.  Every  depart- 
ment is  flooded  with  assertions  which  can  never  be 
put  to  a  test,  and  upon  the  strength  of  propositions, 
which  are  amenable  to  neither  proof  nor  intuition, 
the  most  extravagant  theories  are  built  up.  In  many 


Review  of  Herbert  Spencer.  283 

quarters,  especially  in  biology  and  physiology,  science 
has  degenerated  altogether  from,  that  severe  adher- 
ence to  ascertained  fact,  which  has  won  for  it  its  pres- 
ent distinction.  Contradiction  and  absurdity  go  for 
nothing  so  long  as  they  fall  in  with  prevailing  tenden- 
cies. But  that  such  a  work  as  the  one  in  hand,  should 
pass,  at  once  for  the  profoundest  philosophy  and  the 
most  assured  science,  is  discouraging  to  the  last  de- 
gree. It  is  extremely  fashionable — the  false  is  apt  to 
be  fashionable — to  decry  metaphysics  as  a  useless 
study;  but  a  small  amount  of  logical  culture  and 
metaphysical  knowledge  would  render  such  systems 
as  this  impossible,  or  at  least  harmless.  I  have  not 
much  expectation  of  a  speedy  revival  of  metaphysical 
study,  still  I  do  hope  that  intellectual  buffoonery 
may  not  always  pass  for  profound  wisdom,  even  if  it 
does  call  itself  science. 


THE  END. 


UNIVERSITY  OF   CALIFORNIA 


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